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 This study explores the influence of Montesquieu, Rousseau and Pascal on 
Tocqueville’s religious teaching to show that it has two components: (a) to provide for 
order in the disordered democratic state and (b) to satisfy a primordial human need for 
the eternal.  The analysis follows Tocqueville’s own method of contrast and analogy to 
show how the harmonious combination of the teaching of the enlightenment with religion 
in America on the one hand and their discordant linking in France on the other produced 
opposite consequences for liberty.    
The study examines why Tocqueville insists that the mutual dependence of 
religion and liberty is more necessary in democracy than in aristocracy.  Second, it 
demonstrates how Montesquieu’s teaching helps Tocqueville to explain the American 
religious phenomenon, which combines an equal fervor for material well-being with 
systematic piety.  Third, it explores how Tocqueville modifies Rousseau’s teaching on 
opinion to promote religion as the appropriate source of moral authority in democracy.  
Fourth, it uncovers how Tocqueville combines selected elements of Rousseau’s natural 
religion with Montesquieu’s concept of virtue as enlightened interest and the moralistic 
language of Pascal to encourage religious habits that conform to the inclinations of the 
 
democratic intellect and sentiment.  Finally, it explores how Tocqueville’s teaching can 
help thoughtful Americans deliberate about the moral issues that confront the U.S. today.  
 
Tocqueville’s teaching draws attention to the precarious position of liberty in 
egalitarian societies where the instinct for individual independence causes human beings 
to become amoral and apolitical.  Equality induces them to become totally absorbed with 
the pursuit of material well-being and thus to direct all personal intellectual resources 
toward that goal, making common opinion the sole guide of reason in all other matters.  
Moreover, since laws usually reflect changing opinions Tocqueville affirms that religion  
-- the only fixed point around which human beings can orient themselves—must be used 
to sustain liberty by making it the foundation of public opinion.  
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Statement of Purpose 
This study argues that Alexis de Tocqueville’s view of religion, as it is articulated 
in his theory of democracy, combines the teachings of Rousseau, Pascal, and 
Montesquieu, with all of whom by his own admission he spends some time each day. 
“There are three men with whom I spend a little time each day; they are Pascal, 
Montesquieu and Rousseau.”1 These daily tête à têtes with men of disparate views on 
religion are undertaken by Tocqueville evidently for the purpose of finding an 
intersection of ethical ideas capable of providing a moral anchor to man to meet the 
challenges he faces in modern democracy.2  
This study also argues that Tocqueville’s aristocratic and Catholic education plays 
a role in his penetrating understanding of the important place he insists religion ought to 
occupy in democratic society.  However, it places greater emphasis on disentangling the 
intellectual influence of Pascal, Rousseau and Montesquieu on Tocqueville’s religious 
teaching.  The lessons Tocqueville learns from them about the human condition, human 
nature and the generative principles of political regimes respectively provide an essential 
backdrop for understanding the nuances in his teaching on religion and morality.   
A review of the scholarly literature interpreting Tocqueville’s works reveals that 
most scholars, including inter alia, Jean-Claude Lamberti, Marvin Zetterbaum, John 
Koritansky, Doris Goldstein and Sanford Kessler, have noted almost exclusively 
Rousseau’s and/or Montesquieu’s contributions to his scholarship.  The only exceptions 
to this general rule are the analysis of Peter Augustine Lawler and that of Pierre Manent, 
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which emphasize his debt to Pascal.  This tendency of scholars to focus on the influence 
of one or the other of these three thinkers, who have irreconcilable views on religion, 
leaves all previous interpretations of Tocqueville’s teaching on religion wanting in 
completeness. It is noteworthy, however, that in the introduction to his translation of 
Democracy in America, Harvey Mansfield maintains like the present study that all three 
men influence Tocqueville’s democratic theory. This study hopefully complements and 
improves upon Mansfield’s cursory view of their contribution to the substance of 
Tocqueville’s political thought.   
In taking a comprehensive approach to the various elements that influence 
Tocqueville’s religious teaching this study hopes to show that it is two-dimensional.  In 
the first place it is concerned with establishing moral order in democratic society and in 
the second it appeals to a primordial human need for the eternal, which Tocqueville felt 
acutely enough to believe that it is a sentiment he shares with all human beings.    
Tocqueville has the rare distinction of being among a few of his contemporaries 
to recognize that if the new age of equality opened unlimited horizons to the possibility 
of human perfectibility, it also produces a fertile ground for the darker side of human 
nature to flourish.  He sees that equality does not necessarily lead to liberty and that in 
fact it has the potential to degenerate into a tyranny not yet seen in the history of the 
world, which if not checked will completely destroy human dignity.  His observations of 
American democracy elucidate for him the possibility of amalgamating the diverse 
principles he extracts from his conversations with his three teachers.  By combining 
empirical evidence with theory he is able to carve a coherent moral political philosophy 
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that conforms to the complexity of modern democratic life to  lead democratic man to 
liberty.  
Tocqueville’s optimism about human possibilities far exceeds Rousseau’s 
expectations for men in society while his temperate approach to religion falls short of 
Pascal’s orthodoxy.  Yet, strong echoes of Rousseau and Pascal permeate his teaching on 
religion and morality.  In Tocqueville’s moral doctrine Pascal’s religion offers man a way 
in which to emancipate himself from the progressive degeneration wherein Rousseau sees 
him succumbing.  This accommodation is no doubt the result of Tocqueville’s efforts to 
liberate French society from the entrapments and vices of the bourgeois culture enslaving 
it during the monarchy of Louis-Philippe (1830-1848). Tocqueville’s moral doctrine 
finds an intermediate position between Pascal’s rigorous faith and Rousseau’s 
pedagogical method to stem the social corruption that was engulfing the French nation.3  
This compromise explains the resulting ambivalence in Tocqueville’s religious teaching, 
which also draws its orientation from Montesquieu to whom he is indebted for his 
conviction that religion can function as a political institution whose benefit is 
demonstrated by the American democratic experience.  In sum, in viewing Tocqueville’s 
religious doctrine through the prism of Pascal, Rousseau, and Montesquieu this study 
shows that it is an odd blend of two distinct mutually reinforcing components:  it 
addresses a political need at the same time that it confirms the individual’s longing for 
God, a longing whose fulfillment he believes is integral to the achievement of human 
liberty and human capacity for greatness.        
Tocqueville borrows from Montesquieu and Rousseau the general philosophical 
concepts of the enlightenment. From them he learns the role of religion in providing man 
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an internalized sense of duty and the experience of extreme self-consciousness brought 
about by historical progress respectively.  He learns from Pascal the core of the human 
condition and the tension between the “angel and the brute”4 that resides in man’s soul, 
and this knowledge allows him to construct a political theory that seeks to restrain the 
beast unleashed by democracy’s “potentially unlimited horizon.”5 This amalgam in 
Tocqueville’s political thought leaves the impression that it may be possible to reconcile 
the natural antagonism between philosophy and religion.  In any case during his visit to 
America, Tocqueville notes the harmony that exists between religious beliefs and the 
application of the philosophical method of the enlightenment among the Americans and  
finds this to be a good thing. 
In order to achieve its stated objective, this study follows Tocqueville’s own 
method of contrast and analogy to show how the “American syncretism of faith and 
reason and their French antagonism”6 had opposite consequences for democratic liberty.  
The purpose of this comparison is threefold.  First, it confirms the reciprocal relationship 
Tocqueville finds to exist among religion, morality and liberty.  Second, it shows that the 
instability of the modern democratic state creates by necessity the dependence of liberty 
on religion.  Such dependence was not as essential to the aristocratic social state wherein 
tradition and order prevailed.  Third, it establishes that the ideals of the enlightenment, 
which are premised on the teachings of Christianity, cannot on their own provide man a 
substantive basis to meet the singular challenges of the modern democratic state; he also 
needs the support of religious beliefs to sustain him through them.  
Tocqueville’s admiration for the ideas propagated by the enlightenment “at least, 
the correct, reasonable, applicable portion of those ideas, which, after all, are my own”7 
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did not prevent him from recognizing that their failure to fulfill the vast hopes they had 
inspired produced the “great malady”8 of the nineteenth century.  This malady which 
manifested itself in the immense spiritual lassitude of French society could only be 
counterpoised by a return to traditional beliefs.  He found that religion provides the most 
powerful force to mitigate “the last century’s exaggerated and rather puerile confidence 
in the power that man exercises over himself and in that of peoples over their own 
destiny.”9  His observations about modern democracy were illuminated by these 
convictions, which were inspired by lessons he learned from Pascal, Rousseau, and  
Montesquieu.  
In sum, this study has two main objectives.  First, it seeks to elucidate that 
Tocqueville’s keen interest in religion is prompted by his belief that there is an 
irreducible link between morality and liberty that makes religion more useful to 
egalitarian than other societies.  Second, it seeks to demonstrate that his view of religion 
as it is articulated in his theory of democracy is filtered not only through the prism of his 
aristocratic lineage and the teachings of the enlightenment but also through Pascal’s 
understanding of the human condition less his Jansenist10 ideas, which maintain that the 
city of man is vulnerable as long as it is not united with the City of God.   
 
The present chapter seeks to situate the context in which Tocqueville’s religious 
doctrine evolved and to trace its development by analyzing the structure of Democracy in 
America. Chapter Two outlines the considerations and constitutive elements that 
underpin Tocqueville’s teaching on religion to sketch the connection that exists for him 
between religion and liberty.  It contrasts his view of aristocratic and democratic liberty 
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to determine why his perspective assumes that liberty in aristocracy is less dependent on 
religion for its sustenance.  This standpoint leaves open the question whether his 
Pascalian outlook of man’s religious longings relates to man qua man or to man in a 
particular political regime, viz., democracy.  Nevertheless, because Tocqueville’s 
exhortation is directed at democracy and because it relies less on the orthodox teaching of 
Pascal than the alluring capacity of its language to engage man to think about his future, 
his influence will be examined along that of Rousseau and Montesquieu in chapter five.    
Chapter Three focuses on Tocqueville’s debt to Montesquieu by examining the 
status of religion in American democracy.  Its objective is to determine whether it is 
religion per se that helps to maintain the equilibrium between equality and liberty in 
America or an amalgam of moral habits generated by America’s Puritan tradition and 
practical reason.  
Chapter Four explores the influence of opinions on beliefs to show that 
Tocqueville is particularly indebted to Rousseau, whose perspective of bourgeois society 
illuminates for him equality’s potential to direct the human passions toward opposite 
ends.  On the one hand it promotes compassion and on the other it fosters a subjection to 
materialism with deleterious effect for liberty. It shows that opinions in France, unlike 
those that govern American society, corrupted beliefs because French democracy 
originated in inequality and irreligion.   
Chapter Five analyses Tocqueville’s religious doctrine to show that it combines 
elements of Rousseau’s natural religion with Montesquieu’s concept of virtue as 
enlightened interest and the moralistic language of Pascal, a mixture that enables him to 
accommodate democratic man’s intellectual habit and appeal at the same time to the 
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human longing for the otherworldly to counterbalance democratic materialism.  This 
mixture is less incongruous than it appears initially when it is considered that the 
doctrines of Rousseau’s natural religion are identical to Christianity’s principles of 
morality while Pascal’s apologia of Christianity was motivated to combat the libertinism 
of his time, an undertaking not unlike Tocqueville’s quest to infuse the materialistic 
values of bourgeois society with a measure of religious morality.  
In the second volume of Democracy in America Tocqueville appeals to the 
exercise of moral responsibility by man and woman that is the essence of Rousseau’s 
teaching and the human capacity for greatness and dignity so integral to Pascal’s teaching 
to argue for the benefits of religion on both a political and spiritual level under equality of 
conditions.  Would the course of French democracy have been altered simply by a strong 
religious base in the absence of the social equality that Tocqueville affirms is the 
generative fact of American democracy?  Chapter Five shows that despite the 
ambivalence that emerges from Tocqueville’s religious teaching, it nonetheless 
establishes incontestably the dependence of democratic liberty on a strong moral 
foundation that religion alone provides.  Finally, Chapter Six examines the way in which 
thoughtful Americans can use Tocqueville’s teaching to deliberate about the moral issues 
that confront the U.S. today. 
 
How to Account for the Ambivalence in Tocqueville’s Religious Doctrine 
As previously noted Tocqueville’s religious doctrine bears the imprint of his 
aristocratic lineage11 and Catholic upbringing12 as well as the influence of Rousseau, 
Pascal, and Montesquieu.  His indebtedness to the latter is more palpable in his analysis 
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of the way in which the general principles of government exercise tremendous influence 
on shaping the direction of societies than it is in the area of religion.13  Nevertheless, 
Tocqueville’s published works and correspondence14 both reveal a religious perspective 
that is filtered more or less through the prism of each of the foregoing elements.  For 
example his religious teaching incorporates each of the following: a tacit assumption that 
religion is far more necessary for guiding man to virtue in democratic than in aristocratic 
society; a belief that Christianity, particularly Catholicism, is more suitable to 
democracy; and an adherence to the deism espoused by Rousseau to Pascal’s 
understanding of the antagonistic dualism of human nature to Montesquieu’s view that 
religion is necessary to societies.  
Likewise, Tocqueville’s teaching tends to suggest two separate alternatives for 
establishing morality in society.  The first, which is based on the teachings of the 
enlightenment or more specifically the method taught by Montesquieu and Rousseau, 
affirms that proper education can lead to moral choice.  This view is reinforced by 
Tocqueville’s observations of American democracy where he notes that it is more the 
habit of religious practices than religious convictions per se that maintain moral order in 
society.  The second, which borrows the language of Pascal, maintains that human beings 
need religious authority to provide them the moral standards on which their ability to 
make proper use of his liberty depends.15  Tocqueville believes that this authority is all 
the more essential to democratic societies because democratic individualism enervates the 
human spirit. He teaches that a social community must be bound by common beliefs 
based on political and moral principles similar to the Americans’ beliefs in republicanism 
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and human perfectibility respectively, which have their foundations in their Puritan 
religious heritage, to combat the nefarious consequences of democratic individualism.16     
One way to account for Tocqueville’s ambivalent religious perspective is to 
recognize that his religious teaching is implicitly bifurcated along class lines.   
I confess that what I see here disposes me more than I ever was 
before to believing that what is called natural religion could suffice for the 
superior classes of society… By contrast, the people… will see in this 
natural religion only the absence of any belief in the afterlife and they will 
fall steadily into the single doctrine of self-interest.17   
In his view, deism -- similar to that professed by Rousseau -- adequately provides a moral 
compass for the elite while fulfilling at least intellectually a human longing for 
knowledge of God’s existence and the immortality of the soul.  But, the “bridle of 
religion”18 is needed to instill adequate moral conduct in the masses.  
Class considerations notwithstanding, Tocqueville’s underlying premise for 
establishing morality in democratic society relies on his unwavering conviction that man 
qua man derives great comfort in having a fixed idea about God and his own place in the 
order of creation.  He draws this conviction from personal introspection, which taught 
him that knowledge about God provides man a temporary refuge from the restlessness 
and inevitable sufferings of human existence.  For example, when Mary Motley, his 
future wife and the most important friend of his adult life, hesitated to consent to his 
marriage proposal in the summer of 1833, Tocqueville faced this painful disappointment 
by questioning whether any solace is to be found in the human condition.  Unfortunately, 
the letter in which he expresses his anguish is not extant.  We know by Louis de 
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Kergolay’s response and attempt to console him that Tocqueville must have shared his 
deep sorrow with his life long and intimate friend.   
I have thought myself so unhappy for such small things while you must be 
cruelly so at this time in such a profound matter.  What an idea to think 
that there is no remedy in pain than pain itself and the exhaustion that it 
causes!  I would like to see you have some sentiment that survives the 
state in which you find yourself; you speak to me of God; I have at time so 
regretted not to be a pious man, that this gave me then some spaces of time 
full of religion which is the only thing in the world which is strong enough 
to combat a violent sadness.  Our age which advances provides a glimpse 
of the term of this life, something one does not think about at twenty.  The 
frequent idea that we will die and will be reborn appeases alone the 
sadness of this life; these years that appear so cruel cease to be when 
contemplated in the context of the whole of existence.19   
In the course of his life long correspondence with his numerous friends  
Tocqueville maintains views similar to those Kergolay so eloquently expresses in the 
foregoing letter, viz.,  that religion alone provides solace to man.  This view underpins his 
thoughtful analysis of modern democratic societies which encapsulates the belief that 
social customs and traditions rooted in religion are particularly necessary to these 
societies to give man the moral resilience he needs to combat the bad inclinations of 
democratic equality. In fact, Tocqueville believes man’s proclivity for spiritual 
nourishment to be so strong, particularly in democratic societies for reasons that will be 
discussed later, that he affirms man succumbs eventually to pantheism if he is deprived of 
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religion for too long. Therefore, the task of the statesman and philosopher, which 
Tocqueville assumes as his life long goal, is to harness and channel appropriately man’s 
innate need of religion for the good of the democratic state.  
 
The Structure and Objective of Democracy in America  
 
As noted previously Tocqueville’s correspondence, which is invaluable insofar as 
it opens a window onto the religious convictions and moral principles that guided him, 
reveals also that his interest in America was spurred by his patriotic devotion to France.  
He wanted to understand the causes that pushed American democracy toward liberty and 
French democracy toward despotism. During his American journey he thought 
incessantly of France.  Writing to Louis de Kergolay from New York on June 29, 1831 he 
states:  “In the midst of all the theories with which I amuse my imagination here, the 
memory of France becomes a worm that consumes me.  It manages to surprise me by day 
in the midst of our work, by night when I wake up.”20  
   Tocqueville’s constant preoccupation with France brought him to relate 
everything he observed in America to France. The result is that Democracy in America is 
replete with the contrast between America and France and aristocracy and democracy. 
In my work on America, I almost always followed the second 
method [writing with a view to making people understand].  Although I 
very rarely spoke of France in my book, I did not write one page of it 
without thinking about her and without having her, so to speak, before my 
eyes.  And what above all I have sought to put in relief in relation to the 
United States and to have well understood, was less the complete picture 
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of that foreign society than its contrasts and resemblances to our own.  It is 
always either from opposition or from analogy with one that I set out to 
give a just and interesting idea of the other.  I tell you that not as example 
to follow but as a good item to know.  In my opinion, that continual 
reflection that I was making without saying so on France was one of the 
prime causes for the book’s success. 21  
The first comparison allows him to present to his targeted audience, the French nation,  
the institutional characteristics of an orderly democracy as they exist in America. The 
second, for its part, permits him to show the superiority of the aristocratic state over the 
democratic regime insofar as the former represents the embodiment of stability and order 
and the latter its opposites. With these contrasts Tocqueville shows that with the 
disappearance of the stratified aristocratic order that favored human greatness, religion 
offers the sole possibility to man to avoid succumbing to the downward moral spiral to 
which democratic mediocrity leads.  
Tocqueville published the first volume of Democracy in America in 1835, and his 
debt to Montesquieu is most obvious in this volume.  It focuses mainly on the 
institutional structure of American democracy and the causes for its success.  It concludes 
with a sober recognition that America cannot be imitated because the American situation 
is unique.  Unlike France, America has no anti-democratic history and is geographically 
boundless.  American society can enjoy the advantages of decentralization, local self-
government and a respect for property rights as a result of these fortunate circumstances.  
Moreover, the jealousies of democratic people, which are the outgrowth of equality and 
the problem of most democracies, is not so prevalent in America because from its 
 13
inception America cultivated the expression of sub-political passion through its numerous 
associations and institutions.  Thus, he leaves no doubt that he envisages a different kind 
of democracy for France whose circumstances and social conditions differ significantly 
from those of America. What America managed to achieve fortuitously, European 
statesmen will have to accomplish by art.  
Tocqueville published the second volume of Democracy in America in 1840, nine 
years after his visit to America.  In this volume, he sets for himself the task of defining 
the impact of the democratic regime on the character of its citizen.  When he was 
contemplating writing this volume, he faced the impossibility of finding an empirical 
example of a pure democratic type.  America was exceptional; England was a mixture of 
aristocracy and democracy; and France was revolutionary.  Yet, all three were 
representative of a type of democracy.  The result is that Tocqueville’s democratic 
prototype falls somewhere between the extremes of the liberal spirit that characterizes 
American democracy and the revolutionary spirit that typifies French democracy.  The 
second volume also enfolds a censure of democratic society that implicates France 
insofar as it is the antithesis of the spirit of order, association and religion that 
Tocqueville asserts in the first volume are the elements that maintain American 
democracy.   The influence of Pascal and Rousseau on his thought is most palpable in the 
second volume.  
Throughout Democracy in America, Tocqueville maintains that democracy is 
unstable because laws are constantly changing and people are in perpetual movement 
from one end of the social stratum to the other as their fortune rise and fall whereas 
everything is static and fixed in aristocracy.  He guides his analysis of democracy by 
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contrasting the evolution of political liberty among France, England and America.  He 
admired England’s system of representative government, which was evolving toward 
greater democracy while avoiding a revolutionary crisis thanks to the reforms of 183222 
and America’s ability to reconcile equality with the spirit of liberty and the spirit of 
religion. These comparisons allow him to elucidate the tension between liberty and 
equality and to demonstrate equality’s propensity to nurture an incomparable taste for 
well-being, which engenders a sort of despotism even in the best circumstances-- albeit a 
soft one. Together the two volumes constitute a warning to France and the rest of Europe 
about the inevitability of democracy and the many possibilities it embraces so that they 
can make provisions to avert its worst manifestations. 
In The Strange Liberalism of Alexis de Tocqueville, Roger Boesche argues that 
Tocqueville was faced with the great difficulty of writing about a subject that was still 
evolving in the nineteenth century and thus impossible to define accurately.  The 
movement toward democracy or leveling tendency, which filled his soul with a “religious 
terror,”23 appeared to Tocqueville to take many paths toward its end.  As for his 
contemporaries, the meaning they attached to democracy changed its aspect according to 
their political sympathies and affiliations.  Yet, Boesche argues that given that 
democratie was the key word in Democracy in America, it would seem that Tocqueville 
would have given it a precise meaning.  His failure to do so made him the spokesman for 
numerous antagonistic groups who saw in him all at once the political characteristics of a 
democrat, a legitimist, a republican, a conservative, a liberal, a socialist and so on.  
Tocqueville responded to the different political features attributed to him with intelligent 
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arguments formulated to show why he could not have alternatively the aristocratic or 
democratic prejudices his audience found in his work. 
However, this attempt by Tocqueville to demonstrate rationally the nature of his 
political instinct is contradicted by a more private assessment of his political standing, 
which is noted in a page of his diary entitled “My instinct, my opinions.”  He writes:   
Experience has taught me that most men, and surely myself, 
always come back in the end more or less to their fundamental instincts, 
and that they do well only those things that are compatible with their 
instincts.  Let me therefore consider in all sincerity what my fundamental 
instincts and earnest principles are.  For democratic institutions I have an 
intellectual preference, but I am by instinct an aristocrat, which is to say 
that I despise and fear the mob.  I passionately love liberty, legality, 
respect for rights, but not democracy.  That is my innermost feeling.  I 
hate demagoguery, the disordered action of the masses, their violent and 
unenlightened intervention in political matters, the envious passions of the 
lower classes, irreligious inclinations.  That is my innermost feeling.  I 
belong neither to the revolutionary party, nor to the conservative party.  
But, nevertheless and after all, I am more attached to the second than to 
the first.  For I differ from the second more by the means than by the end, 
while I differ from the first all at the same time by the means and the end.  
Liberty is the first of my passions. That is the plain truth.24  
If Tocqueville’s aristocratic instincts inclined him to accept democracy reluctantly 
and as a matter of necessity, it did not prevent him from judging it fairly and with 
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unbelievable foresight.  He explains his position to Kergolay in a letter in which he 
admits his recognition of the difficulty of founding a democratic government in France, 
adding that if he had the choice he would not attempt it.  Yet, he maintains that he refuses 
to believe that God has been pushing three hundred thousand men for several centuries 
toward equality of conditions for the simple pleasure of leading them to the despotism of 
a Tiberius or a Claudius.  While he ignores the reason for which God is pulling the world 
toward democracy, he expresses his position as follows. 
Embarked on a ship I did not build, I am looking for a way to use it 
to reach the nearest port.  Is it perilous to attempt such an enterprise?  
Show me something more perilous than to remain stationary and a path 
less dangerous to follow and I will admit that I am wrong.  In our days, the 
high society appears to me to be in the situation of a man who has a 
wound in his arm; gangrene has set in and is spreading.  It is no doubt very 
painful to have his arm amputated, the surgery could be fatal, but is it not 
better to risk living as an amputee than to die with one’s two arms?25  
These strong convictions compelled Tocqueville to approach his monumental 
work on democracy with great sincerity, honesty and an austere self-discipline that strove 
to repress as much as it is humanly possible any latent propensities that would be 
prejudicial to his self-imposed task to steer French democracy on a moral course.  He 
exhorts France’s statesman or legislator to make it his duty not only to direct and guide 
democracy on that course but also “to adapt its government to time and place; to modify 
it according to circumstances and men.”26 By the time Tocqueville published the second 
volume of Democracy in America, the “bourgeois”27 monarchy of King Louis-Philippe 
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had been in power for ten years and Tocqueville himself had served in the Chamber of 
Deputies for one year28 where he witnessed first-hand the vices of democratic equality.  
These realities no doubt made his pleas more urgent to French politicians to create a 
moral political environment in which man’s soul can be elevated toward the sublime. 
The second volume of Democracy in America is partly dedicated to the task of  
exhorting governments to put the dogma of the immortality of the soul in honor by acting 
“every day as if they believed in it; and [by] conforming scrupulously to religious 
morality in great affairs they can flatter themselves that they are teaching citizens to 
know it, love it and respect it in small ones.”29 This hortatory message reiterates the 
importance of keeping matters of religion and state separate.  Tocqueville became 
convinced during his American sojourn about the benefits of disengaging religion from 
politics, and he advocated that position in the political arena.  An apparent benefit of 
separating religion from politics is that in mixing its interests with those of this world, 
religion becomes almost as fragile as all the powers on earth.  Religion retains its 
legitimate authority only when it is not bound to ephemeral powers.  The Catholic 
Church had lost its empire over the souls of the French precisely because it was allied 
with the despotic power of the monarchy.  While the American paradigm could not be 
entirely replicated in France, it nonetheless provides a powerful example, which could be 
modified to France’s needs, since man’s spiritual longings are the same everywhere.   
This conviction forms the backdrop for the principles that guide the religious foundation 




                                                 
NOTES 
1 Letter to Louis de Kergolay, November 10, 1836, in Alexis de Tocqueville, Oeuvres 
complètes: correspondance d’Alexis de Tocqueville et de Louis de Kergolay, ed. J. P. 
Mayer, texte établi par André Jardin, intro. Jean-Alain Lesourd, (Paris: Gallimard, 1977), 
tome XIII, 418.  (Hereafter references to this work will appear as OC XIII).  Also see 
Jean-Claude Lamberti, Tocqueville and the Two Democracies, trans. Arthur Goldhammer 
(Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1989), 5.  
2 See Appendix B for my translation of an article published by Louis de Kergolay in 
April 1861 in Le Correspondant, a leading Paris newspaper, titled “Etude littéraire sur 
Alexis de Tocqueville.”   This article as its title suggests, had a different objective than the 
present study insofar as its author limits himself to the influence these three men had on 
Tocqueville’s style as opposed to the substance of his ideas.  Kergolay’s view is 
noteworthy inasmuch as among Tocqueville’s friends he was the one with whom 
Tocqueville was most intellectually aligned and whose advice Tocqueville sought 
consistently about his works on both substance as well as form, but more often on the 
latter.  The following exchange of letters between the two friends provides evidence of 
Tocqueville’s reliance on Kergolay’s intellectual advice for his great works.   
On January 6, 1838 Tocqueville writes to Kergolay that he needs to hold a discussion 
with him about the second volume of Democracy in America, which he was writing at the 
time.  He wanted Kergolay to help him sort out the issue of ambition in a social state in 
which equality of conditions prevail.  Tocqueville hypothesizes that in such a state 
ambition consists in the desire of people to change places, but great ambitions therein 
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diminish.  Nevertheless, he muses that if equality puts great ambitions within the grasp of 
less people, might it not also permit it to everyone.  Therefore, would it not follow that in 
the midst of this immense and perpetual agitation of ambition, it would be born 
necessarily by a fixed law a certain number of great ambitions?   
In his answer, February 2, 1838, Kergolay examines Tocqueville’s question by first 
establishing the meaning of democracy as it was understood in the 19th century.  He 
asserts that democracy is both a social and a political state.  The first is the social 
movement toward equality and the second is still difficult to assess insofar as its essential 
and fundamental constitution is not yet a reality.  Kergolay maintains that in the 
aristocratic state birth leads a man to great ambition; this condition is lacking to the 
democratic man who must first create a social position for himself before he can open for 
himself the door to a great ambition.  Thus, he concludes that in general democracy 
develops small, mediocre ambitions but it is too soon to form a judgment about its 
potentiality to develop great ones.   
The way in which Tocqueville settles this matter in the chapter titled “Why One Finds So 
Many Ambitious Men in the United States and So Few Great Ambitions” in volume 2 of 
Democracy in America closely parallels Kergolay’s analysis.    
Eighteen years later after his publication of L’Ancien régime Tocqueville has the 
following to say to Kergolay on his comments about his book.  In a letter, July 29, 1856, 
he states: “thus your judgment on it [my book] has charmed me… I was also very happy 
by your telling me that my style has become more natural…  
Here is what he has to say in a subsequent letter, August 28, 1856:  “Of all the 
correspondence which the publication of my book has occasioned between me and 
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friends and sometimes foreigners, correspondence which would already make a good 
volume, your letter is assuredly the most remarkable and the most useful.  I do not 
adequately know how to beg you not to leave your work imperfect, but on the contrary to 
give it the most development that you could give it.  You will do me the greatest service 
in acting this way.  For, pushed as I am by circumstances toward the literary life, I have 
more reasons than ever to make myself as eminent as possible.  I was surprised that you 
would have found in the first reading as many mistakes told as your first letter seemed to 
indicate… But this time your judgment aims much higher and reaches what one could 
call the substantial part of the style, that which escapes completely the vulgar judges and  
which all the talents of grammarians do not even hint at.  The part of your letter that 
treats this matter has particularly struck me.  I have always vaguely felt the existence of 
the problem you signal: this tendency to enclose all sorts of shades of ideas in the same 
sentence, such that while completing and laying out the idea, one enervates it and weaken 
the expression.  But never had this flaw been signaled more clearly to me by another; and 
in fact it is one of those which all readers feel the inconvenience, but which almost none 
has had the time or the eagerness to discover the cause.  It produces in most of them 
impressions but no distinct idea.  Not only, do you specify it; but what is even more 
precious to me, you make it leap to my eyes with deletions which lighten the phrase 
without obscuring it.  It is to do me a great service.  The more conclusive examples you 
will furnish me, the more you will succeed in curing me; for it is not the perception and 
the conviction of the problem that you signal, which I lack, as I was telling you a minute 
ago.  I know there is between my style and the style of great writers a certain obstacle 
that I must overcome to pass from the crowd into the ranks of these… What you are 
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doing [annotating the text] is important enough to me to wait for you to take the time 
necessary for your work.   See OC XIII, 13, 17-18 & 308-309 respectively and 352-365 
for Kergolay’s article reproduced in Appendix A of this study. 
3 I am indebted to Peter Augustine Lawler whose analysis of Tocqueville’s view of 
human liberty in The Restless Mind (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
Inc., 1993) helped me confirm my own thesis that Tocqueville’s teaching on religion 
relies heavily on the lessons he learned from Pascal and Rousseau about the human 
condition.     
4 Tocqueville uses the language of Pascal to differentiate man from beast.  The first is 
dependent upon his soul to elevate himself above the needs of the body whereas the latter 
is guided only by his instincts.  For this reason it behooves man to make his soul great 
and strong so that its greatness can be put in the service of the body to tame its instincts.  
It is in this vein that he asserts “in men, the angel teaches the brute the art of satisfying 
itself.” Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. & ed. Harvey C. Mansfield 
& Delba Winthrop, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2000), vol. 2, pt. 
2, chap. 16 (henceforth designated as II, 2, 16), 521.  Also see Alexis de Tocqueville, De 
la démocratie en Amérique, Oeuvres II , Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, ed. André Jardin 
with Jean-Claude Lamberti and James T. Schleifer, (Paris: editions Gallimard, 1992), II, 
2,16, 661.  (Henceforth references to this work will appear as DA for both the English 
translation and the French text with the page of the English translation appearing before 
that of the French text and the two separated by a slash, e.g., DA, II, 2, 16, 521/661).   
Pascal asserted that “man is neither angel or beast, and misfortune wants that he who 
wants to  make the angel make [instead] the beast,” Blaise Pascal, Pensées,  Texte de 
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l’édition Brunschvicg, intro. & notes Ch.-M. des Granges, (Paris: editions Garnier Freres, 
1964), no. 358, 164.  
Peter Lawler takes a similar position by arguing that Tocqueville’s “psychology borrows 
Pascal’s definition of the incomprehensible mixture” of man’s true state, which hovers 
between “certain knowledge” and “absolute ignorance,” ergo, it is “neither angel nor 
brute.” Peter Augustine Lawler, The Restless Mind, 80-81.  
5 This expression is borrowed from Matthew Mancini, Alexis de Tocqueville, (New 
York: Twayne Publishers, 1994), 51. 
6 This expression is borrowed from Françoise Mélonio, Tocqueville and the French , 
trans. Beth G. Raps, (Charlottesville and London: University Press of Virginia, 1998), 64. 
7 Letter to Gustave de Beaumont, April 24, 1856, in Alexis de Tocqueville, Oeuvres 
complètes, correspondance d’Alexis de Tocqueville et de Gustave de Beaumont, ed. J. P. 
Mayer, texte établi et préfacé par André Jardin, (Paris: Gallimard, 1967), tome VIII, vol. 
3, 395.  (Hereafter references to this work will appear as OC VIII)  See also Alexis de 
Tocqueville, Selected letters on Politics and Society, ed. Roger Boesche, trans. James 
Toupin and Roger Boesche, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1985), 330.  
8 Letter to Arthur de Gobineau, December 20, 1853, in Alexis de Tocqueville, Oeuvres 
complètes, correspondance d’Alexis de Tocqueville et d’Arthur de Gobineau, 6ème 
édition, ed. J. P. Mayer, texte établi et annoté par M. Degros, intro. J. J. Chevalier, (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1959), tome IX, 205.  (Hereafter references to this work will appear as OC 
IX).  See also Tocqueville, Selected letters, 303. 
9 Ibid., 205 and Selected Letters, 303. 
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10 Jansenist was the name given to the followers of Cornelius Jansenius by their Jesuit 
enemies at the beginning of their quarrel in the middle of the seventeenth century over 
the interpretation of the canonical texts, in particular Paul’s letter to the Romans: do we 
human creatures contribute in any way to our salvation and, if so, in what way?  The 
Jesuits accused the Jansenists of being tainted with the horrors of the heresy found in 
Calvin’s theory of predestination, which is not unlike that of Augustine, viz., that “human 
creatures after the Fall can perform no morally good act unaided; for every such act need 
the infusion of grace which is given to some and refused to others by the sheer wish of 
God, and not because some are more deserving of grace than others.”  Jansenius’ 
followers refuted their detractors by calling themselves disciples of Augustine whose 
authority had been unshakable in Christianity.  In fact, the Catholic Church codified his 
teaching in the Augustinian theology.   “Augustine not only codified the orthodox 
doctrine of original sin and divine grace but to a large extent created it…  By the sheer 
fact of being Adam’s descendents, [man] contracted his actual sin, and not only the 
propensity to sin…thus suggesting that Adam was a kind of universal, and that we are not 
simply his offspring, but in moral terms, his replicas, that we participate actively in his 
guilt.”  Leszek Kolakowski, God Owes Us Nothing, A Brief Remark on Pascal’s Religion 
and on the Spirit of Jansenism, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 
1995), 13 and 32.  
It is unlikely that Tocqueville accepted the Augustinian-Jansenist orthodox teaching on 
grace since it denies man the free-will that allows him to achieve indefinite perfectibility.  
In fact, it is probably such Catholic dogma that caused him to question his faith once he 
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discovered the teachings of the enlightenment.  The affinity between Tocqueville and 
Pascal lies in their self-imposed duty to combat irreligion in their respective time.  
Kolakowski states that “Pascal was responding to the Cartesian-libertine mentality that 
robbed the world of purpose, meaning, and life.  He defended Christianity from a position 
which, he knew, could not be reinforced by appeals to scholastic rationalism (he would, 
perhaps, reluctantly have accepted Heidegger’s belief that philosophy is by nature a-
theistic, that is alien to the problem of God, at least in the sense that it is helpless in the 
search for the real God who matters).   A scientist, he saw the world, like his 
contemporaries and unlike Renaissance naturalists, as a machine or as an indifferent dead 
mass, and he opposed the unshakable faith of the elect to the religious indifference of the 
enlightened and to the seeming bravery of God-killers.  Behind the veil of the optimistic 
worship of Reason he disclosed the unacknowledged fear and self-deception of people 
who avoid the real issues of life.  He assimilated the new science and greatly contributed 
to it, but he fought against the Enlightenment of his age, which, in his eyes, produced 
despair in disguise.” Ibid., 188. 
These sentiments certainly echo Tocqueville’s own anxiety about irreligion and a general 
tendency in France to espouse materialistic doctrines.  While Tocqueville is certainly not 
anti-enlightenment, he, nonetheless, condemns the doctrines of the French  philosophes 
of the eighteenth century for spreading universal discredit of all religious beliefs.  Alexis 
de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the Revolution, ed. with an introduction and critical 
apparatus by François Furet and Françoise Mélonio, trans. Alan S. Kahan, (Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), I, 2, 96.  Also see Alexis de 
Tocqueville, L’Ancien régime et la révolution, Oeuvres complètes, ed. J. P. Mayer, intro. 
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Georges Lefèbvre, (Paris: Gallimard, 1952), I, 2, 83-84.  (Henceforth all references to 
this work will appear as OR for the English translation and AR for the French text as 
follows OR/AR with the pages to the corresponding texts separated also by a slash, e.g., 
OR/AR, I, 2, 96/83-84).    
11 Publicly Tocqueville disavowed any preference for aristocracy or democracy.  In a 
letter, March 22, 1837, to his friend and English translator of his published works, Henry 
Reeve, he states: “it delights me to see the different features that are given to me 
according to the political passions of the person who cites me. ..To the present day, I have 
not yet found one of them that completely looked like me. ..They alternately give me 
democratic or aristocratic prejudices; I perhaps would have had one set of prejudices or 
the other, if I had been born in another century and in another country.  But the chance of 
birth has made me very comfortable defending both…Aristocracy was already dead when 
I started life and democracy did not yet exist, so my instinct could lead me blindly neither 
toward one nor toward the other…Belonging to the old aristocracy of my homeland, I 
had neither hatred nor natural jealousy against the aristocracy, and that aristocracy being 
destroyed, I did not have any natural love for it either, since one only attaches oneself to 
what is living.  I was near enough to it to know it well, far enough away to judge it 
without passion.  I would say as much about the democratic element.” Alexis de 
Tocqueville, Oeuvres complètes, correspondance anglaise, correspondance d’Alexis de 
Tocqueville avec Henry Reeve et John Stuart Mill, 5ème édition, ed. J. P. Mayer, texte 
établi et annoté par J. P. Mayer et Gustave Rudier, intro. J. P. Mayer, (Paris: Gallimard, 
1954), tome VI, 37-38.  (Hereafter references to this work will be shown as OC VI)  See 
also Tocqueville, Selected letters, 115-116 
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12 Tocqueville’s Catholic beliefs were influenced by the Jansenist doctrines professed by 
his tutor, the Abbé Lesueur.  Tocqueville’s beloved Bébé, his nickname for his tutor, 
served his family in this capacity for fifty-one years.  He had been chosen in 1780 by 
Tocqueville’s pious paternal grandmother, Catherine de Damas, to be the preceptor of 
Tocqueville’s father, Hervé and subsequently that of Tocqueville and his brothers.  
Antoine Rédier asserts that Tocqueville, whose most aristocratic feature was a noble soul, 
owes his moral uprightness to the advice and example of the pious Abbé Lesueur. 
Antoine Rédier, Comme disait Monsieur de Tocqueville, (Paris: Perrin, 1925), 8 and 35-
36.   
Nevertheless, his early religious indoctrination was shaken at the age of sixteen when he 
discovered, inter alia, Descartes, Rousseau, and Voltaire in his father’s library.  This 
discovery caused him to be racked with doubt throughout his life except perhaps in his 
final days.  This experience prompted him to write to his beloved tutor, “I believe, but I 
can no longer practice.”  Tocqueville’s ensuing struggle to regain his faith was a major 
catalyst in his life long ambition to reconcile the humanistic aspirations embodied in the 
philosophy of the eighteenth century with Christianity and the “spirit of religion” with the 
“spirit of liberty.” Letter to Abbé Lesueur, September 8, 1824, in Tocqueville and the 
Two Democracies, 4.  See also George Wilson Pierson, Tocqueville in America abridged 
by Dudley C. Lunt from Tocqueville and Beaumont in America, (Garden City, New 
York: Anchor Books Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1959), 7-8.   This study has to rely on 
secondary sources here since this letter is not included in the collection of letters to Abbé 
Lesueur that appear in the J. P. Mayer édition of the Oeuvres complètes, correspondance 
familiale.  It is probably part of a private collection, which the Commission de 
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publication des oeuvres de Tocqueville is compiling for a future volume of the Oeuvres 
complètes to be published under the title “Correspondence à divers.”  Nevertheless, this 
study is comfortable with the assertion attributed to Tocqueville herein since he clearly 
discussed the issue of his profoundly shaken faith with his tutor as shown elsewhere in 
this study.     
13 Tocqueville’s voluminous correspondence reveals that he was assiduously studying 
Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Pascal at the end of 1836 when he was preparing to begin 
work on the second volume of Democracy in America.  However, it is very likely that he 
consulted Montesquieu in the preparation of the first volume which emphasizes the 
influence of mores on society.  At any rate, we know that in the summer of 1832 
Montesquieu was the subject of discussion between Louis de Kergolay and Tocqueville.  
The two friends always discussed with each other their views about the authors they were 
reading.  Unfortunately, we have only the letter in which Kergolay informs Tocqueville 
he is reading De l’esprit des lois but we do not have the latter’s response to this letter.   
To the extent that religion is one of the elements that is included in Montesquieu and 
Tocqueville’s concept of mores, one could say that Montesquieu has an indirect influence 
on the important place Tocqueville assigns to religion in his teaching.  Moreover, it is not 
unlikely that Tocqueville consulted the works of all three philosophers a short time 
before the publication of the first volume of that work.  In his comments to Tocqueville’s 
draft of the first volume, Kergolay urges him to read Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Pascal 
to improve his general style adding that they are indeed the teachers most suitable to him.  
Letter to Tocqueville, August 5, 1832, and Letter to Tocqueville not dated but estimated 
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to have been written end of October 1834, a few months before the January 1835 
publication of Democracy in America respectively in OC XIII, 366. 
Peter Augustine Lawler emphasizes Tocqueville’s debt to Pascal and Rousseau but omits 
to mention the influence of Montesquieu.  He explains this omission in a footnote in 
which he relies on Wilhelm Hennis’s scholarship to show that Tocqueville’s debt to 
Montesquieu was superficial.  In The Restless Mind he states Hennis argues that 
Tocqueville partly rejected the “individualistic liberalism” championed by Montesquieu 
because he recognized the trend toward “atomistic liberty” would lead to the “miserable 
degradation of the increasingly disordered soul” of democratic man.  
Tocqueville’s thoughtful analysis of democratic society puts great store on religion to 
combat the pernicious effect of  “individualistic liberalism” on liberty by emphasizing 
Christianity’s exhortation to the individual about his moral responsibility not only to 
himself but also to God and his community.  It is therefore not unreasonable to suggest 
that Tocqueville would refrain from highlighting in a discussion on religion any merit he 
may have assigned to Montesquieu’s liberalism, which was produced by the 
enlightenment in an era far different from the democratic one of concern to him.  
However, it is important to note that Lawler finds it nonetheless necessary to point out 
that Tocqueville’s rejection of  “individualistic liberalism” does not completely liberate 
him from his debt to Montequieu.  Lawler rightly insists that Tocqueville owes something 
to Montesquieu in his partisanship of individuality in opposition to the modern civic 
republicanism inspired by Rousseau, which placed greater value on equality than on 
liberty.  Wilhelm Hennis, In Search of the “New Science of Politics”: Interpreting 
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Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, ed. Ken Masugi (Savage, Md.: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1991), 39-40, 54-58 quoted in The Restless Mind, 184. 
14 See Appendix C for a synopsis of Tocqueville’s correspondence. 
  
15 In this sense liberty has both a private and political meaning.  The first, which is the 
liberty to guard oneself from sin, is a precondition for the second. 
Referring to the reign of Edward VI who established a modified Protestantism when he 
succeeded the despotic reign of his father, Tocqueville asserts the following.  “His reign 
presents a pleasant spectacle that shows the need men have of authority in religious 
matters and to what extent they start to err when they lose this base of certainty to call 
only to their reason.”  Undoubtedly, Tocqueville wants to imply here that the English of 
that era had not yet grown accustomed enough to liberty to make full usage of their 
capacity to exercise complete moral independence.  Letter to Beaumont, October 5, 1828, 
in OC VIII, vol. 1, 70.   
16 Letter to Kergolay, June 29, 1831, in OC XIII, 225-227.  
It is likely that the observations Tocqueville made during his sojourn in America 
prompted him to rethink and modify the primacy he accorded religion to rule entirely in 
the moral world a few years earlier in his letter to Beaumont cited above.  He seems to 
have found a middle ground in which he admits enlightenment can fulfill at least partly 
the role religion plays in shaping morality in society.  This view is expressed in a letter in 
which he outlines his assessment of Machiavelli’s portrait of Italian society in the middle 
ages--one in which real virtue was almost non-existent while extraordinary vices reign 
and skepticism ruled in the upper classes and superstitions wreaked havoc in the lower.   
“I know what was true of the Italian of the XVI century is not necessarily true of the 
 30
                                                                                                                                                 
other nations of Europe.  I see nevertheless that the eras that immediately preceded the 
Reformation have been everywhere centuries of great corruption.  Ignorance and religion 
misunderstood in the masses; doubt and incredulity in the superior classes.  In a word the 
wrongs of barbarism and of the great civilization united together.  This brings me more 
and more to think that once religious beliefs are shaken in a nation, there must not be any 
hesitation, it must at any price be pushed toward enlightenment.”  It is noteworthy that 
Tocqueville reviles Machiavelli and condemns his teaching, which is antithetical to his.  
“The core of his thought is that all actions are indifferent in themselves and that they 
must be judged by the cleverness they show and the success that follows them.  For him 
the world is a great arena in which God is absent, where conscience has nothing to do and 
where each concludes his business the best he can.”  Tocqueville’s view of the 
immorality that governs French politics in his own time is underscored by his assertion 
that  “Machiavelli is the grandfather of M. Thiers.” Throughout his letters and in his 
Souvenirs, Tocqueville’s most scathing comments about human baseness include 
Adolphe Thiers, his colleague during his tenure in the Chamber of Deputies.  He 
expresses similar views to Royer-Collard about his reading of Machiavelli’s complete 
disregard for morality and virtue. “In sum, Machiavelli’s Prince works so skillfully and 
laboriously to become a great criminal, that I think that he would have been far less 
difficult for him to manage by being simply honest.”  Letter to Kergolay, August 5, 1836, 
in OC XIII, 390 and letter to Royer-Collard, August 25, 1836, in Alexis de Tocqueville, 
Oeuvres complètes, correspondance d’Alexis de Tocqueville et de Pierre-Paul Royer-
Collard, correspondence d’Alexis de Tocqueville et de Jean-Jacques Ampère, ed. J. P. 
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Mayer, texte établi, annoté et prefacé par André Jardin, (Paris: Gallimard, 1970), tome 
XI, 19-20.  (Hereafter references to this work will appear as OC XI).  
17 Letter to Louis de Kergolay, June 29, 1831, in OC XIII, 231.  See also Tocqueville, 
Selected letters, 50. 
18 Selected letters, 52. 
 
19 Letter from Kergolay, August 18, 1833, in OC XIII, 334. 
Mary Motley probably did not want to formalize her union with Tocqueville because she 
did not want to confront the sea of disapproval with which it would be met by 
Toqueville’s family and friends, who objected to the marriage.  In their view, her English 
commoner background put a great social distance between herself and Tocqueville’s 
aristocratic milieu.  Kergolay was first among the friends who objected to the marriage. 
20  OC XIII, 235.  See also Tocqueville, Selected Letters, 58. 
21 Letter to Louis de Kergolay, October 18, 1847, in OC XIII, 208 and in Selected 
Letters, 191.  
22 The Reform Bill of 1830-32 facilitated England’s transition to democracy by adapting 
the system of Parliamentary Cabinet government to the new social facts created by the 
Industrial Revolution.  This involved the admission first of the middle and then working 
class as partners in the control of the political machine.  This adjustment was seen as a 
means to avoid the breakdown of the parliamentary system and a war of the classes.  
George Macaulay Trevelyan, A Shortened History of England, (London and New York: 
Penguin Books, 1942), 461. 
23 DA, 6/7. 
 
24 Comme disait Monsieur de Tocqueville, 46-48.  
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25 Letter to Kergolay not dated but estimated to have been written at the end of January 
1835 around the time of the publication of the first volume of Democracy in America in 
OC XIII, 373-374.   
26 DA, 7/8. 
27 The caricaturists of the 1830’s represented Louis-Philippe as a bourgeois and 
parsimonious fellow. His ascent to the throne flattered the bourgeoisie, which recognized 
itself in this “King-Citizen.”  He facilitated the consolidation of bourgeois power under 
the banner of liberalism.  While his brand of liberalism was founded on the principle of 
respect for individual liberties, it rested in effect on the political superiority of the elite, 
which favored the bourgeois interests.  Georges Duby, Histoire de la France, (Paris: 
Librairie Larousse, 1970), 383 & 458.  
Louis-Philippe’s liberalism embraced the anticlerical and bonapartist elements France 
inherited from the Revolution.  It was very different from Tocqueville’s “new 
liberalism,” which is suited to democratic times insofar as it focuses on reconciling the 
spirit of liberty and the spirit of religion and is opposed to the revolutionary spirit.  
Tocqueville accepted without enthusiasm the July monarchy because it was a better 
alternative to the republic and because it appeared to him to be France’s last chance for 
instituting a constitutional monarchy.  His hopes were soon dashed since Louis-Philippe’s 
victory over the republican rioting did not lead to liberalism’s rebirth but to the personal 
power of the king, the crisis of the parliamentary regime and the erosion of public spirit.  
Jean-Claude Lamberti, “Notice” in De la démocratie en Amérique, 1047.  
28 Tocqueville was elected deputy of Valognes on March 2, 1839 and he published the 
second volume in April of the following year. 
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IS RELIGION SOLELY A MEANS TO LIBERTY IN TOCQUEVILLE’S 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OR IS IT ALSO AN END IN ITSELF? 
 
This chapter aims to demonstrate the mutual dependence of religion and liberty in 
Tocqueville’s thought.  Tocqueville’s religious teaching is overshadowed by his own 
admission that he struggleg most of his life with metaphysical doubt.  Yet, despite his 
avowed religious conflict, his published works, correspondence and travel notes show 
palpable evidence of a man whose thoughts and actions always assume the existence of a 
Creator to whom he and all men are duty bound to live a moral life according to the 
teachings of the Scriptures. In fact, Tocqueville’s ideas and life long exemplary conduct 
show that he believes human liberty and dignity, the things he loves most passionately, 
are possible only when man submits his will to divine law and authority.   
We know from Antoine Rédier, who was the first scholar to have access to the  
Tocqueville archives and who therefore had the opportunity to examine a wealth of 
private papers that had not been edited for publication1 that Tocqueville lived and thought 
on the margin of religion.  Mr. Rédier asserts that “if he [Tocqueville] broke with the 
faith of his fathers, he never left the surroundings, not even the shadow of this Church, 
where the men and women of his breeding prayed for centuries.”2 Mr. Rédier’s research 
allowed J. P. Mayer, who compiled the unedited correspondence of Tocqueville, to 
conclude that his religious beliefs during the time he was assailed with doubt, i.e., from 
adolescence until shortly before his death, was one of Christian deism.3 Tocqueville’s 
biographer, André Jardin, seems to agree with these two assessments of his religious 
beliefs.  He disagrees with the commentators who claimed after Tocqueville’s death that 
his decision to take the last rites points to his deathbed conversion to “intellectual 
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Catholicism,” since to take this sacrament he would have had to have met the necessary 
precondition of affirming his belief in Catholic doctrines or otherwise risked committing 
sacrilege.  Nevertheless, Mr. Jardin’s comments on this subject are inconclusive as 
evidenced by his sober final remark: “[t]here are intimate reaches of the spirit that compel 
one to silence.”4
A study that seeks to understand the role of religion in Tocqueville’s political 
philosophy like the present one has a profound interest in first settling as best as possible 
the issue of Tocqueville's religious beliefs; for his noble character or grandeur d’âme  
presupposes a close connection between his beliefs and teaching.5  What does 
Tocqueville’s teaching tell us about what it means to be religious?  Does being religious 
for him depend solely on one’s acceptance of Christian doctrines or can some men use 
their reason to answer abstract or theoretical questions about God that allow them to lead 
moral lives without adhering to any formal religious beliefs?  To what extent does 
Tocqueville’s aristocratic view of his targeted audience, i.e., democratic society, bear on 
what he teaches about religion? 
One thing is clear: Tocqueville ranks Christianity above all other religions for 
having amalgamated the important moral principles of justice and equality among men;  
for creating a human society outside of all national societies thereby making all men 
brothers; and for raising the standard of morality by placing the sanction of moral laws, 
which were heretofore in this world, in the afterlife.  He credits these Christian moral 
principles for the development of Western Civilization and the ascendance of democracy, 
a less elevated but more just political system than aristocracy.6  It is also clear to him that 
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the great mass of men are unable to use their reason to arrive at abstract truths and thus 
need dogmatic faith to believe in God and a moral order.7
Notwithstanding these definitive answers, Tocqueville’s religious teaching 
remains nebulous unless it is examined through lenses that allow one to determine 
whether religion is for him an end in itself or a means to his beloved liberty or both.  This 
approach is an important step toward unraveling the Tocquevillean paradox on religion, 
which leaves his teaching on this subject open to varied interpretations.  On one hand he 
claims unbelief but on the other he admits the existence of God with utmost sincerity and 
conviction8 and exhorts democratic societies to submit to the authority of religion.  The 
goal of this chapter, therefore, is to probe the irreducible link between religion and liberty 
found in Tocqueville’s political philosophy, which distinguishes between two kinds of 
liberty, both of which are subject to moral law.  The first, private liberty consists in 
guarding oneself free from the fetters of sins by obeying moral law and the second, public 
liberty is an extension of the first carried through active participation in the public 
sphere.9  
 
How Tocqueville’s Religious Sentiments Integrate the Elements of a Mixed 
Intellectual Tradition  
  
In his analysis of the “Influence of Democracy on the Intellectual Movement in 
the United States” in part one of the second volume of Democracy in America, 
Tocqueville affirms that the great utility of religion is “more visible among people where 
conditions are equal than among all others…[because] equality, which introduces great 
goods into the world, nevertheless suggests to men very dangerous instincts… it tends to 
isolate men from one another and to bring one to be wholly occupied with himself alone.  
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It opens their soul excessively to the love of material enjoyments”10 insofar as an 
apparent immense and easy course seems open to them to fulfill their ambitions when the 
prerogatives of birth and fortune are destroyed.  Yet, because this course is equally 
opened to all it absorbs democratic man in petty passions as he engages in the fierce 
competition for limited resources in the public sphere. “The greatest advantage of 
religions is to inspire wholly contrary instincts [as] there is no religion that does not place 
man’s desires beyond and above earthly goods.”11  
Religion then is particularly useful to democratic societies because it serves to 
constrain the flow of petty passions that equality engenders.  It fulfills this function by 
appealing to man’s innate need for belief in the existence of God and the immortality of 
the soul to provide him a sense of order in an otherwise chaotic world.  Because the 
rewards for these immaterial longings carry with them moral obligations, religious beliefs 
impose restraints on man’s baser instincts. In short, there is no religion, “even the most 
false and dangerous,”12 that does not draw man from time to time away from 
contemplation of himself.  These assumptions lead Tocqueville to conclude that under the 
empire of religion the proper exercise of self-government, liberty and an orderly social 
democracy are not irreconcilable as long as religions discreetly keep within the bounds 
that are proper to them.      
Some scholars13 interested in Tocqueville argue that he sought to replace 
traditional Christianity with a freedom-oriented civil religion14 while others15 believe that 
his life long endeavor to prove the mutual dependence of liberty and faith caused him to 
view religion solely from a political point of view.  These arguments take for granted 
Rousseau’s and Montesquieu’s influence on his thought, which focuses on the political 
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utility of religion, while discounting totally that of Pascal, which centers on man’s innate 
longing for the divine in his life and his abject restlessness in its absence.  Yet these not 
so unreasonable conclusions, given Tocqueville’s political interest in religion, take 
nonetheless a far too simplistic view of Tocqueville’s painful ambivalence about his 
religious beliefs.16  It is more to the point to say that the position he advances on religion 
in his published works tends to a great extent to be concerned primarily with the good it 
brings to the body politic while less prominently it suggests also religion’s ability to bring 
solace to man.   
The tendency to overlook the great length to which Tocqueville goes to explain 
man’s need of religion to answer persistent questions about God, moral choice and the 
meaning of life probably stems from his own suggestion that he follows the tradition of 
Montesquieu insofar as he writes about religion not as a theologian but as “one who 
writes about politics.”17 Indeed, one could easily confine his teaching to this heritage if 
one takes in isolation his comment to his friend Charles Stoffels: “I am neither a 
philosopher nor a theologian, but a statesman who believes in the necessity of religious 
beliefs and who desires passionately to conserve what is left of them in this country and 
to foster them, if the thing is possible.”18  
Yet this assertion should not be considered a conclusive account of Tocqueville’s 
religious convictions. He laments his crisis of faith all his life and describes his 
experience with doubt as “the most insupportable of all evils of this world.”  He considers 
the universal doubt that afflicted him as “a sad and frightening illness,” and thinks that 
happiness is the lot of “those who have never known this illness, or who no longer know 
it!”19  He ranks illnesses, death and doubt as life’s worse evils. Doubt is as much a 
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debilitating illness to Tocqueville as the frequent severe stomach ailments that caused 
him to be inclined to a black melancholia.  Nevertheless, he accommodates himself to 
live courageously with these illnesses. Here is what he has to say about living with doubt.  
Life is neither a pleasure nor a sorrow; it is a serious affair with 
which we are charged, and toward which our duty is to acquit ourselves as 
well as possible.  I assure you, my dear friend, that whenever I have 
managed to view it in this way, I have drawn great internal strength from 
this thought… 
 When I first began to reflect, I believed that the world was full of 
demonstrable truths; that it was only a matter of looking carefully to see 
them.  But when I sought to apply myself to considering the objects, I 
perceived nothing but inextricable doubts.  I cannot express to you, my 
dear Charles, the horrible state into which this discovery threw me.  That 
was the unhappiest time of my life; I can only compare myself to a man 
who, seized by dizziness, believes that he feels the floor tremble under his 
feet and sees the walls that surround him move; even today, I recall that 
period with a feeling of horror.  I can say that then I fought with doubt 
hand to hand, and that it is rare to do so with more despair.  Well!  I 
ultimately convinced myself that the search for absolute, demonstrable 
truth, like the quest for perfect happiness, was an effort directed toward 
the impossible.  It is not that there are not some truths that merit man’s 
complete conviction, but be sure they are very few in number.  Concerning 
the immense majority of points that it is important for us to know, we have 
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only probabilities, almosts.  To despair of its being so is to despair of 
being a man, for that is one of the most inflexible laws of our nature.  
Does it follow that man must never act because he is never sure of 
anything?  Certainly that is not my doctrine… 
 But, whatever one does, you tell me, the doubt on which one risks 
oneself is always a painful state.  Undoubtedly: I consider this doubt to be 
one of the greatest miseries of our nature; I place it immediately after 
illnesses and death, but precisely because I hold this opinion of it, I cannot 
imagine that so many men inflict it on themselves gratuitously and 
uselessly.  That is why I have always considered metaphysics and all the 
purely theoretical sciences, which serve for nothing in the reality of life, to 
be voluntary torment that man has consented to inflict on himself…20  
 The tenor of the foregoing letter evinces the extent to which Tocqueville 
syncretizes Pascal and Rousseau’s teaching to arrive at the penetrating understanding of 
human nature, its limitations and moral obligations that permeates his thought.  It is 
Pascalian in its essence inasmuch as it testifies to the misery of man without God; and 
Rousseauan insofar as it prescribes public virtue, which for Tocqueville is foremost 
among man’s duties, as a moral antidote to human passions.  Tocqueville’s conviction 
about the seriousness of life and one’s duty toward it permeates his letters to his closest 
friends until the time of his death on April 16, 1859.   
The informed reader familiar with Tocqueville’s correspondence can surmise 
nonetheless the preponderance of his debt to Rousseau by considering the linkage he 
makes between the moral and political world, which he affirms are for him indivisible, in 
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a subsequent letter addressed to another correspondent sixteen months later.  Whereas the 
letter above is concerned with metaphysical doubt, this succeeding letter addresses 
another form of pyrrhonism, which Tocqueville finds equally pernicious as demonstrated 
by the metaphorical term he uses to describe it: “political atheism.”21  
Tocqueville not only affirms consistently the intimate connection between moral 
and political obligations but he also believes that the exercise of each demands courage or 
manliness, which he insists was the mark of honor in feudal societies and ancient Rome 
where it became synonymous with “virtu,” the Latin word for virtue.22  However, he 
wants to modify this aristocratic or republican notion of virtue, which was heretofore 
associated with military courage and thus was attainable only by the social elite, by 
infusing it with a modern ethical standard that makes participation in human affairs the 
moral responsibility of not just a few men but that of all men.  The courage appropriate to 
modern democratic man is one that pushes him to exercise moral choice in the practical 
affairs that absorb him daily under a system of equality.   
Democracy requires a different moral standard than aristocratic society inasmuch 
as it lacks the latter’s superior class whose privileged social standing invested it with the 
duty to preserve liberty and guide opinions. All being equal, none has the leisure to 
meditate on abstractions beyond the competence of human reason.  To engage in 
metaphysics is a useless activity that only serves to condemn oneself to apathy, 
particularly in the fluid democratic environment, a choice for Tocqueville that has no 
moral or practical political value.  Rather, Tocqueville’s doctrine reveals a moral choice; 
political participation not only offers the means to acquit oneself of a moral duty to 
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oneself and one’s fellowmen but it also provides an outlet through which to escape what 
Pascal defines as the existential restlessness that is the bane of human life. 
On a more spiritual level, the letter points to an accommodation with doubt that 
nonetheless admits to a belief in certain unproven but eternal truths.  One of the unproven 
truths to which Tocqueville refers here is undeniably the belief in the existence of God 
and that of the soul as a separate entity from the body.  We know this because in 
Democracy in America he invokes the ability of the Socratic school to settle the question 
of the existence of God and that of the soul’s survival over the body as the substance that 
gave Platonic philosophy a “sublime spark.”  According to Tocqueville its “great literary 
reputation” has survived over those of other schools of ancient philosophy precisely 
because it was joined to spiritualism.23 This claim cannot be discarded by the skeptical 
reader as a mere rhetorical ploy since Tocqueville praises Platonic philosophy also in 
private for its appeal to the immaterial.  This is what he has to say about it to his friend 
Gustave de Beaumont in a letter in which he tries momentarily to escape the vile 
spectacle of political ambitions in France to contemplate instead the principles that 
nourish a noble instinct in man.  
I was reflecting the other day: going over in my mind the works of 
the human spirit which have most seized the imagination of the human 
race and which possess the most duration and brilliance, I found that in a 
great majority of cases it was those books in which the great principles of 
the beautiful and the good, as well as the high and salutary theories of the 
existence of God and the immortality of the soul have penetrated the most 
profoundly; these great works have best put in relief and exhibited those 
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principles and those theories.  There one finds, then, the most durable and 
most efficient cause of the great literary successes, which proves that after 
all it is in that direction that the heart of mankind tends in the most 
energetic and most continuous manner.  Deprive Plato, for example, of 
this aspiration toward immortality and the infinite which transports him, 
and leave him only with his useless forms, his incomplete and often 
ridiculous knowledge, his eloquence that escapes us at such a great 
distance, and he falls into obscurity and becomes unreadable.  But Plato 
addressed himself to the noblest and most persevering instinct in our 
nature, and he will live as long as there are men; he will carry along even 
those who only half-understand him, and he will always be an enormous 
figure in the world of intellects.24  
Tocqueville’s own work and personal conduct consistently affirm that the 
greatness of man is irrevocably linked to his belief in the existence of God and 
immortality of the soul. Writing to Louis de Kergolay on August 8, 1838 he declares: 
“There is continuously a spiritual and great aspiration in this man [Plato], which moves 
and elevates me.  I believe without doubt, it is owed especially to this fact that he so 
gloriously crossed the centuries; after all, in all times men like to be talked to about their 
soul even though they occupy themselves only with their bodies.”25 He is convinced 
absolutely that man achieves his capacity for greatness only by affirming this belief, 
which for him is incontrovertibly connected to morality, and in this he shows a great 
affinity with Pascal who states:   
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It is beyond doubt that, whether the soul is mortal or immortal, this 
must make a whole difference in morality.  And yet the philosophers have 
steered their morality independently of this: they deliberate to spend an 
hour [on it].  [The philosophy of] Plato, prepared [the way] for 
Christianity.  [Consider the] duplicity of the philosophers who did not 
discuss the immortality of the soul.  [The] disingenuousness of their 
dilemma [is seen] in Montaigne.26   
Tocqueville’s doubt therefore would appear to stem from something other than 
what he considers to be a reasonable belief in the otherworldly.  This study suggests it is 
confined to his uneasiness about accepting specific doctrines of the Catholic Church.  For 
example he criticizes the proclamation of the bull “Ineffabilis Deus” by Pope Pius IX on 
December 8, 1854 making it mandatory to believe after 2000 years in the Church’s 
history in the mystery of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary as a condition to 
remain Catholic.27  Although this illustration postdates his writing of Democracy in 
America, it points to the particular character of Tocqueville’s battle with disbelief, which 
is reminiscent of the problem that afflicts Rousseau’s Savoyard Vicar.  
What doubled my confusion was that I was born in a church which 
decides everything and permits no doubt; therefore, the rejection of a 
single point made me reject all the rest, and the impossibility of accepting 
so many absurd decisions also detached me from those which were not 
absurd.  By being told “Believe everything,” I was prevented from 
believing anything, and I no longer knew where to stop.28
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  The identification of the precise nature of Tocqueville’s disbelief helps then to 
confine it to doctrines he finds repugnant to reason.  Just as important it helps to attenuate 
the charge that he views religion only as a tool to achieve political good by bringing to 
the fore that he also views it as an end in itself for its capacity to foster human greatness.     
It is safe to say that religion, at least the universal belief in the existence of God 
and the immortality of the soul, for Tocqueville contains its own intrinsic value for 
attenuating man’s existential angst.  Just as he discovered early in life metaphysics cannot 
suppress this anxiety so inseparable from the human condition, experience taught him 
also later that no worldly diversion can quell it even as he spent the greater part of his life 
seeking solace by devoting himself to political and scholarly work.      
Tocqueville’s solution for coping with the mental anguish his doubt causes him is 
to find distraction in work to escape Pascal’s incisive depiction of the human condition.  
“Nothing is more intolerable to man than to be in a state of complete rest, without 
passions, without business, without diversion, without industry.  He feels then his 
nothingness, his abandonment, his inadequacy, his dependence, his powerlessness, his 
emptiness.  Forthwith he will bring from the depth of his soul boredom, blackness, 
sadness, sorrow, heartache, despair.”29  Writing to his friend Corcelle after one of his 
many illnesses, this time with pleurisy a few years before his death, he expresses the 
consolation he draws from his work.   
I have nevertheless returned seriously to my work since eight days 
and I am beginning to find in it not only the calm that I needed, but also a 
certain drive that I no longer knew since I had left the countryside.  I feel, 
more and more, that work is my only refuge and that it is when I am well 
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entrenched in it that I can find this relaxation that so many others do not 
begin to encounter except by stopping to work.  The study of the Greek 
roots [of words] would tire me less, I think, than my own erring thoughts 
about my [troubled] times and inability to penetrate the great problems of 
human destiny.30      
Tocqueville’s withdrawal from political life made him feel more acutely with 
time the need to find diversion in work to escape what Pascal describes as “the natural 
misfortune of our weak, mortal and miserable condition.”31  In this he clearly embodies 
the restlessness Pascal maintains assails man in the absence of God in his life.  “It is 
always because my soul would find itself ill at ease in its abode, that it went to seek, at all 
costs, the lively diversion of a great work of the mind.”32  It is noteworthy that 
Tocqueville continuously invokes the language of Pascal in his private correspondence 
and public writing to affirm like him that no diversion can console man of his 
estrangement from God, which chills the soul. Two years before his death he writes to 
Louis de Kergolay. 
You know that the most fixed principle in my mind is that there is 
never a period in life in which one can rest himself; that the effort outside 
oneself and even more inside oneself is necessary and even more 
necessary as one grows old than in youth.  I compare man in this world to 
a traveler who walks unceasingly toward a region more and more cold, 
and who is obliged to gesticulate more as he goes further.  The great 
sickness of the soul is the cold.  And to fight against this fearsome illness, 
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we must not only maintain the lively movement of our mind with work but 
also by contact with our fellowmen and the affairs of this world…33  
Yet, his two primary occupations, politics and writing, did not completely bring 
him the respite he sought so fervently.  Despite his commitment to political participation 
Tocqueville painfully discovered after a long career in politics that the political life has 
its own limitations.  Politics in the end failed to satisfy his natural taste for great actions 
and great virtues because it offered such a disquieting spectacle of human baseness and 
with it the despairing realization of the impossibility to achieve his conceived project of 
fusing religion and liberty.  Likewise, literary success did not help to cure him from the 
restlessness and malaise that was a source of constant affliction to his soul.   
Tocqueville’s most definitive word about his religious sentiments are recorded 
approximately two years prior to his death in a letter, February 26, 1857, to his confidant 
and spiritual advisor, Madame Swetchine.  He makes this confession in the context of his 
chronic dissatisfaction with himself, which was re-awakened after his 1856 success with 
the publication of L’Ancien régime et la révolution, a success that left him wanting for 
the greatness he craved and yet knew could not be satisfied solely with worldly 
achievement.  It is noteworthy that Tocqueville carefully differentiates between what he 
characterizes as religious sentiments and beliefs in his correspondence with Madame 
Swetchine just as he cautiously makes a clear distinction between religious habits and 
convictions in his travel notes about the status of religion in America.   This division, as 
will be shown in a later chapter, underlines his debt to Pascal for whom religious 
sentiments and convictions are the preserves of the heart inasmuch as they are inspired by 
divine grace and subsist independent of reason.  In contrast, beliefs and habits depend on 
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reason insofar as habits confirm the proofs outlined by reason to incline the body to 
beliefs.    
[H]ere is another [cause] well worthy of pity!  This one is in the 
incessant and always vain effort of a mind which aspires to certainty and 
cannot grasp it; which more than any other perhaps needs it and less than 
any other can enjoy it peacefully.  The sight of the problem of human 
existence preoccupies me ceaselessly and overwhelms me ceaselessly.  I 
can no more penetrate this mystery than I can remove my eye from it.  It 
excites me and demoralizes me by turns.  In this world I find human life 
inexplicable and in the other frightening.  I believe strongly in another life, 
since God who is sovereignly just, has given us the idea; in this other life, 
to the remuneration of good and bad, since God has allowed us to 
distinguish them and has given us the liberty to choose; but outside of 
these clear notions, everything that go beyond the limits of this world 
appear to me to be encircled in a darkness that terrifies me.34      
Tocqueville’s acknowledged struggle to settle the eternal questions of religion 
makes it understandable that his religious teaching would be overshadowed by some 
ambivalence that leaves it open to varied interpretations. Doris Goldstein’s explanation 
for the apparent disjunction in Tocqueville’s religious teaching offers a comprehensive 
view of religion’s importance to him that goes beyond mere political utility.  She argues 
that to ignore Tocqueville’s continued personal concerns with religion and “his residual 
Christian beliefs is to make a far too secular thinker of him [that] neglects the 
connections between his personal religious beliefs and his historical and theoretical 
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statements about religion.”  She maintains that Tocqueville had an innate “feeling” or 
“need” for religion and concludes: 
If to be “religious” is to believe in a Deity whose existence gives 
the world order and meaning, then Tocqueville was religious.  From the 
existence of God he derived belief in a moral and physical order, in the 
immortality of the soul, and in the human capacity for free and responsible 
action.  Even though his reason for accepting these precepts were 
frequently couched in terms of “need” and “utility,” he did accept them.  
He found both the need and the justification for religious belief within 
himself, and assumed that these were characteristics of human nature in 
general.  Thus, his functional approach to religious phenomena or, as 
Tocqueville himself described it, his tendency to consider religion “from a 
human point of view,” rested ultimately upon conclusions that he had 
drawn from introspection.35
 
How the Tension between Equality and Liberty in France Helped to Shape 
Tocqueville’s Political Doctrine   
  
Tocqueville worried continuously that Liberty was especially threatened in France 
where the passion for equality subsumed the desire for freedom.  France, throughout his 
short life, continued to be convulsed by the revolutionary spasms that established 
democracy by abolishing the old social structure and eliminating traditional institutions, 
including religion.   His contemporaries did not share his commitment to the liberal 
values that inspired the revolution of 1789 when the nobility, the clergy and the third 
estate united to combat the absolutism of the monarchy on the eve of the bloody terror.  
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Throughout his tenure in the Chamber of Deputies (1839-1848) under the July Monarchy, 
liberals believed that liberty could be founded on an artificial bourgeois aristocracy while 
democrats ignored the political value of liberty preferring to believe that equality was 
enough to produce it. The first believed that the bourgeoisie could assume the role 
previously occupied by the nobility while the latter believed that if all had an equal right 
to concur in the government they would all be perfectly free because no one could 
exercise a tyrannical power over them.  
Tocqueville opposed them both because he believed liberty and equality to be 
closely intertwined although not easily reconciled in France inasmuch as democracy there 
was founded upon a system of social inequality, which exacerbates the democratic 
obsession with equality.  He believed the democrats’ view to be the ideal to which all 
democratic people tend but that between this ideal and reality less perfect forms of 
democracy exist.  For example, he argues that equality can be established in civil society 
but not in the political world or there can be equality in the political world without 
political freedom insofar as one might be equal to all those like oneself excepting the one 
who rules as master over all.  His unique perspective was instrumental in shaping his 
political doctrine, which focuses on reviving the spirit of liberty and equality that stirred 
France on the eve of the bloody terror. 
The passions which had just disturbed so violently the various 
classes of society seemed suddenly to cool down in this hour when, for the 
first time in two centuries, these classes were about to act together… All 
had demanded with equal fervor the restoration of the great Assembly, 
now reborn.  Each of them saw in that reunion the means of realizing his 
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fondest hopes.  The Estates-General were to meet at last: a common joy 
filled those divided hearts and bound them together for an instant before 
they were to separate forever. 
At that moment all minds were struck by the peril of disunion.  A 
supreme effort was made to agree.  Instead of trying to find the causes of 
difference, men wished to find only the common grounds of agreement: 
the destruction of arbitrary power, the self-government of the nation, the 
recognition of the rights of every citizen, liberty of the press, personal 
freedom, the mitigation of the law, a strengthening of justice, religious 
toleration, the abolition of commercial and industrial restriction- these 
were the things demanded by everyone... 
I think that no epoch of history has ever witnessed so large a 
number so passionately devoted to the public good, so honestly forgetful 
of themselves, so absorbed in the contemplation of the common interest, 
so resolved to risk everything they cherished in their private lives, so 
willing to overcome the small sentiments of their hearts.  This was the 
general source of that passion, courage, and patriotism from which all the 
great deeds of the French Revolution were to issue. 
The spectacle was short, but it was one of incomparable grandeur.  
It will never be effaced from the memory of mankind.  All foreign nations 
witnessed it, applauded it, were moved by it… 
I venture to say that there is but one people on this earth which 
could have staged such a spectacle.  I know my nation- I know but all too 
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well her errors, her faults, her foibles, and her sins.  But I also know of 
what she is capable.  There are enterprises which only the French nation 
can conceive; there are magnanimous resolutions which this nation alone 
dares to take.  She alone will suddenly embrace the common cause of 
humanity, willing to fight for it; and if she be subject to awful reverses, 
she has also sublime moments which sweep her to heights which no other 
people will ever reach.36   
Tocqueville invested great hopes in the realization of his political doctrine 
particularly because France had once before for a brief moment managed to overcome 
her habitual obsession for equality with an overwhelming passion for liberty.  If she 
could do it once Tocqueville believed with proper guidance she could do it effectively a 
second time.  France came close to harmonizing the ideals of liberals and democrats 
during that “first stage of ’89, when the spirit of equality and liberty” were the supreme 
expression of every Frenchman’s desires.  “[W]hen they wanted to create not only 
democratic institutions but free ones; when they sought not only to destroy privileges but 
to honor and recognize rights.  It was a time of youth, enthusiasm, pride, a time of 
generous and sincere emotions, whose memory, despite its mistakes, will always be 
preserved by humanity, and which, for a long time to come, will trouble the sleep of all 
those who wish to corrupt or enslave France.”37  
Despite his anxiety about democratic equality, Tocqueville accepts it because he 
recognizes that liberty can no longer have a foundation in aristocratic inequality.  He 
notes in one of his notebooks how dangerous it is to limit access to government to a 
single class in the new age of democracy:  “Anyone who, in the centuries upon which we 
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are about to embark, attempts to base liberty upon aristocracy is doomed to failure… 
Anyone who attempts to retain power within a single class, by whatever name it may be 
called, is doomed to failure.”38   He accepts equality for this reason and focuses on 
finding the means to realize in France the equilibrium between liberty and equality.  He 
learned from his sojourn in America that religion helps to maintain democratic liberty.  
Consequently, he spent his entire political career in his native France on the elusive quest 
to actualize his political doctrine while pursuing at the same time his cherished hope to  
reconcile liberty and religion, which was extremely important to him personally. 
 
How for Tocqueville Religion Helps to Maintain an Equilibrium between Equality 
and Liberty 
 
A close connection exists for Tocqueville between religion and liberty, which 
occupies the preeminent place in his hierarchy of beliefs, followed closely by friendship 
and patriotism. Religion is closely connected to Tocqueville’s passion, “the love of 
liberty and human dignity.”39 He derives his ardent passion for liberty from the religious 
idea of free will and the responsibility for one’s action associated with that concept.  
Fearing that man exhibits in democracy a far greater love for equality, which constantly 
eludes him and hence absorbs him completely causing him to subordinate everything to 
it, Tocqueville invests high hopes in religion for preserving his beloved liberty. He 
attributes the incomparable difference that exists between the flourishing liberty in 
American democracy and its striking absence in France to the important place religion 
occupies in American society. 
There exist more family ties than are supposed between political 
passions and religious passions.  On both sides general goods, immaterial 
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to a certain degree, are in sight; on both sides an ideal of society is 
pursued, a certain perfecting of the human species, the picture of which 
raises souls above contemplation of private interests and carries them 
away.  For my part, I more easily understand a man animated at the same 
time both by religious passion and political passion than by political 
passion and the passion for well-being, for example.  The first two can 
hold together and be embraced in the same soul, but not the second two.  
There is another reason that is less general and less grand, but perhaps 
actually more conclusive, which explains to me why the two passions go 
together and stimulate each other: that is the service that they are often  
called upon to render to each other.  Free institutions are often the natural 
and sometimes indispensable instruments of religious passions.  Nearly all 
the efforts that the moderns have made toward liberty they have made 
because of the need for manifesting or defending their religious opinions.  
It is religious passion that pushed the Puritans to America and led them to 
want to govern themselves there.  The two English revolutions were made 
to win liberty of conscience.  It is the same need that made the Huguenot 
nobility tend toward republican opinions in the 16th  century in France.  
Religious passions in all these cases aroused political passions, and the 
political passions served the free development of others.40   
Just as religion helps to sustain liberty, so does friendship in Tocqueville’s new 
kind of liberalism.  It brings like-minded people to form organizations that foster liberty. 
“In my opinion, the march of time, the developments of well-being,…[dots appear in the 
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text] have, in America, taken away from the religious element three-quarters of its 
original power.  However, all that remains of it is greatly agitated.  Religious men in the 
United States meet, speak, act in common more than anywhere else.”41  Tocqueville thus 
finds that when friendship grows from shared moral sentiments and ideas it negates the 
passion for well-being equality engenders.  Moreover, on a more personal level it brings 
solace and nourishes hope, especially under the yoke and misery of despotism.  Weary of 
the political situation in France following Louis-Napoléon’s coup d’état he has this to say 
about friendship: “I find bearable only the company of people who think and feel like me.  
The homeland is nowhere but there.”42  In short, friendship is for Tocqueville not only a 
“beautiful passion” but also a political virtue even though he bitterly laments a year after 
the coup d’état:  “Remember that in politics friendships are not negotiated as in private 
life and that their greatest and may be their only bonds are common hatreds.”43  
Nevertheless, despite this uncharacteristic display of cynicism his correspondence is 
replete with testimonies of the enduring pleasures he derived from friendship.   
I thank you with all my heart for your letter, my dear friend, I have 
never felt more deeply than while reading it the value of the friendship 
that unites us.  Let us hold onto that feeling with all our might, my dear 
Louis: it alone in this world is firm and stable.  As long as we can support 
ourselves on each other with confidence this way, we will never be 
weak…It [friendship] cannot arise at all ages; but once it does arise, I do 
not see why age should weaken it or even make it change its nature, 
especially for those who, understanding all of its value, watch over it 
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unceasingly and do not allow to alter what alone sustains it, confidence in 
great as well as in small things.44
Finally, Tocqueville regards patriotism as a sacred duty that promotes the proud 
and manly virtue that makes liberty possible.  In his detailed outline for a projected book 
“The European Revolution,” which was to be a sequel to L’Ancien régime, Tocqueville 
reserves a section that seeks to justify patriotism to show why Christian moralists are 
wrong to subordinate it to humanity. 
Man has been created by God (I do not know why) in such a way 
that the larger the object of his love the less directly attached he is to it.  
His heart needs particular passions; he needs limited objects for his 
affections to keep these firm and enduring.  There are but few who will 
burn with ardent love for the entire human species.  The way in which 
Providence lets most people work for the good of humanity seems to 
divide this great object into many smaller parts, making each of these 
fragments worthy objects of love to those whose compose them.  If 
everyone fulfills his duties in that way (and within these limits such duties 
are not beyond anyone’s natural capacities if properly directed by morals 
and reason), the general good of humanity would be produced by the 
many, despite the absence of more direct efforts by a few.  I am convinced 
that the interests of the human race are better served by giving every man 
a particular fatherland than by trying to inflame his passions for the whole 
of humanity.  The latter, whatever one may do, the common man will 
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perceive only from a viewpoint that is distant, aloof, uncertain, and cold.  
(A good idea, which could be fruitful, though badly sketched here.)45  
Tocqueville wants to suffuse democratic equality foremost with religious values 
and secondarily with a respect for friendship and patriotism because even though he 
accepted the ascendance of democracy as the work of Providence, he nevertheless 
maintained all his life great reservations about its ability to foster liberty.  The great 
personal demands equality places on the individual produce a propensity toward social 
atomization in democratic societies that has nefarious effects on liberty.  These demands 
preclude democratic man not only from cultivating the sublime aspirations that inclined 
aristocratic societies toward greatness but also from fully attending to the public duties 
that allow him to safeguard his liberty.  “I have always said that it is more difficult to 
stabilize and to maintain liberty in our new democratic societies than in certain 
aristocratic societies of the past.  But I shall never dare to think it impossible.”46  
Consequently, Tocqueville appeals principally to religion to carve a path to liberty in 
democracy because religion’s emphasis on the otherworldly helps to refocus democratic 
man’s commonplace desires for material well-being and the petty ambitions that feed 
them.  
It is equally important to note that Tocqueville ascribes to the presence of liberty 
in America and its absence in France another cause, viz., the manner in which democratic 
equality was established in each of these countries.  This cause is relevant to the overall 
comprehension of this study as it is directly related to the character of the democratic 
state and the influence its foundation holds over the religious sentiments of democratic 
citizens.  Tocqueville argues cogently that the Americans and the French have adapted 
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differently to their democratic social state for the following reason.  Whereas the first 
constituted themselves into that state to practice their religion in freedom, the latter 
substituted an aristocratic society for a democratic one and in that process jettisoned all 
their institutions, excepting only the oppressive administrative centralization, which 
resulted in calamitous effects for liberty.  Administrative centralization destroyed in 
France the spirit of self-reliance that permeates American democratic life. 
The establishment of democracy from these two opposite points bore divergent 
consequence for political liberty in America and France.  First, the Americans enjoy a 
peaceful democratic equality conducive to liberty while the French have to contend with 
a revolutionary equality that is not.  Second, whereas American equality encompasses 
legal equality and social equality, equality in France consists in mere equality before the 
law combined with inequality in social relations. Thus, the general character of the 
American social state gives democracy there an opposite orientation from that of the 
French. The first tends toward liberty whereas the second is naturally carried alternatively 
between anarchy and despotism.  Tocqueville is unequivocal that the presence of religion 
and a ubiquitous equality at the founding of America allowed it to conciliate equality 
with liberty whereas their absence at that of France resulted in an antagonistic duality 
between equality and liberty to the detriment of the latter. 
Tocqueville deduces from these observations that religion has indeed acquired a 
greater social and political value with modernity.  Modern democracy,47 which is coeval 
with the enlightenment’s proclamation of the need to submit the objects of all beliefs to 
the individual effort of reason, leaves man more alone and isolated than he was under 
aristocracy’s hierarchic social structure.  Tocqueville draws a parallel between 
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aristocratic and democratic societies to show that the utility of religion increases with the 
relaxation of the interdependent relations common to the hierarchic order of aristocratic 
societies which serve to maintain the social state into a cohesive whole.  In aristocratic 
societies, man was bound to several of his fellow citizens by social traditions delineated 
by a very distinct and immobile class structure.  In contrast, man in democratic society 
finds himself virtually without any resources other than his reason to meet both his 
spiritual and material needs in a fluid social structure. His boundless independence leaves 
him little time for contemplation and prey to countless temptations he is ill-equipped to 
combat.  Thus, on a practical level religion, more specifically Christianity,48  provides a 
moral anchor to man for his own good and that of the social state while on a spiritual 
level it helps him to cope with the existential restlessness of the human condition, which  
the vicissitudes of democratic life further exacerbates.  In short, religion binds man to his 
fellowmen by providing a highly integrated and widely moral system for society, which 
imposes duties on him for his own good and that of the state.  
In a letter to Louis de Kergolay, Tocqueville likens the role of religion in society 
to the “Victorian sexual code” insofar as it is “a form which powerful minds, whether for 
good or evil, break through, but which serves as a barrier for the weak and ordinary.”49 It 
is no wonder then that Tocqueville, for whom democracy is synonymous with mediocrity 
and conformity, inter alia, looks to religion to restrain desires and discipline wants that 
are destructive to liberty with the sunset of the aristocratic era.     
Tocqueville believes that the value of religion increases in democratic societies 
because equality fosters an egoistic individualism, which privileges the private over the 
public, as each is self-absorbedly engaged in the pursuit of material well-being. Because 
 60
it is self-referenced democratic individualism also engenders moral and intellectual 
isolation, which can be both valuable and dangerous insofar as it encourages the efforts 
of individual reason on the one hand and intellectual conformity on the other.   
Individualism leads to conformity because at the same time that it compels 
intellectual self-reliance in practical affairs it also leaves democratic citizens who are 
completely absorbed in the competitive pursuit of an equality that always threatens to 
elude them with little leisure for speculative studies.   Democratic man’s absorption in 
material pursuit disposes him to place little value on intellectual activities if they are not 
directly related to practical matters that affect his worldly interests.  These inclinations 
leave him bereft of the intellectual capacity and will to challenge common opinion.  
Moreover, the similarity men share in times of equality disposes them to have little faith 
in one another and to put instead unlimited trust in the judgment of the public; they 
assume that because “all have the same enlightenment truth is found on the side of the 
greatest number.”50  The tendency to abdicate individual autonomy to follow the will of 
the majority holds the potential for encouraging moral ineptitude.  Religion, particularly 
Christianity, provides a counterbalance to conformity because it imposes on man the 
responsibility to submit his thoughts and actions to the rigors of individual moral 
judgment, which is a precondition for liberty. 
 
How Tocqueville Defines the Connection He Makes between Religion and Liberty 
Because the concept of liberty is so closely connected to Tocqueville’s religious 
thought, it is worthwhile to examine at this juncture the meaning it holds for him by 
reviewing one by one his three separate attempts to define it in his published works.   
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First, in Volume One of Democracy in America, which he published in January 1835, he 
acclaims as a beautiful definition of liberty a passage taken from a speech given in 1645 
by John Winthrop, the Deputy-Governor of Massachussetts, which he found in Cotton 
Mather’s Magnalia Christi Americana.  It is worth noting that Tocqueville reproduces the 
original text faithfully with the exception that in the first sentence he translates “liberty” 
as “independence.”  Winthrop who was called upon to defend himself from the 
accusation of infringing upon the liberties of the people, defines liberty in the following 
term. 
Nor would I have you to mistake in the Point of your own Liberty.  There 
is a Liberty of corrupt Nature, which is affected both by Men and Beasts, 
to do what they list; and this Liberty is inconsistent with Authority, 
impatient of all Restraint; by this Liberty, Sumus Omnes Deteriores (We 
are all the worse): Tis the Grand Enemy of Truth and Peace, and all the 
Ordinances of God are bent against it.  But there is a Civil, a Moral, a 
Federal Liberty, which is the proper End and Object of Authority; it is a 
Liberty for that only which is just and good; for this Liberty you are to 
stand with the hazard of your very Lives.51
Tocqueville acclaims as beautiful Winthrop’s definition of liberty because it is 
premised on moral law and corresponds with his own belief that there is a reciprocal 
bond between liberty and religion insofar as each needs the other to flourish. His 
convictions regarding the mutual dependence of moral and political liberty and his study 
of American democracy prove to him irreversibly that religion needs liberty for the 
expression of its beliefs and liberty needs religion to maintain its vigor in an age of 
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equality that exalts individualism. “To persuade men that respect for divine and human 
laws are the best means to remain free and that liberty is the best means to remain honest 
and religious, this is not possible you will say.  I am also tempted to believe it.  But the 
thing is true nevertheless, and I will attempt to say it at great risk.”52
Religion teaches that obedience to divine law makes man independent of other 
men because it demands the obedience of each and all to the one and same immutable 
law.  A society organized on the basis of that superior law will enjoy freedom because if 
all consent to obey the same higher law then the independence of each does not conflict 
with that of all and order prevails.  In other words liberty does not have a secure 
foundation unless it is structured on moral law, which binds everyone equally to its 
precepts.  
You seem to contest the political function of religions.  Here we 
assume truly antithetical positions.  You say that the fear of God does not 
stop people from murder.  Even if this were true- and I doubt whether it is 
really true- what is the conclusion?  Whether secular or religious, the 
function of law is not to eliminate crime (which is usually the product of 
deranged instincts and of such violent passions as will not be halted by the 
mere existence of laws).  The efficacy of laws consists in their impact on 
society, in their regulation of matters of daily life, and in setting the 
general temper of habits and ideas.  Laws, and especially religious laws, 
are thus so necessary that there never has been a people of any importance 
that could do without them.  I know that there are many who now think 
that one day they may be able to do without this regimen, and every 
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morning they keep looking eagerly for this new day.  I think they are 
looking in vain.  I should even be more inclined to believe in the coming 
of some new religion than in the continuation of the prosperity and 
greatness of modern societies without religion.  If Christianity must in 
effect disappear, as many people are quick to say it, it will happen to us 
what happened to the ancients before its arrival, a long moral decay, a 
vicious and troubled old age that will end by bringing from I don’t know 
where or how a new renovation.53
Tocqueville’s conviction of the interdependence of religion and liberty drives his 
unwavering commitment to promote their harmonious coexistence in his beloved France 
and compels him to define himself as a “liberal of a new kind.” 54 It was the 
preoccupation of his whole life and he was willing to sacrifice his tranquillity to obtain it 
because he saw it as the only way to prevent democratic equality from completely 
eroding man’s capacity for greatness. “I am [convinced] that man’s true grandeur lies 
only in the harmony of the liberal sentiment and religious sentiment, both working 
simultaneously to animate and restrain souls, and [my] sole political passion for thirty 
years has been to bring about this harmony.”55
Tocqueville is convinced that liberty is more dependent on religion in 
democracies than in aristocracies for the simple reason that in the first the tempo of life 
rarely ascends above a prosaic quality whereas in the second it takes a more poetic flight.   
This difference leaves democratic citizens bereft of the ideals that foster the aristocratic 
citizen’s nobility of soul and impel him to be free of the selfish cares and pettiness that 
enslaves human beings in general and prompt them to place personal interests above 
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common ones. Being much more absorbed with their equality, which they confuse with 
liberty,56 democratic citizens are always in danger of forfeiting their right to liberty by 
neglecting to attend to the common good, the only incontestable way of preserving it. The 
individualistic notion of liberty engendered by equality leaves each too weak to combat 
alone an encroaching power.  Thus, by attending solely to his private interest democratic 
man soon finds himself fettered by the despotic power of many or one. Tocqueville 
illuminates for us the differentiation he makes between the aristocratic and democratic 
notion of liberty in an article, “Etat social et politique de la France,” he wrote for the 
London and Westminster Review in 1836 at the invitation of his friend John Stuart Mill.   
Liberty can in effect occur to the human mind under two different forms.  
One can see in it the use of a common right or the enjoyment of a 
privilege.  To want to be free in one’s actions or in a few of one’s actions, 
not because all men have a general right to independence, but because one 
possesses oneself a particular right to remain independent, such was the 
manner in which one understood liberty in the middle ages, and such it 
was almost always understood in aristocratic societies, wherein the 
conditions are very unequal, and wherein the human mind having once 
contracted the habit of privileges, ends by ranking among the number of 
privileges the usage of all the goods of this world.  This notion of liberty 
referring itself only to the man who has conceived it, or at the most to the 
class to which it belongs, can subsist in a nation where general liberty does 
not exist.  It happens even sometime that the love of liberty is all the more 
intense in some when the necessary guarantees to liberty are not to be 
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found for all.  The exception is then all the more precious as it is more 
rare.  This aristocratic notion of liberty produces in those who have 
conceived it an exalted sentiment of their individual value, a passionate 
taste for independence.  It gives to egoism energy and a singular power.  
Conceived by individuals, it has often brought men to the most 
extraordinary actions; adopted by an entire nation it has created the 
greatest people that ever were… 
Following the modern notion, the democratic notion, and I dare say the 
just notion of liberty, each man, being presumed to have receive from 
nature the necessary lights to conduct himself, holds from birth an equal 
and imprescriptible right to live independent of his fellow creatures, in all 
that is of concern only to himself, and to regulate as he wants it his own 
destiny. 
From the time that this notion of liberty has penetrated profoundly in the 
mind of a people, and has solidly establish itself, absolute and arbitrary 
power becomes no more than a material fact, a passing accident.  For each 
having an absolute right over himself, it results from this that the 
sovereign can emanate only from the union of the will of all.  From that 
time also obedience has lost its morality, and there is no middle ground 
between the masculine and proud virtues of the citizen and the low 
subservience of the slave. 
As the ranks equalize themselves in a nation, this notion of liberty tends 
naturally to prevail.57
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In comparing the different notions of liberty proper to aristocratic and modern 
democratic societies, Tocqueville points to the elitist quality of the first and the universal 
quality of the second and the political consequences that result from these differences.  In 
the first case, liberty endures not only because it is founded on force but also because it is 
a habit born of privilege, which is jealously guarded by those who possess it whether they 
are an individual, a class or a nation.  It is displayed by a proud egoism that produces 
human greatness insofar as it is premised on a code of honor that propels men to great 
actions.  In contrast, the modern democratic notion of liberty, which is founded on the 
concept of equality, is more precarious insofar as its foundation on self-reliance leads to 
opposed consequences: either equality in freedom or equality under despotism.  The first 
is possible when all make public affairs their principal affair and the second establishes 
itself when everyone is absorbed with his particular interests. Tocqueville believes 
democratic liberty can free itself from the shackles of particular interests if it incorporates 
the moral content of Christianity from which it derives its moral authority.  Without this 
moral compass, which insists on an equal moral responsibility for each man and also of 
his duties to God, to himself, and to others, it risks succumbing to a slavish 
individualism. 
Tocqueville offers a final version of his understanding of liberty in his last work, 
L’Ancien rćgime et la rćvolution published in 1856, which is almost identical to 
Winthrop’s definition whose beauty he first acclaimed in Democracy in America more 
than twenty years before.  If nothing else it shows that he did not waver over the years 
from his conviction about the interdependence of liberty and religion.  However, this 
definition of liberty defers in a significant way from Winthrop’s account insofar as liberty 
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is something more than a higher law to regulate man’s actions.  It is also a virtue and the 
soul of the one endowed with it exalts freedom, is proud and dignified, in other words he 
is a citizen.  
[t]hat which, in all times, has so strongly attached certain men’s hearts to 
[it], are its own attractions, its own peculiar charm, independent of its 
benefits; it is the pleasure of being able to speak, act, and breathe without 
constraint, under the government of God and the laws alone.  Whoever 
seeks for anything from freedom but itself is made for slavery… Do not 
ask me to analyze this sublime desire, it must be felt.  It enters of itself 
into the great hearts that God has prepared to receive it; it fills them, it 
fires them.  One must give up on making this comprehensible to the 
mediocre souls who have never felt it.58
In this definition, Tocqueville paints a version of aristocratic liberty that 
incorporates the notion of moral liberty taught him by his beloved tutor, Abbé Lesueur, 
during his lessons on Catechism and the self-governance of Rousseau’s virtuous citizen.  
It combines submission to divine law with freedom from the passions that enslave man. 
Written during the repressive years of the Second Empire this passage reflects a 
longing for the moral character Tocqueville associates with the old aristocratic feudal 
order as he beholds the national degeneracy that was leading France further and further 
away from the principles he held so dear.  He recalls with nostalgia this all too forgotten 
period in a letter to his brother Hubert de Tocqueville dated February 23, 1857 written 
while preparing his notes to undertake the writing of the second volume of L’Ancien 
régime et la révolution, which he did not have time to complete before his death.   
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For the first time in the twenty years that I have lived in this country 
[the chateau at Tocqueville in Normandy], I have undertaken to put a little 
order into all the old papers that are heaped up here in what is called the 
charter room… I have encountered the line of our fathers through nearly 
four hundred years…I noticed, in doing this reading, that three hundred 
years ago, we served as godfathers for a very large number of the 
inhabitants of the village: new proof of the sweet and paternal relations 
that, in that time, still existed between the upper and lower classes; 
relations that were replaced in so many places by sentiments of jealousy, 
suspicion, and often hatred.59
 The paternalism of the past was associated with certain reciprocal obligations that 
bound organically the relations of men in the political community to safeguard liberty.  
The nobility employed its free time, which was made possible by the labor of the 
commoners who served it, toward securing the political interests of the entire community 
by safeguarding them from the encroachment of monarchical power. Under aristocratic 
stratification, the devotion an inferior owed a superior and the protection the latter owed 
the former strengthened social cohesion insofar as the demands of mutual obligations 
caused each to forget himself to focus on the duties of his social rank.  Since this organic 
bond of human affection is broken in democracies liberty in this regime necessarily has to 
be appended to religion.  Tocqueville finds empirical evidence in his observation of 
American democracy of the need for a moral bond to replace the organic one that 
regulated human relations under aristocracy.  
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NOTES 
 
1 Until Antoine Rédier’s discoveries, fragments of Tocqueville’s correspondence whose 
importance are priceless for shedding light on his religious sentiments and convictions 
were not available to the public.  As noted in appendix A the first edition of his complete 
works, including his vast correspondence, published in the 1860’s by Madame de 
Tocqueville and his friend Gustave de Beaumont was truncated in great part to protect his 
memory and the privacy of his correspondents.  This edited publication was all that was 
available to the public until Mr. Rédier’s research early last century allowed J. P. Mayer 
to undertake in the 1950’s to compile Tocqueville’s complete works (Oeuvres 
complètes), which contain the unedited version of his invaluable correspondence.  
2 Antoine Rédier, Comme disait Monsieur de Tocqueville, (Paris: Perrin, 1925), 39. 
 
3 J. P. Mayer, Alexis de Tocqueville, (Paris: Gallimard, 1948), 16. 
 
4 Mr. Jardin states that a controversy was sparked after Tocqueville’s death about the 
status of his faith.  The commentators who viewed Tocqueville as a Catholic belonged to 
two schools: those who claim that he was always a believer; and those who have tried to 
show that toward the very end of his life he returned to Catholicism.  André Jardin, 
Tocqueville, A Biography, (NY: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1988), 528-533. 
5 In a letter, which is probably a response to one from his preceptor who apparently 
expressed sadness about his pupil’s abstention from religious practices, the 
approximately sixteen year old Tocqueville defends himself from the suspicions the good 
Abbé raised about the consequences of this fact on his good conduct.  “Not happy to 
fulfill my obligations, I have prevented others from fulfilling theirs.  I want to believe 
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that you did not think it over before accusing me of such cowardice.  I may not have 
always given good example and in this sense I may be guilty without doubt; but to turn 
another from making his salvation because I do not have the courage to make mine, to 
want to expose him to dangers so that he shares them with me, it would be an evil act of 
which, God be thanked, I do not believe myself capable.”  Letter to Abbé Lesueur (dated 
approximately 1821-1822) in Oeuvres complètes, correspondance familiale, établi par 
André Jardin, annoté par Jean-Louis Benoit et André Jardin, prefacé par Jean-Louis 
Benoit et soumis pour contrôle et approbation à Jean-Claude Casanova et Michelle Pérot, 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1998), tome XIV, 44.  (Hereafter references to this work will be shown 
as OC XIV). 
Tocqueville’s youthful sense of moral responsibility guides him to express similar 
sentiments in Democracy in America when in a general way he discusses the impact of 
false doctrines on the religious outlook of men in democratic centuries.  His views on this 
issue are doubtless drawn from introspection since they echo the sentiments expressed in 
the foregoing letter to Abbé Leseur.  “Carried along by an insensible current against 
which they do not have the courage to struggle and to which they nonetheless yield with 
regret, they abandon the faith that they love to follow the doubt that leads them to 
despair…In ceasing to believe religion true, the unbeliever continues to judge it useful.  
Considering religious beliefs under a human aspect, he recognizes their empire over 
mores, their influence on laws.  He understands how they can make men live in peace and 
prepare them gently for death.  He therefore regrets his faith after he has lost it, and 
deprived of a good of which he knows the entire value, he fears to take it away from 
those who still possess it.”  Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. & ed. 
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Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago 
Press, 2000), I, 2, 9, 286.  Also see Alexis de Tocqueville, De la démocratie en Amérique 
Oeuvres II, Bibliothèque de La Pléiade, ed. André Jardin with Jean-Claude Lamberti and 
James T. Schleifer, (Paris: editions Gallimard, 1992), I, 2, 9, 346-347. (Hereafter 
references to this work will appear as DA, volume, part, chapter for both the English 
translation and the French text with the page of the English translation preceding that of 
the French text and the two separated by a slash, e.g., DA I, 2, 9, 286/346-347).  
6 Letter to Arthur de Gobineau, September 5, 1843, in Alexis de Tocqueville, Oeuvres 
complètes: correspondence d’Alexis de Tocqueville et d’Arthur de Gobineau, 6eme ed., 
ed. J. P. Mayer, intro. J. J. Chevalier, (Paris:Gallimard, 1959), tome IX, 45-46. 
(Henceforth references to this work will appear as OC IX).    
7 Alexis de Tocqueville, Journey to America, trans. George Lawrence, ed. J. P. Mayer, 
(London: Faber & Faber LTD, 1959), 64.  See also Alexis de Tocqueville, “Voyage en 
Amérique” in Oeuvre I, Bibliothèque de La Pléiade, édition publiée sous la direction 
d’André Jardin avec pour ce volume la collaboration de Françoise Mélonio et Lise 
Quéffelec, (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), 78. (Hereafter references to this work, which 
contains Tocqueville’s travel notes abroad, will be shown as notes for a specific country 
in Oeuvres I.  In cases where it is an ibidem the page # will appear for the English text 
first and the French text last, the two separated by a slash).  It is worth noting that the 
dates for the entry under discussion here do not correspond in the English and French 
texts.  The first shows an entry dated October 12, 1831 whereas the latter shows the same 
entry on October 2, 1831. 
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8 In the same letter quoted above in note 3, Tocqueville explains his religious dilemma to 
Abbé Lesueur and begs him to show him a way out of it.  “I told you more than once that 
I believe an exemplary life and the habit of piety to be the most happy state not only for 
the other world but also for this one.  I told you that:  I believe it firmly in fact.  Although 
I am not very old, I have nevertheless already felt enough that there was not one sole 
pleasure really pure in what is named as such and that nothing could fix the inconstancy 
of the human heart if it is not a hope that does not end with life.  I feel all of that stronger 
than I can express it.  I have said it a thousand times in the intimacy of friendship, there is 
not one day that I do not regret bitterly the time in which religion was easy for me to 
follow, I have several time attempted on my own to put myself back on the road and… 
(Dots appear in the text).  Find me, my dear friend, a means to tame my own heart, to 
fight an enemy one meets everywhere, who finds sometimes enough strength in our 
weakness to choke even the voice of reason, and then I will practice, I will be much 
happier than I am, I feel it.” Letter to Abbé Lesueur (dated approximately 1821-1822) in 
OC XIV, 44. 
9 I am indebted to Antoine Rédier who first brought to my attention this very important 
distinction. Comme disait Monsieur de Tocqueville, 57 
10 DA, II, 1, 5, 419/532-533. 
 
11 Ibid, 419/533. 
 
12 Ibid, 419/533.  
13 See Françoise Mélonio for the unanimous denouncement of Tocqueville by his French 
readers, both Protestants and Catholics, for what they characterized as his apology for the 
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entrapment of religion within the bounds of reason. Tocqueville and the French, trans. 
Beth G. Raps, (Charlottesville and London: University Press of Virginia, 1998).   
Also see Sanford Kessler who argues that Tocqueville advocates a civil religion, which 
purports to be theocentric but in fact is designed to serve secular as opposed to 
transcendent or otherworldly ends, Tocqueville’s Civil Religion, (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1994).  
Finally see Jean-Claude Lamberti who asserts that Tocqueville’s religious perspective in  
Democracy in America shows that at the time he wrote this work he “had encountered 
only the God of the philosophers and the scientists.”  Tocqueville and the Two 
Democracies, trans. Arthur Goldhammer, (Cambridge and London: Harvard University 
Press, 1989), 161. 
14 Jean-Jacques Rousseau defines the concept of a social religion in the Social Contract.  
In his examination of the historical impact of religion on the civil state, Rousseau 
reserves his most scathing comments for the established Christian church, which under 
pretense of a “so-called kingdom of the other world was seen to become, under a visible 
ruler, the most violent despotism of this world.”  He differentiates between the 
Christianity of the established church and that of the Gospel. 
 [The religion of the Gospel is] the religion of the private person…[It is 
the] holy, sublime and true religion [under which] men, as children of the 
same God, look on all others as brothers, and the society which unites 
them is not dissolved by death…But this religion, having no specific 
connexion with the body politic…far from attaching the hearts of citizen 
to the state, this religion detaches them from it as from all other things of 
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this world; and I know nothing more contrary to the social spirit.  It is said 
that a people of the true Christians would form the most perfect society 
imaginable.  I see but one great flaw in this hypothesis, namely that a 
society of true Christians would not be a society of men… Christianity is a 
wholly spiritual religion, concerned with the things of heaven; the 
Christian’s homeland is not of this world.  The Christian does his duty, it 
is true, but he does it with profound indifference towards the good or ill 
success of his deeds…Christianity preaches only servitude and 
submission.  Its spirit is too favourable to tyranny for tyranny not to take 
advantage of it.  True Christians are made to be slaves they know it and 
they hardly care; this short life has too little value in their eyes… There is 
thus a profession of faith which is purely civil and of which it is the 
sovereign’s function to determine the articles, not strictly as religious 
dogmas, but as sentiments of sociability, without which it is impossible to 
be either a good citizen or a loyal subject... The dogmas of the civil 
religion must be simple and few in number, expressed precisely and 
without explanations or commentaries.  The existence of an omnipotent, 
intelligent, benevolent divinity that foresees and provides; the life to 
come; the happiness of the just; the punishment of sinners; the sanctity of 
the social contract and the law – these are the positive dogmas.  As for the 
negative dogmas, I would limit them to a single one: no intolerance.  
Intolerance is something which belongs to the religions we have rejected.”  
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Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, trans. Maurice Cranston, 
(Middlesex:  Penguin Books, 1968), bk.4, chap. 8, 179-186.  
It is unthinkable that Tocqueville, who rebukes his young protégé Arthur de Gobineau for 
suggesting that Christianity is a religion for slaves, would agree totally with Rousseau.  In 
his correspondence with Gobineau, Tocqueville undertakes a strong defense of 
Christianity, which he reproaches only for neglecting to teach the importance of public 
virtues.  Letter to Arthur de Gobineau, September 5, 1843, and Letter to Arthur de 
Gobineau, October 2, 1843 in OC IX, 45-48 and 56-62 respectively.   
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that Tocqueville, like Rousseau, recognizes the need to 
simplify the rituals of religion, or implicitly Catholicism, in order to make it more 
palatable to democratic citizens who scorn forms. DA, II, 1, 5, 421/546.      
15 See Seymour Drescher, Tocqueville and England, (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1964), 11.   
16 Tocqueville’s religious convictions have been the subject of passionate controversies 
sparked by his own admission to Madame Swetchine about the metaphysical doubts, 
which begin to assail him from the age of sixteen.  “My life until then had been spent in a 
complete security of faith which had not allowed doubt to penetrate my soul.  Then doubt 
entered in it, rather it precipitated itself in it with an extreme violence, not only the doubt 
of this or that, but universal doubt.  I felt suddenly the sensation which those who have 
assisted an earthquake speak of, when the ground shakes under their feet, the walls 
around them, the ceilings on their head, the furniture in their hands, the entire nature 
before their eyes. I was seized by the blackest melancholy, took an extreme distaste for 
life without knowing it, and somewhat assailed with confusion and terror at the sight of 
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the road left for me to follow in the world.”  Letter to Madame Sophie Swetchine, 
February 26, 1857, in Alexis de Tocqueville, Oeuvres complètes, correspondance 
d’Alexis de Tocqueville et de Francisque de Corcelle, correspondance d’Alexis de 
Tocqueville et de Madame Swetchine, ed. J. P. Mayer, volume établi par Pierre Gibert et 
soumis pour contrôle et approbation à Claude Bressolette et André Jardin, (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1983) tome XV, 315.  (Hereafter references to this work will appear as OC 
XV).     
Tocqueville also confessed to his young protégé Arthur de Gobineau that “I am not a 
believer- this I am far from stating to boast- but all unbeliever that I am, I have never 
been able to defend myself from a profound emotion in reading the Scriptures.”  See 
Letter to Arthur de Gobineau, October 2, 1843, in OC IX, 57.  Lastly, as shown 
previously in this study he makes the same admission to his tutor Abbé Lesueur and his 
friend Charles Stoffels.  
17 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, trans. & ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn 
Miller & Harold Samuel Stone, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pt. 5, 
bk. 24, chap. 1, 459.   
18 At this time only a copy of this letter, July 6, 1845, from a private collection is 
available at the Commission de publication des oeuvres de Tocqueville.  I am grateful to 
Françoise Mélonio of the Commission who kindly provided me a copy.  The Commission 
plans to publish the letter in a future volume of the Oeuvres complètes to be published 
under the title “Correspondance à divers.”  Since the letter has not been published it is 
worthwhile to reproduce it entirely here to provide the context in which Tocqueville 
makes this assertion.  Tocqueville writes to his friend Charles Stoffels, a philosopher, to 
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comment on a book he has written about religion and to explain why he disagrees with 
Stoffels’ position, which in his view is an endorsement of Montalembert’s liberal 
Catholic political agenda. (Tocqueville suspected the liberal Catholics of clericalism.  
Montalembert harbored a strong antipathy for democracy and scorn for America.  He 
eventually rallied to Tocqueville’s liberal position after the fall of the second empire in 
1852 at which time he proclaimed himself Tocqueville’s  “intellectual heir.”  Tocqueville 
and the French, 117). 
“With this book you belong to the school of Montalembert, to this school which instead 
of looking for the points by which religion and the century can draw closer seems to 
attach itself to prove where they are irreconcilable.  According to the principles of this 
school, you look for the arguments which must naturally collide harshly with the opinions 
or if you want, the prejudices of our contemporaries.  It is how you endeavor to demystify 
the Saint Bartholomew, to rehabilitate the inquisition, you praise the Monks and you 
attack the old principles of the Gallican Church.  I don’t want to discuss with you all 
these arguments.  I am of an opinion absolutely contrary to yours on many and I am not 
completely of your opinion on any.  But it is not of their truthfulness or of their absolute 
falseness that I want to speak here. What I want to address (and you will pardon me- I am 
neither a philosopher nor a theologian, but a statesman who believes in the necessity of 
religious beliefs and who desires passionately to conserve what is left of them in this 
country and to foster them, if the thing is possible-) is the extreme danger that such 
doctrines and the party which professes them and the newspapers which advocate them 
and the books which contain them have for religion and with it liberty.”    
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See also J. P. Mayer, “Tocqueville as a Political Sociologist,” Political Studies, I (1953), 
133.   
19 Letter to Madame Sophie Swetchine, February 26, 1857, in OC XV, 315.  See also 
Comme disait Monsieur de Tocqueville, 288 and Roger Boesche, The Strange Liberalism 
of Alexis de Tocqueville, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 185-186. 
20 Letter to Charles Stoffels, October 22, 1831, in Alexis de Tocqueville, Oeuvres 
complètes d’Alexis de Tocqueville, nouvelle correspondance de Alexis de Tocqueville, 
entièrement inédite, publiées par Madame de Tocqueville, (Paris: Michel Levy Frères, 
Libraires Editeurs, 1866) tome VII, 81-84.  In this publication the letter is addressed to A. 
M. Charles *** omitting the last name for the reasons of privacy mentioned earlier in 
appendix A and note 1 of the present chapter.  See also Alexis de Tocqueville, Selected 
Letters on Politics and Society, ed. Roger Boesche, trans. James Toupin and Roger 
Boesche, (Berkely and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985).  62-64.   
21 Letter to Eugène Stoffels, January 12, 1833, in Oeuvres complètes d’Alexis de 
Tocqueville, correspondance et oeuvres posthumes, (Paris: Michel Levy Frères, Libraires 
Editeurs, 1866), tome V, 422-423. (Henceforth references to this work will appear as OC 
V). 
22 DA, II, 3, 18, 591 & 593/748 & 750. 
 
23 DA, II, 2, 15, 520/659.  Tocqueville’s expresses a similar view in his analysis of Plato 
in his personal notes.  In his notes Tocqueville states that morality is the principal 
characteristic of Plato’s political doctrine, the quality that immortalizes his teaching.  See 
Alexis de Tocqueville, Oeuvres complètes, mélanges, volume établi par Françoise 
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Mélonio, soumis pour contrôle et approbation à Jean-Claude Cassanova et Pierre 
Rosanvallon, (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), 555 and note 2.   
24 Letter, April 22, 1838, in Tocqueville, Selected Letters, 130. 
 
25 Alexis de Tocqueville,  Oeuvres complètes, correspondance d’Alexis de Tocqueville et 
de Louis de Kergolay, ed. J. P. Mayer, texte établi par André Jardin, introduction et notes 
par Alain Lesourd, (Paris: Gallimard, 1977), tome XIII, 41.  (Hereafter references to this 
work will appear as OC XIII). 
26 Blaise Pascal, Pensées, Texte de l’édition Brunschwicg, intro. & notes Ch.-M. des 
Granges, (Paris: Editions Garnier Frères, 1964), nos. 219 & 220, 132. 
27 Letter to Francisque de Corcelle, December 28, 1854, in OC XV, 129. 
 
28 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile or On Education, intro., trans., and notes by Allan 
Bloom, (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1979), bk. 4, 268.    
29 Pensées, no. 131, 108. 
 
30 Letter,  January 1, 1853, in OC XV, 69. 
 
31 Pensées, no. 139, 109-110. 
  
32 Letter to Gustave de Beaumont, January 2, 1858, in Oeuvres complètes, 
correspondance d’Alexis de Tocqueville et de Gustave de Beaumont, ed. J. P. Mayer, 
texte établi, annoté et prefacé par André Jardin, (Paris: Gallimard, 1967), 529. 
33 Letter, February 3, 1857, in OC XIII, 324. 
 
34 Letter in OC XV, 314-315. 
35 Doris S. Goldstein, Trial of Faith: Religion and Politics in Tocqueville’s Thought, 
(New York, Oxford and Amsterdam: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, Inc., 
1975), 8-9.   
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36 Alexis de Tocqueville, “The European Revolution” & Correspondence with Gobineau, 
intro., ed., and trans., John Lukacs, (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1959),  bk. 1, chap. 
VII, 85-87.  
37 Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the Revolution, ed. with an introduction 
and critical apparatus by François Furet and Françoise Mélonio, trans. Alan S. Kahan, 
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), I, 1, 2, 85. See also 
Alexis de Tocqueville, Oeuvres complètes II, L’Ancien régime et la révolution, édition 
définitive publiée sous la direction de J. P. Mayer, introduction par George Lefèbvre, 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1952), I, 1, 2, 72.  (Henceforth all references to this work will appear 
as OR for the English translation and AR for the French text followed by volume, book, 
chapter, page with the pages of the English and French texts separated by a slash, e.g., 
OR/AR, I, 1, 2, 85/72). 
38 Tocqueville and the Two Democracies, 40-41.  
39 Letter to Henry Reeve,  March 22, 1837, in Alexis de Tocqueville, Oeuvres complètes, 
correpondance anglaise: correspondance d’Alexis ce Tocqueville avec Henry Reeve et 
John Stuart Mill, ed. J. P. Mayer, texte établi et annoté par J. P. Mayer et Gustave Rudler, 
intro. J. P. Mayer, (Paris: Gallimard, 1954), tome VI, 37.  (Hereafter references to this 
work will appear as OC VI).  
40 Letter to Louis de Kergolay, October 18, 1847, in OC XIII, 209.  See also Tocqueville, 
Selected Letters, 192. 
41 Ibid., 209 and  Selected Letters, 193. 
 
42 Letter to Francisque de Corcelle, November 21, 1852, in OC XV, 62. 
 
43 Letter to Francisque de Corcelle, December 17, 1852, in ibid., 67. 
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44 Letter to Louis de Kergolay,  March 27, 1828, in Tocqueville,  Selected Letters, 35. 
 
45 “The European Revolution” & Correspondence with Gobineau, bk. 5, chap. III, 169-
170. 
46 Letter to Arthur de Gobineau, January 24, 1857, in OC IX, 280.  See also ibid., 309.   
 
47 Tocqueville uses the term “démocratie” to designate the social state of the Anglo-
Americans, which is characterized by equality of conditions or to designate a type of 
political regime characterized by the sovereignty of the people. Nevertheless, it was 
difficult to define the latter at the time Tocqueville wrote the two Democracies.  We find 
evidence of this in an exchange of letters between Tocqueville and Kergolay in which 
Tocqueville seeks from his friend some clarification on one of the chapters he is writing 
for the second volume of Democracy in America.  In his response Kergolay emphasizes 
the meaning of democracy as it is understood in the 19th century to make his point.  He 
states: “It is both a social state and a political state.  The first is the social movement 
toward equality and the second is still difficult to assess insofar as its essential and 
fundamental constitution is not yet a reality.”  Letter to Tocqueville from Kergolay, June 
6, 1838, in OC XIII, 17.  
 It is worth noting that Roger Boesche among others has shown that Tocqueville’s 
political vocabulary is sometimes not as clear as his ideas, because it reflects the new and 
still changing realities of the 19th  century.  Likewise, Jean-Claude Lamberti reports that 
scholars, including George Wilson Pierson (Tocqueville and Beaumont in America, 6-7 
with note, 158-159 and note, 165-166 and 757-758), Jack Lively (The Social and Political 
Thought of Alexis de Tocqueville, 49-50), James T. Schleifer (The Making of 
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Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, 263-274 with notes, 345-347), and Marvin 
Zetterbaum (Tocqueville and the Problem of Democracy, 53-54), have identified at least 
half a dozen distinct meanings to his use of the term “démocratie.”  Lamberti compiles in 
a footnote the eleven different definitions of the word “démocratie” Schleifer found in 
Democracy in America.  They are:  
(1) a fact;  
(2) an irresistible tendency; 
 (3) a social revolution; 
 (4) a social state; 
 (5) the sovereignty of the people;  
(6) the practical realization of the idea of popular sovereignty; 
 (7) the people (sometimes all the people, sometimes the “lower classes”); 
 (8) mobility;  
(9) the middle classes;  
(10) equality of conditions; and 
 (11) the feeling of equality. 
  Lamberti compiles these various meanings into two groups that correspond to my 
understanding of the term as described above:  (a) the democratic social state (i.e., 4, 
together with 1, 2, 3, 8, 10, and 11), and (b) government of the people, consisting of 5 
and 6.  As for 7 and 9 Lamberti believes they can have either a political or sociological 
interpretation, depending on the context.  To support this last claim, he adduces 
Democracy in America, I, 2, 5, 217: “The Government of the Middle Classes,” and 
Democracy in America, II, 2, 10, 135: “The Passion for Material Well-Being is 
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Essentially a Middle-Class Passion.”  Tocqueville and the Two Democracies, 258, notes 
12 and 14.    
48 Tocqueville is particularly critical of Islam in Democracy in America for confounding 
divine law with political maxims and civil and criminal law.  Given his belief that it is 
best to maintain the separation of Church and state in democracy to prevent the 
identification of divine law with the instability inherent in the political laws, he implicitly 
suggests the incompatibility of Islam and democracy.  DA,II, 1, 5, 419/533-534. 
Tocqueville makes his most scathing remarks about Islam in a private letter, October 22, 
1843, to Arthur de Gobineau, his young protégé and later Chef de Cabinet during his 
tenure as France’s Minister of Foreign Affairs with whom he had many disagreements 
about politics, religion, and Gobineau’s materialist theory on race.  “While you are so 
severe with the religion [Christianity] which, after all, did so much to establish our 
leadership among the human race, it seems that you have a certain weakness for 
Islamism.  This makes me think of another friend whom I met in Africa, where he had 
become converted to the Mohammedan religion.  I was not impressed by this spectacle.  I 
often studied the Koran when concerned with our relations with the Moslem populations 
of Algiers and the Orient.  I must say that I emerged convinced that there are in the entire 
world few religions with such disastrous consequences for men than that of Mohammed.  
To me it is the primary cause of the now visible decadence of the Islamic world, and 
though it may be less absurd than the polytheism of the antiques, its social and political 
tendencies are, in my opinion, more to be feared, compared to paganism.  I see it more 
like a decline rather than a progress.  Here is something that it would be possible for me, I 
believe, to demonstrate to you clearly, if you ever had the bad idea to have yourself 
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circumcised.” See OC IX, 68-69.  See also “The European Revolution” and 
Correspondence with Gobineau, 212. 
Nevertheless, if Tocqueville shows an instinctive intellectual distaste for Islam he does 
not for this reason discount its occasional openness to enlightenment.  “Islamism has not 
been inscrutable to enlightenment; it has often admitted in its bosom certain sciences or 
certain arts.”  Tocqueville takes this position to object to  the more extreme view being 
propagated in the France of the 1840’s that the Arabs are an inferior race comparable to 
the red-skinned Indians.  By discounting the ancient civilization of the Arabs these 
theories hoped to justify the total subjugation of the Algerians and their eventual 
extinction to make way for colonialism.  Tocqueville argued it was in France’s interest to 
reinvigorate and not continue to destroy the civilization of the Muslim societies it found 
in Africa, “as imperfect and backward as it is.”  In one of his many prescient moments 
Tocqueville issues the following warning in his May 24, 1847,  “Rapports sur L’Algérie” 
to the Chamber of Deputies.  “The religious passions that the Koran inspires are to us, 
they say, hostile, and it is good to let them extinguish themselves in superstition and 
ignorance, through lack of jurists and priests.  It would be to commit a great foolishness 
to attempt it.  When religious passions exist in a nation, they always find men who take 
upon themselves to take advantage of them and drive them.  Let disappear the natural and 
regular interpreters of religion, you will not abolish the religious passions, you will only 
hand the discipline of them to the furious or to the impostors.  We know today that it was 
the fanatical mendicants, belonging to the secret associations, sort of irregular and 
ignorant clergy, who enflamed the mind of the population in the last insurrection, and 
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brought the war [of Bou Maza in 1844-1845].  “Rapports sur L’Algérie 1847” in Oeuvre 
I, 815-816 and note 1, 1541.     
49 Letter, February 1, 1837, in OC XIII, 446.  See Tocqueville and England, 12.   
50 DA, II, 1, 2, 409/521. 
 
51 Cotton Mather, Magnalia Christi Americana, Books I and II, ed. Kenneth B. Murdock 
with the assistance of Elizabeth W. Miller, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1977), 224.  See also DA, I, 1, 2, 42/46. 
52 Letter to Eugène Stoffels, July 24, 1836, in OC V, 432-433.   
53 Letter to Arthur de Gobineau, October 22, 1843, in OC IX, 68.  See also “The 
European Revolution” and Correspondence with Gobineau, 211-212.   
54 Letter to Eugène Stoffels, July 24, 1836, in OC V, 431. 
 
55 Letter to Claude-Francois (nicknamed Francisque by Tocqueville) de Corcelle, 
September 17, 1853, in OC XV, 81.  See also Tocqueville,  Selected Letters, 295. 
56 Antoine Rédier argues that in the preface of Democracy in America, Tocqueville 
himself uses the terms equality and liberty interchangeably.  He explains there is indeed a 
common point between the two if they are examined from the perspective of Christianity, 
which in making all men equal, made them free one from the other.  However, 
Tocqueville knows too well that it is a false proposition to assume that a democratic man 
is a free man.  Comme disait Monsieur de Tocqueville, 93-96. 
57 Alexis de Tocqueville, “Etat social et politique de la France avant et depuis 1789” in 
AR, I, 62-63. (The English text is not cited because the essay is not included in the 
English translation).   
58 OR/AR, I, 3, 4, 217/217.   
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MONTESQUIEU’S INFLUENCE ON TOCQUEVILLE’S RELIGIOUS 
TEACHING: HOW TOCQUEVILLE CAME TO IDENTIFY AMERICAN 
BELIEFS WITH A MODIFIED REPUBLICAN VIRTUE  
 
The objective of this chapter is to show that Tocqueville’s religious  doctrine as it 
is articulated in the first volume of Democracy in America is primarily an adaptation of 
America’s unique system of beliefs to Montesquieu’s framework of principles to explain 
the soul of the American democratic regime.  America provides Tocqueville a fertile 
ground in which to test Montesquieu’s theories because it is a federation of democratic 
republics that combines various political characteristics identified by Montesquieu as 
proper to this type of regime including, inter alia, democracy’s love of equality and 
republican virtue.  Moreover, America has the rare distinction of having inherited the 
characteristics Montesquieu asserts are proper only to England: a spirit of liberty; a 
commercial spirit; and a spirit of religion.  Montesquieu’s theoretical structure allows 
Tocqueville to explain how despite apparent “indifference to [religious dogmas],” Anglo-
Americans produced nonetheless a morally ordered democracy.1    By drawing on his 
knowledge of Montesquieu he is able to explain the American religious phenomenon, 
which combines an equal fervor for material well-being and systematic piety. 
More specifically, the chapter will argue that Montesquieu illuminates for 
Tocqueville how the moral values of Americans are a synthesis of religious practice, 
republican ethics, and commercial habits bred by a tradition of liberty inherited from 
England.  This perspective enables him to show that the American religious spirit stems 
less from dogmatic convictions than from habits developed to inculcate moral order in 
society to facilitate the parallel objectives of commerce and the republic.  Thus, in 
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following Montesquieu, Tocqueville is able to show that the Anglo-American 
commercial spirit breeds an enlightened self-interest that functions as a substitute for 
virtue insofar as it contributes to the well-being of the republic.  In fact, the Americans of 
the nineteenth century exemplified for Tocqueville what Montesquieu before him had 
concluded: an egalitarian republic produces neither great vices nor heroic virtues but 
mores that produce well-ordered mediocrity.2 In short, the chapter demonstrates that 
Tocqueville’s conclusion about the status of religion in the American republic at the end 
of the first volume is less a blanket articulation of his religious doctrine than that of a 
systemization of the common principles that constitutes the unique beliefs of Anglo-
Americans.  
Tocqueville’s political philosophy with its emphasis on morality is partially 
structured on Montesquieu’s determination that virtue is the principle of democracy, i.e., 
the nourishing spring most necessary to its survivability,3 although it is Rousseau who 
ultimately helps him to identify the modern democratic character and the means by which 
to instill it with virtue, a subject that will be explored in greater detail in the next chapter.  
Nevertheless, this chapter aims to show that Tocqueville adduces Rousseau’s concept of 
sovereignty embodied in America’s township government to illustrate that Montesquieu’s 
emphasis on making virtue the object of education in a democratic republican regime4  
remains valid for modern democracy, with the caveat that modern democratic virtue 
requires a moral component that religion alone provides. Thus, with this stipulation 
Tocqueville modifies Montesquieu’s teaching to accommodate the needs of modern 
democracy.  His visit to America gave empirical evidence to Tocqueville that a 
republican government more than any other needs what Montesquieu refers to as the 
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power of education because “political virtue is a renunciation of oneself, which is always 
a very painful thing.”5  
 
A digression is in order here to recapitulate Tocqueville’s concept of virtue.  It is 
important to recall that Tocqueville associates virtue with liberty, more specifically 
liberty of conscience to obey moral law which makes political liberty possible; it is only 
between these two poles that a balance between duties and rights respectively can be 
found within the modern democratic state.   For Tocqueville liberty is possible only when 
man exercises moral responsibility, which he learns from religion.  “Liberty is in truth a 
sacred thing.  Only one other thing is more worthy of the name: virtue.  And what is 
virtue, if not free choice of what is good?”6
It is his determination to interlace liberty with religion and morality that causes 
Tocqueville to call for “a new political science…for a world altogether new”7 and to 
define himself as a “liberal of a new kind,” to differentiate himself from other liberals.  
Classical liberalism, with its emphasis on the political and economic rights of the 
individual, tends to promote in Tocqueville’s view a disheartening indifference to the 
civic virtue that contributed to the greatness of the ancient republics Montesquieu 
studied.  Classical liberalism encourages the devaluation of political virtue by privileging 
individual rights that favor material well-being over civic duty.  It displaces virtue insofar 
as it presumes that individual happiness takes precedence over the duties of citizenship 
thereby creating a moral vacuum in which the individual is left politically and 
intellectually too isolated to secure his liberty. 
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Tocqueville’s “new liberalism” is as much a product of his Catholic upbringing as 
that of his aristocratic heritage insofar as it places respectively as much emphasis on the 
individual’s equal right to liberty as on the citizen’s moral duty to procure it.  In this 
respect he conceives political virtue as a religious duty in an age in which it does not 
emanate from aristocratic honor.  Put another way he believes political freedom in 
democracy is attainable only through moral freedom.  He wants to correct classical 
liberalism by infusing it with the religious morality that makes political freedom possible 
under a system of equality.   
In sum, his liberalism places great emphasis on religion because he believes that 
in the absence of an aristocratic corps to “maintain the human mind in faith”8 and manage 
public affairs9 religion should extend its field of moral inculcation to include public 
duties as well as private ones. He finds one great weakness in Christianity’s otherwise 
admirable moral foundation- that of neglecting to emphasize in the Church’s teaching the 
importance of public virtues.  “The duties of men to one another as citizens, the citizen’s 
obligations to the fatherland, seem to me poorly defined and relatively neglected in 
Christian ethics.  That, it seems to me, is the weak point of that admirable moral system, 
just as it was the only really strong point of ancient morality.”10  This gross oversight is 
all the more worrisome in the new age of democracy for the reason stated above.  The 
lack of emphasis on public morality in the Church’s teaching continues to preoccupy him 
up until his untimely death at the age of 54 on April 16, 1859 as outlined in the letters 
below to his friend Sophie Swetchine dated September 10, 1856 and October 20, 1856 
respectively. 
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There are, it seems to me, two distinct parts to morality, each of 
which is as important as the other in the eyes of God, but which in our 
days, His ministers teach us with a very unequal ardor.  The one relates to 
private life: these are the relative duties of people as fathers, as sons, as 
wives or husbands… (the dots appear in the text) The other concerns 
public life: these are the duties that every citizen has toward his country 
and the human society to which he belongs.  Am I mistaken in believing 
that the clergy of our time is very occupied with the first portion of 
morality and very little occupied with the second?  That seems to me 
especially apparent in the way in which women feel and think.  I see a 
great number of them who have a thousand private virtues in which the 
direct and beneficial action of religion is to be perceived; who, thanks to 
it, are very faithful wives, excellent mothers; who show themselves to be 
indulgent toward their servants, charitable toward the poor… (the dots 
appear in the text)  But as to that part of duties that is related to public life, 
they do not seem to have the least idea.  Not only do they not practice 
them for themselves, which is natural enough, but they do not seem even 
to have any thought of inculcating them in those on whom they have 
influence.  That is an aspect of education that is as if it were invisible to 
them.  It was not like this under the Old Regime, which, amidst many 
vices, included proud and manly virtues.  I have often heard it said that my 
grandmother, who was a very saintly woman, after having recommended 
to her young son the exercise of all the duties of private life, did not fail to 
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add: “And then, my child, never forget that a man above all owes himself 
to his homeland; that there is no sacrifice that he must not make for it; that 
he cannot rest indifferent to its fate, and that God demands of him that he 
always be ready to consecrate, if need be, his time, his fortune, and even 
his life to the service of the state and of the king.”11  
It is noteworthy that the exchange of letters between Tocqueville and Madame 
Swetchine cited in this section focus on Madame Swetchine’s interpretation of L’Ancien 
régime et la révolution, which had just been published on June 16, 1856.  Madame 
Swetchine praised the book but challenged Tocqueville on two points of extreme 
importance to him: religion and liberty.  Madame Swetchine not only disagreed with 
Tocqueville on the role of public education he wants to assign to the Church but also for 
exalting feudal and aristocratic liberty in his work.  With respect to the first, Madame 
Swetchine affirms that the Catholic Church would compromise her mission, which is the 
revelation of divine truth, if she undertook to put herself under the exclusive service of 
any regime.  Moreover, she argues that feudalism is the most reprehensible political 
system because the greatness it produced was limited to one class.  The only conceivable 
liberty for her is one that can be counted among the goods that God has equally given to 
all his creatures, including youth, strength, health, intelligence, etc.   
Tocqueville responds to her criticism by stating that he shares her noble views 
about everything that resembles slavery12 and that in praising aristocratic liberty he only 
wants to emphasize the importance to democracy of making sure that political equality 
does not become synonymous with the equal subjection of all to one master.  He provides 
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her a clarification of his views in a subsequent letter about the specific role he would like 
the Church to take in fulfilling the crucially important undertaking of educating citizens.   
I am not asking priests to make it a duty of conscience for the men 
whose education is confided to them or on whom they exercise an 
influence that they be favorable to the republic or the monarchy.  
However, I admit that I would like them to say more often that at the same 
time that they are Christians they belong to one of these great human 
associations that God has established without doubt to attach individuals 
one to another, associations that are called nations and whose territory is 
called the homeland.  I would desire that they cause to penetrate further in 
men’s souls that each owes himself to this collective being before 
belonging to himself.  That with regard to this being, it is not permitted to 
fall into indifference, even less so to make of this indifference a sort of 
soft virtue which enervates some of the most noble instincts that have been 
given to us; that all are responsible for what happens to it; and that all, 
depending on their lights, are held to work constantly for its prosperity and 
to guard over it so that they are only submitted to beneficent, respectable 
and legitimate authorities.13      
The foregoing letters clarify the considerations that fuel Tocqueville’s desire to 
appeal to religion to inspire patriotism in democracy.  In the absence of the manly spirit 
that was the foundation of this noble virtue in aristocracy, he wants the Church to instill 
in citizens the idea that devotion to their homeland is as much an important part of their 
moral duty as any other.  By giving patriotism divine sanction he hopes to awaken the 
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democratic citizen to the importance of civic virtue, which in his view is the best 
corrective to the inherent propensity of modern democracy to stifle liberty.   
It is incontrovertible for Tocqueville that liberalism’s exaltation of individual 
rights and its tendency to privilege private interest over public good has displaced 
political virtue.  Liberal individualism emphasizes less obedience to moral law than 
obedience to a selfish passion for material well-being.  It is the same thing as egoism, 
which has always existed, but because it permeates democratic society it leads to dreadful 
consequences for the body politic.  It must be corrected lest it leads the individual down a 
path straight to servitude.  The isolation it encourages makes the individual weak, 
powerless and disposes citizens, who prize private tranquility above all else, to surrender 
their liberty to the first self-proclaimed shepherd who they believe will secure it for 
them.14
Tocqueville believes a moral education that emphasizes the citizen’s duties is of 
the utmost necessity in an egalitarian state, especially in France where the absence of 
institutions to promote public virtue combined with the democratic instinct to focus 
solely on one’s personal interest have made equality alternatively synonymous with 
anarchy and despotism.  A moral education founded on the same immutable law must 
direct individual action to bind citizens to one another by a sense of moral duty.  A 
religious based morality is much more necessary in the democratic state because men are 
no longer bound each to the other by the reciprocal duties that existed under the immobile 
class structure of aristocratic hierarchy.  Therefore, in a democratic republic the laws of 
education and those of the legislator must be premised on moral principles that promote 
virtue. 15     
 95
Tocqueville discovered during his sojourn in the United States that the Americans 
had found an effective way to combat the democratic tendency to surrender to a selfish 
individualism.   
But when I came to examine attentively the state of society, I 
discovered without difficulty that Americans had made great and fortunate 
efforts to combat these weaknesses of the human heart and to correct these 
natural defects of democracy… 
It seemed to me that American legislators had come, not without 
success, to oppose the idea of rights to sentiments of envy; to the 
continuous movements of the political world, the immobility of religious 
morality; the experience of the people, to its theoretical ignorance, and its 
habit of business, to the enthusiasm of its desires.16
Tocqueville returns to this theme again in the second volume of Democracy in 
America to reiterate the responsibility legislators have in promoting virtue by means of 
religion. 
Legislators of democracies and all honest and enlightened men 
who live in them must therefore apply themselves relentlessly to raising 
up souls and keeping them turned toward Heaven.  It is necessary for all 
those who are interested in the future of democratic societies to unite, and 
for all in concert to make continuous efforts to spread within these 
societies a taste for the infinite, a sentiment of greatness, and a love of 
immaterial pleasures.17  
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Tocqueville emphasizes the need to impregnate modern democratic virtue with a 
moral component because America presents for him evidence of its positive effect on the 
modern democratic character:  in America religion and interest create a moral hybrid that 
accommodates the modern democratic instinct. This American phenomenon causes him 
to concede soon upon his arrival in New York from France on May 10, 1831 that a 
different moral tenet has replaced in this country the one that animated the republics of 
antiquity.  The principle of subordinating private interests to the general good that 
maintained the ancient republics and in that sense made them virtuous was not the one 
operative in the American republic.  Already on May 29, 1831 he was writing the 
following in his travel notebook.   
The principle of this one [America] seems to be to make private 
interests harmonize with the general interest.  A sort of refined and 
intelligent selfishness seems to be the pivot on which the whole machine 
turns.  These people here do not trouble themselves to find out whether 
public virtue is good, but they do claim to prove that it is useful.  If the 
latter point is true, as I think it is in part, this society can pass as 
enlightened, but not as virtuous.  But up to what extent can the two 
principles of individual well-being and the general good in fact be 
merged?  How far can a conscience, which one might say was based on 
reflection and calculation, master those political passions which are not 
yet born, but which certainly will be born?  That is something which only 
the future will show. 
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When one reflects on the nature of this society here, one sees to 
some extent the explanation of what I have just written; American society 
is composed of a thousand different elements recently assembled. 
The men who live under its laws are still English, French, German 
and Dutch.  They have neither religion, morals, nor ideas in common; up 
to the present one cannot say that there is an American character, at least 
unless it is the very fact of not having any.  There is no common memory, 
no national attachments here.  What then can be the only bond that unites 
the different parts of the body? Interest.18   
Can private interests alone dispel the political passions that destroy liberty?  
Tocqueville answers this question a few months later by modifying Montesquieu’s claim 
that virtue is the principle that maintains republics.  An entry in his travel notebook dated 
November 30, 1831 shows an adjustment to reflect the new perspective he gains from 
observing American democracy. 
Another point that America demonstrates is that virtue is not, as 
has long been claimed, the only thing that maintains republics, but that 
enlightenment, more than any other thing, makes this social condition 
easy.  The Americans are scarcely more virtuous than others; but they are 
infinitely more enlightened (I speak of the masses) than any other people I 
know; I do not only want to say that there are more people there who 
know how to read and write (a matter to which perhaps more importance 
is attached than is due), but the body of people who have understanding of 
public affairs, knowledge of the laws and of precedents, feeling for the 
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well-understood interests of the nation and the faculty to understand them, 
is greater there than in any other place in the world.19   
 
America forces Tocqueville to reframe the lessons on republican principle taught 
by Montesquieu, viz., that the virtue of a republic is simply love of the republic.20 He 
finds that the ancient republican virtue Montesquieu praises has been replaced in 
American democracy by an enlightened selfishness that nonetheless produces similar 
benefits for the republic. The lesson of America brings Tocqueville by a circuitous path 
to agree with Montesquieu that love of the republic in a democracy is that of the 
democracy; and the love of the democracy is that of equality.21  Tocqueville draws on the 
Anglo-American experience to show that in modern democracy the only way to achieve 
the result noted by Montesquieu is to “hasten to unite in the eyes of the people individual 
interest to the interest of the country, for disinterested love of one’s native country is 
fleeing away without return.” 22  
 However, with respect to France he finds that the democratic passion for equality  
has produced an unenlightened selfishness-- shaped by the circumstances in which 
equality was established there-- that has destroyed all notions of public spirit.  This 
particular case brings him to disagree partially with Montesquieu who maintains that love 
of the republic is compatible with love of equality insofar as these two passions 
conjointly lead each to place the interest of country above his own particular interests.  
Montesquieu’s study of the ancient democratic republics leads him to this conclusion 
because love of equality in these states was synonymous with love of frugality, which 
means that equality was limited to the happiness of striving to surpass other citizens’ 
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ability to make the greatest sacrifices for one’s country.23  In contrast in France love of 
equality gives rise to class envy and hatred and an all-consuming passion for material 
well-being that entirely debilitate public virtue.    
Despite these modifications, Montesquieu remains an important point of reference 
for Tocqueville inasmuch as he elucidates for him one of the particular attributes that 
keeps the American’s preoccupation with his private interest from completely debilitating 
public virtue in this nation. Virtue in America does not emanate from the selfless love of 
the republic but from the restive commercial spirit that animates a passion for order and 
regularity of mores,24 habits that are indispensable to the management of prosperous 
affairs.  The commercial spirit emulates virtue because it is closely linked to the interest 
of the Americans who “carry the habits of trade into politics.”25   
Commerce softens mores by producing in men a certain sentiment for “exact 
justice” and wherever it exists mores are sweet because it creates mutual needs that can 
only be satisfied by virtuous mores,26 albeit self-interested ones in modern democracies.  
Adducing England, Montesquieu shows that her propensity to subordinate her political to 
her commercial interests without adverse political effects shows how well liberty and 
commerce are suited one to the other.27  In fact, he asserts that England is the country in 
the world, which has known best how to value simultaneously these three great things: 
religion, commerce and liberty.28
Once again Tocqueville agrees partly with Montesquieu’s assertion that there is a 
hidden connection between liberty and commerce.  However, if for Montesquieu the 
spirit of commerce naturally engenders in men the spirit of liberty for Tocqueville this 
relationship is reversed.  He believes on the contrary that it is the spirit and habits of 
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liberty that produce the spirit and habits of commerce.  He argues it is the first that 
generates the second based on his observations of world history, which show that free 
nations have existed without engaging in commerce whereas all commercial nations have 
been free.  
To be free, one must know how to conceive a difficult undertaking 
and to persevere in it, to have the habit to act on one’s own initiative; to 
live free, one must habituate oneself to an existence full of agitation and 
peril; to watch ceaselessly and to keep every minute a watchful eye about 
oneself: this is the price of liberty.  All these things are equally necessary 
to succeed in commerce. 
When I see the direction imparted to the human spirit in England 
by political life, when I see the Englishman sure of the aid of his laws, 
relying on himself and seeing no obstacle but in the limit of his own 
powers, acting without constraint; when I see him animated by the idea 
that he can do anything, looking incessantly upon the present with anxiety 
and seeking everywhere the best; when I see him thus, I do not look to see 
whether nature has carved out ports for him, provided the coal, given the 
iron.  The cause of his commercial prosperity is not there: it is within 
himself.29  
Tocqueville’s description of the commercial spirit that animates the English is 
identical to his portrait of the restlessness that drives the Anglo-American’s unrelenting 
search to better his lot.  The American displays a “commercial and mercantile spirit”30 
which, like that of the Englishman, is the product of the liberty he enjoys.    
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Howsoever powerful and impetuous the course of history is here 
[America], imagination always goes in advance of it, and the picture is 
never large enough.  There is no country in the world where man more 
confidently takes charge of the future, or where he feels with more pride 
that he can fashion the universe to please himself.  It is a movement of the 
mind which can only be compared with that which brought about the 
discovery of the New World three centuries ago.  And in fact, one might 
say that America has been discovered for a second time…[T]he American 
has no time to attach himself to anything, he is only accustomed to change 
and ends by looking on it as the natural state of man.  Much more, he feels 
the need of it, he loves it, for instability instead of causing disasters for 
him, seems only to bring forth wonders around him. (The idea of a 
possible improvement, of a successive and continuous betterment of the 
social condition, that idea is ever before him in all its facets).31  
In Democracy in America, Tocqueville argues that the commercial spirit of 
Americans is one among the causes that maintain their republics.32  He describes the 
American republics “like companies of merchants formed to exploit in common the 
wilderness lands of the New World, and busy in a commerce that is prospering.”33  The 
powerful influence of this spirit on political actions and opinions is rendered memorable 
by Tocqueville in the following anecdote. 
  During his stay in America circumstances compelled him to seek refuge one 
night at the door of a wealthy planter in Pennsylvania.  This planter was a Frenchman 
who Tocqueville recognized by name.  This Frenchmen happened to be “a great leveler 
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and an ardent demagogue” who forty years before had been expelled from France for his 
political opinions.  Tocqueville expresses his astonishment at hearing this man discourse 
on the right of property with the expertise of an economist, extol the necessary hierarchy 
that fortune establishes among men, obedience to established law, the influence of good 
mores in republics and the assistance that religious ideas lend to order and freedom.  He 
attributes one cause for the complete change in the man’s judgment and newfound 
enlightenment: the new well-being he had acquired in America’s vast landscape of 
commercial opportunities.34      
 
How Montesquieu Illuminates for Tocqueville that the Common Features America 
Shares with England Contributes to its Democratic Success  
 
When he published the first volume of Democracy in America in January 1835, 
Tocqueville’s friend and mentor Pierre-Paul Royer-Collard35 acknowledged his masterful 
analysis of democracy in the modern world with the following acclamation: “since 
Montesquieu there has been nothing like it.”36  Indeed, Tocqueville uses Montesquieu’s 
method of identifying the dominant feature that governs a society and constitutes its 
“general spirit,”37 to understand the modern democratic regime as he found it in America.  
Thinking of his native France whose encounter with democracy had coincided with more 
than thirty years of succeeding revolutions he ponders the means for directing her toward 
a moral equilibrium between private interests and the public good comparable to that 
which America has achieved.  Montesquieu provides the tools to guide him toward his 
objective.  
Tocqueville not only resorts to Montesquieu to discover how the laws might 
contribute to shaping the “general spirit” of democracy in France but he also shares his 
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teacher’s interest in England as a comparative model of liberty to be emulated beside 
America.  Tocqueville carried a lifelong fascination with England, which represents for 
him a closer ideal of the type of government he wanted to see emerge in France’s 
movement toward democracy.  England is primarily an aristocratic state that contains a 
modicum of democratic elements whereas America is completely democratic, the only 
feature that differentiates it from England.  France for its part is an incongruous mixture 
of England’s tradition of social inequality and America’s legal equality. Thus, although 
Tocqueville attributes a greater influence to mores than to laws in the success of 
American democracy,38 he recognizes that laws will have to shape mores to establish in 
France the same tradition of liberty America shares with England.  
The most tangible account left by Tocqueville of the vision he had for democracy 
in France is provided below in letters to Eugène Stoffels, Claude-François de Corcelle 
and Louis de Kergolay respectively.  The letter to Stoffels written on October 5, 1836, 
about twenty-one months after the publication of the first volume of Democracy in 
America outlines his political view for France whereas the ones to Corcelle and 
Kergolay, which follow it, bring into perspective how England epitomizes the vision he 
had in mind for France. 
And what do I want?  Let us distinguish, in order to understand 
each other better, between the end and the means.  What is the end?  What 
I want is not a republic, but a hereditary monarchy.  I would even prefer it 
to be legitimate rather than elected like the one we have, because it would 
be stronger, especially externally.  What I want is a central government 
energetic in its own sphere of action.  Energy from the central government 
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is even more necessary among a democratic people in whom the social 
force is more diffused than in an aristocracy.  Besides our situation in 
Europe lays down an imperative law for us in what should be a thing of 
choice.  But I wish that this central power had a clearly delineated sphere, 
that it were involved with what is a necessary part of its functions and not 
with everything in general, and that it were forever subordinated, in its 
tendency, to public opinion and to the legislative power that represents this 
public opinion.  I believe that the central power can be invested with very 
great prerogatives, can be energetic and powerful in its sphere, and that at 
the same time provincial liberties can be developed…I wish that general 
principles of government were liberal, that the largest possible part were 
left to the action of individuals, to personal initiatives.  I believe that all 
these things are compatible; even more, I am profoundly convinced that 
there will never be order and tranquility except when they are successfully 
combined. 
As for the means:  with all those who admit that we must make our 
way gradually toward this goal, I am very much in accord.  I am the first 
to admit that it is necessary to proceed slowly, with precaution, with 
legality.  My conviction is that our current institutions are sufficient for 
reaching the result I have in view.  Far, then, from wanting to violate the 
laws, I profess an almost superstitious respect for the laws.  But I wish that 
the laws would tend little and gradually toward the goal I have just 
indicated, instead of making powerless and dangerous efforts to turn back.  
 105
I wish that the government would itself prepare mores and practices so 
that people would do without it in many cases in which its intervention is 
still necessary or invoked without necessity…39   
Tocqueville did not change his perspective, which remained consistent for over 
twenty years as will be shown presently.  His sketch of a government he believed would 
conform to France’s very particular circumstances appears in many respects to be 
modeled on England’s mixture of aristocratic and liberal principles.  The letters below 
written following his second visit to England in June-July 1857, approximately two years 
before his death, supports this study’s view. 
On July 29, 1857, he writes to Corcelle: 
I have so much to say on England, which I have seen again after 
twenty years and with a much greater experience of men, that I would 
need several letters to give an account of the sensations I have received 
and the ideas that have passed through my mind in the presence of the 
spectacle I had before my eyes. 
It is the greatest spectacle there is in the world, although 
everything in it is not great… 
[W]hat one sees everywhere is the union and understanding that 
exist among all the men who belong to the enlightened classes, from the 
beginning of the bourgeoisie to the highest of the aristocracy, for 
defending the society and freely leading it in common.  I do not envy 
England its riches and its power, but I envy it that; and I took a deep 
breath on finding myself for the first time in so many years, beyond those 
 106
class hatreds and jealousies that, after having been the source of all our 
miseries, have destroyed our liberty. 
England made me feel a second joy of which I have been deprived 
for a very long time; it made me see a perfect accord between the religious 
world and the political world, private virtues and public virtues, 
Christianity and liberty…40
And on August 4, 1857 he writes to Kergolay:  
You understand well that I did not spend my time in England 
without looking around in curiosity.  I still found England more 
aristocratic in appearance than the way at least I had left it twenty years 
ago.  The democratic ferment, which at that time had climbed to the 
surface, has disappeared and all the upper classes appear to get along 
better to lead in common the affairs than at the period of which I speak.  
What a grand spectacle, but for a Frenchman who makes a return on 
himself what a sad spectacle!  There is not a single one of my theoretical 
ideas on the practice of political liberty and on what allows its use to men 
that did not appear once more to me to be wholly justified by everything 
that I had under my eyes!  The more I penetrated the detail of the manner 
in which the affairs are conducted, the more these truths seem to me 
demonstrated; for, it is the way in which the smallest affairs are managed 
that makes one understand what is going on in the great ones.  If one 
wanted to limit himself to study the English political world from the top 
he would never understand anything.  But to come back to this great 
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problem of our time: not only does the aristocracy seem more solidly 
seated than ever, but the nation leaves evidently without a complaint the 
government in the hands of a very small number of families.  Nevertheless 
and despite this appearance, I believe that the movement that is 
imperiously pushing all the other nations in an anti-aristocratic direction, 
carries little by little and slowly England itself.   There should be more 
time than I have to explain to you what makes me believe this.  I limit 
myself to give you my general impression which is that the aristocracy, 
especially the one which is combined with birth, continues to govern less 
than before by a dominating force that is its own than by a sort of tacit and 
voluntary agreement of the other classes which leave it willingly at the 
head of the affairs, as long as the affairs will be well managed.  I believe 
that great reverses and especially flaws would easily enough make the 
other classes appear suddenly in the government.  It seems to me that such 
is the sentiment of the clever ones even among the governing class and 
this sentiment will preserve them undoubtedly for a long time yet from a 
fall…41  
England is pivotal to Tocqueville’s analysis of democracy not only because like 
Montesquieu he admires its traditions of liberty and religion but also because he credits 
these habits, which the Americans inherited from England for the development of a free 
democracy in this country.  His solution for France lies somewhere between the social 
harmony England manages to maintain in its march toward democracy and the 
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achievement of the Americans who have made these English habits the pillars of 
democracy.   
Throughout his commentary, Tocqueville maintains that the Anglo-American 
national character shows a disposition to value concurrently religion, commerce and 
liberty, the same characteristics Montesquieu previously attributed to the English.  He 
also notes that all of these things unite to form the general spirit manifested in the mores 
and institutions of the Anglo-Americans.  These observations lead him to trace the 
generative cause that allows the Anglo-Americans to enjoy a well-ordered democratic 
state to their Puritan founding.  The Puritans brought with them from England not only 
their religious fervor and desire for complete freedom but also the general features of 
their social and political English ancestry.  Tocqueville provides a succinct account of the 
Anglo-Americans’ origin in Volume I, Part I, Chapter 2 of Democracy in America titled 
“On the Point of Departure and its Importance to the Future of the Americans.”  He 
remarks on the incomparable advantage America offers for the study of democracy 
insofar as it combines a system of complete equality with the English traditions the 
Puritans brought with them to the New World.  Thereafter, Tocqueville states that the 
“present chapter contains the seed of what is to follow and the key to almost the whole 
work.”42  
The importance of the connection between America and England is underscored 
for Tocqueville when he compares the prosperity of America to the paltry success of her    
neighbors in Canada and South America. How is one to explain that all three share the 
same territorial advantages with such contrasting results?43 He attributes the cause of this 
difference to the laws and mores of the Anglo-Americans.44  The “general spirit” of 
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liberty embedded in the mores, institutions and system of common laws America 
inherited from England allows it to exploit to its advantage the vast inexhaustible 
resources of the New World.  Placed in the midst of the wilderness with no external 
enemies to combat the Anglo-American is able to satisfy the unique passion of his life- 
that of making a fortune.  The unlimited opportunities available to him combined with his 
characteristic independence produce in him an obsessive industrious and commercial 
spirit that has a positive impact on politics insofar as it nourishes and occupies passions 
that elsewhere men employ to withdraw from or disturb society.  
The French Canadian exemplifies the first tendency by displaying complacency 
with his lot reminiscent of the French peasant’s lack of initiative, the result of centuries of 
subjection to the paternalistic yoke of administrative centralization, which for 
Tocqueville is very different from government centralization.45  Unlike the Anglo-
American, the mores he brought with him to the New World prevent him from exploiting 
the vast wilderness of the American continent.  He prefers to confine himself within a 
narrow space instead of taking over the still free land at the price of a few days of work.   
“In France, one regards simplicity of taste, tranquility of mores, the spirit of family, and 
love of one’s birthplace as great guarantees of tranquility and happiness for the state; but 
in America, nothing appears more prejudicial to society than virtues like these.  The 
French of Canada, who have faithfully preserved the traditions of old mores, already have 
difficulty in living on their territory, and this small people, which has just been born, will 
soon be prey to the miseries of old nations.”46   
For his part, the South American exhibits the second inclination by living in chaos 
and disorder, totally incapable of making the most of the wealth and opportunities 
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Providence has put at his disposal because he is “obstinately attached to tearing out [his 
compatriot’s] entrails.”47  Although the Spanish of South America enjoy the same 
geographical isolation as the Anglo-Americans, they, nonetheless, put all their resources 
into maintaining armies.  “They [make] war among themselves when foreigners [are] 
lacking.”48  
It is unquestionable for Tocqueville that without the high civilization the Anglo-
Americans inherited from England and the education they derive from their republican 
institutions, the special material advantages of the United States would not be enough to 
produce its wide-ranging prosperity and peaceful democracy.  He does not deny that the 
American republic derives great benefits from its geographical situation on a rich and 
boundless continent.  Nevertheless, Tocqueville shows cogently by the foregoing 
comparisons that America’s superior achievements are primarily the result of the Anglo-
American’s moral and intellectual qualities, the restiveness of spirit that drives him to 
brave all dangers and miseries to seek his fortune, and the extreme love of independence 
that allows him to satisfy his immoderate desire for wealth.  In sum, the commercial 
passions he shares with his English forebears occupy the Anglo-American so completely 
that they turn him from any desire to indulge political passions. He knows that prosperity 
needs order and since the richness of the land allows all needs to be satisfied without 
trouble he finds it in his interest to concern himself with the public affairs of his locality 
and nation, which are intimately tied to his own.    
The primary objective then of Tocqueville in the first volume of Democracy in 
America is to demonstrate to his countrymen that democracy is compatible with order if 
the requisite institutions are put in place to encourage the development of orderly mores.  
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America’s geographical advantages contribute to the success of her democracy but are 
not the cause of it.  Rather it is her mores and the practical political education the 
Americans obtain from their free institutions to reinforce these mores that is the cause of 
her success.  Tocqueville stresses the importance of this revelation for him.  “It is this 
truth in which I firmly believe, that inspires in me the only hope I have for the future 
happiness of Europe.”49  He is convinced that the right political institutions over time 
could modify the mores of the French to allow them to enjoy an ordered democratic state, 
although he recognizes the sequence was reversed in America where mores shaped 
political institutions and laws that are favorable to liberty.  Nevertheless, Tocqueville’s 
hortatory message to his countrymen has one main objective: to state his belief that 
America teaches democracy can be regulated with the aid of political institutions and 
mores that favor liberty.    
In America free mores have made free political institutions; in 
France it is for free political institutions to mould mores.  That is the end 
to which we must strive but without forgetting the point of departure… 
Every religious doctrine has a political doctrine which, by affinity, is 
attached to it.  It is an incontestable point in the sense, where nothing runs 
contrary to that tendency, it is sure to show itself.  But it does not follow 
that it is impossible to separate religious doctrines from all their political 
effects.50  
Tocqueville is convinced that liberty flourishes in America because the 
institutions that maintain democracy here take their orientation from two intellectual 
traditions: republicanism and Protestantism.  These two beliefs are greatly compatible 
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with liberty insofar as both appeal to human reason as the most reliable guide to political 
and moral action respectively.  Republicanism fosters political liberty because it is 
premised on the view that his reason makes the individual the best judge of his interest 
whereas Protestantism promotes moral liberty inasmuch as it teaches that God has put 
within the reach of every man the means to find the path to Heaven.  In relying on the 
sovereign capacity of the individual’s intelligence both traditions make it possible for 
political society and religious society to be governed by means of democracy without 
endangering liberty.   
The compatibility of republicanism and Protestantism had been previously noted 
by Montesquieu who argued that Protestantism appealed to the spirit of independence and 
liberty that characterize the northern countries’ preference for republicanism whereas 
those of the south who were accustomed to the rule of a visible ruler remained Catholic, 
the religion most suited to monarchy inasmuch as both subject men to an authority.51  
Tocqueville agrees with Montesquieu that there is an affinity between the religion a 
people adopts and their form of government, however he disagrees with him that 
Catholicism is not suited to a democratic republic.  Tocqueville is careful to de-
emphasize Montesquieu’s generalization about the congruity of Protestantism and 
republicanism by maintaining that their harmony in America is due primarily to the 
fortuitous circumstances in which democracy was established here insofar as the Puritans 
were motivated by a need to practice their religion in freedom.  
In fact, Tocqueville goes to great length to show that the independence 
Protestantism encourages is ill-suited to democracy and to insist that they harmonize in 
America because “Americans so completely confuse Christianity and freedom in their 
 113
minds that it is almost impossible to have them conceive of the one without the other.”52 
He affirms that among all the Christian dogmas Catholicism is more favorable to equality 
of conditions because it makes the same demands on everyone and does not differentiate 
among men despite the natural, social and economic inequalities that inevitably create  
barriers among them.   
Tocqueville for reasons that should be obvious to the reader by now, viz., that 
Catholicism is not only the religion he professes but also is the established religion of 
France, wants to show that Catholic dogmatic uniformity is better suited to restrain the 
excesses of democratic independence in a nation like France, which does not enjoy a 
tradition of liberty.  He argues that unlike Protestantism, which emphasizes 
independence, Catholicism highlights the equality of men who are all answerable to one  
authority.  Given France’s obsession with equality and her inexperience with self-reliance 
that is the legacy of administrative centralization, Catholicism is more suited to her 
needs.  “Among Catholics, religious society is composed of only two elements: the priest 
and the people.  The priest alone is raised above the faithful: everything is equal below 
him.  In the matter of dogmas, Catholicism places the same standard on all intellects; it 
forces the details of the same beliefs on the learned as well as the ignorant, the man of 
genius as well as the vulgar…”53       
There is a less obvious reason for Tocqueville’s insistence that Catholicism is the 
religion most appropriate to democratic people, which he does not specify in Democracy 
in America but which he addresses in both a letter to Kergolay from America and in his 
travel notes that is reminiscent of Montesquieu’s view that laws-- both civil and 
religious-- should conform to the “nature of the climate of a people.”54 In his letter to 
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Kergolay and in his travel notes respectively he maintains that the spirit of Protestants is 
“cold and logical,”55  and that the Anglo-American has a “cold and rationalist”56 
temperament like that of his English forebears.  Thus, by analogy he shows that 
Protestantism works for America not because it is a democratic republic but because 
Anglo-Americans share with the English the spirit of “independence fostered by the 
[northern] climate”57 that makes Protestantism as well as republicanism attractive to the 
people of that region. He assesses the American national character by drawing a parallel 
between its prominent features and those of the English.  What emerges from this 
comparison is that the only characteristic that differentiates the Anglo-Americans from 
the English is the aristocratic habits of the latter.  Otherwise, they are both the same.   
The fact is that there are pretty few peoples who can be understood 
from one end to the other.  The special reason that has put the Americans 
in a state to be understood, is that they have been able to build their social 
edifice from a clean start. 
If it be true that each people has a special character independent of 
its political interest, just as each man has one independent of his social 
position, one might say that America gives the most perfect picture, for 
good and for ill, of the special character of the English race.  The 
American is the Englishman left to himself.  The picture follows of what I 
mean by the English character…(the dots are in the manuscript)  All that 
is brilliant, generous, splendid, and magnificent in the British character, all 
that is aristocratic and not English. 
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Spirit coldly burning, serious, tenacious, selfish, cold, frozen 
imagination, having respect for money, industrious, proud and 
rationalist.58    
The Anglo-American’s pragmatic character explains for Tocqueville his ability to 
display an extreme tolerance toward dogmas in general, which allows numerous sects to 
coexist in the United States without a hint of discord as long as they preach the 
“platitudes of [Christian] morality.”59  Tocqueville equates this show of tolerance to mere 
indifference by contrasting it to the approach of the French to religion.   
[I]n France those who believe demonstrate their belief by sacrifices 
of time, effort, and wealth.  One senses that they are acting under the sway 
of a passion that dominates them and for which they have become agents.  
It is true that alongside these people one finds the kinds of brutes who hold 
in horror the very name of religion and who do not very easily even 
distinguish good from evil.  Neither of these groups seems to exist here 
among the bulk of Protestants.60
This difference in temperament underscores for Tocqueville that Protestantism 
would not be suitable to the French.  Moreover, he ponders that the Anglo-American’s 
banal approach to religion cannot fail in the long-term to open the human mind to doubt, 
a consequence that would be disastrous for democracy in the absence of the strong 
religious habits and tradition of liberty America inherited from England.  In fact, he sees 
evidence of this tendency even in America where those among the working classes who 
are religious are abandoning the uncertainties of Protestantism for the empire of authority 
Catholicism offers while the upper ranks of society are more and more given to embrace 
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a pure Deism. These apostasies divided along class lines reinforce his view that 
Protestantism cannot fulfill the needs of democratic nations, especially those of the 
French. 
He advocates Catholicism, which he finds more compatible with the French 
temperament, as the religion most suitable to democratic men who do not have a habit of 
liberty.  Moreover, Catholicism like the Ancien Régime subjects the individual to a 
central authority in the interest of order.   He creates a number of dichotomous 
relationships to distinguish Protestant from Catholics.  These binary associations are 
classified respectively as follows: Protestant: Catholic; rationalist: passionate; tolerant: 
intolerant; and indifferent: believer. These defining character traits strengthen his belief 
that the harmony that exists between Protestantism and democracy in this country is not 
only purely an American phenomenon but also that Protestantism, “which generally 
brings man less to equality than to independence”61can only be a transitional religion for 
democratic people who need the certainty of beliefs to keep them grounded through the 
constant changes of democratic life.   
Yet, Tocqueville admires the way in which the religious and irreligious instincts 
in America conform to public opinion by affirming the Christian principles that maintain 
moral uniformity in society.  “If it serves man very much as an individual that his religion 
be true, this is not so for society.  Society has nothing to fear nor to hope from the other 
life; and what is most important to it is not so much that all citizens profess the true 
religion but that they profess a religion.”62  Tocqueville owes this insight to the teachings 
of the enlightenment articulated by Montesquieu as well as Rousseau.   Montesquieu, for 
whom religion is necessary to society, maintains that even the religions whose premises 
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are false can contribute to the well-being of society.63  Likewise, Rousseau asserts: “I 
regard all the particular religions as so many salutary institutions, which prescribe in each 
country a uniform manner of honoring God by public worship.”64      
In sum, Tocqueville follows Montesquieu in the first volume of Democracy in 
America by affirming that religions must accommodate the social and political state if 
they are to exert any moral influence on believers, albeit by adjusting his teaching to meet 
the demands of modern democracy.  He believes religion must take care to avoid any 
collision with the generally accepted ideas and permanent interests that reign in common 
opinion, which in the case of modern democracy emphasize a passion for equality.  
Consequently, he underscores that there are special circumstances that make 
Protestantism compatible with democracy in America even though he believes 
Catholicism is the religion most suitable for democracy, particularly democracy in 
France.  In tracing the evolution of his thought to Montesquieu to settle this question this 
study may have suggested that he embraces a fatalistic view of history, a charge that has 
been previously leveled against him.   In order to dispel any doubt that this was the aim 
of the foregoing analysis this section will end with a digression from its main objective.  
 
This study adduces the associations Tocqueville makes among religious choice, 
national character, and social class not to imply that there is a tendency in him to embrace 
a fatalistic view of history but rather to point to an affinity between Montesquieu’s 
theories on diverse subjects and Tocqueville’s analysis of modern democracy as he found 
it in America, which he uses as a base to seek a solution that would allow democracy 
eventually to flourish in liberty in France.  His perspective of democracy from the 
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opposed realities of America and France forces him to compare all the elements that mold 
the particular habits and character of the Anglo-Americans and that of the French to 
discover how to replicate in his native land the harmony between liberty and equality he 
found here by taking national traits into consideration. Fatalism is completely antithetical 
to the principles Tocqueville espouse as is attested by his rebuke of his protégé Arthur de 
Gobineau’s racial theories.   
I admit that I could not believe how you could fail to see the 
difficulty of reconciling your scientific theories with the letter and with the 
spirit of Christianity.  About the letter: what is clearer in Genesis than the 
unity of the human race and the descent of all men from the same 
ancestor?  About the spirit: is it not its unique trait to have abolished those 
racial distinctions which the Jewish religion still retained and to have 
made therefrom but one human race, all of whose members are equally 
capable of improving and uniting themselves?  How can this spirit- and I 
am trying to use plain common sense- be reconciled with a doctrine that 
makes races distinct and unequal, with differing capacities of 
understanding, of judgment, of action, due to some original and immutable 
disposition which invisibly denies the possibility of improvement for 
certain peoples?  Evidently Christianity wishes to make all men brothers 
and equals.  Your doctrine makes them cousins at best whose common 
father is very far away in the heavens; to you down here there are only 
victors and vanquished, masters and slaves, due to their birthrights.  This 
is obvious since your doctrines are being approved, cited, commented 
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upon by whom?  By slaveowners and by those who favor the perpetuation 
of slavery on the basis of radical differences of race.65   
Marvin Zetterbaum argues forcefully that Tocqueville’s own inevitability thesis 
and conception of the progress of democracy as a providential fact is fatalistic “at least as 
[it] is formulated in the introduction of Democracy in America and reaffirmed in the Old 
Regime.”66 However, this study differs with his interpretation on the basis that a fatalistic 
conception of history is contrary to Tocqueville’s belief in the principles of human liberty 
and perfectibility and Christian morality that are so central to his teaching.  Furthermore, 
he rejects Gobineau’s materialist doctrines because he is keenly aware of the 
intellectual’s moral responsibility to guard from propagating a conception of history that 
enfolds deleterious consequences for society.  It is more to the point to argue that 
Tocqueville’s appeal to Providence is a rhetorical device employed to lend legitimacy to 
democracy and re-establish credibility for religion in France, which he believes is 
essential to the success of democracy in that country.  Another likely interpretation of the 
inevitability thesis is that of Jean-Claude Lamberti who argues that Tocqueville’s 
intellectual outlook is closer to a willingness to entertain deterministic theories.67  As the 
foregoing discussion on national characteristics and religion shows, his view coincides 
more with the deterministic thesis insofar as he accepts that historical facts are governed 
by what Montesquieu identified as the “nature of climates.”68 Here is how Tocqueville 
explains it to his friend Gustave de Beaumont in a letter in which he discusses 
Gobineau’s racial doctrines. 
Gobineau has just sent me a thick book, full of research and talent, 
in which he endeavors to prove that everything that takes place in the 
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world may be explained by differences of race, system of a horse dealer  
rather than that of a statesman;  I do not believe a word of it.  And yet, I 
think that there is in every nation, whether in consequence of race or of an 
education which has lasted for centuries, some peculiarity, tenacious if not 
permanent, which combines itself with all the events that befall it, and is 
seen across all its fortunes, in every period of its history.69
Another example of his deterministic view of history is found in Democracy in 
America in the chapter in which he describes the American continent by asserting that its 
physical appearance and climate suggest that North America “had been created to 
become the domain of the intellect.”  In contrast, those of South America and the West 
Indies suggest that it “was to be the dwelling of the senses.”70 These statements are 
deterministic insofar as they are intended to show how climate influences men’s 
propensities; they are meant to show that a cause, climate, produces particular effects on 
men.  It is noteworthy that when determinism leads to immoral practices Tocqueville 
forthrightly rejects to entertain its claims.  This is evident when he discusses climate in 
the context of the pernicious practice of slavery in the American South. Tocqueville 
rejects the assertion that the tropical climate makes work fatal to the European in that 
region and thus makes slavery necessary since the Negro submits to work there without 
danger.  He compares the climate of the American South with that of Spain and Italy to 
show that work is no more fatal to the Spaniards and Italians than it would be to the 
Americans of the South to refute those who advocate slavery.71   
In short, Tocqueville’s indignation against fatalistic doctrines is so strong that he 
chooses to conclude Democracy in America by underscoring the power he attributes to 
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free will in shaping individuals and nations.  “Providence has not created the human race 
either entirely independent or perfectly slave.  It traces, it is true, a fatal circle around 
each man that he cannot leave; but within its vast limits man is powerful and free; so too 
with peoples.”72
 
How Tocqueville Came to Proclaim that Religion is the Preeminent Political 
Institution of Modern Democracy 
 
Tocqueville’s commentary on American democracy provides him the means 
through which to discuss the institutional changes from which French democracy would 
benefit.  Thus, it contains both praise and criticism for American institutions.  As to be 
expected he praises the institutional practices that would aid France toward an orderly 
democracy and criticizes those that would encourage her propensity to accommodate the 
worse tendencies of democracy.   
Tocqueville maintains that the religious reverence Americans have for their 
republican institutions is the primary cause for the pervasive public spiritedness to be 
found in this country.  He places the origin of all powers in the will of the majority and 
recognizes its strong influence over the enforcement of moral order.  Nevertheless, he 
denounces the omnipotence of the majority in America for its potential to tyrannize 
minorities and ostracize anyone who challenges its will. He is also concerned that the 
mutability of America’s secondary laws might eventually jeopardize the stability of the 
country’s fundamental law.  However, he does not find these democratic liabilities overly 
alarming for America where the first is tempered by the absence of administrative 
centralization while the second has a powerful counterbalance in religion, which the 
majority employs to restrain any licentiousness it deems harmful to republican beliefs.   
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It is worthwhile to recall here that Tocqueville begins his study of American 
democracy in the tradition of Montesquieu by looking for its generative principle.  After 
careful observations and numerous conversation and interviews with prominent citizens 
during his American sojourn he discovers as it has already been noted that it is not virtue 
per se but enlightenment that drives the American political machine.  Therefore, it is 
useful to anyone who wishes to apply the valuable lessons he teaches about democracy to 
follow him through the steps that lead him to this innovative political principle, which 
differentiates itself from Montesquieu’s concept of classical virtue insofar as it 
incorporates a moral element.   
The first volume of Democracy in America in great part recasts the observations 
and conversations, which are recorded in Tocqueville’s American travel notes and his 
letters to France from America, that bring him to proclaim the need for a new political 
science.  Tocqueville tirelessly questioned his American hosts to understand the spirit 
that gives American democracy its impulse for freedom and then submitted to assiduous 
meditations all that he learned from them before he proceeded to formulate a 
philosophical framework for modern democracy.  This method allowed him to perceive 
that the American republics had to be judged by a different standard than the one 
Montesquieu used to evaluate the ancient Greek and Roman republics.  The “enlightened 
people who inhabit [the American republics]” could not be compared to the “coarse 
populace” of the ancient republics.  “New ideas [had to be applied] to a social state so 
new”73 and the identification of enlightenment as the most obvious cause for the moral 
order prevailing in the American democratic republic was for Tocqueville an important 
step toward that objective.   
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During his stay in Boston, Tocqueville had the opportunity to consult with a 
number of prominent citizens including, inter alia, university president of Cambridge 
Josiah Quincy, Jr., Massachusetts State Senator Francis Calley Gray, the exiled German 
liberal Francis Lieber best known for his Encyclopaedia Americana, the diplomat 
Alexander Everett, the Georgian planter Henry Clay, former President John Quincy 
Adams and Reverend Jared Sparks, the learned New England historian.74Tocqueville 
continued to cultivate his relationship with these eminent Americans until the end of his 
life as attests his intermittent correspondence with them across the Atlantic.75   
Tocqueville learned from them the interconnectedness and workings of the 
essential organs of American democracy, which draws its vitality and orderly taste for 
freedom both from Puritan ethics and political principles.  Puritanism as Tocqueville 
explains in Democracy in America “was not only a religious doctrine; it also blended at 
several points with the most absolute democratic and republican theories.”76 The 
Puritans’ first political act was to constitute themselves into a social body structured on 
the English habit of township government and with it the dogma of the sovereignty of the 
people.  These two political principles are favorable to freedom insofar as the first 
encourages participation in public affairs inasmuch as it brings men to see the mutual 
advantage they have in combining their efforts to prosper while the latter encourages 
respect for law insofar as it is an expression of the general will of the people.  
Tocqueville is clearly indebted to Rousseau for his understanding of the importance of 
this last principle to freedom, which is outlined in The Social Contract.77  In short, he 
credits these political institutions for the American’s enlightened view of the mutual 
connection between his self-interest and his freedom.   
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Mr. Sparks identified for Tocqueville the communal spirit of the Americans, 
which he attributed to the republican and religious enthusiasm of these settlers who 
organized the principle of universal representation as soon as they landed in New 
England, “the cradle of American democracy.”78   He described for Tocqueville in an 
essay titled “On the Government of Towns in Massachusetts” how this principle of 
republicanism established by New England is the foundation of American republican 
institutions.  The essay is a modified blueprint of Rousseau’s Social Contract insofar as it 
outlines how the first settlers who arrived at Plymouth abandoned the state of nature 
wherein they found themselves by agreeing upon a system of social and political 
regulations based on the principles of the equal rights of each individual and the power of 
the majority to control the whole.  This mode of government was replicated as new 
settlements were established each as an independent republic. It is thus that Tocqueville 
learned the large modern republic he came to study was in reality a union of small 
republics, albeit ones which shared common traditions and interests.  Incidentally, the 
model of the early American republics he provides in Democracy in America corresponds 
greatly with the facts provided by Mr. Sparks on New England as they are recorded in his 
travel journal. 
As Tocqueville’s American education progressed it became increasingly apparent 
to him that the pulse of the American republic emanates from township life.  Through his 
engagement in township life the Anglo-American learns the art of self-government and 
the reciprocal relations between duties and rights that are the foundation of moral and 
political freedom respectively.  The Americans derive their understanding of public 
affairs, knowledge of the laws, and notion for the well-understood interests of the nation, 
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which are invariably tied to their own, from their municipal institutions.  Tocqueville 
praises the institution of the township for placing freedom within the reach of the people 
“by mak[ing] them taste its peaceful employ and habituate them to making use of it.  
Without the institutions of a township a nation can give itself a free government, but it 
does not have the spirit of freedom.”79   
The Anglo-American citizen acquires the habit of settling all differences through 
discussion and proceeding by means of majorities from municipal institutions.  
Tocqueville was particularly interested in this aspect of American democracy whose 
superiority over French administrative centralization is palpable insofar as it is a 
wonderful school of self-government, one that has contributed greatly to make America 
the nation with the most advanced practical political education in the modern world.80  
Everywhere he looked in America, government was absent; the dogma of the 
sovereignty of the people that emanated from the township government of the Puritans 
was in evidence in the entire political system of the Anglo-Americans.  Unlike France 
where government meddled in every detail of social life, he found here that the people 
managed their own affairs and followed their own initiatives to make social 
improvements without having recourse to the authorities.  If a new school, hospital or 
road were needed, the individual who conceived the idea announced his plan, offered to 
manage it and called on his fellow compatriots to lend their support to the project.     
Tocqueville emphasizes repeatedly the significant impact this principle of popular 
sovereignty has on the moral and political character of a nation.  “Each man learns to 
think and to act for himself without counting on the support of any outside power which, 
however watchful it may be, can never answer all the needs of man in society.  The man 
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thus used to seeking his well-being by his own efforts alone stands the higher in his own 
esteem as well as in that of others; he grows stronger and greater of soul.”81 The self-
reliance of the American and his readiness to associate with his fellow citizens to 
accomplish any objective he deems beneficial to his community and thus himself are 
direct consequences of the republican spirit that permeates every aspect of social life. 
Participation in township life gives practical meaning to the dogma of the 
sovereignty of the people and constitutes the primary source of political enlightenment 
insofar as it teaches that the interest of each is tied to the interests of all.  Tocqueville 
adduces the institution of the jury as a powerful and direct application of this dogma 
inasmuch as it makes the people the ultimate judge of everything that is allowed and 
forbidden in society and thus makes it the locus of moral authority.   It is a school where 
the people not only learn about their rights but also one in which they learn to take 
responsibility in public affairs and in this way it contributes to their enlightenment at the 
same time that it militates against the individual egotism democratic equality fosters.  In 
addition, most township laws require the citizen to receive an elementary education 
whose curriculum generally comprised knowledge of the nation’s history and familiarity 
of the principal features of the Constitution that governs it as well as the basic doctrines 
and proofs of religion.               
In his conversation with Senator Gray, Tocqueville learned that the truly 
parliamentary spirit of American political institutions and civic associations are the 
legacy of the English spirit and an altogether republican religion.  As noted earlier the 
Puritans who founded the New England townships were as committed to their religion as 
they were to republicanism, both of which are founded on the concept that reason is the 
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guiding principle of morality and society.  Tocqueville affirms in his travel notes that this 
concept underpins the “two great social principles [that] rule American society [and 
explain] the laws and habits which govern it.”  He enumerates these principles as follows. 
1st. The majority may be mistaken on some points, but finally it is 
always right and there is no moral power above it. 
2nd. Every individual, private person, society, community or 
nation, is the only lawful judge of its own interest, and, provided it does 
not harm the interests of others, nobody has the right to interfere.82   
The Anglo-American citizen learns from participating in his township to discern 
“clear and practical ideas on the nature of his duties as well as the extent of his 
rights.”83 The idea of rights, particularly property rights, are important to freedom 
because they teach citizens in principle to respect each other’s personal interest lest 
by not doing so they forfeit their own.  Political rights extended to the least of citizens 
have the same positive effect since to attack those of others means risking violating 
one’s own.  Moreover, they encourage political participation, which is the most 
effective means for the citizen to safeguard his interest.  Tocqueville underscores the 
importance of the idea of rights to the movement of modern democracy and argues 
that without it fear becomes the sole alternative available to govern a nation.  The 
principle of rights is essential to the democratic state inasmuch as it is bound “to the 
personal interest that offers itself as the only immobile point in the human heart.”84 It 
carries unimaginable benefits for the body politic insofar as it gives the poor as well 
as the rich a stake in society and thus provides a powerful incentive even to the have-
nots to preserve order.  
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Tocqueville viewed the question of property rights as being so critical to the 
health of the fledgling French republic that he addressed it cogently in a speech to the 
Constituent Assembly on September 12, 1848 to castigate the socialists for treating it 
as the origin of all the evils in the world.85 The right to property was for him not only 
one of the fundamental principles of human liberty but also the crucial safeguard of 
order and stability in democracy.  He invoked the French Revolution and the 
principles of liberty for which it stood to support his position.  He begged his 
colleagues to recall that the Revolution was not fought to subjugate the nation to the 
slavish equality of socialism with its false promise of a limitless consumption for all 
but to establish a free democratic equality, which the abolition of property rights 
severely jeopardizes.        
And property, gentlemen, property!  Without doubt the French 
Revolution waged an energetic and cruel war against a certain number of 
property owners; but as to the principle itself of private property, she has 
always respected, honored it, she has placed it in the first rank of its 
constitutions.  No other nation has more magnificently treated it; she has 
carved it on the frontispiece of its laws. 86
Likewise, Tocqueville for whom “the most rational government is not that in 
which all the interested parties take part, but that which the most enlightened and 
most moral classes of society direct,”87  nonetheless made the reform of electoral 
laws88 along with, inter alia, the separation of Church and state and the liberalization 
of public education, the objectives of his domestic political agenda.89  His advocacy 
for electoral reform was grounded in the realistic view that it was a crucial step in 
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solving the class war that was undermining any sustainable progress toward order in 
France.  He showed his commitment to this endeavor by the way in which he 
accommodated himself to the provisional government’s March 2, 1848 proclamation 
of universal suffrage (i.e., for all the male population above the age of twenty).   
Tocqueville recounts in his Recollections how he modestly took his place among the 
voters ranked in alphabetical order to elect the members of the Constitutional 
Assembly, of which he became a member.  Although he would have preferred a 
progressive reform of the suffrage laws, he nonetheless accepted as a pragmatic 
measure the sweeping change instituted by the moderate republicans, who were for 
him a better alternative to the socialist party that represented the insurgents of the 
February revolution.  
He outlines his adjustment to the new political reality of France in a letter to Paul 
Clamorgan, his election organizer and public relations manager in his home district of 
Valognes:  “I therefore have the firm expectation that… the majority of the Assembly 
will be moderate, that it will want the republic because a reasonable man cannot 
imagine the possibility of anything else today, but that it will want a republic strongly 
and regularly constituted like that of the United States.”90     
The concept of equal rights is incidentally one area in which Montesquieu has 
little to teach Tocqueville for the apparent reason that his teacher studied and wrote 
about the democratic republics of the ancient world where the concept of universal 
right was unknown.  In both Athens and Rome political participation was limited to 
the few who were counted as citizens in states populated predominantly by slaves, 
effectively making these democratic republics de facto aristocracies.  Hence, it is not 
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Montesquieu but Rousseau who provides the obvious theoretical reference from 
which Tocqueville surveys this still new phenomenon insofar as Rousseau argues that 
man agrees to exchange his natural freedom in society for all the rights that serve as 
the basis of the social contract.91  Nevertheless, Montesquieu addresses the issue of 
property right and the importance of invariably guaranteeing effectually its protection 
in the civil laws for the sake of the public good.92   
Thus, Tocqueville establishes implicitly at the outset that the success of American 
democracy is owed far more to the political habits the Puritans established in 
township life than to the Constitutional law that unites the states.  Yet, even as he 
maintains that the Anglo-American democratic republican tradition is foremost one 
that is instituted to foster freedom, Tocqueville shows nonetheless that civil 
obedience alone is not enough to sustain freedom.  Political freedom is contingent 
upon the moral obligation to obey a higher authority than the self.  He insists that the 
Anglo-American is able to make judicious use of his freedom not only because the 
structure of his government allows him to cherish it but because also his mores 
predispose him to make religion the regulating power to which he submits.  Religion 
facilitates freedom in America insofar as it provides moral guidance to curb the 
otherwise complete independence democratic institutions promote.  
So, therefore, at the same time that law permits the American 
people to do everything, religion prevents them from conceiving 
everything and forbids them to dare everything. 
Religion, which, among Americans, never mixes directly in the 
government of society, should therefore be considered as the first of their 
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political institutions; for if it does not give them the taste for freedom, it 
singularly facilitates it. 
It is also from this point of view that the inhabitants of the United 
States themselves consider religious beliefs.  I do not know if all 
Americans have faith in their religion- for who can read to the bottom of 
hearts?- but I am sure that they believe it necessary to the maintenance of 
republican institutions.  This opinion does not belong only to one class of 
citizens or to one party, but to the entire nation; one finds it in all ranks.93
As he is wont to do when he wants to really stress a point, Tocqueville provides 
an anecdote to explain his assertion that religion facilitates the maintenance of American 
republican institutions.  Tocqueville chooses his tale carefully to drive home one essential 
point: the Americans are enlightened enough to recognize the interest they have in 
making religion the guardian of the republic.  Thus, he is implicitly stating that religion 
for the Americans is less an end in itself than a means for preserving their republic.   
I saw Americans associating to send priests into the new states of 
the West to found schools and churches there; they fear that religion will 
be lost in the midst of the woods, and that the people growing up may not 
be as free as the one from which it has issued.  I encountered wealthy 
inhabitants of New England who abandoned the land of their birth with the 
aim of going to lay the foundations of Christianity and freedom by the 
banks of the Mississippi or on the prairies of Illinois.  Thus it is that in the 
United States religious zeal constantly warms itself at the hearth of 
patriotism.  You think that these men act solely in consideration of the 
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other life, but you are mistaken: eternity is one of their cares.  If you 
interrogate these missionaries of Christian civilization, you will be 
altogether surprised to hear them speak so often of the goods of this world, 
and to find the political where you believe you will only see the religious.  
“All American republics are in solidarity with one another,” they will say 
to you; “if the republics of the West fell into anarchy or came under the 
yoke of despotism, the republican institutions that flourish on the edges of 
the Atlantic Ocean would be in great peril; we therefore have an interest in 
the new states’ being religious so they permit us to remain free.94  
Unlike France where the spirit of religion and the spirit of freedom “have often 
made war with each other,” the mores of the first Anglo-Americans “combined 
marvelously these two perfectly distinct elements.”95 Tocqueville attributes this harmony 
between politics and religion to the mores of the New England founders who “were at 
once ardent sectarians and exalted innovators” while at the same time they maintained a 
strict compliance with religious beliefs.  He marvels in Democracy in America that men 
who had purchased the ability to pursue their religious opinion at the price of the 
inevitable miseries of exile could devote themselves with almost equal ardor to seek so 
aggressively material wealth.  He finds the key to America’s success in their uncanny 
ability to keep separate their allegiance to the City of God from the city of men, wherein 
in the first everything is ordered, “foreseen and decided in advance” whereas in the 
second everything is “agitated, contested and uncertain.”96  
Tocqueville’s grasp of the practical benefits America accrues as a result of this 
clear separation echoes Montesquieu for whom this was theoretically self-evident.   
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Given his characterization of modern democracy’s restless spirit Tocqueville finds 
empirical proof in America that the logic of disestablishment signaled by Montesquieu is 
especially necessary in this state to give the citizen an internalized sense of order for the 
good of society.   
One should not enact by divine laws that which should be enacted 
by human laws, or regulate by human laws that which should be regulated 
by divine laws. 
These two sorts of laws differ as to their origin, as to their object, 
and as to their nature… 
1. The nature of human laws is to be subject to all the accidents 
that occur and to vary as men’s wills change, whereas the nature of the 
laws of religion is never to vary… 
2. There are states in which the laws are nothing, or nothing but a 
capricious and transitory will of the sovereign.  If, in these states, the laws 
of religion were of the same nature as human laws, the laws of religion 
would also be nothing; however it is necessary in society for something to 
be fixed, and religion is that fixed thing…97
Tocqueville affirms that the Puritan settler’s religious mores, which insisted on 
their unwavering commitment to Christianity and strict adherence to the Mosaic code 
of laws, continue to influence American democracy even after their progeny 
abandoned their strict orthodoxy.98  These laws were rigidly upheld by their political 
communities and in that way penetrated into the domain of conscience to produce in 
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the citizen an internal sense of moral duty.  Tocqueville sees this commitment to 
moral duty as their most valuable legacy to American democracy whose resilience he 
believes is owed to the fact that their mores over time grew preponderant over those 
of the South.  He credits religion and freedom for giving the inhabitants of New 
England manly habits defined by a strong individual self-reliance that found its 
ultimate expression in a general commitment to civic life for the well-being of the 
community.   
Tocqueville contrasts the legacy of the Puritans in the American North to the 
mores of the South, which were shaped by a tradition of slavery that exerted a 
debilitative influence on the character and the laws of the Southerner.  The chasm that 
separated the industrious North from the indolent South was already becoming an 
increasingly controversial issue during Tocqueville’s American tour and he discussed 
this issue at length with Mr. Adams.  The stark difference in habits that divided the 
American North and South reinforced for Tocqueville the value of infusing politics 
with a moral content to maintain liberty inasmuch as he argues that the preponderance 
of the religious and political habits of the North99 offers the only hope for the survival 
of the union of the states.  The political and religious doctrines of the New England 
founders produced a very distinct national character than that produced by slavery in 
the South.  In Tocqueville’s view the culture of the South, which he characterizes as 
“feverish, disordered, revolutionary and passionate,” was vastly inferior in every 
respect to that of the North whose government appeared “strong, regular, durable, 
perfectly suited to the physical and moral state of things.”100   
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In short, Tocqueville is unequivocal that the “general spirit” of the Puritan settlers 
of the sixteenth century played a pivotal role in shaping American democracy into a 
morally ordered society.  Religion kept them firmly anchored in a sea of democratic 
inconstancies and enabled them to perpetuate in democracy the English tradition of 
freedom because for them freedom and Christianity were one and the same.  It is for this 
reason that Tocqueville maintains that religion is the first among the Anglo-Americans 
political institutions.  Nevertheless, despite his admiration Tocqueville harbored a strong 
aristocratic distaste for the way in which overtime the Anglo-American religious spirit 
took on a commercial character.  In his travel notebook, Tocqueville marks his preference 
for the French Canadian parish priest who “is in every deed the shepherd of his flock,” as 
opposed to the American Protestant minister who behaves like “an entrepreneur of a 
religious industry.”101 Yet, even as he rejects this crude approach to the sanctity of 
religion he admires its result: a stable democracy whose Puritan forefathers’ religious and 
republican habits pave the way for the healthy separation of the interests of Heaven from 
those of this world, if not in spirit at least in the laws.  
 
Would Extending the Connection with England Beyond Puritanism Have 
Hampered Tocqueville’s Ability to Make a Strong Case for Disestablishment in 
France?    
 
Democracy in America assigns the success of American democracy exclusively to 
Puritanism’s religious and political doctrines.  Tocqueville is much more circumspect 
about overstating England’s other contributions to that success in his book than he is in 
his travel notes.  This omission was noted by a prominent Tocqueville scholar who 
affirms that Tocqueville said little about the inheritance from England because he never 
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fully grasped the significance of the English connection.102  Given, inter alia, his 
application of Mr. Sparks’ historical lesson, which is very much in evidence in his 
commentary, this study takes the position that Tocqueville is too much of an astute 
observer and excellent pupil of Montesquieu to commit such a gross oversight without a 
valid reason.  In fact, while he pursued his study of American democracy during his 1831 
American sojourn Tocqueville heard his hosts, most particularly Messrs. Sparks and 
Everett, make repeated suggestions that no one could fully understand American 
institutions without some knowledge of the history of the English Island from which they 
sprung.  
Tocqueville went to England in August 1833 precisely to fulfill that requirement 
before undertaking to compose the first volume of Democracy in America in the fall of 
1833.  His notes on his “Voyage en Angleterre de 1833” (Journey to England in 1833) 
show that he discovered in England the same institutional features he found favorable to 
liberty in America: a reserved but profound religious disposition; decentralization as the 
cause of material progress; and political harmony derived from a government that 
appropriates its rules to the needs of each localities.103  His travel account parallels 
Montesquieu observations of England,104 and this chapter makes clear how much 
Tocqueville cements this connection by insisting he saw in evidence in America the same 
harmony among religion, commerce and liberty Montesquieu found there.  Therefore, 
Tocqueville had more than enough supporting material to underscore the strong 
connection between America and England. 
There are several considerations, however, that suggest Tocqueville had good 
rhetorical reasons to circumscribe the English-American connection to the legacy of 
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Puritanism.  First, his primary objective was to paint for the French the tableau of a true 
democratic society.  America was the nineteenth century’s democratic country par 
excellence whereas the principle of aristocracy was the vital principle of England’s 
constitution despite a general movement toward democracy insofar as the aristocracy was 
founded on wealth,105 which unlike France’s caste system was something acquirable.  
Any significant focus on England therefore would have distracted from his main goal 
even though England remained throughout his life the “democratic” model he wanted for 
France.  In a letter to his friend, John Stuart Mill, shortly after the publication of 
Democracy in America he laments the way in which in France democracy remains a 
velleity that debases it.  In contrast he praises England’s limited practice of democracy.  
“All that I see of English democrats leads me on the contrary to think that if their views 
are often narrow and exclusive, at least theirs is the true goal that friends of democracy 
must take.  Their final object seems to me to be, in reality, to put the majority of citizens 
in a fit state for governing and to make it capable of governing… I am myself a democrat 
in this sense.”106   Second, he wanted to demonstrate the mutual dependence among 
religion, morality and liberty by underscoring how the disestablishment of the Church in 
America was an important factor contributing in their concurrence.  
A greater emphasis on England, especially one that extended to England proper in 
the nineteenth century would have weakened his advocacy for disestablishment in France 
because the Established Church of England was at the time of his visit in an analogous 
position with the Catholic Church of France before the Revolution of 1789, i.e., it was 
rich, in disarray and held political power.  Moreover, it is noteworthy that Tocqueville 
recognized the troubles of the Anglican Church would have very different consequences 
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for the religious spirit in England than those that heretofore assailed the Catholic Church 
in France for reasons related specifically to the English character, which as shown 
previously he qualified as more serious and less passionate than that of the French.  In 
addition, unlike the French who exchanged Catholicism for irreligion, the English were 
merely replacing their faithfulness to the Anglican Church with a new allegiance to the 
Protestant sects that were growing in proportion with the lost of Anglican adherents.107
These considerations no doubt reinforced for Tocqueville the inconvenience of 
dwelling too much on the link between America and England.  To do so might not only 
have harmed his long-term objective to reconcile religion and liberalism in France but 
also it might help to widen the division between Catholics and liberals in that country.  It 
would at the very least serve to entrench the first in their desire to reinstate the Church to 
its former political supremacy which it hoped to achieve by gaining absolute control of 
the French educational system, a politically controversial issue in the 1830’s.108  
Moreover, the liberals who did not want to share political power with the Catholic party 
would have been too happy to find a new reason to discredit religion by drawing an 
analogy between the Anglican Church and Catholic Church.  Lastly, Tocqueville would 
not have wanted to show any coincidence between England’s general movement toward 
democracy and the growth of Protestantism in that country. Therefore, it was best for him 
to confine the influence of England to Puritanism in his commentary, which aims 
primarily at reconciling liberty with the Catholic Church in France.  It was more 
important to his objective to emphasize the primacy of the institutions that allow the 
Americans to maintain the “general spirit” of liberty, which Montesquieu had found 
prevalent among the English.  His hope for an ordered democracy in France would be 
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better realized if he focused on the institutional character of American democracy, which 
promotes a modern version of ancient republican virtue.  
Tocqueville’s new political science in effect shows that enlightenment is to 
modern democracy what Montesquieu affirms virtue was to ancient democracy.  He 
succeeds in demonstrating that political virtue in modern democracy is not an end in itself 
but a means through which private interest is harmonized with the common good.  The 
founding of America on a moral and political principle premised on reason allowed 
religion and politics each to operate in its own respective sphere to allow the first to serve 
the interest of freedom.  For Tocqueville, the bifurcation of the spiritual and political has 
unrivaled benefits for the democratic social state, which fosters chaos and disorder.  It not 
only preserves religion from sharing the uncertain fortune of political life but functions 
also to allow the internalization of an unchanging moral order to guide citizens through 
its vicissitudes. 
 America draws its inclination for passive and voluntary obedience in the moral 
world from the Puritans, whose piety did not preclude them from attending to their well-
being and freedom in the political world.  The order and harmony of religion, the source 
of divine goodness and justice, provided them a marvelous counterbalance for coping 
with the chaos and disharmony Tocqueville asserts reign in the political world, the source 
of human injustice and evil.  He finds in the Anglo-American whose mores were shaped 
by the Puritans empirical evidence to buttress his conviction that moral order is the most 
important pillar of political freedom.   
The practical religious habits of the Anglo-Americans combined with the 
enlightenment they obtain from their political institutions make it possible for them to 
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make universal reason the locus of moral authority insofar as universal reason in this 
country is guided by religious habits.  Thus, in the final analysis Tocqueville’s 
commentary implies that enlightenment as the governing principle of democracy needs 
religion.  He shows determinedly that it is the Americans’ religious habits, which they 
confound with freedom, much less than their convictions that generate the moral order 
necessary to allow the sovereign to govern itself. 
Tocqueville’s commentary on American democracy at the end of Volume I is not 
his final word on the important place he carves for religion in his political philosophy.  It 
is rather an exposition of the way in which enlightened self-interest can become a 
substitute for virtue in modern democracy.  The next chapter outlines how Tocqueville 
applies the lessons he learns in America to Rousseau’s teaching on opinion to show that a 
complete equality of conditions fosters a simulacrum of virtue founded on enlightened 
self-interest as well as conformity to common opinion, which in democracy constitutes 
the most powerful source of moral authority.  These lessons reinforce his conviction that 
the legislator must harness religion to shape common opinion in democracy to lead men 





                                                 
NOTES 
 
1 Approximately a month after his arrival in the United States, Tocqueville writes to 
Kergolay that “the religious and anti-religious instincts that can exist in man develop 
themselves here in perfect liberty; I would like to make you see this curious spectacle, 
you would find in it the two principles that divide the political world elsewhere.  
Protestants of all faiths, Anglicans, Lutherans, Calvinists, Presbyterians, Anabaptists, 
Quakers, and a hundred other Christian sects, constitute the background of the 
population.  Practicing and indifferent population, which lives from day to day, 
accommodating itself to an environment less satisfying than peaceful but in which 
conformity is satisfied.”  Letter to Louis de Kergolay, June 29, 1831, in Alexis de 
Tocqueville, Oeuvres complètes, correspondance d’Alexis de Tocqueville et de Louis de 
Kergolay, ed. J. P. Mayer, texte établi par André Jardin, introduction et notes par Jean-
Alain Lesourd, (Paris: Gallimard, 1977), tome XIII, 229.  (Hereafter references to this 
work will appear as OC XIII)  
Tocqueville maintains this position in his conversation with the distinguished physician, 
Dr. Richard Spring Stewart, on November 1, 1831 at the time of his visit to the state of 
Maryland.  In response to the doctor’s question regarding his general impression of the 
state of religion in the United States, Tocqueville states the following.  “I admit that I am 
inclined to see a profound indifference beneath all religious beliefs.  I imagine that the 
greater part of the enlightened classes have many doubts about dogma, but that they are 
careful not to show them; for they feel that positive religion is a moral and political 
institution which it is important to preserve.”  Alexis de Tocqueville, Journey to America, 
trans. George Lawrence, ed. J. P. Mayer, (London: Faber & Faber LTD,1959), 79.  See 
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also  Alexis de Tocqueville, “Voyage en Amérique” in Oeuvres I, Bibliothèque de La 
Pléiade, édition publiée sous la direction d’André Jardin avec pour ce volume la 
collaboration de Françoise Mélonio et Lise Quéffelec, (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), 94.  
(Hereafter references to this work, which contains inter alia Tocqueville’s travel notes to 
America, England, Ireland, Switzerland and Algeria, will be shown as notes for the 
appropriate country in Oeuvres I.  In cases where the reference is shown as an ibidem the 
English and French page numbers will be separated by a slash respectively, e.g., “Voyage 
en Amérique” in Oeuvres I, 79/94.)  
Compare Tocqueville’s perspective with Montesquieu’s description of the effect of 
liberty on religion in England.  “With regard to religion, as in this state each citizen 
would have his own will and would consequently be led by his own enlightenment or his 
fantasies, what would happen is either that everyone would be very indifferent to all sorts 
of religion of whatever kind, in which case everyone would tend to embrace the dominant 
religion, or that one would be zealous for religion in general, in which case sects would 
multiply.”  The Spirit of the Laws, trans. & ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, 
Harold Samuel Stone, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pt. 3, bk. 19, 
chap. 27, 330. 
2 Ibid., pt. 1, bk. 5, chap. 3, 44. 
3 Ibid., pt. 1, bk. 3, chap. 3, 22.  
4 Ibid., pt. 1, bk. 4, chap. 1, 31. 
 
5 Ibid., pt. 1, bk. 4, chap. 5, 35. 
  
6 “Voyage en Angleterre et en Irlande de 1835” in Oeuvres I, 514. 
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7 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. & ed. Harvey C. Mansfield & 
Delba Winthrop, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 7.  Also see 
Alexis de Tocqueville, De la démocratie en Amérique, Oeuvres II, Bibliothèque de la 
Pléiade, ed. André Jardin with Jean-Claude Lamberti and James T. Schleifer, (Paris: 
editions Gallimard, 1992), 8. (Henceforth references to this work will appear as DA, 
volume, part, chapter for both the English translation and French text with the page of the 
English translation appearing before that of the French text and the two separated by a 
slash). 
8 DA, II, 1, 17, 459/584. 
  
9 Ibid., I, 2, 5, 201/239-240. 
  
10 Letter to Arthur de Gobineau, September 5, 1843, in Alexis de Tocqueville, Oeuvres 
complètes, correspondance d’Alexis de Tocqueville et d’Arthur de Gobineau, texte établi 
et annoté par M. Degros, intro. par J. J. Chevalier, avertissement de J. P. Mayer, (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1959), tome IX, 46.  (Hereafter references to this work will appear as OC IX).  
11 Alexis de Tocqueville, Oeuvres complètes, correspondance d’Alexis de Tocqueville et 
de Francisque de Corcelle, correspondance d’Alexis de Tocqueville et de Madame 
Swetchine, ed. J. P. Mayer, volume établi par Pierre Gibert, soumis pour contrôle et 
approbation à Claude Bressolette et André Jardin, (Paris: Gallimard, 1983), tome XV, 
292-293. (Hereafter reference to this work will be shown as OC XV).  See also Selected 
Letters on Politics and Society, ed. Roger Boesche, trans. James Toupin and Roger 
Boesche, (Berkely and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), 338-339.   
12 Even though this chapter focuses on Tocqueville’s debt to enlightenment principles, 
particularly those of Montesquieu, it is important to underscore here that his view of 
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slavery is guided far more by his Christian and liberal principles than the prejudices that 
characterize Montesquieu’s “enlightened” view of the subject.  Tocqueville viewed the 
South’s slave culture as the scourge of American democracy. He has been criticized for 
the lack of importance he seems to have given this subject in his work.  He had good 
reasons for his decision:  1) there was an agreement between Tocqueville and his 
traveling companion to America and friend Gustave de Beaumont that the latter would 
take up the task of depicting the effect of slavery on the mores of Americans and 
Beaumont published in 1835 a work titled “Marie ou l’esclavage aux Etats Unis” to fulfill 
that objective; and 2) Tocqueville’s overall objective in the Democracy is to paint a 
picture of democracy for his French audience.  Thus, America’s race problem is 
tangential to his subject inasmuch as it holds no relevance for his primary audience, 
which is why he relegates it to the last chapter of volume I and confines his discussion of 
the issue of Negro slavery in America to its toxic effects on the health of the republic.  As 
far as he was concerned Beaumont’s “Marie” addresses the issue of slavery by painting 
its debilitating influence on the character of master and slave.     
Nevertheless, Tocqueville is indebted to Montesquieu for his great understanding of the 
pernicious effect of slavery on morality and the grave danger to which a state exposes 
itself when it harbors a large slave population, particularly one which is subject to the 
cruelty of masters without any protection from the laws. ( The Spirit of the Laws, pt. 3, 
bk. 15, chaps. 1, 13 & 16, 246, 256 & 258-259) His analysis of the consequences of 
Southern slavery certainly addresses these issues.   
However, Tocqueville parts with Montesquieu for whom Christianity’s principle of 
equality, which makes slavery a practice against nature, does not extend to Negroes who 
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Montesquieu maintains are not men.  Not only does Montesquieu maintain that slavery in 
some countries can be founded on natural reason, (The Spirit of the Laws, pt. 3, bk. 15, 
chap 7, 251-252) but he also cites several economic reasons he deems appropriate to 
sanction Negro slavery in America.  (The Spirit of the Laws, pt. 3, bk. 15, chap. 5, 250) 
Needless to say that Tocqueville takes a diametrically opposed view from Montesquieu 
on the moral issue of Negro slavery that is consistent with the Christian and liberal 
principles he advocates.  As has already been shown in this study his correspondence 
with Gobineau makes clear that he rejects the fatalism inherent in racial theories for its 
deleterious effect on individuals and nations.  
 Moreover, Tocqueville devoted considerable energy both in and out of parliament to the 
emancipation of Negro slaves in France’s colonies.  In 1843 he wrote a series of essays 
published in Le Siècle, a Paris newspaper, in which he argued for emancipation both from 
a moral and pragmatic standpoint.  He refutes Montesquieu’s economic argument to 
support Negro slavery by adducing the success of English emancipation in nineteen 
colonies, which contrary to widespread anticipation did not destroy colonial economies, 
to support his abolition crusade. (See Alexis de Tocqueville, Writings on Empire and 
Slavery, ed. and trans. Jennifer Pitts, (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 2001), 199-226 passim.) 
13 OC XV, 296-297 
 
14 It is important to note here that Tocqueville’s new liberalism does not in anyway 
devalue the individual.  In fact, Tocqueville is sincerely attached to individualism in its 
nobler form and if he denounces democratic individualism he does so in the name of 
individual dignity and love of liberty.  A letter written to Arthur de Gobineau on January 
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liberty.  I have always said that it is more difficult to stabilize and to maintain human 
liberty in our new democratic societies than in certain aristocratic societies of the past.  
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the idea that one might as well despair of trying.  No, I shall not believe that this human 
race, which is at the head of all visible creation, has become that bastardized flock of 
sheep which you say it is, and that nothing remains but to deliver it without future and 
without hope to a small number of shepherds, who after all, are not better animals than 
are we, the human sheep, and who indeed are often worse.  You will forgive me when I 
have less confidence in you than in the goodness and the justice of God.”  Letter to 
Arthur de Gobineau, January 24, 1857, in OC IX, 280.  See also Alexis de Tocqueville, 
“The European Revolution” & Correspondence with Gobineau, intro., ed., and trans., 
John Lukacs, (Wesport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1959), 309-310.   Lastly see 
Jean-Claude Lamberti, Tocqueville and the Two Democracies, trans. Arthur 
Goldhammer, (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1989), 175. 
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sense the ancients attached to the word mores; not only do I apply it to mores properly 
so-called, which one could call habits of the heart, but to the different notions that men 
possess, to the various opinions that are current in their midst, and to the sum of ideas of 
which the habits of the mind are formed.  I therefore comprehend under this word the 
moral and intellectual state of a people.” DA, I, 2, 9, 275/331. 
The key here is that mores for Tocqueville encompass the habits of the heart, the domain 
of religion, as well as those of the mind.  The mores and laws of the Americans combine 
the religious beliefs of the Puritans and love of liberty that prompted them to seek 
political freedom in exile to practice their religion.  The result is that there are two 
tendencies, “diverse but not contrary, traces of which it is easy to find everywhere in 
mores as in the laws…Far from harming each other, these two tendencies apparently so 
opposed, advance in accord and seem to lend each other mutual support.”  Ibid., I, 1, 2, 
43/47-48. 
Tocqueville’s definition of mores coincides with Rousseau’s classification of laws, which 
include political or fundamental laws, civil and criminal laws and an unspecified fourth. 
[This fourth law,] the most important of all, which is inscribed neither on marble nor 
brass, but in the hearts of the citizens, a law which forms the true constitution of the state, 
a law which gathers new strength every day and which, when other laws age or wither 
away, reanimates or replaces them; a law which sustains a nation in the spirit of its 
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institution and imperceptibly substitutes the force of habit for the force of authority.  I 
refer to morals, customs and, above all, belief: this feature, unknown to our political 
theorists, is the one on which the success of all the laws depends; it is the feature on 
which the great lawgiver bestows his secret care, for though he seems to confine himself 
to detailed legal enactments, which are really only the arching of the vault, he knows that 
morals, which develop more slowly, ultimately become its immovable keystone.  Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, trans. Maurice Cranston, (Baltimore: Penguin 
Books, 1968), bk. II, chap. 12, 99-100.    
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part of the union to another to pursue their commercial interests the Anglo-Americans 
take with them the same religious and republican sentiments.  Tocqueville asserts that the 
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the union to all parts of the world and the wealth of the globe into the heart of the union.  
The South and West need the commercial resources of the North, which carries their 
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products across the seas and uses their raw materials for its manufactures and freight for 
its vessels.  Thus, Tocqueville argues that commerce is foremost among the republic’s 
interests insofar as it is the bond that unites Americans and contributes immensely to 
shaping the national character.   
Tocqueville demonstrates the importance of the commercial spirit to the long-term 
prospects of the American republican union in his discussion of Southern slavery, which 
is the one single element that poses the greatest threat to its preservation.  The shadow 
cast by slavery over American democracy gives Tocqueville the opportunity to 
demonstrate the strong resilience of republicanism, which he asserts functions as the 
country’s secular religious creed and as such reigns undisputed in public opinion.  In fact, 
he determines that it is the glue that binds Americans into a cohesive whole despite their 
regional differences.  Tocqueville maintains that republicanism’s stronghold on the 
American psyche is the only hope of survival for the fragile union whose fate hangs in 
the balance over the issue of Southern slavery.  As compelling as it is the issue of slavery 
is not enough to cause the dismemberment of the Union because at its core the 
commercial interests of the republic constitute the essence of the American social state.    
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Restoration but as Tocqueville saw it their role changed once they had beaten the 
aristocracy by the social cataclysm of the July Revolution of 1830 that ended the 
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chose to assume the Doctrinaires’ old role of intellectual critic.  
 It is noteworthy that it was Royer-Collard who as a standing member of l’Académie 
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stated admiration for Winthrop’s definition of liberty, he was familiar with Cotton 
Mather’s Magnalia Christi Americana from which he, no doubt, obtained useful 
information about the religious influence of the pilgrims on American colonial life.  In 
the Magnalia Christi Americana, Mather shows evidence of a spiritual gap of the kind 
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1670’s.  In the biographical section on Cotton Mather in the Magnalia Christi Americana, 
it is noted that his father observed signs of spiritual decay in the New England state of 
Massachussetts, the cradle of Puritan piety, shortly after his ordination as minister of the 
Second Church.  “The population of Boston had increased, and many children of the first 
Congregational settlers of the town lacked the religious fervor which had brought their 
parents to New England.  Some of them, although professing piety, were less concerned 
with salvation in the next world than with material prosperity in this.  In the next two 
decades the situation became worse.”  Increase Mather (Cotton’s father) in 1674, the year 
in which Cotton entered Harvard, preached a sermon bewailing the decline of the “power 
of godliness” in New England.  He reminded his listeners that “the interest of New 
England was Religion, which did distinguish us from the English Plantations; they were 
built upon a worldly design, but we upon a Religious design… 
…Early in 1698, John Leverett, William and Thomas Brattle, and a group of merchants 
and other prosperous and influential men in Boston, decided to establish a new Church.” 
The Mathers waged a fierce but losing campaign against “these dangerous innovators 
within the Congregational fold” who sought to subvert the Congregational churches.  It 
appears that their “subversion” amounted to some changes in ritual and innovations in the 
way in which ministers were authorized to admit to communion and full membership 
anyone of  “visible sanctity without a relation of a religious experience proving 
‘conversion’ or ‘regeneration.”  It is important to note that the innovators prevailed over 
the Mathers.  Thus, it would appear that the break with orthodoxy began much earlier and 
gradually expanded.  The innovators of the seventeenth century, like their nineteenth 
century descendants, were more interested in observing the symbolic rituals of religion 
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 HOW TOCQUEVILLE ADAPTS ROUSSEAU’S TEACHING ON OPINION TO 
PROMOTE RELIGION AS THE APPROPRIATE SOURCE OF AUTHORITY IN 
DEMOCRACIES FOR UNIFYING MEN AND LEADING THEM TO MORAL 
VIRTUE  
 
This chapter examines how Rousseau reinforces for Tocqueville the single power 
of common opinion in shaping the moral fiber of society, especially in democratic 
republics.  Rousseau believes that opinions corrupt man.1  They are not only the nefarious 
product of pride, vanity, and ambition but also instruments of deception.  He proposes 
two solutions to this invariable social problem: 1) a pedagogical method to counter 
passions excited by conventionalities; and 2) a civil religion to strengthen the power of 
law.  In the first case, a proper education meticulously tailored to nurture man’s natural 
development guides him to cultivate his reason and sentiments enabling him to reject the 
false opinions that harden and spoil the innocent heart with which nature has endowed 
him.2 At the same time and with the same care Rousseau outlines a different system of 
education for woman, one that subjects her to opinions.  In the second instance, a 
universal principle whose object is to enlighten and guide the public serves as the 
foundation for law since “a blind multitude… seldom knows what is good for it.. .[and] 
must be shown the good path it is seeking.”3  This chapter will focus on the first approach 
while the second will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter, which 
examines specifically Tocqueville’s democratic religious doctrine. 
Tocqueville’s description of the American founding, which the preceding chapter 
shows was influenced by Jared Sparks’ portrait of the establishment of the New England 
colony, brings to mind the contour of the theoretical republic Rousseau creates in the 
Social Contract, a treatise on the intimate connection between liberty and law, both moral 
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and political.  As shown in the previous chapter, Tocqueville attributes the strength of 
American democracy to the common interests and beliefs that unite its people in their 
love of freedom.  He credits Christianity and republicanism for the moral order that 
regulates American life in the federal republic despite strong regional differences. 
Moreover, in the first volume of Democracy in America he demonstrates that America 
owes its democratic success to other equally important causes unique to the country such 
as, inter alia, a pervasive equality and institutions that foster morality and republican 
virtue.  
Nevertheless, Rousseau’s influence is most apparent in the second volume in 
which Tocqueville shows the intimate connection between political regimes and moral 
freedom.  He formulates a religious pedagogy to foster democratic liberty in this work by 
comparing the limits of intellectual freedom in democratic society-- exemplified by  
America and revolutionary France-- with the reflective taste for it that was the distinctive 
mark of aristocratic society.  This comparison allows him to demonstrate that in 
democracy man is bereft of the ready source of beliefs that served under the pyramid of 
status of aristocratic society to regulate social relations: aristocratic power issued from 
divine right and class opinion directed by the powerful intellect of a few well-born 
individuals served as the principal arbiter of beliefs. In contrast, democratic equality 
throws man back on his own resources, which are restricted by the limits of his mind and 
his short span of life, to formulate his beliefs.   
Tocqueville, following Rousseau, maintains that man’s condition as well as the 
necessities of social life compels him to draw his beliefs from a moral and intellectual 
authority.  However, it is noteworthy that Tocqueville, unlike Rousseau, believes that the 
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place of this authority may be variable and depends on the nature of political regimes.  
Having located the center of beliefs in democracy in the opinion of the crowd 
Tocqueville aims to imbue common opinion with a moral standard.  His work relies 
heavily on Rousseau’s political philosophy insofar as it makes reason an important 
foundation of belief.  Rousseau’s assertion that “[t]he greatest ideas of the divinity come 
to us from reason alone,”4 provides Tocqueville a powerful premise on which to found 
democratic morality since Tocqueville’s own analysis of democracy leads him to 
conclude that the most compelling effect of equality on man’s intellect is to lead him 
back toward his “own reason as the most visible and closest source of truth.” 5     
For Rousseau social life is impossible unless the goal of the social enterprise, i.e., 
for men to live equally free under a system of law, is to transform human nature from 
solitary being into a part of a much greater whole from which the “individual will then 
receive, in a sense, his life and his being.”6  Tocqueville recognizes Rousseau’s solitary 
being in the atomistic individual democracy creates and like Rousseau he maintains that 
if [democratic] man is to remain free he will have to replace his independence with a 
moral and communal existence.  Rousseau’s political teaching allows Tocqueville to 
move from the particular practical experience of the Americans, which demonstrates that 
common actions in an egalitarian society sustain democratic freedom, to the universal.  
Thus, it enables him to carve a path through which France can hope to lift herself out of 
the cycle of revolutions in which she is engulfed.   
I, too, believe that our contemporaries have been badly brought up 
and that this is a prime cause of their miseries and of their weakness, but I 
believe that a better upbringing could repair the wrongs done by their 
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miseducation; I believe that it is not permissible to renounce such an 
effort.  I believe that one could still achieve something with our 
contemporaries, as with all men, through an appeal to their natural 
decency and common sense.7  
This perspective allows Tocqueville to nurture amid consistent political upheavals 
his lifelong hope that France’s democratic malaise could be cured in the long-term by 
reforming opinions.  Tocqueville adopts Rousseau’s viewpoint that it is opinion that 
governs man in society to such an extent that he admits in the last years of his life “I 
attach a secondary influence to institutions on man’s destiny.”8  He states elsewhere: 
“Not mechanical legal structures but the ideas and passions of men are the motive forces 
of human affairs.”9  
Throughout the nineteenth century French society displayed the worst 
propensities of the human heart awakened by democratic equality.  The Revolution, 
which catapulted France from an aristocratic to a democratic society, disrupted ancient 
beliefs, weakened authority and obscured the common ideas that serve as moral anchors 
in society.   
If equality of conditions is favorable to good morals, the social 
travail that renders conditions equal is quite fatal to them... In the fifty 
years that France has been transforming itself, we have rarely had 
freedom, but always disorder.  In the midst of the universal confusion of 
ideas and general shaking of opinions, amid this incoherent mixture of just 
and unjust, of true and false, of right and fact, public virtue has become 
uncertain and private morality unsteady.10
 163
 Tocqueville is convinced that the French nation can eventually give itself an 
ordered democratic state like that of the Americans only if the all-absorbing 
preoccupation with private interests that divide the country can be neutralized by shared 
beliefs to bind men into a community.  But, he faces insurmountable barriers to 
accomplish this objective in France, a country which he believes is slipping relentlessly 
toward the materialism equality engenders.  “Materialism is a dangerous malady of the 
human mind in all nations; but one must dread it particularly in a democratic people 
because it combines marvelously with the most familiar vice [the taste for material 
enjoyments that disposes men to believe that all is nothing but matter] of the heart in 
these peoples.”11  He expresses this concern to his friend Arthur de Gobineau whose 
materialist racial theories he opposed.   
I never concealed from you that I am greatly prejudiced against 
what seems to be your principal idea, which, I must confess, to me seems 
to belong to the group of materialistic theories… I am also concerned 
whether the present state of public opinion is at all propitious for the 
success of a book such as yours.  For, even though people are becoming 
every day more subservient to materialism through their tastes and habits, 
and through the increasing mediocrity of political and moral doctrines, 
they become at the same time extreme spiritualists in their philosophy.12  
In the tradition of Rousseau, Tocqueville proceeds to show that since equality 
brings man to rely solely on his reason only a rational principle that transcends the 
material world can combat democracy’s worst inclinations and foster in the democratic 
regime a spirit of liberty.  For him a religion that teaches man about the immortality of 
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the soul helps to guard democratic peoples from descending into the fatal circle of 
materialism into which they are propelled because it forces them to think about the 
future, a powerful incentive for abiding by a strict code of moral conduct in this life.  
 
Why Tocqueville Expands his Theoretical Framework beyond Montesquieu to  
Rousseau in the Second Volume of Democracy in America   
 
As the enlightenment’s foremost advocate of equality in the name of freedom, 
Rousseau provides Tocqueville a more comprehensive framework than Montesquieu to 
analyze democracy in all its facets in the second volume.  In this work Tocqueville turns 
his focus from analyzing the effects of the democratic social state of the Americans on 
their political laws and mores to uncover the defects of equality and prevent them from 
destroying all bases of freedom in the old aristocratic societies of Europe, especially 
revolutionary France.  This expansion is consistent with and provides continuity to the 
premise upon which democratic morality is founded in the first volume insofar as 
Rousseau agrees with Montesquieu that “virtue [is] the cardinal principle of a republic.”13
However, Rousseau argues that Montesquieu errs in attributing this principle 
solely to a republic since it ought to be the foundation of any well-constituted state, albeit 
with a greater or lesser degree according to the form of government.  For example, he 
argues that an elective aristocracy needs fewer virtues than a democracy because in an 
ideal world “it is the best and most natural arrangement for the wisest to govern the 
multitude, [provided] they will govern for its advantage and not their own.”14  But, 
Rousseau who like Tocqueville recognizes that democracy is more just than other forms 
of government is also cognizant that the age of aristocracy has passed and that with the 
dawning of egalitarianism a new type of man has emerged who is the personification of 
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mediocrity.15  His pedagogical project, which is directed at illuminating a path to virtue 
and liberty for this new human specimen, offers Tocqueville greater possibilities than 
Montesquieu for discovering the means to make equality compatible with freedom. 
Montesquieu’s political philosophy leads Tocqueville to identify the combination 
of happy circumstances that produced American democratic virtue and which, by the 
way, distinguish America from any other democratic republics, ancient and modern.  
France and the fledgling democracies of the Old World, which are founded on the debris 
of feudal aristocracy, possess none of the conditions that have contributed to the 
compatibility of equality and freedom in the New World.  Moreover, Montesquieu’s 
democratic theory is limited to the ancient political world and therefore its scope does not 
embrace the most important condition of modern democracies: equality of conditions.  If 
Montesquieu’s perspective helps Tocqueville to distinguish the particular attributes of 
American virtue, which is a mixture of the patriotic spirit found in the democracies of the 
ancient world, aristocratic courage and England’s commercial spirit, it does not however 
lend itself to identifying a generic standard for virtue in modern democracies.   
Tocqueville finds Rousseau’s teaching on virtue, which proceeds from his 
insightful understanding of human nature, particularly helpful when he turns his focus 
from America to analyze democracy in France where it oscillates between despotism and 
anarchy.  Rousseau not only takes equality of conditions into account but he also studies 
the human passions awakened by the advent of egalitarianism and their detrimental effect 
on the body politic.  His teaching aims to combat these passions, which lead to the single-
minded pursuit of private interest thereby causing the moral foundation of society to 
erode.  Tocqueville’s empirical study of democratic society in France leads him to 
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conclude with Rousseau that a counterpoise must be found to stem the egoistic 
preoccupation with one’s well-being egalitarianism promotes.  While Tocqueville 
proclaims democratic equality as a “providential fact,”16  he nonetheless recognizes like 
Rousseau that it “demands much vigilance and courage to maintain it unchanged.”17  
Rousseau’s teaching highlights for Tocqueville the endemic problem of democracy 
allowing him to identify its cure by comparing the democracies of America and France. 
Rousseau’s teaching is based not only on the fundamental premise that the 
primary objective of education is to make man strong but also on the principle that man is 
sociable as a result of his weakness.18  Noting that equality causes man to feel reduced to 
a weak and isolated being, Tocqueville finds in Rousseau’s teaching a way in which to 
exhort democratic man to transform his weakness into strength.  Tocqueville observes 
that the feeling of weakness and isolation equality engenders is capable of producing two 
distinct tendencies. On the one hand, it can change the aspect of civil society by 
suggesting new sentiments and ideas to man that turn his heart to humanity while on the 
other it can bring out the worst in human nature by promoting a fierce competitiveness, 
which left undirected extinguishes the bonds of affection that make communal life 
possible.   
Rousseau is the first modern philosopher to recognize that there is a conflict 
between social equality and freedom for the following reasons.  The democratic state is 
characterized by instability because theoretically those who make the law also execute 
the law. This structural defect makes it liable to internecine strife because inevitably a 
multitude of particular interests insinuates themselves in public affairs to blur the 
attention that ought to be given to general perspectives. Once the power of government is 
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misused, it follows inevitably that liberty will be misused.  Consequently, he maintains 
that the constancy of democracies depends on a citizenry that possesses moral strength to 
subordinate its private interests to the common good. However, it is painfully evident to 
Rousseau that the egalitarian principles of the enlightenment produced a weak man  
whose ascendance makes it extremely difficult to achieve in modern society the same 
dedication to the community that was seen in the democracies of the ancient world 
Montesquieu studied.   
This “new” man is the antithesis of Rousseau’s view of the ideal citizen inasmuch 
as he places his good above the common good.  Rousseau contrasts him to savage man 
who he partially resembles insofar as he shares the savage’s inclination to be concerned 
only with himself but lacks his wholesome goodness.  Savage man is innately good 
because his relations are confined to the things that ensure his preservation.  In contrast, 
Rousseau’s “new” man has desires that exceed his needs and thus is dependent on other 
men to satisfy a host of imaginary wants, not least of all his understanding of himself.  
“Dependence on things, since it has no morality, is in no way detrimental to freedom and 
engenders no vices.  Dependence on men, since it is without order, engenders all the 
vices, and by it, master and slave are mutually corrupted.  If there is any means of 
remedying this ill in society, it is to substitute law for man and to arm the general will 
with a real strength superior to the action of every particular will.”19    
One of the fundamental principles of Rousseau’s teaching is that in becoming a 
citizen man agrees to make his interest identical with that of the common good.  Social 
life irrevocably divests him of the freedom the savage enjoyed to be concerned only with 
himself.  It makes the essential demand that he harmonizes his concerns with those of his 
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community.  Thus, for Rousseau to disregard the good of one’s community and one’s 
fellows for the sake of one’s own is to be in effect immoral.  A man who has not learned 
to sacrifice his interest for the common interest has not learned to struggle with himself 
and conquer himself.  He possesses neither the wholesome goodness of the savage nor 
the uprightness of the citizen.  He is unjust because inevitably he causes hurt to another 
when he pursues exclusively his own good.   
He who in the civil order wants to preserve the primacy of the 
sentiments of nature does not know what he wants.  Always in 
contradiction with himself, always floating between his inclinations and 
his duties, he will never be either man or citizen.  He will be good neither 
for himself nor for others.  He will be one of these men of our days: a 
Frenchman, an Englishman, a bourgeois.  He will be nothing.20  
Rousseau indicts the bourgeois because he is not a citizen and therefore he is 
immoral since for him it is inexorably citizenship and the obligations it entails that allows 
man to realize his own nature as man.  The bourgeois is not a man because he does not 
rule himself for it is only by taking an interest in the common good that man as citizen 
secures the liberty that allows him to rule himself.  He is a pathetic egoist who in thinking 
only of himself is not only ruled by his passions but is also totally dependent on the 
opinion of his peers for his sense of worth.  Rousseau views the ascendance of bourgeois 
values as a great threat to liberty because this man’s internalized contradictions and 
insatiable hunger for material comfort drives him to sacrifice all the things that are 
conducive to it, including, inter alia, country, friendship and family.  Thus, social 
equality gives rise to an immoral consequence insofar as it tends to destroy the 
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fundamental bonds of social life.  Rousseau shows that the moral corruption unleashed by 
bourgeois society is reversible only if the people as sovereign exercises its right to 
compel the sociability indispensable to freedom, i.e., “the love of law and justice or 
willingness [of the individual] to sacrifice, if need be, his life to his duty.”21     
Rousseau makes an intimate connection between law and freedom in his 
description of the change produced in man by the contractual agreement that converts his 
natural freedom into civil freedom.  If man gains by the social contract civil liberty and 
the legal right of property in his possessions, he is also constrained by it to subordinate 
his particular interest to that of the common good.  Yet, he is free because he is both 
sovereign and subject.  As a member of the sovereign body he enacts the rules and laws 
he is obliged to obey as subject and thus in effect he rules himself.  His obedience is a 
moral duty that draws its impulse from his will to rule himself.  The social pact thus 
changes the rule of conduct that guided man’s actions in his original state by replacing 
instinct with justice giving his actions the moral quality they previously lacked. 
It is only then, when the voice of duty has taken the place of 
physical impulse, and right that of desire, that man, who has hitherto 
thought only of himself, finds himself compelled to act on other 
principles, and to consult his reason rather than study his inclinations… 
We might also add that man acquires with civil society, civil freedom, 
which alone makes man the master of himself; for to be governed by 
appetite alone is slavery, while obedience to a law one prescribes to 
oneself is freedom.22    
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As shown previously in this study Tocqueville’s own notion of freedom like that 
of Rousseau incorporates two essential elements: a moral standard and a political one, but 
it proceeds from a different intellectual orientation.  Tocqueville owes his moral view of 
liberty to his Catholic upbringing and his political view of it to his aristocratic lineage 
insofar as it exalts the courage that produces human greatness.  In contrast, Rousseau’s 
concept of liberty issues from a visceral reaction against the skepticism of the eighteenth 
century philosophes who in the name of human progress and science wanted to deprive 
man of the freedom of will that gives moral significance to his actions.  He rejects the 
philosophes’ call for an “enlightened despotism”23 to stimulate progress by insisting that 
social life is based on mutual obligations and reciprocity between the individual and his 
community.  This voluntary exchange is the sole legitimate basis for social life and the 
only one that makes moral freedom possible.   
Nevertheless, the passion for liberty Tocqueville shares with Rousseau leads him 
to seek along the same path as his predecessor a means to safeguard it in an “enlightened” 
new world where bourgeois values-- having supplanted the aristocratic virtue he so loves 
-- pose a colossal impediment to freedom.  Yet, because their views are informed by 
different perspectives they follow the same tract up to a point.  Tocqueville’s Catholic 
upbringing as will be shown in the next chapter restrains him from accepting de facto 
Rousseau’s rejection of Christian principles as a guide for reason even though he shares 
some of his disillusionments with the Catholic Church and his distaste for unreasonable 
dogmas.24  Or put another way, Tocqueville follows Rousseau insofar as he wants to 
make reason the center of moral authority but he departs from him inasmuch as he 
believes Christian mores are needed in democracies to guide man’s reason. 
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Tocqueville like Rousseau harbors a strong distaste for the bourgeois.  He 
provides a scathing portrait of this man in his Recollections, which it is worthwhile to 
reproduce here since he did not intend this work for publication and thus it offers a most 
sincere expression of his thought. 
Our history from 1789 to 1830, viewed from a distance and as a 
whole, affords as it were the picture of a struggle to the death between the 
Ancien Régime, its traditions, memories, hopes and men, as represented by 
the aristocracy, and the New France led by the Middle Class… In 1830 the 
triumph of the middle class had been definite and so thorough that all 
political power, every franchise, every prerogative, and the whole 
government was confined and, as it were, heaped up within the narrow 
limits of this one class, to the statutory exclusion of all beneath them and 
the actual exclusion of all above.  Not only did it thus rule society, but it 
may be said to have formed it.  It entrenched itself in every vacant place, 
prodigiously augmented the number of places and accustomed itself to live 
almost as much upon the Treasury as upon its own industry. 
No sooner had the Revolution of 1830 become an accomplished 
fact, than there ensued a great lull in political passion, a sort of general 
subsidence, accompanied by a rapid increase in public wealth.  The 
particular spirit of the middle class became the general spirit of the 
government; it ruled the latter’s foreign policy as well as affairs at home: 
an active, industrious spirit, often dishonourable, generally orderly, 
occasionally reckless through vanity or egoism, but timid by temperament, 
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moderate in all things except in its love of ease and comfort, and last but 
not least mediocre.  It was a spirit which, mingled with that of the people 
or of the aristocracy, can do wonders; but which by itself will never 
produce more than a government shorn of both virtue and greatness.  
Master of everything in a manner that no aristocracy has ever been or may 
ever hope to be, the middle class, when called upon to assume the 
government, took it up as an industrial enterprise; it entrenched itself 
behind its power, and before long, in their egoism, each of its members 
thought much more of his private business than of public affairs; of his 
personal enjoyment than of the greatness of the nation.25    
The author of Democracy in America’s depiction of the French middle class  
recalls Rousseau’s portrait of the bourgeois.  Nevertheless, it is important to note that he 
locates the vile inclinations of the French middle class less in equality than in a particular 
political circumstance.  As will be shown below Tocqueville’s study of American 
democracy allows him to modify Rousseau’s teaching to show that equality, despite its 
deficiencies, produces ipso facto a salutary effect on the ideas and sentiments of men, 
which when properly directed can lead them to moral virtue.  In sum, a close look at 
Tocqueville’s treatise reveals that he identifies two distinct democratic men: his 
American is the prototype of Rousseau’s citizen whereas his French or revolutionary 
democrat is the archetype of Rousseau’s bourgeois.   
Tocqueville’s commentary on democracy juxtaposes the American democrat to 
his French counterpart and compares them to the aristocrat to show that structurally 
democracy indeed has a proclivity to debilitate public virtue.  These comparisons allow 
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him to show that: 1) the Old World democrat distinguishes himself from the American by 
prizing equality above liberty primarily because his encounter with democracy issued 
from a protracted class struggle and thus he is ready to sacrifice everything like 
Rousseau’s bourgeois to satisfy his singular passion for a good that so long eluded him; 
and 2) equality intrinsically inclines men to selfishness making this age old vice more 
pernicious to democratic society because it has acquired in it a political dimension but 
this tendency is not without remedy as the American example demonstrates.   
In the first place he shows how a long history of social inequality prevents the 
European democrat from discerning what is obvious to the American: “freedom [is] the 
best instrument and greatest guarantee of [his] well-being.  Americans love these two 
things for each other.” In this sense the American is indistinguishable from the aristocrat.  
Thus, Tocqueville maintains that unlike the French the American has an enlightened view 
of equality that enables him to see participation in public affairs as his principal affair 
because it secures for him a government that allows him to acquire the goods he desires 
and enjoy in peace those he has acquired.26  Secondly, Tocqueville shows how 
democratic selfishness, which he redefines as individualism, is more pernicious than its 
aristocratic incarnation because it erodes the foundation of liberty leaving man prey to 
despotism.    
Individualism leads man to turn all his sentiments toward the self abandoning 
society at large to itself.  Tocqueville differentiates this tendency to withdraw from the 
mass and create one’s own little society with one’s family and friends from the depraved 
instinct that gives rise to selfishness.  Individualism, unlike selfishness which 
extinguishes all virtues, begins only by withering the source of public virtue but 
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Tocqueville affirms that in the long term it annihilates all the others and degenerates into 
selfishness.  Individualism is more intractable than selfishness because it is undeniably 
produced by equality and as a result it permeates the entire social fabric and undermines 
it.  In contrast selfishness is a vice as old as the world and thus is a trait found randomly 
in every society and not the defining mark of any.    
Tocqueville differentiates individualism from selfishness by demonstrating that 
the latter’s existence in aristocratic society did not prevent men from being bound to each 
other by the reciprocal exchange of protection and cooperation the hierarchic social state 
imposed upon superiors and inferiors respectively.  Moreover, men were attached to one 
another by ties of caste, class, guild or family.  Thus, the structure of aristocracy ensured 
sociability inasmuch as it made it practically impossible for the individual to withdraw 
completely from involvement in his community, which as previously shown constitutes 
for both Rousseau and Tocqueville the basis of moral virtue. 
Democratic individualism, Tocqueville argues, poses an unprecedented threat to 
freedom because the constant movement that characterizes the democratic social state 
destroys the bonds of affection and corporate attachments that maintained order in the 
aristocratic community.  Tocqueville’s democrat is tormented incessantly by the fear of 
falling and the ambition to rise on the ever-rotating social ladder.  Money is his only 
means for transforming his social status and distinguishing himself from his neighbors.  
Thus, the desire to enrich himself takes precedence over all else leaving him vulnerable 
to succumb to all the passions capable of satisfying his desire.  The passion for wealth is 
particularly harmful to democratic freedom because the egalitarian social state is devoid 
of the structural mechanisms that exerted moral pressure on the members of aristocratic 
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society to participate in community affairs.  Absorbed by the passion for wealth 
democratic men are therefore willing to abandon their principal affair, which is to guard 
their freedom, to the care of anyone, including a despot as long as he is able to secure for 
them the order they need to conduct business affairs.  Tocqueville is painfully aware that 
nineteenth century French society is constantly teetering on the brink of a vile servitude 
due to this pervasive problem. “Despotism alone can furnish these passions [preference 
for business, love of profit, the search for material pleasure and comfort] with the secrecy 
and shadow which make greed feel at home, and let it reap its dishonest profits despite 
dishonor.  Without despotism these passions would have been strong, with it they are all-
powerful.”27    
Characteristically Tocqueville insists that if the passion for wealth is a product of 
equality it, nonetheless, has different ramifications for democratic people depending upon 
whether the equality of conditions they enjoy is complete or tenuous.  His teaching relies 
on this important distinction to suggest the way in which to reconcile the passions 
equality fosters with a love of freedom.  
When the taste for material enjoyments develops in one of these 
peoples [those transitioning from inequality to equality of conditions] 
more rapidly than enlightenment and the habits of freedom, there comes a 
moment when men are swept away and almost beside themselves at the 
sight of the new goods that they are ready to grasp.  Preoccupied with the 
sole care of making a fortune, they no longer perceive the tight bond that 
unites the particular fortune of each of them to the prosperity of all.  There 
is no need to tear from such citizens the rights they possess; they 
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themselves willingly allow them to escape.  The exercise of their political 
duties appears to them a distressing contretemps that distracts them from 
their industry.  If it is a question of choosing their representatives, of 
giving assistance to authority, of treating the common thing in common, 
they lack the time; they cannot waste their precious time in useless work.  
These are games of the idle that do not suit grave men occupied with the 
serious interests of life.  These people believe they are following the 
doctrine of interest, but they have only a coarse idea of it, and to watch 
better over what they call their affairs, they neglect the principal one, 
which is to remain masters of themselves.28   
The dread of the bourgeois Tocqueville shares with Rousseau leads him to 
examine closely Rousseau’s insightful understanding of the bourgeois and the principal 
passions that motivate him.  Armed with this new perspective he is able to formulate a 
moral teaching that combine Rousseau’s rational moral perspective with the fundamental 
precepts of Christianity.  Therefore, the next section will examine Rousseau’s guideline 
for redirecting the passions to attain virtue in society inasmuch as it provides an essential 
backdrop against which to view Tocqueville’s teaching on religion.   
 
How for Rousseau Reason Must Supplant Opinion if Man is to Achieve Moral 
Virtue in Society 
 
Rousseau’s comprehensive study of human nature leads him to the conclusion 
that man confounds virtue with the vulgar opinions and prejudices that on the contrary 
incite the passions and make him weak.29  According to him nature and a wise providence 
inscribed in the heart of man two passions: they are self-love and the fear of death.  These 
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two innate passions, which tend to our preservation, awaken the sentiments of our 
connections with others.  But, because opinions distort man’s imagination before he is 
able to sense his relations the passions are modified in social life and Rousseau wants to 
re-direct them toward their primal inclination.  He maintains that as our relations increase 
we acquire false ideas from which flow new needs that deprave the human heart and 
extinguish in it the bonds of human affections and reciprocal obligations, which for him 
constitute the basis of morality insofar as they tend to the common good.     
Human virtue for Rousseau consists in the love of order that belongs to a being 
with the strength of will to overcome the passions30 or more specifically, one who has the 
ability to order self-love judiciously in his relations with other men.  It is directed by 
reason and actualized only by a being that knows himself, knows how to live-- which 
entails his resignation to dying and all the miseries man is heir to-- and makes himself 
happy by drawing his contentment from within a heart that is robust and humane.  In 
sum, only a man who knows how to order himself by keeping a proportionate balance 
between his desires and his faculties so that his “power [i.e., reason as governing 
authority] and will [are put] in perfect equality”31 is esteemed by Rousseau to be happy  
and therefore to possess virtue.   
At the heart of Rousseau’s teaching is the incontestable principle that the first 
movements of nature are always right and that there is no original perversity to be found 
in the human heart.  Self-love in itself and relative to the individual is good and useful 
and naturally neutral.  It directs us to love what preserves us and to repel what harms us.  
Its adulteration is a consequence of socialization, which sets men at odds with each other.   
The inevitable comparisons socialization engenders among human beings produce a 
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value system that makes them dependent on the judgment and opinion of other men 
rather than on their natural inclinations for a moral sense of self.  Thus, in society self-
love is transformed from an instrument of necessity to one of insatiable desires whose 
fulfillment completely absorbs men and makes them forget their natural goodness.  Then, 
men are driven not by a sense of mutual affection for and obligation to each other but by 
the expediency of particular interest harmful to their wholesomeness.  “Private interest, 
which in case of conflict necessarily prevails over everything, teaches everyone to adorn 
vice with the mask of virtue.”32       
Nevertheless, Rousseau asserts that social life does not have to turn out so badly 
for man since nature also has provided him innate faculties suitable to his nature to allow 
him to realize his greatest potential in society.  He maintains that nature has not only 
endowed man with innate passions that tend to his preservation but it has also given him 
sentiments relative to his species to attenuate self-love’s tendency to become tyrannical.  
He supports his claims with a lengthy argument based on the premise that man was born 
equal and free but his freedom prior to social life was that of “a narrow and stupid 
animal.”33  Social life transforms man from a brute into “a creature of intelligence”34  
insofar as it is founded on a mutual contract among men who agreed to trade their natural 
independence for civil rights and the obligations appended to them.  Thus, it is the more 
circumscribed freedom man acquires in society that elevates him from and makes him 
superior in dignity to the beast.  The social compact is the means by which man realizes 
his nature as man.  Consequently, Rousseau maintains that it is only in society that man is 
able to realize his nature and for this reason he is by his nature sociable.  Man’s natural 
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sentiments, which are anterior to reason, bind him into a relation between himself and his 
fellows that constitutes a moral system from which the impulse of conscience is born.   
Conscience is for Rousseau the “divine instinct [in man]… [the] certain guide of a 
being that is ignorant and limited but intelligent and free; [the] infallible judge of good 
and bad which makes man like unto God;  it is [conscience] who make[s] the excellence 
of his nature and the morality of his actions.”35  In short, it is man’s conscience, the 
sentiment that makes him love good and hate bad, which raises man above the brute and 
keeps him from surrendering his reason to opinions and prejudices. “I know that the exact 
proprieties and a superficial virtue would demand more… But I believe I have a more 
certain rule and I am holding to it.  I listen secretly to my conscience; it reproaches me 
nothing, and it never leads astray a soul that consults it sincerely.  If that is not enough to 
justify me in the world, it suffices to my own tranquility.”36 Nevertheless, conscience 
although independent of reason cannot be developed without it.   The voice of conscience 
is reawakened in society by religion and man needs reason to understand religion, which 
can guide him to morality provided it is a religion untainted by opinions.  
Man’s reason and his free-will, the faculties that lead him to know the good and 
make him choose it respectively, differentiate him from the beast but alone do not suffice 
to raise him above it.  Left alone with his reason man would be led from error to error 
inasmuch as reason can be obscured by imagination, which is susceptible to the influence 
of opinion.   Social life is full of corruption precisely because most men have forgotten 
nature’s language, which is the moral guidance each man receives from his conscience, 
the innate principle of justice and virtue that directs his actions with the aid of reason.  
Rather, most men listen only to their reason, which relates everything to the individual, 
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instead of heeding the voice of their conscience, which speaks to the common interest.  
“Too often reason deceives us.  We have acquired only too much right to challenge it.  
But conscience never deceives us; it is man’s true guide.  It is to the soul what instinct is 
to the body; he who knows conscience obeys nature and does not fear being led astray.”37   
Rousseau thus shows that moral guidance, which makes social harmony and freedom 
possible, is not established by reason alone-- the faculty capable of leading man to 
knowledge of the good--  but is rooted in a natural sentiment, conscience-- the innate 
principle that makes us love the good and therefore to employ our liberty to choose it.38      
Because the voice of conscience is extinguished in society, Rousseau proposes to 
lead men back to it by cultivating their reason so that their enlightenment progresses 
correlatively with each stage of their physical development.   His pedagogical method is 
founded on the measure of man’s faculties at each stage of his development and the 
occupations that suit these faculties so that he learns to exercise his judgment with the 
discernment appropriate to his age.  Thus, Rousseau argues that man is prepared to 
consider the great primordial questions that religion addresses only when the progress of 
his enlightenment leads him in that direction.   
An upbringing that allows the natural passions to develop in accordance with 
nature’s slow and deliberate instruction makes the attainment of virtue possible because 
the senses, which are the first instruments of our knowledge, wake the imagination.  But 
when contrary to nature the senses are prematurely aroused by imagination the natural 
passions are transformed into vices because what we feel is not shaped by the timely 
experiences and observations that animate imagination but by opinions, which enliven it 
prematurely and upset the natural progress of the mind.  Because our faculties are limited 
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to the things that we can sense man remains closest to his natural goodness when he sees 
with his own eyes and feels with his own heart.  Then the authority that governs him is 
not the passions and opinions of men but that of his reason. He remains as natural as 
possible, i.e., true to himself, when he is guided not by opinions but by his reason. 
Consequently, Rousseau promotes an education that follows nature’s timetable 
and is free from the encumbrances of science (which inspires man with the terror of death 
and makes him feel it ahead of its time), superstitions (which makes him believe gods 
will protect him in this life or provide him with another life), and social proprieties 
(which fill him with superfluous desires).  All these notions invert nature’s order by 
waking the imagination before the senses to produce a significant change in the moral 
perspective of man.  They pervert consciousness thereby making man dependent and 
weak and transmute self-love into pride, vanity, ambition, anger, jealousy, envy, 
resentment and so on. “From the bosom of so many diverse passions I see opinion raising 
an unshakable throne, and stupid mortals, subjected to its empire, basing their own 
existence on the judgments of others.”39    
The natural development of the passions nourishes a strong and humane heart 
because it is an imagination untainted by opinion that makes us feel the ills of others 
while reflection, which brings us to see that we are not exempt from them, determines the 
judgment we make about them.  By upsetting this natural process society fatally causes 
man to rely on opinions rather than his reason for his guide to moral virtue.   
Rousseau believes that in society man needs virtue, or more specifically the 
ordering of self-love according to nature’s instruction, to combat this tendency.  As the 
origin of all the passions self-love is good when one remains master over it but it 
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becomes dangerous and harmful when succumbing to opinions man allows himself to 
become subjected to it.  “They [our natural passions] are instruments of our freedom; 
they tend to preserve us.  All those which subject us and destroy us come from elsewhere.  
Nature does not give them to us.  We appropriate them to the detriment of our nature.”40   
Self-love is the natural inclination that brings “every animal to watch over its own 
preservation, and which, directed in man by reason and modified by pity produces 
humanity and virtue.” Pity is the only natural virtue that Rousseau attributes to man.  It 
softens the desire for self-preservation in primitive man and attenuates the ferocity of 
vanity, which “is only a relative sentiment, artificial and born in society [that] inclines 
each individual to have a greater esteem for himself than for anyone else, inspires in man 
all the harm they do to one another, and is the true source of honor.”41  Thus, pity, the 
natural virtue, serves to regulate the primal passion, self-love, which degenerates in 
society into something bad by the application made of it and the relations given to it. 
For Rousseau the unity of man consists in the wholesome equilibrium of self-love 
and pity with which nature has endowed him.  His teaching aims to demonstrate that their 
harmonization leads to a happy life and he outlines how this concurrence can be achieved 
in society.  More specifically, he wants to show that man’s actions acquire a moral 
quality when his sensibility begins to extend outside of himself beyond his own 
individuality to “take on, first, the sentiments and, then, the notions of good and evil 
which truly constitute him as a man and an integral part of his species.”42    
Rousseau’s identification of the bourgeois, who is uniquely, involved with his 
preservation and well-being is meant to show that such a man is incapable of achieving 
the equilibrium that fosters a unified self.  Turning a blind eye from human sufferings to 
 183
contemplate the deceptive images of human happiness contrived by opinions that 
enervate his imagination, his sensibility inclines him less to the sweetness of pity than to 
the bitterness of envy.  Always regretting the goods he believes elude him he is 
incessantly in a state of conflict unable to bridge the chasm between his faculties and 
desires.  The resulting dividedness he experiences between these two poles leads him to 
self-alienation while at the same time it foments his vanity making it impossible for him 
to recognize the common weakness and miseries he shares with all men and which turn 
the heart to humanity.   
Social life enervates self-love’s ability to order itself because opinions influence 
the imagination and obscure the universal ideas men have about good and evil.  Thus, it is 
extremely important in society to restrain imagination by sentiment and reason.  Reason 
must be developed as the opportunities arise to exercise it so that man may find “in [its 
cultivation] only what is necessary for him to live in society,”43 and that means the power 
and will to direct self-love toward its natural inclination to beneficence.  Rousseau 
differentiates between good self-love or amour de soi, which is good and useful in itself 
when guided by nature, and bad self-love or amour-propre, which is an adulteration of 
the first and a product of society.   
Amour de soi, which recognizes necessity, is satisfied when our true needs are 
satisfied.  “What makes man essentially good is to have few needs and to compare 
himself little to others; what makes him essentially bad is to have many needs and to 
depend much on opinion.”44  Amour de soi desires nothing beyond the satisfaction of 
man’s physical needs and thus it is “inner-directed”45 and conforms to man’s natural 
goodness.  As long as it remains a natural impulse to our preservation it produces strength 
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and independence in the individual.  Rousseau believes that he who is strong does not do 
harm and according to him “[t]he only lesson of morality appropriate to childhood and 
the most important for every age is never to do harm.”46 In sum, self-love is a tender 
plant, which must be nurtured through the cultivation of reason to produce a robust soul 
capable of regulating the passions and awakening the heart to the interest it has in loving 
the order that is the basis of a good conscience, the true source of happiness.   
Rousseau’s notion of order is synonymous with goodness and justice, which are 
the attributes of God.  “[T]he goodness of God is the love of order; for it is by order that 
He maintains what exists and links each part with the whole.  God is just… it is a 
consequence of His goodness.”47 Reason makes these divine principles evident to man 
when he contemplates God’s works, which is the only proof he has of God’s existence 
since he is otherwise limited by his understanding to know Him by His essence.  By 
ordering himself and his actions according to the divine principles of goodness and 
justice man makes use of his faculties to attain the condition of happiness, strength and 
freedom that constitute the essence of virtue. Human justice emulates the order of divine 
goodness and justice insofar as it consists in generalizing one’s particular interest to make 
it more equitable.   “[T]he good man orders himself in relation to the whole, and the 
wicked one orders the whole in relation to himself.  The latter makes himself the center 
of all things; the former measures his radius and keeps to the circumference.  Then he is 
ordered in relation to the common center, which is God, and in relation to all the 
concentric circles, which are the creatures.”48  Of all the virtues, justice is for Rousseau 
the one that contributes most to the common good of men.   
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In contrast, amour-propre is the cultivation of one’s ability to manipulate and 
control other men to do one’s will.  Its arbitrariness makes it inconsistent with order.  It is 
a dangerous instrument that produces the self-centeredness that is antithetical to order.  
Amour-propre is never satisfied because it not only makes us prefer ourselves to others 
and relates everything to us even to the detriment of the rest of mankind, but it also 
makes the impossible demand that others prefer us to themselves.49  It leads to an 
incessant urge to compare ourselves to others and when these comparisons are not 
favorable to us to envy them and prefer to be someone other than ourselves.  In the first 
instance it engenders the desire for domination while in the latter it produces self-
alienation. It feeds itself at the expense of other men and becomes pride in great souls and 
vanity in small ones and “[o]ften it wounds the hand making use of it and rarely does 
good without evil.”50   
Rousseau’s solution for keeping amour de soi from degenerating into amour-
propre is essentially to teach man from early childhood to have few needs, to be self-
sufficient and to compare himself little to others.  According to him, man falls into the 
snare of amour-propre when he has many needs and depends very much on opinion by 
subjecting his existence to the judgments of others.  Yet, Rousseau concedes that since 
man has to live in society and will inevitably seek the esteem of others, he will succumb 
to amour-propre to some degree.  Prompted by this realization, he endeavors to show that 
amour-propre can be moderated and transformed into a virtue by an education that 
cultivates the seed of pity rooted in every man’s heart.  A proper education can help 
direct amour-propre toward the good by teaching man to extend his heart to others and 
consecrate his care to their happiness instead of focusing solely on “the baseness of 
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private interest and the abjectness of the human I “51 that contracts it.  Rousseau speaks 
here of fostering compassion, which is not a virtue but a selfish passion that nonetheless 
creates a bond of affection among men because it is born out of the common miseries 
they all share.     
Compassion is nourished by an education that awakens a child’s sensibility not 
only by showing him men by means of the accidents and vicissitudes of fortune common 
to the species but also by exposing him to the natural and civil inequalities that 
differentiate men within the social order.  Such an education makes him feel his own 
vulnerability and then animates his imagination by transporting him out of himself to 
identify with the ills of others.  It promotes his natural inclination to feel pity for the 
sufferings of others by calling on the first movements of his heart to awaken his 
conscience and enlighten his reason in order to temper the dangerous passions that 
amour-propre nurtures.  This method “excite[s] in him goodness, humanity, 
commiseration, beneficence, and all the attractive and sweet passions naturally pleasing 
to men, and prevent[s] the birth of envy, covetousness, hate, and all the repulsive and 
cruel passions which make sensibility, so to speak, not only nothing but negative and 
torment the man who experiences them.”52  Thus, Rousseau teaches it is possible to direct 
self-love toward goodness and human justice and affirms that “love of men derived from 
love of self is the principle of human justice.”53 In sum, for him man enters the moral 
order not by listening to opinions, which include religion and its tendency to lead either 
to skepticism or fanaticism and their deleterious consequences, but in governing himself 
by “the true affections of his soul enlightened by reason” and it is by this “ordered 
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development of his primitive affections”54 that he is able to form with other men the 
bonds of affection essential to social life.  
 
How for Tocqueville Opinion Reflects the Principles of Political Regimes:  Under 
Equality Opinion Can Carry the Authority of Reason to Bring Man to Moral Virtue  
 
As the previous section shows Rousseau’s pedagogical method for directing self-
love aims at providing man the capacity to rule himself through the exercise of his 
reason.  Self-rule enables man to return as closely as possible to the condition of 
goodness and happiness he enjoyed prior to social life by setting him free from the fetters 
of opinion, which nourishes the passions and corrodes morality.  However, because 
Rousseau premises his system of education on a study of human nature that is limited to 
an exclusive comparison between savage man and social man personified as the 
bourgeois he does not foresee the possibility that opinion can produce the contrary effect 
of restraining the passions under certain favorable social conditions.   
In contrast, Tocqueville who owes his philosophical insight to Rousseau as well 
as Montesquieu broadens the scope of Rousseau’s teaching to illustrate that the effect of 
opinion on morality varies according to the motivating principles of political regimes.  
Taking the Anglo-American societies as his democratic model, Tocqueville opposes them 
to the revolutionary democracy of France and European aristocratic societies to show that 
an “enlightened” equality promotes moral opinions by dint of utility.  Thus, it produces 
changes in social man’s manner of thinking and feeling that achieve comparable results 
to Rousseau’s proposed natural education.   
Tocqueville adapts Rousseau’s teaching to his democratic theory by showing that 
equality of conditions causes man to experience on the one hand his individual weakness 
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and thus brings him ipso facto to compassion.  On the other hand, it makes him call on 
the effort of his reason because his similarity to other men leads him to rely on “his own 
reason as the most visible and closest source of truth.”55 This tendency leads to other 
habits of mind that not only give opinion the force of reason but also reinforces equality’s 
salutary effect on sentiment since “our sentiments depends on our ideas.”56 It is from this 
change in perspective that Tocqueville is able to argue conversely that in democratic 
society opinion has the authority of reason.  
Equality of conditions engenders for Tocqueville’s American an unprecedented 
environment in which common opinion assumes the eminence of reason and thus 
becomes synonymous with moral authority, paradoxically changing the premise of 
Rousseau’s teaching on opinion.    Tocqueville argues that complete equality gives birth 
to a large number of “eager and anxious small proprietors”57 whose unwavering desire to 
increase their well-being inclines them toward the orderly virtues that favor trade.  This 
constantly growing middle-class, which constitutes the majority, possesses enough goods 
to desire order and to make it its principal affair to ensure that prevailing opinions are 
conducive to it.  It is noteworthy that Tocqueville’s concept of order approximates that of 
Rousseau insofar as he associates it with the divine attributes that serve as model for 
human justice.  Not unlike Rousseau he maintains that “the goal of God is order,”58 and 
that man follows this principle when he confounds his particular interest with that of his 
community.   
Rousseau’s bourgeois, who experiences self-love as amour-propre because his 
imagination is corrupted by opinion, must be taught to feel compassion whereas 
Tocqueville’s American is brought to this sentiment by the habit of mind he develops to 
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obtain the most benefit from his isolated social condition.  The pervasiveness of equality 
among the Americans makes evident to each the precariousness of his fortune due to the 
constant movement of the social order, a condition that impels everyone to sense his own 
weakness and isolation.  Tocqueville maintains that the state of weakness and isolation 
engendered by equality awakens the imagination of the American to his own likeness to 
others and brings him to understand what they feel and to judge them by himself.  The 
commonality of sentiment Tocqueville’s Americans share fuel in their heart a sensibility 
akin to natural pity, albeit a pity based on rational calculation and thus is closer to the 
selfish passion Rousseau calls compassion.   
When ranks are almost equal in a people, all men having nearly the 
same manner of thinking and feeling, each of them can judge the 
sensations of all the others in a moment: he casts a rapid glance at himself; 
that is enough for him.  There is therefore no misery he does not conceive 
without trouble and whose extent a secret instinct does not discover for 
him.  It makes no difference whether it is a question of strangers or of 
enemies: imagination immediately puts him in their place.  It mixes 
something personal with his pity and makes him suffer himself while the 
body of someone like him is torn apart. 
In democratic centuries, men rarely devote themselves to one 
another; but they show a general compassion for all members of the 
human species.  One does not see them inflict useless evils, and when they 
can relieve the sorrows of another without denying themselves much, they 
take pleasure in doing it; they are not disinterested but they are mild.   
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Although the Americans have so to speak reduced selfishness to a social 
and philosophical theory, they do not show themselves any less accessible 
to pity.59    
Thus, the compassion of Tocqueville’s American is a product of equality insofar 
as it is fostered by the common awareness that because all are alike each invariably 
experiences the vagaries of fortune and suffers its pains and miseries in his own turn.    
Tocqueville’s perspective implies that equality affects the imagination in the same 
manner as Rousseau’s meticulous education insofar as it leads man to virtue by 
transforming amour-propre into a sentiment of humanity fostered by compassion.  This 
adaptation of Rousseau’s teaching to the American democratic experience strongly 
suggests that compassion is within the reach of all democratic people since it is a 
consequence of a characteristic they all share: equality. 
The lesson Tocqueville wants to convey to his French audience is that an 
enlightened equality like that of the Americans sees that it is in the interest of each to be 
concerned with his fellowmen because alone each is too weak to remain free.  
Tocqueville’s compatriots are as blinded by their passions as Rousseau’s bourgeois 
insofar as they are powerfully divided by the “envy, hatred and scorn of [their] 
neighbor…”60 sentiments, which were produced by the prolonged conflict between the 
classes constituting the former aristocratic social structure and are perpetuated under a 
tenuous equality that clings to anachronistic principles of class differences.   
“[Throughout the eighteenth century] [a]lthough the fate of the 
nobility and that of the bourgeoisie had been very different between them, 
they resembled each other in one respect: the bourgeois ended up living as 
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separated from the masses as the noble himself.  Far from drawing himself 
closer to the peasants he fled from the contact of their miseries; instead of 
uniting himself closely to them to struggle together against their common 
inequality, he sought only to create new injustices for his own use: one 
sees him as passionate to procure for himself exceptions as the noble to 
maintain his privileges.  These peasants, from whom he issued, had 
become for him not only strangers but in effect unfamiliar, and it was not 
until after he had put weapons into their hands that he noticed that he had 
excited passions of which he had not the faintest idea, passions he was as 
powerless to contain as to direct, and of which he was going to become the 
victim after having been their promoter.”61  
  In contrast, Tocqueville’s enlightened American experiences his equality in a way 
reminiscent of Rousseau’s citizen inasmuch as his imagination is guided by practical 
reason, which makes evident to him that the best way to secure his interest is to secure his 
freedom.  He is cognizant that alone he is too weak to guard over his freedom and that the  
best way to secure it is to make the interest of his community his principal interest.     
Tocqueville, not unlike Rousseau, is well aware that with the leveling of society 
has come a lowering of standards but Tocqueville, unlike Rousseau, accepts democratic 
mediocrity as a fact and thus is reconciled to bringing democratic man to virtue by 
accommodating the principle of utility that characterizes this regime.  In the chapter titled 
“How the Americans Combat Individualism by the Doctrine of Self-Interest Well 
Understood” in Volume Two, Part Two, Chapter Eight, he argues that democratic 
morality is sustainable only if it takes into account the inclination of the democratic 
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imagination to focus on the material world.  In short, it is evident to Tocqueville that 
expediency is the sole means by which to bring democratic men to virtue.  Even if it is a 
virtue “not very lofty”62 insofar as it does not lead to the potential for human greatness 
that he so admires in the aristocrat, it is nonetheless praiseworthy because it creates 
among men the bond of community essential to freedom. 
Tocqueville’s studious observation of the American democratic experience 
convinces him that in centuries of enlightenment there is only one way to guide men 
to virtue:  it is not by noble ideals but by a means that is within the reach of all 
intellects, the personal interest of each. He contrasts the method of the French who 
“still feigns great devotions every day that [he] has no longer”63 by clinging to an 
anachronistic notion of virtue to the cleverness of American moralists who have 
capitalized on the habits of mind and sentiments equality already suggests to their 
countrymen to propagate the doctrine of self-interest well-understood.  The first 
approach, which does not cohere with democratic values insofar as it relies on the 
aristocratic idea of beauty to bring men to morality, causes hateful passions to fester 
in a cesspool of hypocrisy that engenders disorder.  In contrast the second is 
impregnated with pragmatism and thus contributes immensely to temper the 
American’s passion for well-being when it is in danger of transcending the bounds of 
order. The greatest appeal of the enlightened self-interest of the Americans remains 
for Tocqueville its ability to transform the passion for material well-being into a 
virtue that accommodates this democratic weakness.     
Tocqueville’s hortatory message to nineteenth century French society, which he 
sees languishing in a moral and political vacuum, is that when a doctrine like that of 
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the self-interest well-understood of the Americans obtains a great empire over the 
minds of a democratic people it directs the passions by making use of the personal 
interest that incite them.  Tocqueville is convinced that through the daily exercise of 
making little sacrifices, the American exchanges each day a part of his particular 
interest to save the rest thereby carving for himself through habit an indirect path 
toward the peaceful virtues that favor trade:  love of order, temperance, moderation, 
farsightedness and self-mastery.   If for Rousseau opinion holds sway over the 
passions, Tocqueville on the other hand finds that an enlightened opinion like the 
American doctrine of self-interest well-understood can restrain them.   
The doctrine of self-interest entrenches itself easily in democratic society because 
it suits the mediocre inclinations of the “anxious and small proprietors” that constitute 
the middle-class.  Once it takes hold in this class it is easily popularized precisely 
because it is the class among democratic peoples “that gives power to ideas and sets 
the tone of mores.  It [this class] makes its opinion predominate everywhere at the 
same time as its will, and even those who are most inclined to resist its commands 
allow themselves in the end to be carried away by its example.”64  
Tocqueville makes the important observation that the American middle-class 
maintains the stability of the state because it constitutes a powerful majority, which 
jealously guards “the singular fixity of certain principles” as a means to 
counterbalance “the great mobility of human actions”65 to which democracy gives 
rise.  In other words, like the Puritans of yore the majority opposes the arbitrariness of 
human laws to the constancy of religion’s moral laws.  Thus, although Tocqueville’s 
American has abandoned the religious orthodoxy of his forebears, he is able to temper 
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the constant agitation of democratic public life with the calm of an immobile intellect, 
which is governed by the “force, at once material and moral”66 of the majority.  Put 
another way the majority constrains the intellectual freedom and will of the American 
within the circle it draws around thought.   Anyone who has the temerity to venture 
outside of this circle incurs banishment by ostracism, a fate worse than death insofar 
as it attacks the soul while leaving the body intact  
Common opinion has a formidable influence over the mind of each citizen under 
equality of conditions because it is the vehicle through which the majority promotes order 
in the interest of the material prosperity of all.  It compels conformity primarily because 
public favor is indispensable to the social and economic survival of democratic man.  
Anyone who dares to challenge public opinion must be prepared to live with the scorn of 
his fellowmen and accept a more complete isolation than that which equality by its nature 
already imposes.  Tocqueville maintains there is no freedom of mind in America 
precisely because the fear of disgrace is a strong deterrent for those who would want to 
express ideas contrary to those of the majority.  For example, he avers that “[o]ne 
encounters non-believers in America, but disbelief finds so to speak no organ.”67  The 
majority uses its omnipotence to enforce religious observance in the name of order and 
morality.  “Religion itself reigns there [in America] much less as revealed doctrine than 
as common opinion.”68 To put it another way, common opinion harnesses religion to 
promote order in the interest of the community.   
During Tocqueville’s American tour he noted almost immediately the superior 
power of public opinion over the laws in religious and political matters.  In the letter to 
Kergolay dated June 29, 1831, which has already been quoted numerous times in this 
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study, Tocqueville maintains that in matter of religious practices public opinion is much 
stronger than the law in compelling everyone to obey the “Judaic” observance of Church 
attendance on Sundays and abstain from all amusements.69   
Likewise, public opinion imposes itself in matters of politics as exemplified by 
the following case of intimidation documented in his American travel journal.  A passage 
of this journal relates that the state of Philadelphia had granted legal voting rights to 
Negro citizens who, to his surprise, seemed indifferent to the privilege of being granted 
this important political right by abstaining from presenting themselves at the polls.  After 
inquiring into the reason for their apparent apathy he discovers that the Negroes feared 
retribution if they attempted to take advantage of these rights, because public opinion 
does not support the law. It is noteworthy that Tocqueville is well aware that public 
opinion can be misguided, irrational and immoral as in this case, which makes him fear 
the tyranny of the majority.  Nevertheless, he maintains that as a general rule public 
opinion in America reflects the religious habits the nation inherited from the Puritans.70  
Tocqueville provides a psychological reason for the opposed tendencies of 
equality to induce each man to think for himself in practical matters on the one hand, and 
on the other, to impel him to conform to opinion in matters where uniform standards are 
needed: equality makes man independent at the cost of isolation from his fellow citizen 
and thus leaves him weak and defenseless against the action of the greatest number.  
Recognizing that public opinion enjoys a formidable power in democracy that was 
inconceivable in aristocracy, he argues that it is the most appropriate vehicle to bring men 
to morality in this regime.  He expresses with lyricism what for him remains a most 
memorable observation of American democracy:  the unprecedented force of the public 
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to impose its will.  “It [the public] does not persuade [one] of its beliefs, it imposes them 
and makes them penetrate souls by a sort of immense pressure of the minds of all on the 
intellect of each.”71     
While Rousseau is unequivocal that reason must conquer opinion to free social 
man from the passions and superstitions that enslave him, Tocqueville turns his claim on 
its head by showing that under equality of conditions there is hardly a separation between 
opinion and moral authority: they very nearly fuse into one.  Tocqueville’s assertion can 
be summarized as follows.  The American accepts the opinion of the majority as the rule 
of reason because it is the collective judgment of his compatriots with whom he shares 
the same habit of mind generated by equality.  If, on the one hand, equality leads him to 
put all the effort of his reason toward the pursuit of his material well-being, on the other it 
absorbs his soul entirely with matters of practical interest leaving him little leisure to 
think about anything else.  Hence, the same equality that makes him rely on the effort on 
his reason in his personal affairs induces him to put an unlimited trust in the judgment of 
the public, with which he shares many similarities in all areas of common interest.   For 
this reason, Tocqueville posits that where a complete equality of conditions prevails the 
minds of men are inclined naturally toward analogous ideas because it brings them to 
share similar needs, habits and taste and consequently to draw their judgment from the 
same source. In this way they remain within the bounds of reason even when they relieve 
themselves from the obligation to form their own opinion about “a great number of 
theories on matters of philosophy, morality, or politics that everyone thus adopts without 
examination, on the faith of the public.”72   
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“As men resemble each other more, the dogma of equality of intellect insinuates 
itself little by little into their beliefs.”73  In turn, this notion leads them to conclude that 
“when all have the same enlightenment, truth [must be] on the side of the greatest 
number.”74  This disposition of democratic people to believe in the infallibility of the 
mass is antithetical to the inclination of aristocratic people who “take the superior reason 
of one man or one class as a guide for their opinions.”75 Thus, among democratic people 
universal reason is found to be a surer path to truth than individual reason in all matters 
not related to personal affairs and Tocqueville shows that when it is intermingled with the 
religious habits of the Americans it is a powerful source of moral authority.  He 
proclaims that “common opinion [is] the sole guide that remains for individual reason 
among democratic peoples.”76     
Tocqueville insists that the effect of equality on the intellectual habits of 
democratic citizens would not alone have given opinion the moral force to attenuate the 
passions without the contribution of two exceptional circumstances that are unique to 
America.  The first is that religion, which “gave birth to the Anglo-American societies,” 
permeates all their habits and sentiments and the second is that religion exists “entirely 
distinct from the political order, in such a way that ancient laws could easily be changed 
without shaking ancient beliefs.”77 In contrast, in France where religion and politics have 
always been intertwined, there is nothing to fill the moral vacuum that followed the 
democratic revolution, which jettisoned all ancient beliefs and traditions for new and 
untried ideas.  
“We are proposing in this first part to give on the state of France, 
before the great Revolution of 1789, some explanations, without which the 
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actual state would be very difficult to understand…The Church of France 
under Louis XIV was all at the same time a religious institution and a 
political institution.  In the intervening period that separated the death of 
this prince and the French revolution, beliefs having been gradually 
weakened, the priest and the masses became little by little strangers to 
each other.  This change was produced by causes it would be too long to 
enumerate.  At the end of the XVIII century the French clergy possessed 
still its goods; it meddled itself still with all the affairs of state; but it had 
in all parts lost control over the mind of the population, and the Church 
had become a political institution, much more than a religious 
institution.”78   
Tocqueville’s empirical study of American democracy enables him to correct 
Rousseau’s view that opinion has an adverse effect on the passions insofar as he 
demonstrates, on the contrary, that common opinion can contain the passions under 
equality of conditions when it is founded on the autonomous authority of religion.   Since 
it is invariable for him that the intellectual movement of equality leads to the intellectual 
empire of the majority, which will always be absolute in democratic people regardless of 
the political laws that govern them, he insists that public opinion directed by religion is a 
powerful tool for instituting order.  “[I]n centuries of equality, one can foresee that faith 
in common opinion will become a sort of religion whose prophet will be the majority.”79  
Despite his fear of the potential of majority power to become tyrannical, Tocqueville 
maintains, nonetheless, that “the power [of majority opinion to impose order and morality 
in democracies] is doubtless good.”80  Thus, by analogy he wants to show that French 
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common opinion can lead to results similar to those of America provided that religion 
operates exclusively in its own sphere, a condition essential for restoring the credibility of 
its authority.  
 
How Tocqueville’s View regarding the Significant Contribution Woman Can Make 
to Democratic Order Is Modeled on Rousseau’s Teaching on the Subjection of 
Woman to Opinion  
 
Despite the differences with Rousseau outlined above Tocqueville nevertheless 
remains a disciple of Rousseau in asserting that woman plays a pivotal role in directing 
and guarding democratic morality.  As shown in the previous section Tocqueville sees 
that equality produces similar results as Rousseau’s meticulous pedagogy to direct the 
sentiments and intellect of man toward reason. However, he also finds that equality, like 
the bourgeois society Rousseau castigates, has the disadvantage of blurring the 
distinctions that separate the sexes with deleterious consequences for social order.  
Therefore, while he finds no need to stress the standards of education for man he devotes 
a great deal of attention to that of woman to correct the erroneous democratic tendency to 
confound sexual equality with sameness.  Tocqueville’s attentive consideration of this 
matter is traceable to Rousseau and acknowledging this connection enriches the reader’s 
understanding of his religious teaching and clarifies the meaning of his dictum: “the 
singular prosperity and growing force of this [American] people [should be principally 
attributed] to the superiority of its women.”81 Therefore, a small digression is necessary 
at this juncture to show how much Tocqueville is indebted to Rousseau in attributing 
social order in democracy to the opinions that regulate the conduct of women. 
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Rousseau finds in the inequalities that exist in the physical constitution of the 
sexes a natural and reasonable base for defining their separate obligations and this 
prompts him to establish an opposite standard for woman than man with respect to 
opinion.  He argues that nature has made woman weak and man strong, but it has 
compensated her with the ability to turn her weakness into strength not only by giving her 
a greater facility to excite the desires than man has to satisfy them but also by “join[ing] 
modesty to these desires in order to constrain them.”82  From this assertion he proceeds to 
demonstrate that in the human struggle to overcome the passions woman’s natural reserve 
is the equivalent of man’s reason.  Consequently, he wants woman to make modesty 
rather than reason the foundation of her virtue.  Furthermore, he affirms that since woman 
is the sex nature has charged with the bearing of children, reason dictates that she is 
accountable to the other sex for the children she bears.  Thus, for Rousseau sexual 
difference determines intellectual and moral difference and in the case of woman her 
unique constitution makes her virtue not only a matter of good conduct but also one of 
reputation thereby making her dependent on the opinions of men.     
Therefore, Rousseau’s system of education for woman follows a different track 
from the one he proposes for man because the honor of each sex inasmuch as it relates to 
opinion has completely different principles for him. The virtue of man, which is in him 
and his judgment alone, makes him despise the opinions and the prejudices of men.  In 
contrast, the virtue of woman, which depends on the opinions of others, makes her 
respect these opinions because her reputation is measured by them.  This difference is 
noteworthy in the context of a discussion on religion inasmuch as there exists for 
Rousseau an indissoluble connection between opinion and religion.  “It is especially in 
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matters of religion that opinion triumphs.”83  Therefore, unlike man, woman does not 
draw the rule of her beliefs from reason but from submitting to unexamined opinions as 
will become obvious below.  Suffice it to say for now Rousseau is unequivocal that 
“[o]pinion is the grave of virtue among men and its throne among women.”84  
As it should be clear to the reader by now, Rousseau’s teaching is founded on the 
principle that nature provides a certain roadmap to the human species for the attainment 
of order and all the goodness that flows from it.  From this general principle he is able to 
argue that the conventional inequality of the sexes is both the work of nature, which has 
constituted them differently, and reason, which shows that their disparate constitutions 
are intended for different purposes.  Thus, to make them equal by discounting these 
differences is to pervert nature’s order, which can only be maintained by taking into 
account the dissimilarities that allow the sexes to complement each other-- both 
physically and intellectually-- to accomplish nature’s end.   
On this basis Rousseau maintains that social parity between the sexes is possible 
only when each sex follows individually his natural orientation.  Man derives his power 
over woman from his greater natural physical strength but she counterbalances his power 
with her charms and her cleverness, which nature has given her to exploit his position of 
authority over her.  In other words, woman is compensated for the power man has in his 
strength to subjugate her with the cleverness to enslave him with her charms and 
Rousseau aims to show that it is by using this capacity judiciously that she becomes his 
equal.  It is by means of this talent that woman “keeps herself his [man’s] equal and 
governs him while obeying him.”85  In sum, Rousseau teaches that social order is possible 
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only when woman and man understand their equality in the sense in which nature in her 
wisdom intended, i.e., by assuming the separate role it carved for them.    
 It is not difficult to trace in Rousseau’s argument an undercurrent of sexism that 
fuels the vociferous denouncements of feminist adherents who argue that Rousseau’s 
system of sexual difference is prejudicial to women since the “power” of modesty and 
ingenuity he grants them is the instrument of their subjugation.  For example, Carole 
Pateman argues in the Sexual Contract that Rousseau makes modesty, “[which] is a 
precarious control of sexual desire,” rather than reason the regulating moral faculty for 
woman to exclude her from participating in civil society.86  This perspective dismisses 
with utter contempt Rousseau’s overarching goal, which seeks “a natural base on which 
to form conventional ties,”87 to stem the deleterious effects of bourgeois values on 
society. Yet, at the same time the feminist criticism is not entirely without merit insofar 
as it reminds us that Rousseau’s system of sexual difference removes from woman the 
political means to combat man’s tyranny.  Paradoxically, Rousseau justifies his 
differentiated moral system on the converse consideration, which is based on the fear that 
without restraint woman would emasculate man.   
“With so great an inequality in what each risks in the [sexual] 
union, how can one fail to see that if reserve did not impose on one sex the 
moderation which nature imposes on the other, the result would soon be 
the ruin of both, and mankind would perish by the means established for 
preserving it?   For, given the ease with which women arouse men’s 
senses…men would finally be their victims and would see themselves 
dragged to death without ever being able to defend themselves.”88  
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  To appreciate the merit of Rousseau’s controversial position it must be viewed in 
the context of his broader argument, which maintains that the interdependence social life 
creates among men in public life and between man and woman in private life entails a 
system of cooperation that brings about a consciousness of obligation that is the basis of 
morality.  Because the union of the sexes constitutes a microcosm of society the 
obligations for cooperation that make social life possible must therefore originate in 
private life where the most effective collaboration proceeds from taking into account the 
physical difference of the sexes.  Furthermore, since the harmony that reigns in the 
familial hearth is the origin of social order, Rousseau puts a greater burden of restraint on 
woman because in his view her unfaithfulness far more than that of man dissolves the 
family.  Her betrayal, which destroys the primary social bond insofar as her husband and 
offspring are uncertain of their legitimate ties to each other, gives rise to countless evils 
and social disorder.  A man’s waywardness having a far less pernicious impact on the 
family, Rousseau finds it necessary to “regulate her [woman’s] views according to those 
of nature,”89 which is another way of saying that her natural vocation of motherhood 
makes it necessary to place her merit in her modesty.  
Viewed from this perspective the subjection of woman to the rule of opinion over 
her conduct facilitates her parity with man inasmuch as having far more to risk in their 
union, the command she exercises over herself and her impulses are the means by which 
she exercises control over man.  Woman draws from the moral fortitude she needs to 
maintain her reputation the esteem and honor to judge man’s merit and hence the implicit  
right to shape her social world.  Thus, woman is less subordinated politically to man as it 
appears at first sight because she has in her exceptional conduct the power to motivate 
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man toward moral judgment and thus participate in the political decisions that affect her 
wellbeing.   The merit of this viewpoint then is that it seeks to establish social harmony 
through a political compromise rooted in morality where modesty and reason 
complement each other and in this particular context it is unrivaled.          
Under Rousseau’s system of sexual difference woman governs men who are her 
judges by honoring herself and an honorable woman is one who loves purity and 
understands its value so that she judiciously avails herself above all to seek her happiness 
in her position, which means making modesty the motive for all her actions.  As noted 
above woman’s virtue and her honor are invested in her modesty because she is 
accountable to the other sex for the children she bears.  Rousseau insists that woman’s 
faithfulness on this matter is essential to the union of the family and by extension the 
well-being of society.    “[T]he love of one’s nearest [is] the principle of the love one 
owes to the state; [it is] by means of the small fatherland which is the family that the 
heart attaches itself to the large one.”90 Therefore, it is not enough for her to be chaste, 
gentle, docile and all the other qualities that constitute the sweetness of her character but 
she must be judged faithful by her husband and society.  Unlike man, she is as beholden 
to her conscience as she is to appearances and must not only make chastity foremost 
among her duties but also honor and reputation.   Rousseau insists that once women 
abandon their duty, which is their modesty, they lose their ascendancy and their 
judgments having no longer any effects on men society becomes depraved.  
Given woman’s eminent position of moral stewardship in society Rousseau 
teaches that the education of woman ought to be contrary to that of man.  However, his 
system of education for girls follows the same natural progression he formulates for boys, 
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i.e., to cultivate their body before their soul, albeit toward a different purpose that 
requires different means.  For example, in the area of physical development the aim for 
boys is strength whereas for girls it is attractiveness.  Likewise, in the moral realm the 
virtue of boys is fostered by developing their reason to prepare them to assume their civic 
duties whereas that of girls is formed by the industriousness and talent they need to fulfill 
their duties as wives and mothers.    
Since woman has a different status than man, which is that of motherhood, her 
system of education must prepare her for her duties, which are all related to “[t]he 
obedience and the fidelity she owes her husband and the tenderness and care she owes to 
her children.”91  The duties of woman include: “[t]o please men, to be useful to them, to 
make herself loved and honored by them, to raise them when young, to care for them 
when grown, to counsel them, to console them, to make their lives sweet and 
agreeable.”92 By entrusting woman with the vital role of shaping man’s character 
Rousseau shows that it is by fulfilling her obligations as he defines them that she extends 
her sphere of influence from the home to society at large.  For this reason he believes that 
woman’s education should be devoted primarily to the refinement of her taste, which is 
the most certain path to lead her to the moral notions associated with the beautiful, to 
prepare her to assume her grave responsibilities as wife and mother.  
Rousseau believes that the best way to cultivate the taste of girls is to regulate 
their natural propensity for coquetry, which left undirected contributes to immorality but 
properly guided promotes modesty and decency-- the virtues that enable them to establish 
their empire over man.  This can be achieved by occupying them with the production of 
all the things associated with the adornment of women, e.g., sewing and lace-making, etc.  
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Knowledge of these crafts is useful insofar as it accustoms them to rely on their own 
industry and attaches them early to the cares that will occupy them in adulthood.  They 
ought to perform these tasks under the loving eyes of their mother who they naturally 
want to emulate.  The habitual constraint this tedious apprenticeship imposes on them  
breeds in them gentleness, which increases their power of persuasion and thus is useful to 
them in their subjection to men and their opinions.  In sum, this training serves to instill 
in them the qualities that are essential to their happiness: vigilance, industriousness, and 
obedience.   Thus, coquetry like amour-propre when properly cultivated is transformed 
from an all-consuming passion into a virtue.    
It is not without coincidence that Rousseau directs woman and man by different 
means to virtue since unsurprisingly for him their physical constitutions determine their 
taste, which in turn directs their intellectual faculties toward different ends.  Woman’s 
taste directs her reason toward the practical whereas man’s causes his to ascend to 
general principles.  Their disparate conceptual abilities affect their individual competence 
to conceive the true idea of religion, which he must discover by the efforts of his reason 
while she practices the beliefs handed to her by an authority.  Furthermore, man’s 
strength and rearing, which give him a greater facility to be active, allow him to “see 
more objects and to judge the relations of sensible beings and the laws of nature.”93  In 
contrast, woman’s weakness, which confines her in the home, reduces her to judging the 
forces to which she is submitted and these are the passions of men.  This gives her a 
tremendous capacity to read in the hearts of men and thus to discover “experimental 
morality,”94 which man reduces into a system.  Their separate intellectual aptitude allows 
them to form a “partnership [that] produces a moral person of which the woman is the 
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eye and the man is the arm, but they have such a dependence on one another that the 
woman learns from the man what must be seen and the man learns from the woman what 
must be done…[I]n the harmony which reigns between them, everything tend to the 
common end…Each follows the prompting of the other; each obeys and both are 
masters.”95  
Expanding the difference between the sexes beyond the physical to the 
intellectual has for Rousseau a practical ethical value, one that reasonably assumes that 
woman in her role as wife and mother has a tremendous influence over the moral content 
of man’s thoughts even though it is he who-- through the discovery of abstract truths-- 
formulates the opinions that regulate society.  Yet, even if woman participates indirectly 
in shaping opinions, she is held nevertheless to a different standard than man in her honor 
and reputation that warrants she safeguards these by submitting to the opinions of men in 
her conduct and an authority in her belief.  Consequently, Rousseau introduces girls to 
religion at a much earlier stage in their development than boys since obedience and not 
reason is the sole measure of their faith.   Because the religion of woman is ruled by 
authority Rousseau wants girls to follow the religion of their mothers who are their 
natural tutors and when their guardianship is transferred from their father to their husband 
to follow the latter’s religion.  This change does not affect their belief because he 
confines their religious instruction to the simple dogmas connected with morality, 
especially those that emphasize their duties and direct human beings toward the good. In 
short, the best way to achieve moral order and protect society from the insidious effects 
of impiety or fanaticism to which women are more susceptible than men is to take into 
account that the different inclination of women’s intellectual faculties makes them 
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naturally less qualified than men to submit received opinions to the examination of their 
reason. 
Nevertheless, Rousseau’s overwhelming distrust of opinions leads him to make 
the cultivation of woman’s reason the final stage of her education on grounds that are 
consistent with his teaching.  The first is that reason is the faculty that brings us to know 
the good, which conscience makes us love and the rule of conscience “exists prior to 
opinion for the whole human species.”96 Woman then is subject foremost to the rule of 
the inner sentiment and she needs her reason to arbitrate between the rule of conscience 
and the rule of opinions when they are in conflict.  The second flows from his belief that 
conjugal unions should be contracted on the basis of the natural suitability of the partners 
and he argues that woman needs an enlightened reason to judge the appropriateness of 
her choice, which greatly impacts her commitment to her duties as wife and mother.  For 
Rousseau the matter of appropriate choice is extremely important since he blames the 
moral disorder of society partly on the conventional practice that focuses on marrying 
positions and wealth rather than persons.  He believes there is a strong connection 
between the happiness of marriage and the morality of citizens because it is the 
sentiments of two people-- and not their positions and wealth-- that sustain a marriage 
through the vicissitudes of fortune.   Therefore, Rousseau maintains that the ability to 
exercise her reason is as indispensable to woman as conforming to opinions to safeguard 
her honor. 
I would not indiscriminately object to a woman’s being limited to 
the labors of her sex alone and left in profound ignorance of all the rest.  
But that would require very simple and very healthy public morals or a 
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very retired way of life.  In big cities and among corrupt men such a 
woman would be too easy to seduce.  Often her virtue would depend only 
on the occasion; in this philosophic age she needs a virtue that can be put 
to the test.  She needs to know beforehand what might be said of her and 
what she ought to think about it. 
Moreover, since she is the subject of the judgment of men, she 
ought to merit their esteem.  She ought, above all, to obtain the esteem of 
her spouse. She ought to make him not only love her person but also 
approve her conduct.  She ought to justify the choice he has made before 
the public and make her husband honored through honor given to his wife.  
How will she go about all this if she is ignorant of our institutions, if she 
knows nothing of our practices and our proprieties, if she knows neither 
the source of human judgments nor the passions determining them?  As 
soon she depends on both her own conscience and the opinions of others, 
she has to learn to compare these two rules, to reconcile them, and to 
prefer the former only when the two are in contradiction.  She becomes the 
judge of her judges; she decides when she ought to subject herself to them 
and when she ought to take exception to them.  Before rejecting or 
accepting their prejudices, she weighs them.  She learns to go back to their 
source, to anticipate them, to use them to her advantage.  She is careful 
never to attract blame to herself when her duty permits her to avoid it.  
None of this can be done well without cultivating her mind and her 
reason.97     
 210
Tocqueville finds empirical evidence in America to corroborate Rousseau’s 
theory that a well-ordered social life depends on defining the separate obligations of the 
sexes on the basis of their natural differences.  “They [the Americans] have thought that 
since nature had established such great variation between the physical and moral 
constitution of man and that of woman, its clearly indicated goal was to give a diverse 
employment to their different faculties.” 98 This claim on its own may not be definitive 
enough to establish Tocqueville as a disciple of Rousseau on this subject but combined 
with the following it brings his agreement with Rousseau into greater focus.  
There are people in Europe who, confusing the diverse attributes of 
the sexes, intend to make man and woman into beings not equal but alike.  
They give them both the same functions, impose the same duties on them, 
and accord them the same rights…One can easily conceive that in thus 
striving to equalize one sex with the other, one degrades them both; and 
from this course mixture of nature’s works, only weak men and 
disreputable women can ever emerge.99  
Thus, it is unmistakable that Tocqueville echoes Rousseau insofar as he maintains that a 
division of labor on the ground of sexual difference is indispensable to social harmony in 
democracy.  
Tocqueville believes without a doubt that the movement of democracy, which has 
eliminated most other forms of inequality, will not fail to end the social inequality of the 
sexes but he warns that sexual equality is not synonymous with likeness.  He praises the 
American liberal notion of sexual equality, which divides the work of society into two 
separate spheres where men and women each make an equal contribution based on their 
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natural abilities. “Americans have applied to the two sexes the great principle of political 
economy that dominates industry in our day.  They have carefully divided the functions 
of man and woman in order that the great social work be better done.”100     
Rousseau’s influence on Tocqueville is as palpable here as elsewhere with regard 
to the significance he ascribes to the habit of cooperation that regulates family relations in 
America.  This habit is reproduced in the political community with far-reaching 
implications for the ideas that set the tone of opinions.  Rousseau’s teaching emphasizes 
that each gender must be educated with the view to their respective social responsibility 
not only because this method complies with nature’s intended goal for each sex to have a 
different role but also because it provides the best means for establishing order in society.  
His conviction on this matter is unvarying as shown in the two separate texts below.  
[One arrives at] prevent[ing] a dangerous familiarity between the 
two sexes by giving them entirely different occupations, habits, tastes, 
pleasures… [W]oman and her husband are destined to live together, but 
not in the same manner; they have to act in concert without doing the same 
things…[T]he inclinations that nature gives them are as diverse as the 
functions that it imposes on them; their amusements are no less different 
than their duties; in a word, both of them contribute to the common 
happiness by different paths; and this sharing of labor and care is the 
strongest link in their union.101     
He reiterates the same principle in a separate work. 
In following nature’s directions, man and woman ought to act in 
concert, but they ought not to do the same things.  The goal of their labors 
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is common, but their labors themselves are different, and consequently so 
are the tastes directing them… All the faculties common to the two sexes 
are not equally distributed between them; but taken together they balance 
each other out.  Woman is worth more as woman and less as man… To 
cultivate man’s qualities in women and to neglect those which are proper 
to them is obviously to work to their detriment.102    
Nevertheless, Tocqueville does not go as far as Rousseau whose understanding of 
sexual difference emphasizes also a great intellectual gap between man and woman that 
warrants placing her almost entirely under the yoke of opinion.  In fact he goes to great 
length to show that American women derive their superiority from an education that 
cultivates first and foremost their reason.  One way to interpret this shift from Rousseau-- 
whose pedagogy puts primary emphasis on cultivating a girl’s taste to lead her to virtue-- 
is to contemplate as Tocqueville does the particular challenge posed by democracy where 
individual independence penetrates every layer of society, tastes are mottled, custom 
changing and opinion often uncertain.103 These democratic peculiarities, among others, 
lead Tocqueville to search for a different path to virtue for woman than Rousseau and he 
is not surprised to find that “[a]lthough Americans are a very religious people, they have 
not relied on religion alone to defend the virtue of woman; they have sought to arm her 
reason.”104    
Another ostensible motive for this modification may be rooted in Tocqueville’s 
ambivalent position as philosopher and homme politique.   In the latter role he probably 
wants to distance himself publicly from Rousseau on the controversial subject of an 
intellectual difference between the sexes even though in his Recollections he shows that 
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privately he shares Rousseau’s view.  “I was strongly prejudiced against Madame 
[George] Sand, for I loathe women who write, especially those who systematically 
disguise the weaknesses of their sex, instead of interesting us by displaying them in their 
true character.”105 Nevertheless, what is important here is that his teaching diverges from 
Rousseau on the issue of a gender-based intellectual disparity and as is generally the case 
he adduces the American example as the prototype to be followed in democracy. “They 
[the Americans] judge that her mind is as capable as a man’s of discovering the naked 
truth, and her heart firm enough to follow it; and they have never sought to place the 
virtue of the one more than the other under the shelter of prejudices, ignorance, or 
fear.”106  
Yet, if Tocqueville disagrees with Rousseau on the preeminent method for 
bringing woman to virtue, he agrees wholeheartedly with him that modesty ought to be 
the object of her virtue and that the best way to safeguard her chastity is to cultivate her 
reason.  He explains that this adjustment is necessitated by the new social circumstances 
created by equality of conditions.  Democratic independence minimizes considerably 
paternal authority and facilitates conjugal unions based on the natural suitability of the 
partners by removing “all the imaginary or real barriers that separate man from 
woman.”107 This unprecedented independence not only encourages people to marry 
across social boundaries but it also creates opportunities for improprieties.  Therefore, 
woman needs a sound judgment to keep her from succumbing to the credulity of passions 
and to understand she has a powerful motive to withhold her favors for the man who 
shows his preference by his willingness to marry her.  Still, it is with nostalgia that 
Tocqueville advocates a manly education for girls in democracy even as he argues that it 
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is necessary for stemming the moral degeneracy that impeded France from achieving 
liberty for fifty years.  
I know such an education is not without danger; nor am I ignorant 
that it tends to develop judgment at the expense of imagination and to 
make women honest and cold rather than tender spouses and amiable 
companions of man.  If society is more tranquil and better regulated for it, 
private life has often fewer charms.  But those are secondary evils that 
ought to be faced for a greater interest.  Having come to the point where 
we are, we are no longer permitted to make a choice; we need a 
democratic education to safeguard woman from the perils with which the 
institutions and mores of democracy surrounds her.108    
Tocqueville credits the education of American girls for fostering the regular 
habits he finds in their country because it prepares them well to assume the duties of 
womanhood.  The independence they enjoy in girlhood exposes them to the corruption 
and vices of the world giving them a tremendous power of discernment to negotiate with 
calm and confidence the perils of society.  Moreover, they are made acutely aware by an 
inexorable public opinion that reflects the religious beliefs and commercial habits of their 
countrymen that woman’s first obligation is to preserve the sanctity of the conjugal bond.  
Therefore, they “marry only when their reason is exercised and mature.”109    
In contrast, European women fall into the bonds of marriage totally unprepared to 
face their obligations by the almost cloistered education designed for girls in aristocratic 
times.  Unlike American women who willingly renounce worldly pleasures to seek their 
happiness solely within the conjugal dwelling once they commit to marriage, European 
 215
women are not only ill-equipped to face “the disorders inseparable from a democratic 
society”110 but are also eager to exploit the greater independence womanhood bestows 
upon them.  This problem is compounded by the anachronism of making marriage an 
occasion to unite the fortunes of the parties thus “leav[ing] their hearts to wander about 
aimlessly”111 instead of making it a means to cement a bond based on the similarity of 
tastes and ideas that ought to unite a man and a woman.  Tocqueville blames the failure to 
make the education of girls coeval with democratic needs and a stubborn adherence to 
aristocratic marital conventions for the “great number of passing and clandestine 
unions”112 that fuel the disorder that plagues French democratic society.     
In defining the limits of sexual equality in democracy by comparing America and 
France Tocqueville aims to achieve the following objectives:  1) underline, like 
Rousseau, the connection between private and public morality; and 2) show to the 
detractors of democracy in France that equality does not produce immorality and 
irreligion, rather it brings them to light where they already exist.  This contrast enables 
him to show on the one hand that the way in which the Americans understand the 
equality of the sexes fosters social order and on the other it strengthens the social 
standing of women far more than the licentiousness that is ostensibly confounded with 
equality in Europe but in reality demeans women by assuming they are weak and 
seductive.   
 In the first instance, Tocqueville wants to underscore that woman’s faithfulness is 
the principal counterbalance to democratic instability and disorder for the same reason 
advanced by Rousseau, i.e., “the little society of husband and wife” is the foundation of 
“the great political society.”113  He relies on the American model as well as Rousseau’s 
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system of natural difference to show the practicality of making man the head of this little 
society.  He argues that since “the object of democracy is to regulate and legitimate all 
necessary powers, not to destroy all power” the Americans have found efficacious to 
make man “the natural head of the [marital] association,” to avoid “the [social] 
consequence of overturning marital power.”114  
 In contrast to European girls who receive an “aristocratic” education that leaves 
them ill-prepared to assume their duties, American girls are prepared by their 
“democratic” education to accept conjugal authority because they submit to it of their 
own free will after carefully reviewing their options with cold reason. Thus, for 
Tocqueville the strength of will woman needs to meet her democratic obligations makes 
it imperative that she receives an education that forms her reason.  Moreover, like 
Rousseau he maintains that her intellectual faculties must be developed for the sake of 
putting her in an advantageous position to choose well when the time comes for the grave 
decision of finding her lifelong companion since the happiness of the home extends to 
society at large.  Tocqueville follows the tradition of Rousseau by showing that there is 
an unmistakable connection between private morality and public virtue.  
In the second place, Tocqueville wants to show that the disorder in France is not 
produced by democracy per se but instead by the difficulty of replacing a system of 
traditional inequality with equality of conditions.  He supports his assertion by adducing 
the complete reversal in the relation between social standing and respect for old habits 
and aged beliefs to be found in the new social order.  Following the impoverishment of 
the nobles by the Revolution the formerly dissolute aristocracy forced to occupy 
themselves with the serious business of managing their affairs assimilated the democratic 
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habits that contribute to the success of this endeavor:  respect for religious beliefs and 
love of order and peaceful enjoyments.  Ironically, the other classes which naturally had 
these tastes lost them “by the very effort that had to be made to overthrow laws and 
political customs.”115   This social analysis of France’s fifty years encounter with 
democracy reinforces Tocqueville’s argument that democratic order can be sustained 
only by moral habits and religious beliefs. 
It is not equality of conditions that renders men immoral and 
irreligious.  But when men are immoral and irreligious at the same time 
that they are equal, the effects of immorality and irreligion are readily 
produced outwardly, because men have little effect on one another and no 
class exists that takes charge of policing society.  Equality of conditions 
never creates the corruption of mores, but sometimes allows it to 
appear.116      
 
How Tocqueville Collapses Rousseau’s Dichotomous Teaching on Opinion to Show 
that an Enlightened Equality Steers Public Opinion Closer to Moral Law    
   
In his examination of virtue in the chapter titled “On Honor in the United States 
and in Democratic Societies” in Volume Two, Part Three, Chapter Eighteen of 
Democracy in America, Tocqueville concedes to Rousseau that the opinions of man have 
not been guided historically by a universal notion of justice.  He analyses the actions men 
honor in different political regimes to show that the opinions that govern these actions 
generally run counter to the natural order of conscience insofar as they are grounded in 
the arbitrary needs of particular associations or regimes.  However, Tocqueville diverges 
from Rousseau by narrowing the focus of his enquiry to demonstrate that opinion 
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complies with reason the more conditions are equal and deviates from it the more they 
are unequal.  He affirms that in democracies where the needs and interests of society are 
generalized, human opinions tend to be more reasonable and just than in aristocratic 
societies where these interests are particularized.  Yet, despite their differing perspectives 
Tocqueville’s conclusion vindicates Rousseau’s claim that “[i]t is useless to separate the 
morals of a nation from the object of its esteem; for both spring from the same principle 
and both necessarily merge together…To judge morals is to judge what is honoured; to 
judge what is honoured, is to look to opinion as law.”117    
Tocqueville gives concrete meaning to Rousseau’s dictum by analyzing in this 
chapter democratic society in France from the perspective of the aristocratic order that 
preceded it and contrasting it with the eminently democratic social state of the 
Americans.  This comparison shows that under inequality of conditions the rules of honor 
not only grow pari passu with class interests but they also prescribe a complete and 
detailed code for human actions aimed specifically at maintaining the nobility in its 
dominant social position at the expense of moral law.  Hence, in a hierarchical society the 
rules of honor are often arbitrary and inconsistent with the holy law that distinguishes 
good from evil.  For example, Tocqueville maintains that if the particular and temporary 
interest of a people or a class conflicts with the foremost law of morality, which he agrees 
with Rousseau can be summed as “never to harm anyone,”118 it will not hesitate to excuse 
and even honor homicide.  In contrast, under equality of conditions where ranks are 
commingled and class privileges abolished honor is less capricious because its precepts 
are few and ill-defined and consequently tend to be “less and less distant from the moral 
laws adopted by common humanity.”119    
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It is noteworthy that despite its lack of intrinsic moral value Tocqueville 
exonerates aristocratic honor, which prizes indiscriminately the virtues and vices that 
gave it greatness and luster, because he maintains society was compensated for its 
injustice inasmuch as the aristocrat had a sublime idea of the duties of man.  He admires 
the aristocrat’s ingrained sense of duty for its potential to actualize itself into great and 
noble deeds, an important quality for Tocqueville who welcomes democracy’s system of 
justice but regrets that it only produces mediocrity.  He is certain that without vigilance 
democracy will lead man inevitably to despotism.  Unreflectively, Tocqueville’s esteem 
for a convention that was often inconsistent with moral law could at first glance be 
construed as the automatic reflex of his aristocratic instinct.  However, closer scrutiny of 
his analytical method reveals that he values aristocratic honor primarily because it 
commanded self-mastery, the essential quality that makes Rousseau’s citizen a moral 
being.   
Tocqueville carefully crafts his argument to show that the courage to order 
oneself to fulfill one’s duties is both a characteristic of honor and virtue, with the caveat 
that honor differs from virtue insofar as the latter is ruled by a universal law of morality 
whereas the former being coeval with conventional inequalities is always capricious.  
Moreover, honor “only acts in public view” and thus succumbs to vanity whereas virtue 
is self-sustaining and “is satisfied with its own witness.”120  Otherwise, both rely on a 
code of regulations to guide human actions.   
Tocqueville adduces Roman republican honor to underline that honor is always 
ruled by needs and interests that change according to time and place.  For example, the 
Romans judged human actions according to the status of the agent, i.e., whether he was a 
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citizen, a foreigner, a free man or a slave, and prized virtues and vices that were useful to 
Rome’s ambition to conquer the world.  Likewise, feudal aristocratic honor attributed a 
different value to the actions of a man depending on his status as noble or commoner.  
The analogy between Rome and aristocratic France reveals that under a system of 
conventional inequalities public esteem is won indistinguishably by virtue or vice as long 
as it fosters the glory of the dominant class. 
By affirming that honor is established by conventions to create and preserve the 
hierarchic distinctions that contribute to order, Tocqueville wants to show that as a 
concept it can be transmuted to achieve the same end in democracy without 
compromising this regime’s inclination to harmonize more or less with “the general 
reason and the universal conscience of the human race.”121 Tocqueville combines the 
lessons of Montesquieu’s principles of government with Rousseau’s teaching on opinions 
to argue that the notion of honor may be weak and its rules ill-defined in democracy but it 
can remain a powerful motive for regulating human actions if it accords with the 
organizing principle of this regime.  This construction enables him to show by analogy 
that if aristocratic hierarchy produced a rigid code of honor that was the foundation of 
order under a system of inequality, then opinions that support the natural differences of 
man and woman are the most reasonable way to order social life under a system of 
equality.  Thus, the obligations associated with honor, which heretofore derived their 
legitimacy from conventional inequalities, are adjusted in democracy so that their 
authority now becomes grounded in the natural differences of the sexes to effect a moral 
change in the way in which virtues and vices are classified.    
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Tocqueville contrasts the American and French concept of honor to support this 
innovation.  The American makes a virtue of the pursuit of wealth whereas the French 
looks upon it as a vice inasmuch as this view conforms to the aristocratic notion that 
idleness is preferable to remunerative occupation because it is a mark of social 
distinction.  Analogously, there is a striking difference between the American and French 
aristocrat’s view of courage.  “The American calls noble and estimable ambition that 
which our fathers in the Middle Ages named servile cupidity, just as he gives the name of 
blind and barbaric fury to the conquering ardor and warlike humor that threw them into 
new combats each day.”122  It is noteworthy that Tocqueville harbors an instinctive 
aristocratic distaste for the American’s obsession with making a fortune, especially 
because it is an occupation that inevitably encourages cupidity.123  Nevertheless, he 
recognizes that America’s passion for wealth fosters order by establishing a code of 
honor based on sexual difference that is critical to the success of the country’s 
commercial interest.   
Since the Americans present the most complete image of a modern democratic 
society, Tocqueville adduces the American notion of honor that prevails in common 
opinion as a model for democratic nations inasmuch as it emphasizes regular habits that 
lead to order.  American public opinion values the courage it takes to order the self 
toward chastity and industriousness because they are the virtues that foster the 
commercial and industrial interests of the nation and contribute to its greatness.  The self-
discipline on which these virtues depend provides a powerful counterbalance to the 
American’s passion for wealth at the same time that it enables its fulfillment.  Thus, 
American public opinion could be said to be as incoherent as the opinion that regulates 
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aristocratic honor insofar as it displays a relaxed morality regarding the passion for 
wealth but an unsurpassed austerity for the “the vices that are of a nature to adulterate the 
purity of morals and to destroy the conjugal union.”124 But Tocqueville insists that though 
incoherent it is not arbitrary because it draws its moral prerogative from the natural 
separation of sexual labor that fosters order in family life and by extension society at 
large.      
In contrasting aristocratic honor and American public opinion Tocqueville aims to 
goad France to recognize that, for better or worse, democracy has redefined the parameter 
within which social order is possible by constituting it along gender lines rather than class 
lines.  This new social organization can be enforced only by appeal to moral law, which 
religion provides more consistently than human laws in democracies.  He maintains that 
the power of honor to “rule the will more than belief”125 has diminished significantly in 
democracies.  The opinions that rule honor in democracies, though never clear and 
consistent, are all the more confused in France where democracy exists under tenuous 
social conditions. 
[I]n a democratic country like ours where the different classes that 
composed the former society come to mix together without yet being able 
to blend with each other, and introduce diverse and often contrary notions 
of their honor to one another every day; where each man following his 
caprices, abandons one part of the opinions of his fathers and retains 
another, so that in the midst of so many arbitrary measures a common rule 
can never be established.126   
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Tocqueville attributes the situation in France to the upheaval caused by the Revolution, 
which has left society subsisting on the one hand in the twilight of conventional 
inequalities and on the other with a confused understanding of sexual equality.  France 
can regain her former glory only when she begins to accommodate the needs of her new 
social state and for Tocqueville that means bringing democracy and religion into 
harmony to guide opinions.   
Tocqueville’s analysis of honor far from disproving Rousseau’s dichotomous 
view of opinion confirms it insofar as it shows that an enlightened equality facilitates 
social justice and fosters compassion and modesty even if democratic virtue is 
grounded in utility.  Tocqueville praises American honor because it reproves the 
laxity of morals so dangerous to the well-being and prosperity of society even as it 
condones the country’s passion for wealth.  Thus, by acknowledging Tocqueville’s 
debt to Rousseau on this important subject the reader is able to put in context his 
belief that the only way to achieve order in democracy is to imbue public opinion, 
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HOW TOCQUEVILLE SYNCRETIZES THE TEACHING OF THE 
ENLIGHTENMENT WITH THE MORALISTIC LANGUAGE OF PASCAL TO 
FORMULATE A RELIGIOUS DOCTRINE FOR DEMOCRACY  
 
Tocqueville’s religious doctrine is a complex mixture of two distinct traditions 
that leaves it open to various interpretations inasmuch as it enfolds the enlightenment’s 
view of the political utility of religion in the moralistic language of Pascal.  This odd 
combination not only reflects Tocqueville’s own ambivalence about religion but it also 
allows him to make religion a pillar of liberty in a way that conforms to the particular 
intellectual habits and sentiments bred by equality. Following Montesquieu for whom 
religion draws its strength by “fit[ting[ into men’s way of thinking and feeling”1 
Tocqueville finds in Rousseau’s moral teaching an appropriate intellectual model for 
establishing a religious doctrine for democracy. Nevertheless, this accommodation does 
not seem to him to answer completely a general human longing for the spiritual, which 
the enlightenment’s rationalism cannot fulfill.  Hence, he finds in Pascal’s understanding 
of the human condition a way to give expression to and satisfy this yearning, which 
transcends the proclivities that characterize people in particular political regimes.  In sum, 
Tocqueville’s religious teaching seeks to accommodate democracy’s particular 
inclinations by reconciling the enlightenment’s insistence on reason as the basis of 
religious beliefs with a modified version of Pascal’s spiritualism, which emphasizes 
man’s misery without God, by differentiating between two sorts of beliefs: those of the 
intellect and those of the sentiments.   
This chapter examines the contents of Tocqueville’s religious doctrine to show 
that: 1) it is modeled on Rousseau’s natural religion, which in many respects borrows 
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Christianity precepts of morality while rejecting its dogmas as the nefarious opinions that 
corrupt man, to satisfy the intellectual habits of democratic man; 2) it appeals to 
Montesquieu’s concept of virtue to accommodate the democratic sentiment to relate 
everything to self-interest and 3) it suggests that Pascal’s “hidden God”2 alone can 
appease the restlessness and anxiety to which equality gives rise.  Tocqueville, for whom 
religious opinions are essential for bringing man to virtue in democracy, adjusts 
Rousseau’s teaching by underlining the compatibility of the enlightenment with the 
substance if not the form of Christianity.  His religious doctrine is founded on the premise 
that there exists an inexorable harmony between the principles of Christianity and those 
of the enlightenment insofar as the latter fulfilled the promise of Christianity’s 
proclamation of the equality of all men before God.  This innovation makes the 
Rousseau/Montesquieu/Pascal combination a little less incoherent even though there is an 
immense chasm that separates Rousseau’s desire to make reason the foundation of 
religion and Montesquieu’s view that interest imitates virtue when it functions as the 
basis for common action from Pascal’s idea that faith must be the basis of Christian 
beliefs. 
Tocqueville systematizes his religious teaching in the second volume of  
Democracy in America by dividing it into two separate sections that reflect the 
distinction he makes between beliefs as the intellectual habits and as the sentiments of 
men.  In the first section, Tocqueville analyzes the way in which the democratic state 
fosters intellectual habits that incline men to general ideas to show how this affects their 
beliefs, their aptitude for and taste for the sciences, the arts and literature.  This 
introduction paves the way for him to outline the first part of his religious teaching in a 
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discussion on poetry by comparing the objects that lend themselves to the representation 
of the ideal in aristocracy on the one hand and democracy on the other to show the way in 
which beliefs are inspired in these two states.  In the second, he examines the way in 
which the sentiments of individualism and materialism equality generates can be 
harnessed to direct man toward virtue, especially in nations where enlightenment and 
religion are absent.   
The influence of Rousseau is predominant in the first section inasmuch as it relies 
on reason to cultivate beliefs that foster social order whereas in the second that of 
Montesquieu and Pascal is prevalent insofar as Tocqueville appeals to interest as a 
motive for virtue and religious beliefs.  In the latter, he seeks to guide sentiments along a 
middle course to keep democratic people from succumbing on the one hand to 
materialism, which left undirected degrades the human spirit, and on the other to 
spiritualism, which manifest itself as a reaction to materialism and gives rise to the 
fanaticism that leads to intolerance. Since Tocqueville’s religious teaching aims primarily 
to correct the opinions that underpin the bourgeois values of French society, this chapter 
will examine first the views he shares with Rousseau about the questionable practices of 
the Church and second their fundamental differences before it turns to its principal task of 
delineating the elements of his religious doctrine.   
 
 
How Tocqueville’s Condemnation of the Practices and Policies of the Catholic 
Church Recalls Rousseau’s Reasons for Censuring Religion  
 
In a letter, May 13, 1852, to Francisque de Corcelle, his friend and former  Envoy 
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Rome during his short tenure as France’s 
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Minister of Foreign Affairs (June 2, 1849-October 31, 1849),  Tocqueville expresses his 
bitterness against the slavish deference exhibited by the French clergy toward the 
despotism of the Prince-President, Louis Napoléon.3  The tenor of his correspondence 
with Corcelle beginning in the fall of 1849 about the practices of the Church can best be 
characterized as acerbic.  In a number of these letters Tocqueville admonishes Corcelle 
whose veneration for Pope Pius IX and sympathies with and strong ties to France’s 
Catholic party inclined him to challenge Tocqueville’s specific instructions to oppose the 
antiliberal policies of the pope who was willing to adopt any means to maintain the 
temporal power of the Church in Rome.   
Even though the religious sentiments Tocqueville expresses in this 
correspondence postdate the April 1840 publication of the second volume of Democracy 
in America in which the most important elements of his religious teaching are found, they 
are still relevant to this study since they are consistent with that teaching.  The 
correspondence with Corcelle depicts Tocqueville’s personal views on the religious 
events of his time and thus provides a window through which to glimpse the 
circumstances that might have contributed to embed deeper his ambivalent religious 
beliefs.  Tocqueville who was always fearful that his criticisms might be used as 
powerful weapons against religion by its enemies found in Corcelle both a trusted friend 
and a zealous Catholic with whom to spout against the Church’s temerarious 
unwillingness to embrace the unrelenting movement of the century toward liberal 
democracy.4      
You say, may be with reason, that I attach too much importance, 
with respect to faith, to the accidental conduct of the clergy.  You must 
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forgive something of the pain, I could almost say the despair that I feel, at 
the sight of what is happening, convinced as I am that the true greatness of 
man is to be found only in the harmony of the liberal sentiment and the 
religious sentiment, working simultaneously to animate and restrain souls, 
and my sole political passion had been for thirty years to assure this 
harmony.  I am far from saying that among the greatest number of our 
compatriots the respect for religion is not growing at this time (which is  
unfortunately not the same thing as the growth of faith) at the sight of the 
leaders of the Church [acting like] senators, of a government celebrating at 
the slightest thing the necessity of beliefs and the utility of good manners, 
and in return priests praising in the pulpit the chosen of the people and the 
man [Louis-Napoléon] sent from God to save France.  I do not doubt that 
the crowd would not be enlightened in seeing blessed the soldiers who 
have just violently overthrown the laws of the country, and for their part, 
follow the processions; I know that the majority will honor less a 
neglected and poor clergy than a clergy who can lean on the soldier for its 
need and who is endowed, even if it is with confiscated goods; as for me, I 
confess to you, all this amalgam of that which I esteem the most and that 
which I despise the most fill me with disgust and horror.5  
In another letter Tocqueville rails against the French clergy, which 
unscrupulously contradicts itself, for example, on the important policy issue of a free 
system of education to gain favor with the alternate regimes in power at the expense of 
the public good.  He asserts that the impact of this spectacle on delicate minds and lofty 
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souls is more dangerous than Voltaire’s jokes, Rousseau’s tirades against the Church and 
all the effort of the spirit of skepticism of the century.6   Still in another letter to Corcelle,  
September 17, 1853, he declares that if the conduct of the clergy in France is not only 
enough to kill one’s faith, it certainly has had a greater effect in awakening his doubt than 
did his youthful exposure to the complete works of Voltaire and Rousseau.7  In short, his 
correspondence with Corcelle, with whom he had bitter disagreements over the terms of 
France’s negotiating position in the Rome Affair,8 reveals Tocqueville’s painful 
realization that far from embracing the liberal spirit of the century, the Church in Rome   
was instead entrenching itself in the detestable absolutism of the past while in France it 
was making itself a willing servant of despotism.  
The connection Tocqueville makes among the conduct of the Catholic clergy in 
France, Rousseau and his doubt shows by his own admission that Rousseau’s 
condemnation of the Church is not without justification.  The same conclusion cannot be 
drawn about his inclusion of Voltaire in his denunciations, which is an exaggeration 
undoubtedly meant to underscore his belief that the Church by its practices is causing 
irreparable harm to the credibility of religion.  Tocqueville’s reference to Rousseau is 
never disparaging but frequently in his correspondence he uses “voltaireanism” in the 
pejorative sense it was frequently used in the nineteenth century to express a hateful 
skepticism.  For example, Arthur de Gobineau defends himself against Tocqueville’s 
remonstrance for his harsh criticism of Christian morality by stating he is not a 
“voltairean.”9  Likewise, in his scathing description of his former colleagues in the 
Chamber of Deputies, Tocqueville qualifies one of them, a certain M. Viellard,  as “a 
Voltairean in religious belief.”10  
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The linkage with Rousseau also supports this study’s proposition that Rousseau 
influences Tocqueville’s teaching on religion insofar as he provides the foundation upon 
which Tocqueville builds the edifice of a rational religion that corresponds to the needs of 
nineteenth century democratic society.  Tocqueville’s correspondence with Corcelle 
provides ample evidence that he shares with Rousseau an affinity to seek some form of 
alternative to the status quo of the religious establishment for the sake of liberty, even if 
his approach is less unorthodox than that of his mentor.  In sum, it shows that Tocqueville 
holds the moral infractions of the Catholic clergy partly responsible for  harming the 
cause of liberty in nineteenth century France just as Rousseau previously held religion 
responsible for instituting the system of moral or political inequality that enchains man in 
society.11  
Tocqueville’s correspondence with Corcelle as shown herein recalls the 
condemnations, albeit of another kind, that Rousseau heaps upon positive religion, 
especially Christianity.  Rousseau explicitly rejects Christianity and argues cogently for a 
natural religion based solely on reason because he believes positive religion is based on 
error and lies and because it often becomes exclusive it leads men to intolerance.12  In 
short, he sees in positive religion “only the crimes of men and the miseries of 
mankind.”13    Likewise, the correspondence with Corcelle demonstrates the extent to 
which Tocqueville attributes all that he finds problematic with the Catholic Church to the 
vices of men.  Nevertheless, he does not go as far as Rousseau in rejecting Christianity.  
In fact, he maintains that the Christian doctrines, such as “the virtue attributed to faith, 
the utility of faith, the necessity of faith, the inadequacy of deeds without faith,” that lead 
to intolerance “are necessarily inseparable from all the good they bring us.”  He continues 
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further:  “Yet I am convinced that the eventual damage to human morality thereby caused 
is far less than what would result from moral systems that have emancipated themselves 
from religion altogether.  The longer I live the less I think that the peoples of the world 
can ever separate themselves from a positive religion…”14
 And for Tocqueville the best is not only Christianity but it is also the religion 
most suited to democracy.15 Thus, it is noteworthy that his observations of the Church’s 
shortcomings bring him to a different conclusion than Rousseau.  His criticisms are 
confined only to the vices of the temporal government of the Church whose long-term 
effects he fears will be detrimental to the much needed moral and intellectual government 
it must retain over catholicity under democracy.  He differentiates himself from Rousseau 
insofar as he rejects only the temporal government of the Church while emphasizing the 
importance of its spiritual government.  The following comment to Corcelle supports this 
study’s view: “I feel always a certain fear when I see Catholics defend the temporal 
government of the pope as if this government forms an inherent part of the religious 
establishment.”16   
Thus, Tocqueville’s correspondence illuminates the exact point in which he parts 
with Rousseau.  For all his debt to Rousseau, Tocqueville does not endorse his belief that 
positive religion sets man at odds with himself by placing him under contradictory 
obligations, that of a churchman and of a citizen.17 In fact, Tocqueville affirms the social 
usefulness of positive religion for the maintenance of order with the proviso that it limits 
its “authority to bring [democratic] men back to spiritualist opinions.”   The following 
anecdote encapsulates his thought on the subject. 
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The Revolution of 1792, when striking the upper classes, had cured 
them of their irreligiousness; it had taught them, if not the truth, at least 
the social usefulness of belief.  This lesson was lost upon the middle class,  
which remained their political heir and their jealous rival; and the latter 
had even become more skeptical in proportion as the former seemed to 
become more religious.  The Revolution of 1848 had just done on a small 
scale for our tradesmen what that of 1792 had done for the nobility: the 
same reverses, the same terrors, the same conversion; it was the same 
picture, only painted smaller and in less bright and, no doubt, less lasting 
colours.  The clergy had facilitated this conversion by separating itself 
from all the old political parties, and entering into the old, true spirit of the 
Catholic clergy, which is that it should belong only to the Church.  It 
readily, therefore, professed republican opinions, while at the same time it 
gave to long established interests the guarantee of its traditions, its 
customs and its hierarchy.18
 Tocqueville’s teaching without doubt distinguishes itself from that of Rousseau 
by clearly advocating a role for Christianity, especially Catholicism, in democracy with 
the caveat that it must detach itself from political matters to occupy itself solely with 
cultivating man’s natural aspiration for spiritual fulfillment.  He is unequivocal on this 
point in private as well in his more public writings.  “I feel myself so sensitive to the 
almost inevitable dangers that beliefs risk when their interpreters mix in public affairs, 
and I am so convinced that one must maintain Christianity within the new democracies at 
all cost, that I would rather chain priests in the sanctuary than allow them to leave it.” 19  
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Rousseau, the condemned heretic,20 is able to provide Tocqueville, the self-
proclaimed unbeliever, a guide to cultivate democratic morality that accommodates the 
intellectual inclination of democratic people because he uses Christianity’s language to 
promote civic virtue.  However, there are two important differences between the two 
men:  1) whereas Rousseau advocates the unity of the theological and political system,21 
Tocqueville insists on their separation; and 2) even if Tocqueville shares Rousseau’s  
irritation with Christianity, unlike him he is able to separate Christianity from the 
historical context that Rousseau maintains discredits it.  
When one wishes to be critical of Christianity, it is better to keep 
always two things in mind. 
The first is this: Christianity has come to us through centuries 
marked by much rudeness, ignorance, social inequality, and political 
oppression, during which time it was often a weapon in the hands of kings 
and of priests.  It is equitable to judge it in itself and not by the 
environment across which it was compelled to travel.  Almost all the 
exaggerated tendencies, almost all the abuses for which you often quite 
properly reproach Christianity must be attributed to these secondary 
causes and- this I believe I could easily prove- not to the code of morality 
whose first principle is this simple maxim: love God with all your heart 
and your neighbor like yourself, that encapsulates its laws and prophecies. 
The second thing is that Christianity is not a philosophy but a 
religion.  There are of course certain doctrines that are necessarily part and 
parcel of certain religions, and which are not the exclusive attributes of 
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any one of them…[My growing conviction about the necessity of a 
positive religion to guide nations] makes me less strict than you about  the 
inconveniences that are inherent in every religion, even the best.22  
One can almost speculate that Tocqueville would have rebuked Rousseau in the 
same fashion had it been possible for him to do so.  Thus, Tocqueville breaks with 
Rousseau by differentiating between the spiritual sphere of Christianity and its earthly 
government: “[f]aith does not appear to me at all to be mixed in any measure with the 
question [of the perpetual government of souls which God promised to the Church and its 
hope to direct the affairs of government in any country in the world] which is left entirely 
to the speculations of human reason.”23  Nevertheless, the positive example of the 
Americans whose religious beliefs and practices conform to reason leads Tocqueville to 
use Rousseau’s teaching as a framework for his religious doctrine.     
 
How Tocqueville’s Reverence for Christianity and Advocacy for Disestablisment 
Suggest that he Does not Wish to Establish a Civil Religion for Democracy and that 
Rousseau’s Natural Religion is a Closer Model for his Religious Doctrine  
 
Rousseau makes it a civil duty for man to follow the religion of his father and his 
country, a requirement that does not conflict with his condemnation of opinions24 insofar 
as he admits that the limitations of the human condition make it impossible for man to 
examine and judge with his reason all the opinions of positive religions.  “I regard all the 
particular religions as so many salutary institutions which prescribe in each country a 
uniform manner of honoring God by public worship...[Otherwise] the essential worship is 
that of the heart.”25  With the last proviso he admits his preference for “the religion of the 
Gospel, [which for him is] the true theism, and might be called the divine natural law.”26  
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These considerations, i.e., religion’s capacity to inculcate moral values in the citizen for 
the sake of public interest and the conformity of Christianity to natural law, lead him to 
borrow Christianity’s language to establish a civil religion with the force of law for a 
secular objective.    
Tocqueville concurs with Rousseau’s first premise insofar as he recognizes that 
democracy, which is coeval with the enlightenment, limits the objects that occupy man’s 
thought to the procurement of his material well-being.  Democracy not only displaces the 
locus of authority that provided man a moral guide under aristocracy but it also makes 
him more dependent on that authority for his opinions, especially those that  relate to 
general matters like religion, philosophy, politics, etc.  However, the mutability of 
democratic laws gives Tocqueville a compelling justification for situating the authority of 
religion beyond the reach of human reason with, nevertheless, the stipulation that it 
remains within the bounds of intellectual perception to ensure its ability to hold a moral 
influence on democratic society.  Therefore, Tocqueville’s insistence on a clear division 
between the temporal and the spiritual establishes an important difference between his 
religious doctrine and Rousseau’s civil religion, which requires the unity of theology and 
politics, while at the same his demand that religion conforms to reason makes him a 
disciple of Rousseau’s natural religion.   
Tocqueville outlines several themes in the first four chapters of the second 
volume that form the backdrop against which he formulates the portion of his religious 
doctrine that is modeled on Rousseau’s teaching.  First, he shows that by promoting self-
reliance equality brings the American to apply unbeknownst to him the philosophy of the 
enlightenment in his practical affairs and to extend this intellectual habit to other things, 
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including religion.  This general tendency to depend on his reason makes Tocqueville’s 
American scorn forms, which he believes conceal the truth from him.  Second, he argues 
that by isolating men from one another and overwhelming them with the sense of their 
own weakness, equality makes them conform to opinion.  Third, he states that by making 
men similar, equality inclines them to contract the habit and taste for general ideas 
insofar as their similarities lead them to attribute their thoughts and feelings to their 
fellows, except in matters related to their personal interest.  He warns that the democratic 
inclination to make everything self-referenced is disruptive and harmful to political life 
unless it is tempered by free institutions that encourage citizens to participate in public 
affairs.  Lastly, Tocqueville maintains that if the human condition makes general ideas a 
necessity for men, equality augments this necessity by leaving them little leisure for 
contemplation.    
Tocqueville walks a tightrope in his complex approach to formulate a religious 
doctrine compatible with the inclinations democracy generates.  He takes a position 
contrary to that of Rousseau for whom the yoke of opinions is particularly to be feared in 
matters of religion while simultaneously he simplifies and limits Christian dogmas to 
those that constitute Rousseau’s natural religion to accommodate the democratic distaste 
for forms.  Whereas Rousseau maintains that religious opinions lead to intolerance and 
human miseries, Tocqueville affirms that religious dogmas are among the most important 
for men to hold in democratic times.  For Tocqueville, it is indubitable that positive 
religion provides the only moral rudder in the chaotic democratic world to navigate a 
course amidst the dangerous instincts equality inspires.  His overarching goal is to bring 
religion in harmony with the democratic inclinations he carefully outlines in the first four 
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chapters of volume two to make it palatable to democratic man.  Thus, while he disagrees 
explicitly with Rousseau’s condemnation of Christianity for, inter alia, its tendency to 
detach the citizen from his social obligations, he nonetheless models his modified 
Christian religion on Rousseau’s natural religion whose basic tenets are derived from the 
Gospel.    
Rousseau ostensibly exempts the Gospel, which he praises as the “holy, sublime 
and true religion,”27 from his quarrel with the Christianity inasmuch as it enfolds the 
precepts of natural law in its summation of the Christian moral law, which teaches that 
“[l]ove of man derived from love of self is the principle of human justice.”28  In fact, he 
condemns Christianity precisely because intolerance and fanaticism have caused it to 
depart from the fundamental and simple teaching of the Gospel, which is to love one’s 
fellowmen out of love of God.  Yet, even as Rousseau structures his natural religion on 
the pure and simple religion of the Gospel, he maintains that it has serious shortcomings 
that preclude it from being the religion of the citizen: 1) it has no connection to the body 
politic and hence cannot give force to the law to bind society; 2) it detaches the heart of 
the citizen from the state and the things of this world; and 3) it contains a great number of 
things repugnant to reason.  Since for Rousseau the purpose of religion is to promote and 
invigorate the social spirit, the Christianity of the Gospel cannot fulfill this objective.  At 
best, it can constitute the religion of the individual so long as it remains a private affair 
that does not interfere with his duty as a citizen, which ought always to be man’s first and 
foremost obligation.  But Rousseau himself anticipates the near impossibility of this 
accommodation insofar as he argues that Christianity, which leaves the good Christian 
indifferent to the things of this world by preaching submission and servitude, destroys the 
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social spirit and thus opens the door to tyranny.  Therefore, he adjusts the moral language 
of the Gospel to make it compatible with reason by redirecting it to a civic end  
Rousseau outlines his natural religion in the Emile, a philosophical treatise on 
education in which he launches his attack on revealed religion in 1762, the same year he 
completed The Social Contract, a practical guide to political liberty which contains the 
principles of his civil religion.  It is noteworthy that he concludes the Emile by 
delineating the principles of political rights and duties essential to liberty that are the 
subjects of The Social Contract.  The question then is whether the teaching of a civil 
religion in The Social Contract supersedes that of the natural religion found in the Emile.  
This may not seem significant since the articles of faith of Rousseau’s civil religion are 
similar to those of his natural religion insofar as both are founded on the Christian 
concepts of duty and accountability to God in the life to come.  Nevertheless, this study 
takes the position that there is a significant difference between them insofar as the first 
aims to compel public virtue as a matter of law and makes non-conformity punishable by 
death.  In contrast, man submits to the latter of his own will in response to an education 
carefully and specifically tailored to awaken his natural sentiments and cultivate his 
reason to produce the moral virtue that leads to public virtue.  Since the Emile 
incorporates the political elements of The Social Contract, it can be argued that Rousseau 
in the end despairs of relying on philosophy to promote virtue in bourgeois society and 
hence resorts to a civil religion as a more practical means to lead “a blind multitude”29 to 
virtue.  Rousseau himself seems to provide the answer at the end of the “Profession of 
Faith of the Savoyard Vicar” in the Emile by affirming that it is not possible to do for a 
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whole nation that which can be achieved on an individual basis.  Speaking of the quarrel 
between philosophy and religion he affirms:  
I do not know whether one [a good philosopher] is easier to find 
than the other [a true Christian] among individuals.  But I do know that as 
soon as it is a question of peoples, it is necessary to suppose one which 
will abuse philosophy without religion, just as our peoples abuse religion 
without philosophy… 
It still remains to be known whether philosophy, if it were at its 
ease and on the throne, would have a good command over vainglory, 
interest, ambition, and the petty passions of man, and whether it would 
practice that gentle humanity it lauds to us in its writings. 
From the point of view of principles, there is nothing that 
philosophy can do well that religion does not do still better, and religion 
does many things that philosophy could not do… 
It is true that no man follows his religion, when he has one, in 
every point.  It is also true that most men hardly have one and do not 
follow at all the one they have.  Still some men do have one and follow it 
at least in part; and it is indubitable that religious motives often prevent 
them from doing harm and produce virtues and laudable actions which 
would not have occurred without these motives.30      
Tocqueville’s religious doctrine could be said to share the temporal quality of 
Rousseau’s civil religion insofar as it replaces civil law with public opinion, which 
Tocqueville insists is stronger than the law in democracy to compel moral conformity.  
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Moreover, his teaching like that of Rousseau seems at first glance to be less concerned 
with saving man in the next world than it is with circumscribing his actions to a moral 
authority in this one to provide a counterweight to the dangerous instincts democracy 
inspires.  However, while Tocqueville shares Rousseau’s position about making religion 
more civic-oriented, he does not go as far as him to advocate the eradication of positive 
religion.  Rather, Tocqueville instructs that the best way to achieve this objective is to 
confine religion within the bounds proper to it.  In other words, Tocqueville wants to 
keep religion separate from human laws by elevating it to a sphere that deals solely with 
the general relations of men to God, which for him irrevocably has a positive effect on 
the relations of men among themselves.  Thus, in contrast to Rousseau who wants to 
unite religion and politics, Tocqueville argues for the separation of Church and state 
precisely because the laws of the one being divine are constant while those of the latter 
being human are changeable, especially in democracy.  He affirms that religion risks 
compromising its credibility by associating itself with politics, which inescapably suffers 
the reversal of fortunes that is the inevitable fate of human affairs.    
Yet, a plausible case could be made to show that Tocqueville models his religion 
for democracy not on Rousseau’s natural religion but on his civil religion insofar as he 
does not trust reason to guide men in matters of religion in democracy where they are 
completely absorbed with practical matters and have little leisure for contemplation.  
Rousseau’s natural religion teaches that reason is the faculty that leads man to know 
about the existence of God, the immortality of his soul and his duties toward his 
fellowmen.  Moreover, it is the sole means by which man delivers himself from the 
doubts engendered by competing religious and philosophical opinions.  Tocqueville on 
 252
the contrary asserts that because it is so indispensable for men to have fixed ideas about 
religious matters, they cannot rely solely on their reason to comprehend them.  
Accordingly, he maintains that religions “furnish a solution to these primordial questions 
[general ideas about God and human nature] that is clear, precise, intelligible to the 
crowd and very lasting.”31  Thus, Tocqueville here seems less willing to embrace 
Rousseau’s natural teaching to cultivate reason as a means to discover God’s goodness 
and His justice than he is ready to adopt his notion of a civil religion for the crowd as a 
means to foster “sentiments of sociability… [that lead citizens] to love law and justice.”32  
Echoing Rousseau’s sentiments about the political utility of religion he states that “one 
must recognize that if it [religion] does not save men in the other world, it is at least very 
useful to their happiness and greatness in this one.”33  Lastly, Tocqueville’s willingness 
to subordinate individual reason to the authority of religion as common opinion to 
eliminate the potential for doubt in democracy-- where intellectual independence 
combined with little leisure for contemplation and a multiplicity of sects becomes a 
breeding ground for it-- could be interpreted as a compromise toward the wholesale 
solution adopted by Rousseau in his civil religion rather than an endorsement of his 
natural religion.   
The best way to explain the balance Tocqueville seeks to achieve by embracing 
one or the other of Rousseau’s religious models is to consider the assumptions that 
underpin their respective teachings.  In Rousseau’s republican theory only a nation of 
Gods could govern itself democratically34 and a society of true Christians would not be a 
society of men.35  In contrast, Tocqueville’s American convinces the reader that not only 
a nation of men governs itself democratically but also it is able to do so because it is 
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founded on Christian principles.  Nevertheless, Tocqueville seeks a solution for France 
where democracy did not originate under the same favorable conditions.  The habits of 
religion and liberty that keep democracy in check in America are not existent in France. 
Thus, Tocqueville begins his enterprise with a wholly different perspective from that of 
Rousseau for whom there is only one means to neutralize the influence of private 
interests propelling democracies to internecine strife: guide opinions with a civil religion 
to foster justice and prevent the fanaticism and intolerance inherent in religion.  
Tocqueville has the advantage over Rousseau of having observed that self-interest 
in America does not extinguish public virtue because the presence of free institutions 
encourages participation in public affairs. The American experience shows that free 
institutions can fulfill the objective of Rousseau’s civil religion, which is to inspire public 
virtue.  Consequently, while Tocqueville agrees with Rousseau about the utility of 
religion to order human affairs, he stops short of endorsing his replacement of 
Christianity with a civil religion.  Rather, he insists that in democracy positive religion is 
needed to serve the interest of the state by regulating private morality.  He repudiates 
emphatically the notion of a civil religion in the second section of volume two.  “I do not 
believe in the prosperity any more than the longevity of official philosophies, and as for 
state religions, I have always thought that if sometimes they could temporarily serve the 
interests of political power, they would always sooner or later become fatal to the 
Church.”36  Thus, in the final analysis it may be said that his religious doctrine aims like 
Rousseau’s civil religion to inculcate public virtue in the citizen only for a secular end.  
However, because it seeks to achieve this objective by bringing Christianity into harmony 
with reason to fit the intellectual disposition of democratic people, it must be conceded 
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that its principles parallel those of Rousseau’s natural religion, which can be more easily 
adjusted toward the attainment of individual spirituality. 
It is not difficult to see how Tocqueville’s religious doctrine could be interpreted 
on the one hand as an endorsement of Rousseau’s civil religion and on the other as that of 
his natural religion given that both share the same fundamental dogmas, which are also 
the principal dogmas of the Christianity of the Gospel, i.e., the existence of God and the 
immortality of the soul.  Nevertheless, this study maintains that Rousseau’s natural 
religion has greater appeal to Tocqueville as a model because: 1) it emphasizes the 
compatibility of reason and religion and in doing so it provides him a greater latitude to 
incorporate the teachings of Montesquieu and Pascal; and 2) it does not conflict with 
Tocqueville’s advocacy for disestablishment since unlike the civil religion it is silent on 
the unity of the temporal with the spiritual. Thus, as a paradigm it conforms to 
Tocqueville’s objective to accommodate religion with the intellectual disposition of the 
democratic mind while enabling him to promote positive religion, more specifically 
Christianity, as a much needed solace for the atomistic self equality creates.  Just as 
Rousseau’s natural religion instructs that dogmas ought to conform to reason by 
remaining “clear, luminous and striking by their obviousness,”37 Tocqueville adduces the 
example of the Americans to teach that in democracy Christianity ought to limit its 
“forms, practices and [representational] figures… and present ideas clearly, simply and 
generally”38 to conform to the general idea inspired by equality, viz., that all men are 
brothers subject to one single God who imposes the same rules on all.   
Tocqueville’s American resembles Rousseau’s citizen in his perfunctory approach 
to religious worship and if he is not bound by legal order to a civil religion he is 
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nonetheless bound by common opinion to a positive religion.  But since common opinion 
is equivalent to universal reason in democracy, a harmony reigns between religion and 
reason, the premise of Rousseau’s natural religion.   
Tocqueville justifies the specific criteria he outlines for religion in democracy by 
demonstrating that Christian religious beliefs have been influenced historically by the 
social and political state.  For example, the hierarchy of aristocratic societies lent itself to 
a multiplicity of agents and protectors before the sovereign master who were worshipped 
as saints and angels whereas democratic equality disposes the human mind to the unity of 
one Creator to whom alone homage is due.  Tocqueville anticipates criticism with his 
position on accommodation by underlining the two distinct components of religion: the   
forms and substance of beliefs.  The first is the external practice related to worship and 
accessory notions linked to beliefs while the second relates to the principal dogmas that 
constitute a belief.  His willingness to adjust Christianity to democratic instincts is limited 
only to the first of these and his reason for doing so will become more evident in the 
section below.     
 
 
How Tocqueville Draws a Connection between Poetry and Beliefs to Promote a 
Religious Doctrine Conformable to the Ideas and Sentiments Equality Fosters  
   
Tocqueville develops his argument progressively in part one of volume two of   
Democracy in America to demonstrate that only a religion founded on reason will accord 
with the democratic instinct.  He begins by examining the American’s practical 
application of Cartesianism, which demonstrates that equality ipso facto leads citizens to 
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rely on the effort of their reason, before showing that public opinion as universal reason 
is the appropriate generator and reservoir of beliefs in matters of politics and religion.   
Following this introduction he proceeds step-by-step to illustrate the debasement 
of the sciences, the arts and literature in democratic societies through his usual method of 
comparison with aristocracy. Whereas in aristocratic societies intellectual activities were 
conceived and undertaken by a few whose ambition and discriminate taste brought them 
to uncover truth, pursue greatness and represent beauty, in democratic societies they are 
carried out only for their utility and consumption by the vulgar and mediocre crowd.  
This contrast enables him to show that the general lowering of standards in the 
intellectual habits of democratic people is accompanied by an impoverishment of spirit 
that entrenches them in the material world with deleterious effect for morality.     
With this broad overview on the intellectual movement of democratic states, 
Tocqueville prepares his reader for the first phase of his teaching on religion, which he 
elaborates not unsurprisingly in a discussion of poetry that combines the teaching of the 
enlightenment with Pascal’s view of the human condition.  In using poetry as a medium 
to discuss beliefs, Tocqueville remains faithful to the classical and modern philosophical 
tradition of Plato and Rousseau respectively insofar as he concedes that there is an 
irrevocable connection between poetry and beliefs.  Plato replaces poetry with the noble 
lie as the foundation of beliefs whereas Rousseau banishes poetry completely until 
imagination has been purified to conceive the divine and become motivated by love of 
the beautiful.  In contrast, Tocqueville whose project is far more modest than that of 
either of his predecessors-- who seek respectively to create an ideal city ruled by 
philosophers and establish a modern moral philosophy for purely civic ends-- shows that 
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the intellectual inclination of man in democracy makes poetry an appropriate vehicle to 
inspire beliefs favorable to morality.  He argues that because the democratic social state 
leaves the poet few subjects for idealization other than man’s preoccupation with himself, 
it provides him an excellent opportunity to depict the one aspect of man that constitutes 
his greatness, which for Tocqueville is irrevocably linked to the liberty he associates with 
moral choice.       
Tocqueville thus differentiates himself from the classical and modern traditions, 
which maintain that poetry has generally propagated beliefs inimical to reason, to show   
on the contrary that democratic poetry, as will be shown below, can inspire beliefs that 
elevate man’s imagination to conceive the divine order by depicting the moral 
consequences of his actions.  Tocqueville draws a comparison between the objects that 
lend themselves to poetic representation in aristocracy and democracy to support this 
innovation.   
Aristocratic poetry not only disposes the mind to beliefs but it also inclines it to 
adopt one faith over another inasmuch as the immobility of society favors the firmness 
and duration of positive religions and social stratification supports intermediary powers 
between God and man to give poets an inexhaustible source of subjects to idealize.  
Moreover, the order that reigns in the aristocratic state not only nurtures a strong taste for 
ideal beauty but it also produces a peaceful effect on man’s soul.  Hence, it lifts man’s 
spirit above and beyond his material care.   
The opposite is true in the fluid environment of democracy where faltering 
beliefs, which are as changing as laws invite doubt while equality, which makes everyone 
alike leaves the poet little with which to capture the imagination.   Furthermore, the 
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democratic state, which cultivates a taste for the useful and the real, is constantly agitated 
by the “love of material enjoyments, the idea of the better, the competition, and the 
imminent charm of success,”39 leaving the soul continuously restless and the spirit 
bounded in the mundane.   But man remains in his immaterial nature, an object pregnant 
with limitless contrasts that provides the poet a rich source for ideal representation. 
Tocqueville tarries with these comparisons to underscore that poetry not only 
reflects the fundamental traditions of the social state from which it draws its sources, but 
it can also inspire beliefs by idealizing the real and the visible.  Democracy, which has 
simplified religion in the case of the Americans and eliminated it in France, has yet to 
produce any poetry making it difficult to ascertain the general direction poets will take in 
this new social state to influence beliefs.  The Americans who generally furnish him his 
democratic prototypes have not yet produced any poets and Tocqueville finds nothing 
more antipoetic than the life of man in the United States.  Moreover, he maintains that the 
descriptive poetry of nineteenth century Europe whose focus on inanimate nature is 
thought to define democratic poetry represents a mere passing phase in the transitional 
period in which equality is making progress in former aristocratic societies.  Therefore, 
he is left to speculate on the course of democratic poetry.  He posits that democracy’s 
obsession with physical gratification and vision of anticipated success, kindled by a belief 
in progress and the indefinite perfectibility of the human race, will direct the poet’s 
imagination toward the future just as aristocracy’s reverence for ancient traditions and 
beliefs turned it toward contemplation of the past.  Nevertheless, he is cognizant that the 
tendency of democratic poetry to contemplate the future rather than the past can lead to 
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two alternatives:  it can inspire religious beliefs on the one hand or discourage them on 
the other by corrupting the mind with incoherent and fantastic imaginings.   
 Tocqueville focuses his discussion of democratic poetry on the first of these 
options, which coincides with his objective for democracy.  Focusing on the experience 
of the American he shows that if his life is filled with the unpoetic and petty concerns of 
his efforts toward progress, it is nonetheless animated by the poetic idea of the 
assimilation of mankind into one vast democracy from the sight of the constant 
movement and integration of men from different communities and countries.  Despite his 
reservations about democracy’s tendency to impoverish the human spirit, Tocqueville 
thus attributes a poetic quality to the idea of democracy that contrasts with the leitmotif 
of his commentary, viz., equality negates individuality by inducing identification with the 
mass to offset the individual’s sense of weakness and isolation.  Indeed, it is his hope that 
poetry can temper the characteristic herd mentality of democracy by idealizing the 
individual’s moral capacity to control his destiny. 
Tocqueville wants to use poetry as a vehicle to foster beliefs because he is 
particularly concerned about the amoral and fatalistic consequences of the democratic 
tendency to substitute the dominance of the crowd for the will of the individual.  He 
addresses this matter in a later chapter titled “Tendencies Particular to Historians in 
Democratic Times.”  He argues therein that the proclivity of democratic historians to 
deny any weight to the actions of individuals on the events of the world and to attribute 
them instead disproportionately to general causes that seem to obey a blind force is 
dangerous to society insofar as it promotes a doctrine of fatality that devalues free-will 
and with it individual capacity for moral choice.40 Since democratic poetry is still 
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indeterminate Tocqueville wants to show that it can make use of the very circumstances 
that propel it to focus on man and his future to teach that religion provides a fixed point 
in morality to deal with the inevitable conflicts that assail human destiny, particularly in 
the chaotic environment bred by equality.     
Tocqueville’s vision for democratic poetry shows a determination to guide 
opinions toward beliefs and he resorts to the moving language of Pascal who-- contrary to 
Rousseau-- believes that the corruption of human nature predates society and thus 
provides a different corrective for it.  The inclusion of Pascal allows Tocqueville to go 
beyond Rousseau’s secular objective to emphasize religion’s unrivaled capacity to 
alleviate the destabilizing effect of equality on the human spirit. More will be said in the 
section below about Pascal’s influence on Tocqueville’s religious teaching.  Suffice it for 
now to say that for Tocqueville the conception of a providential hand guiding the world 
to democracy, which for him is synonymous with justice,41 provides democratic poets a 
theme that lends itself to the depiction of ideal beauty: the vast limit of human liberty 
within the fatal circle Providence draws around each man.  “Human destinies, man, taken 
apart from his time and his country and placed before nature and God with his passions, 
his doubts, his unheard-of prosperity, and his incomprehensible miseries, will become the 
principal and almost unique object of poetry for these [democratic] people.”42    
It is partially in his description of the direction he outlines for democratic poetry 
that Tocqueville’s teaching on religion assumes a tenor reminiscent of Pascal’s view of 
the human condition insofar as he invokes the inescapable angst that inevitably besets 
man qua man as he contemplates the wretchedness of his existence. It is not difficult to 
see why Tocqueville would choose to borrow Pascal’s perspective to show that the 
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impoverishment of spirit democracy generates is certain to magnify this anguish.  This 
issue, addressed by Rousseau in the context of political life, is given an otherworldly 
dimension by Pascal. 
In contrast to Rousseau who maintains that reason guides man to virtue to 
overcome his weakness, which comes from the inequality between his strength and 
desires, Pascal avers that man can prevail over his weakness only through faith because 
he is composed of two opposed and diverse natures: the body and the soul, which is 
incomprehensible to reason.  Pascal believes that man’s awareness of his dual nature fills 
him with a terror that pushes him to seek countless diversions in order to keep from 
thinking about it.  As he sees it, man can avert his existential anxiety only by including 
God in his life.  
For after all, what is man in nature?  A nothing vis a vis infinity, 
everything with regard to nothingness, a middle between nothing and 
everything.  Infinitely distanced from understanding the extremes, the end 
of things and their principle are for him invincibly hidden in an 
impenetrable secret, equally incapable of seeing the emptiness from where 
he is pulled, and the infinity where he is engulfed…These extremes 
[nothingness and infinity] touch and unite themselves in God and only in 
God… [Otherwise man is] sailing on a vast middle, always uncertain and 
floating, pushed from one end toward the other… Let [him] then not look 
for security and stability.  [His] reason is always deceived by the 
inconstancy of appearances; nothing can fix the finite between the 
infinities that enclose and escape it.43  
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Listen now to Tocqueville as he describes the paradox of democracy wherein the 
individual draws his strength from an indifferent crowd whose formidable power in turn 
makes him feel his smallness and weakness.  Tocqueville maintains that the awareness of 
his own insignificance inevitably prompts man to search for a loftier destiny where he 
can escape his existential loneliness and ennui.  He echoes Pascal when he describes the 
way in which the longings of the human heart for self-understanding can become the 
appropriate subject of democratic poetry.  
I have no need to travel through heaven and earth to discover a 
marvelous object full of contrasts, of infinite greatness and pettiness, of 
profound obscurities and singular clarity, capable of giving birth at once to 
pity, admiration, scorn and terror.  I have only to consider myself: man 
comes from nothing, traverse time, and is going to disappear forever into 
the bosom of God.  One sees him for only a moment wondering, lost, 
between the limits of the two abysses…[Man] is covered enough to 
perceive something of himself and veiled enough so that the rest is sunk in 
impenetrable darkness, into which he plunges constantly and always in 
vain, in order to succeed in grasping himself.44  
Tocqueville adduces the works of three poets, who he believes have succeeded in 
making poetry a vehicle for moral teaching in democracy insofar as they emphasize 
moral choice as a path to human dignity and liberty in a way that combines the teachings 
of Rousseau and Pascal.  Tocqueville’s stated admiration for the poems of Alphonse de 
Lamartine45 (Jocelyn, 1836), and Lord Byron (Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage, 1812-1818) 
and a novel by François Auguste-René de Chateaubriand (René, 1802) leaves little doubt 
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about the combined influence of Rousseau and Pascal on the first portion of his teaching 
on religion.  These works-- excepting Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage, an epic poem 
dedicated to courage, freedom, the transience of human achievements and the enduring 
beauty of nature-- instruct that religion helps man to bear the inevitable miseries borne of 
the conflict between his two natures to overcome his passions.  The notion that man’s 
nature is divided into two warring parties is a common theme that permeates the 
teachings of Rousseau and Pascal, albeit with some significant differences in the way in 
which they are defined.  Because so much of Tocqueville’s teaching on religion is 
condensed in his discussion of poetry, it is worthwhile to make a brief survey of the 
poems he finds suitable for democracy to bring that teaching into greater focus. 
For the sake of simplicity, this examination will be limited to René and Jocelyn, 
each of which share certain similarities with Rousseau’s Julie ou La Nouvelle Eloise 
insofar as all three combine love and religion to teach morality, but unlike Julie the first 
two emphasize the weakness of man without God central to Pascal’s teaching.  Although  
Julie is presented in the form of letters between two lovers, it shares with René the 
characteristics of a novel inasmuch as it has a plot. Thus, it is noteworthy that 
Tocqueville who treats René as a poem omits Julie from his list of “democratic poems” 
despite its thematic connection to René and Jocelyn.  The exclusion of Julie then as well 
as the conspicuous absence of Rousseau’s name from his commentary, in which he cites 
his two other prominent intellectual mentors, raise the possibility that Tocqueville wants 
to distance himself at least politically from Rousseau’s dubious reputation in the 
nineteenth century as the father of Jacobinism, the revolutionary atheism that gave the 
French Revolution its impetus.  He clearly did not want to be publicly associated with 
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Rousseau or his political followers as evidenced by his firm decision to decline an 
invitation to participate in the unveiling of a monument erected to commemorate Voltaire 
and Rousseau in the Pantheon.46  Notwithstanding these considerations, the 
predominance of reason over religion in Rousseau’s Julie seems a likely justification for 
its absence from Tocqueville’s list.  In contrast, the works of Chateaubriand and  
Lamartine attempt to balance reason and religion in a way that is redolent of 
Tocqueville’s own religious perspective as will be shown in the comparison of these 
three works below.   
Rousseau’s Julie is different from Tocqueville’s selected poems for democracy 
because it gives virtue primacy over piety, which for Rousseau is generally more the 
product of pride than faith.  “But what has revolted me against the professional devotees, 
is this austerity of mores which makes them insensitive to humanity, it is this excessive 
pride that makes them look with pity on others.”47  Julie’s piety is reasonable insofar as it 
provides her an outlet in which to nurture the lingering passion of a youthful indiscretion 
by bearing her soul to God but only after attending to her duties as wife and mother. “To 
serve God, I know well it is not to pass one’s life on one’s knees in a chapel; it is to fulfill 
on earth the duties he imposes on us; it is to do in view of pleasing him all that is suitable 
to the state in which he has put us:  the heart is enough for him, and he who does his duty 
praises him.  One must first do what one must do, and then pray when one can; that is the 
rule I try to follow.”48 In contrast, Jocelyn is a heroic poem about the human soul’s ability 
to transcend its passions by conforming to the rigors of religion without which it 
succumbs to depravity while René shows unequivocally the power of religion to heal the 
wounds of this world.  Tocqueville’s choice then is hardly surprising since like Lamartine 
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and especially Chateaubriand he wants to restore religious beliefs by emphasizing the 
beauty and greatness of Christianity.   
In Julie Rousseau demonstrates that faith enlightened by reason embellishes the 
virtue of woman and gives her comfort and fortitude to accept a less than perfect 
happiness in this world.  “I have lived and I die in the Protestant faith, which draws its 
unique rule from the Holy Scriptures and reason; my heart has always confirmed what 
my mouth was pronouncing… that which was impossible for me to believe, I could not 
say that I believed it; I have always sought sincerely that which was consistent with the 
glory of God and the truth.”49 Julie’s devoutness is measured and circumscribed by 
reason, which not only keeps it from being tainted by intolerance but also subordinates it 
to her duty.  It is not by inadvertence that Rousseau makes Julie’s piety a pillar of her 
virtue since an important aspect of woman’s virtue for him is to honor prevailing moral 
opinions, which inevitably are dictated by the religion of the community in which she is 
born.  Rousseau’s Julie resembles in many respects Tocqueville’s American woman in 
her methodical approach to religion. 
Another noteworthy difference between Julie and Tocqueville’s selected poems 
for democracy is that it teaches that man unlike woman can dispense with religion to 
achieve moral virtue even though Rousseau concedes such a man is unfortunate not to 
have the consolation of religion.  Julie’s husband, Wolmar, is an agnostic who carved for 
himself a virtuous life guided solely by his reason.  While Julie is convinced that his 
virtue will earn him divine justice in the next world, she laments his unbelief for robbing 
him of true happiness in this one.  “I would like to see him believe at the price of my 
blood… For of how much sweetness is he not deprived!  What sentiment can console him 
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in his miseries?  Who witnesses the good acts he commits in secrecy?  What voice can 
speak to the depth of his soul?  What reward can he expect from his virtue?  How can he 
face death?  No, I hope he will not await it in this horrible state.”50By cultivating a just 
and honest heart even though he does not believe in God or the immortality of the soul, 
Wolmar fulfills nonetheless the goal of Rousseau’s civil religion, the love of law and 
justice that enables citizens to preserve the sanctity of the social contract.    
Tocqueville’s “democratic poems,” Jocelyn and René, are less focused on the 
disparate moral requirements of the sexes so prevalent in Rousseau’s Julie.  Their 
protagonists, a man and a woman respectively, are guided solely by faith, which rewards 
self-immolation with the hope of Christian redemption and everlasting happiness taught 
by Pascal.  Thus, his selectivity about the poems he recommends for democracy reveals 
in its omission of Julie the limits of his endorsement of Rousseau’s rational religion.   
Although Lamartine and Chateaubriand are clearly indebted to Rousseau in these 
particular works-- Chateaubriand had a love/hate relationship with Rousseau51 and 
Lamartine had a diversity of attitudes toward him-- they also make clear that they share 
with Pascal the Catholic belief that the potential for human greatness is irrevocably 
linked to love of God.  Lamartine and Chateaubriand emphasize in these poems that 
human happiness is fleeting but that God is constant amid the human cycle of suffering, 
work, death, etc. For them it is the moral force man draws from dedicating his life to a 
loving God that liberates him from the harmful passions enabling him to fulfill his duty.   
It is then the notion that love of God is central to the outcome of a difficult choice 
between duty and passion that sets the poems of Lamartine and Chateaubriand apart from 
Rousseau’s Julie.  Tocqueville endorses the works of the first two and remains silent 
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about that of the latter precisely because he wants to teach like Pascal that worldly 
happiness is not only ephemeral but it is also accompanied by agitation and ennui.  These 
symptoms of the existential malaise that is the scourge of human life without exception 
can be cured only with the hope and consolation that Christianity offers.   
René personifies Pascal’s view of man without faith insofar as he is overwhelmed 
by the emptiness, agitation and ennui that assail one in that condition.  In fact in his 
“Défense du Génie du Christianisme,” which included René until the second edition 
Ballanche of 1809, Chateaubriand affirms that the objective of his work like that of 
Pascal’s apology for Christianity is to defend it against its attackers and bring France 
back to the Church to restore the social equilibrium it lost with the Revolution.  
Moreover, René, which is Chateaubriand’s response to Rousseau’s Reveries of the 
Solitary Walker,52 makes evident that religion heals the heart from its fatal passions 
whereas solitude outrages it. He chooses to depict religion in its human relations through 
the medium of a novel to make it agreeable to his compatriots, a project that coincides 
with Tocqueville’s objective to make religion appealing to the democratic mass.   
In René, Chateaubriand contrasts the way in which two siblings, René and 
Amélie, confront their incestuous longings for each other, which originated in René’s 
reveries.  His melancholy is an incurable malady whose source he attributes to his 
lifelong terrifying awareness of a “creation at the same time immense and impenetrable 
and an abyss open at my sides.”53 In contrast, his sister and victim, Amélie, draws her 
strength from the knowledge that man’s life on earth is short and filled with uncertainty 
and thus it behooves him to bear it with fortitude to obtain eternal happiness.  Whereas 
Amélie overcomes her passion by consecrating her life to God and fulfilling her duty to 
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her religious community with charitable works, René makes a different choice preferring 
instead to abandon himself to solitude and despair by aimless wonderings. 
Chateaubriand’s novel implies that René is the author of his own misfortune by 
abandoning himself to his disastrous reveries and instructs that solitude is harmful to him 
who lives without God.  Even when he joins a community of savages in America and 
takes a native wife in keeping with their traditions, he neglects her to indulge himself in 
solitary reveries.  In contrast, Amélie is healed by devoting herself to convent life and 
dies happily.  René ends miserably, a punishment befitting one unable to prevail over his 
passions because he shuns obstinately both the consolation of religion and his civil duty. 
Chateaubriand ends his novel with the harsh reprimand René receives from the 
priest after confiding his story to him leaving no doubt about the moral religious lesson 
he wants to teach.  The priest not only reproves him for abandoning his duties to deliver 
himself to useless reveries but also for his presumptuousness in believing that man can 
suffice to himself and live in solitude without God.  Thus, Chateaubriand combines the 
importance of duty as the ultimate goal of virtue integral to Rousseau’s teaching with 
Pascal’s insistence on faith as the foundation of human happiness. 
Likewise, Lamartine depicts in Jocelyn the consequences of the different choices 
made by Jocelyn and Laurence to cope with their ill-fated love.  Confronted with the hard 
choice between passion and duty, Jocelyn finds the strength to overcome the former to 
follow his vocation of priesthood.  His decision is all the more commendable because it is 
partially influenced by the call to fulfill a pressing need at a time when the irreligion that 
accompanied the Revolution had emptied the Church of its ministers and left the world 
without God.  He offers his great sacrifice to God asking Christ to fill him with charity to 
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love mankind with the same abandon with which he loved Laurence.  In contrast, 
Laurence whose belief is superficial inasmuch as it is an extension of her love for 
Jocelyn, who was the first to teach her to love God, is ready to detest her Creator if He 
should take Jocelyn from her.  Laurence unlike Jocelyn-- who learns overtime to escape 
the weight of his loneliness alternatively with prayers, which fill the desert of his life, and 
science and studies to overcome his doubt and solitude-- abandons herself to a frenzied 
licentiousness born of despair that brings her little solace.     
Lamartine’s epic poem assembles numerous themes that make it appealing to 
Tocqueville as a means to teach religious morality in democracy in a way that coincides 
with his adaptation of Rousseau’s teaching on opinion. For example, it emphasizes the 
importance of education on morality by contrasting the results of its oversight by a 
nurturing mother to the absence of one.  Jocelyn’s ability to cope with disappointment is 
clearly traceable to his attachment to a loving and pious mother who shaped his reason 
with holy lessons whereas Laurence who lost her mother as an infant and received her 
care from a devoted father, who nonetheless neglected to give her religious instruction, is 
given easily to despair.  As a result, Jocelyn finds solace in faith and the fulfillment of his 
religious duty and Laurence is bereft of this consolation because she lacks the fortitude 
religion provides to weather suffering.  Lamartine thus echoes Rousseau who assigns to 
woman the important role of inculcating morality in society insofar as he implies that 
religion taught by a loving mother is the appropriate foundation of a moral education. 
Unlike Chateaubriand who takes the Rousseau of the Reveries to task for 
romanticizing solitude by showing its deleterious effect on the soul, Lamartine’s poem 
follows the principles of natural religion found in his Emile.  For example, Jocelyn 
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teaches the peasant children to hear the voice of their conscience and to use their reason 
to know God by His works.  Additionally, Lamartine makes Jocelyn’s solitary retreat on 
the mountain a time of wondrous contemplation of God’s works in nature.  Jocelyn who 
has faith experiences solitude differently than the agnostic René insofar as his reflection 
on the pristine beauty of nature that surrounds him lifts his heart toward God and brings 
him to transfigure himself in Him to sense his immortality.  Nevertheless, Lamartine like 
Rousseau in the Emile wants to teach also that the weight of solitude is burdensome to 
man who needs human contact to nourish his spirit.  When Jocelyn makes a return on 
himself following his meditations he wishes wholeheartedly for the sweetness of 
companionship if for no other reason than to lift time’s oppressive weight off his soul.  
One almost hears Rousseau speaking through Jocelyn when the latter gives thanks to God 
for granting him his wish when he stumbles unexpectedly upon Laurence who is confided 
to him by her dying father.  “Every hour, every place, every season, every sky is good 
when there are two.”54   
Lamartine’s poem like Tocqueville’s teaching shows a certain ambivalence 
toward religion, which can be explained by the circumstances of his life at the time he 
conceived it.  He began to write Jocelyn in 1831 exactly twenty-one years after an illness 
caused a conversion, which he repudiated in 1832 when he abandoned Catholicism 
definitively.  One sees the strong influence of Rousseau in his depiction of the hypocrisy 
of the clerics who shun Jocelyn, whose chastity they question upon his return to the 
monastery following his conversion in the prison cell of his benefactor and his ensuing 
decision to forego the happiness of sharing his life with Laurence to return to the 
priesthood.  Their absence of charity leaves him feeling among men a greater solitude 
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than that which he experienced when he was alone on the mountain.  Likewise, the reader 
sees the extent to which his view of religion is influenced by Rousseau when he relates 
superfluously an incident of intolerance toward Jews in which Jocelyn intervenes to teach 
the perpetrators charity.  Nevertheless, he shows the residual influence of Catholicism on 
his thought when he has Jocelyn invoke Pascal’s hidden God as the consoler of his 
despair.  “I give my soul to God, and tell myself:  In him, I have the water of my thirst, 
the end of my ennui, I have the friend whose heart of all love abounds.”55 Furthermore, 
Jocelyn refers to the crucifix, which is the sole ornament to warm the walls of his poor, 
village priest cottage, as the celestial friend who fills the desert of his life with his 
presence.  Finally, it is Pascal’s notion of God’s justice that helps Jocelyn to make sense 
of the Revolution’s senseless killing of innocent victims.  “How can the spirit of love, of 
justice, of peace [which is the spirit of God] serve iniquity, hatred, and falsity?  Ah!  It is 
because in his work he acts with men; Virtue conceives them, crime consumes them; The 
worker is divine, the instrument is mortal.”56  
Yet, despite his carefully crafted argument to show how poetry could elevate the 
mediocre democratic intellect, Tocqueville gives his last word on democratic poetry not 
in the chapter bearing this title but in a subsequent one titled “Why American Writers and 
Orators Are Often Bombastic.” One way to explain his about-face, which circuitously 
brings him back to the propositions of Plato and Rousseau on poetry, is to recall that his 
commentary on democracy has two specific objectives.  On the one hand, he wants to 
win over democracy’s opponents in France by depicting its virtues in America and the 
chapter specifically dedicated to poetry accomplishes that goal by allowing him to 
suggest that American democratic poetry may not yet exist but the American people are 
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invigorated by the poetic idea of man’s freedom to shape his destiny under the guiding 
hand of a divine providence.  His selected poems for democracy, which are the works of 
European aristocrats, demonstrates how closely America’s poetic idea corresponds to the 
aristocratic notion of liberty inasmuch as it derives its strength from firm religious beliefs 
that favor stable political institutions.  Alternatively, he wishes to caution democracy’s 
proponents that the democratic taste for material well-being is a constant threat to liberty, 
and he prefers to sound this warning in a separate chapter whose title omits the mention 
of poetry allowing him to preserve the integrity of his original argument, which maintains 
that the correlation between beliefs and poetry that existed in aristocracy can be 
reproduced in democracy in a simpler form.    
The initial optimism that brings Tocqueville to challenge the classical and modern 
notion that poetry has a nefarious effect on beliefs gives way to the more sober 
realization that when beliefs are simplified as they are in democracy poetry can certainly 
depart from the path of the reasonable and the real.  His apprehension stems from the 
nagging awareness that in democracy the existence of the individual is so filled with the 
petty cares that agitates and charms it that when and if he consents to tear himself from 
these it is only to contemplate something bigger than himself and that does not 
necessarily translate into a disposition to meditate on the sovereign master.  In fact, 
Tocqueville posits that lacking an exhaustible source of subjects to depict, the poet will 
seize upon this democratic tendency to captivate the imagination with fantastic beings 
that distort reality and in the end corrupt both himself and his public.  Thus, in the final 
analysis Tocqueville concedes that poetry may indeed not be the channel through which 
morality is inculcated in democratic citizens inasmuch as it contributes to reinforce their 
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material taste and leads them away from the moral anchor of religion, the sole guarantee 
of their freedom. This concession opens the way for him to outline in the second section 
of volume two how his new political science can reanimate beliefs.          
           
How Pascal’s Understanding of the Human Condition Enables Tocqueville to 
Establish a Religious Doctrine for Democracy that Integrates the Principles of the 
Enlightenment with the Basic Tenets of Christian Morality   
 
Tocqueville borrows Pascal’s perspective of human nature to resolve the 
problems he encounters with Rousseau’s teaching on religion.  On the one hand, 
Rousseau’s civil religion, which would allow him to meet the necessity of diffusing 
religion among the democratic masses, is incompatible with his advocacy for 
disestablishment.  On the other hand, Rousseau’s natural religion presents him with some 
difficulties because he does not believe reason can be a reliable guide for religion in 
democracy.  Pascal provides him a way out of his dilemma without prejudice to 
Rousseau, who as previously shown displays a phantom of Christianity-- at least that of 
the Gospel-- in his works.  Pascal’s view that belief in Christianity is not only in man’s 
greatest interest but also is his only path to true happiness enables Tocqueville to use the 
simplicity of Rousseau’s natural religion as a foundation to promote Christian moral 
principles that conform to the inclinations of his democrat’s intellect and sentiments.   
Although Pascal and Rousseau begin their analyses of human nature with 
opposite assumptions that lead them to very different conclusions, they nonetheless agree 
about one thing: the danger of amour-propre to human happiness if it is not directed 
either by faith or reason respectively.  Their concurrence on the importance of guiding 
amour-propre, albeit to very different ends, which for Rousseau is human compassion 
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and for Pascal charity or love of God, allows Tocqueville to use the one’s appeal to 
reason and the other’s appeal to the heart to mitigate the democratic inclination for self-
absorption that he believes is so detrimental to liberty.  If, on one hand, Rousseau helps 
Tocqueville to uncover the detrimental impact of opinions on amour-propre, Pascal, on 
the other, allows him to show the importance of imbuing opinions with Christian beliefs 
to conquer it, inasmuch as it is evident to him that in democracy reason is an unreliable 
guide for man in religious beliefs. 
Pascal teaches that all men seek happiness but none can find it without faith, 
which fills the infinite abyss between man and God, the source of all happiness.  
Therefore, he maintains it would seem reasonable to expect that spiritual devotion would 
be the principal human interest and that religion, which leads man to faith, would be the 
center to which all human actions tend.  But, he finds the opposite to be true and that as a 
general rule, man allows himself to be pulled in the contrary direction because he harbors 
deep in his heart two mutually exclusive loves, neither of which can ever blossom fully 
except at the expense of the other: the first is love of self or amour-propre and the other 
is love of God.57  Amour-propre negates love of God because its fundamental nature is 
concupiscence, an all-encompassing desire for worldly things and pride, which for Pascal 
is responsible for turning man away from God.  “Everything that is in the world is 
concupiscence of the flesh, or concupiscence of the eyes, or pride of life: libido sentiendi, 
libido sciendi, libido dominandi…The three concupiscences have made three sects and 
the philosophers have done nothing other than follow one of the three concupiscences.”58   
 Amour-propre is the result of the corruption provoked by the original sin blinding 
man to justice and truth by bringing him to love only himself and to make himself God 
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even though this human I is contemptible by its vices and miseries.  This aversion to 
justice and truth exists in all men, albeit in different degrees and as long as man is left to 
his own devices he never acts except for the love of self, which is unjust and against all 
order due to the fallen condition to which he has been reduced by sin. Pascal aims to 
show that if man is to achieve happiness he must seek to repudiate amour-propre and 
nurture love of God, which inclines him to goodness and justice.  
At the heart of Pascal’s teaching is the notion that the true and only virtue is to 
hate oneself so that one can find a truly loveable being to love.  Since man is unable to 
love anything outside himself, he must love a being within himself.  That being is the 
universal Being revealed by Christianity, the kingdom of God who lives in man though it 
is not a part of man.59  Christianity is the one and only true religion capable of leading 
man to virtue because it alone understands the contradiction in man’s nature and provides 
the remedy for the miseries inseparable from it.  This conviction is the pillar upon which 
Pascal’s moral doctrine is founded.   
The topic of human corruption pervades Pascal’s writings.  It is addressed in Les 
Provinciales60 as an attack directed at the Jesuits’ casuistry,61 in the Ecrits Sur La 
Grace,62 which completes Les Provinciales by exposing his theological views on the 
subject of grace at the heart of the ecclesiastical controversy that pitted Calvinists, 
Molinists and Jansenists against each other in mid-seventeenth century France, and in the 
Pensées to the spirit of libertine philosophy in vogue in the 1650’s.63 In the latter, Pascal 
aims to demonstrate, inter alia, the superiority of religion over philosophy for leading 
man to morality because religion addresses the subject of greatest interest to him, the 
immortality of his soul.  Since Tocqueville’s religious doctrine relies on the moral 
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teaching of the Pensées, which are Pascal’s notes for the great work he was planning on 
the Truth of the Christian Religion (Vérité de la religion chrétienne),64 to counterbalance 
democratic materialism, this dissertation will focus only on that work.  
Pascal argues in the Pensées that as a principle of amour-propre and interest man 
ought to apply himself with the utmost seriousness to seek his sovereign good-- God-- a 
most pressing matter for him since as a consequence of his fallen state he is in darkness, 
existing between the nothingness from which he originates and the infinity to which he is 
bound.  Faced with the certainty of death that threatens him at every instant, man has the 
choice of one of two possible alternatives: either to live his life seeking the truth to earn 
eternal salvation or ignore the truth and risk eternal damnation.  By presenting to man the 
reality of his situation from this perspective, Pascal shows the reasonability of making it 
one’s duty to seek to know and love God by adopting the teachings of  Christianity, 
which alone provides the remedy for the wretchedness of the human condition.  It is 
indubitable for him that whether man likes it or not he is embarked in a game of chance 
that compels him to bet one way or another on the existence of God and the immortality 
of his soul, a matter of grave importance to morality since it bears on the conduct one 
would reasonably assume to avoid making an irretrievable mistake for eternity.     
The Pensées seek to establish that Christianity is the true religion because it is:   
1) the only one that teaches the inherent contradiction in man by uncovering the great 
principle of greatness and the great principle of misery that reign simultaneously in his 
heart; and 2) the only one that provides the remedy to heal him of the pride and 
concupiscence that rob him of the happiness that comes only from loving God.  Pascal 
seeks to convince the incredulous of this truth by incessantly reminding them that we are 
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all mortal and that we live constantly in the shadow of our own inevitable end and that 
happiness will always elude us as long as God remains hidden from us and that we are 
powerless to escape the impenetrable darkness that surrounds us and fills us with misery 
as long as we remain anchored in the material world.  He could not accept that man 
would show himself to be so unconscionable in avoiding the only thing that really matters 
to him, the immortality of his soul, since he alone among the animals has the ability to 
think, the quality that constitutes his greatness.  “Thinking makes the greatness of man.  
Man is nothing but a reed, the weakest in nature; but he is a thinking reed…since he 
knows that he dies…All our dignity consists then in our thought… Let’s work then to 
think well:  that [is] the principle of morality.”65  Thus, there can be no morality without 
cognizance of the indissoluble bond between misery and greatness that defines the human 
condition in a way that makes one as essential as the other. Without Christianity, which 
uncovers this truth and offers the hope of redemption as remedy, man is powerless 
despite all his efforts to attain the happiness he seeks so desperately.    
It is in vain, oh man, that you look inside yourselves for the cure of 
your miseries.  All your enlightenment can only bring you to know that it 
is not at all in yourselves that you will find either truth or goodness.  The 
philosophers promised it to you and they have been unable to do it.  They 
do not know either what is truly good for you, or what your true state is.  
How could they give remedies to your pains since they do not know them?  
Your principal illnesses are pride, which removes you from God [and] 
concupiscence, which attaches you to the world; and they have done 
nothing but entertain at least one of these illnesses.  If they gave you God 
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for object, it has been only to exercise your greatness: they made you think 
that you were equal to him and conforming by your nature.  And those 
who saw the vanity of this pretence threw you in the other precipice, by 
making you believe that your nature was equal to that of the brutes, and 
brought you to seek your well-being in the concupiscence that is the lot of 
the animals.  It is not the way to cure you of your injustices…66  
Pascal establishes the moral efficacy of Christianity by comparing it to 
philosophy to show that the latter encourages man’s baseness because it is founded on the 
error that man is capable of goodness and justice without God.  He takes to task the 
dogmatists and the pyrrhonists who teach falsely that man maintains himself in virtue by 
his own strength and effort.    
When one wants to follow the virtues to their extreme from one 
end to another, there appears vices that insinuate themselves insensibly in 
them, in their insensible route, on the side of the small infinity; there 
appears also vices, in great amount on the side of the great infinity, in such 
a way that one loses oneself in the vices, and one no longer sees the 
virtues.  One gets oneself caught in the perfection itself.  Man is neither 
angel nor beast, and misfortune wants it that he who wants to make the 
angel makes the beast.67    
Philosophy is antithetical to Christianity because it emphasizes either one or the 
other of the two principles of man’s nature, his greatness or his misery, to lead him either 
to deism or atheism.  Pascal insists that “it matters equally to men to know one or the 
other of these points [man’s greatness and his misery]; and it is equally dangerous to man 
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to know God without knowing his misery, and to know his misery without knowing his 
Redeemer who can heal him of it.  The knowledge of only one of these makes either the 
arrogance of the philosophers, who have known God and not their miseries, or the despair 
of the atheists, who know their misery without the hope of the Redeemer.”68   To know 
and understand these truths taught by Christianity is to understand that God is partially 
hidden to man due to his corruption and partially revealed to those who seek Him, hence 
the reason for which some are saved and others are lost.  
Central to Pascal’s teaching is the notion that “faith is a gift of God [which is very 
different from saying as the philosophers would have one believe] it is a gift of 
reasoning.”69  Faith is nothing more than sensing God with our heart and those who have 
it are inspired by grace, which is a testament of God’s mercy since man is unworthy of it 
by his corruption.  Those who have faith love Him with their heart, the faculty 
responsible for the knowledge of first principles. His teaching therefore endeavors to 
show that God in His mercy has enlightened some with faith while others remain in 
obscurity and thus those for whom God is hidden must seek Him sincerely since He has 
in His justice left “sensible marks in His Church to make Himself known to them.”70       
 Pascal maintains there are three ways to believe: reason, custom and inspiration.  
Christianity does not exclude the first two but it insists on the third, which it maintains is 
available to all men who seek it.  Pascal insists that reason, which is dictated by self-
interest and thus subject to imagination and error, is not the faculty suited to guide men in 
this important quest because it is corrupted.  Those who misguidedly rely on reason alone 
to know about the first principles jeopardize their greatest interest since their happiness 
depends on a truth, which is infinitely incomprehensible to man who as a finite being 
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cannot know the existence and nature of the infinite Being.  “The heart has its reasons 
that reason does not know… It is the heart that senses God and not reason.  That is what 
faith is:  God sensible to the heart, not to reason.”71  For those who are not fortunate to be 
inspired by grace, he teaches that faith can be attained not by working to find convincing 
proofs of God’s existence but by diminishing the passions, which are man’s greatest 
obstacles.   
For one who is without the gift of grace necessary for salvation, Pascal proposes 
that reason can pave a path to faith until such time the heart becomes inspired with it.  
Reason aids in this process by opening the mind to the proofs of Christianity, which are 
in the Scriptures-- the only source of light for man in the otherwise darkness and 
confusion in which God’s nature and nature proper exists for him-- and the prophecies 
announcing the coming of a Redeemer to save him from the concupiscence and pride that 
turns him away from love of God.  But for Pascal this enlightenment remains a human 
faith that is useless for salvation inasmuch as reason can only persuade the mind only as 
long as it remembers the proofs, which escape it at every turn.  Since reason cannot 
incline the heart to nurture love of God, which for Pascal is synonymous with charity, it 
is left to customs to confirm the proofs outlined by reason by inclining the body to belief 
so that the mind easily follows.  It is habit then and not reason that leads to belief by 
inclining our soul to fall naturally in it.  “Habit is our nature.  Who accustoms himself to 
faith, believes it, and can no longer not fear hell, and believes nothing else.”72  Thus, faith 
is achieved by engaging the mind with the proofs it needs to see only once while the body 
does the rest by habit.  Pascal maintains that faith must be rooted in sentiment and not in 
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reason to keep it from vacillating and that it is for this reason that the Psalmist says: 
“Inclina cor meum, Deus.”  73  
Pascal’s thoughtful guideline to belief for those without grace provides 
Tocqueville a solution to the democratic dilemma inasmuch as it encourages a certain 
concern with the future, which is the object of religion, to insinuate itself into the 
democratic mind despite its universal preoccupation with satisfying without delay the 
needs of the body.  In fact, Tocqueville is quick to remark that Pascal’s genius and 
disinterested love of truth, which brought him “to assemble as he did all the powers of 
his intellect in order better to discover the most hidden secrets of the Creator,”74 could 
only have flourished in an aristocratic society.  Thus, if democratic people are to be 
brought to beliefs, it will have to be by a means other than reason and Pascal’s view 
that habits can lead the heart to charity appears to Tocqueville an excellent alternative 
for steering democracy on a moral course.   
Tocqueville’s religious doctrine seeks to uncover a midpoint between materialism 
and spiritualism to keep democratic instincts from falling into one or the other of 
these two extremes, which he believes are equally fatal to liberty in democracy.  
Materialism entrenches itself more easily in democracies since it is a small step from 
an all-consuming disposition to care solely for the needs of the body “to believe that 
all is nothing but matter [thereby creating a] fatal circle”75  that becomes as 
detrimental to the well-being of the body as well as that of the soul.  Just as Pascal 
blames concupiscence for man’s misery by turning him away from God, Tocqueville 
attributes the cause of the restlessness and anxiety that plagues the American in the 
midst of his well-being to materialism.  In fact, he maintains that materialism inflicts 
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such a deep wound on the soul that some Americans succumb to an extreme 
spiritualism to escape the constraints of the body.76  Tocqueville maintains that this 
inversion can be as damaging to democratic people insofar as it turns man away from 
the world and thus destroys all other motive of human actions.   
But since Tocqueville is far more concerned about the pernicious effect of 
materialism than that of spiritualism on democratic people inasmuch as the former 
particularly corresponds and supports their taste for material well-being, he finds in 
Pascal’s teaching a powerful counterweight to steer them half-way in the opposite 
direction.  He describes the democratic passion for well–being as “a tenacious, 
exclusive, universal but contained passion,”77 which naturally occludes the future 
from man’s view by satisfying itself with small comforts achieved without effort and 
at small cost.  For this reason, his teaching reflects a shared conviction with Pascal 
that the potential for human greatness is inseparable from the belief in an afterlife as 
the final goal of life and for him this belief is especially desirable in democracy where 
it moderates the democratic obsession for quick and easy success.  Belief in an 
afterlife is salutary to democratic people because it accustoms them to make little 
sacrifices everyday to obtain a future reward.  From a moral standpoint then 
materialism is more problematic than spiritualism for Tocqueville inasmuch as its 
focus on instant gratification weakens man’s stamina for the long and often uncertain 
investment that is part and parcel of great achievements.  For him the obvious 
solution to democracy’s endemic problem is to balance man’s total absorption with 
the material world, which deprives the imagination of the desire for the greater goods 
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that are the source of human greatness, with spiritual nourishment by making 
religious beliefs the foundation of opinion.   
Tocqueville spells out his philosophical position, which is to conciliate the needs 
of the body with those of the soul, in his initial draft to the chapter titled “How the 
Excessive Love of Well-Being Can Be Harmful to Well-Being” in volume two, part 
two, chapter sixteen.  Thus, while the bulk of his commentary is addressed to 
materialism and its proponents, like the Saint Simonians who sought to institute a 
new morality to “rehabilitate the flesh,”78 he is also intent on showing to the religious 
fanatics that spiritualism is not a desirable alternative.  He sums up his objective as 
follows: “I have proven sufficiently to the materialist people that it is to be desired 
that the taste of well-being does not extinguish the spiritual impulse of the soul…I 
should also add a small chapter in which turning toward the fanatics I would show 
that it is in the own interest of the soul that the body flourishes [since] man is neither 
pure spirit nor pure animal [but both].”79   
Echoing Pascal for whom religion must take into account man’s dual nature, 
Tocqueville affirms that a man who neglects one or the other aspect of his nature to 
fall into an extreme materialism or spiritualism risks degrading and turning himself 
into a brute.  “If men ever came to be contented with material goods, it is to be 
believed that little by little they would lose the art of producing them, and that in the 
end they would enjoy them without discernment and without progress, like brutes.”80  
Likewise, Tocqueville shows how spiritualism can produce a similar effect on man.  
In his initial draft of the chapter titled “Why Certain Americans Display Such an 
Exalted Spiritualism” he recounts how he instinctively recoiled from a raucous scene 
 284
he witnessed in America where a Methodist preacher managed to rouse a crowd of 
worshippers to convulsive repentance by depicting for it the inexhaustible divine 
retribution that awaits man to punish his perverseness.   
I ran away filled with disgust and penetrated by a deep terror.  
Author and conservator of all things, I told myself, can it be that you 
recognize yourself in the horrible portrait that your creatures make of you 
here?  Must man be degraded by fear so that he can be lifted up to you, 
and would he not know how to climb to the rank of your saints without 
giving himself to these outbursts that make him descend below the 
brutes?81   
Time only seemed to have reinforced his conviction that spiritualism no less than 
materialism must be balanced to prevent it from inflicting harm to human dignity.  
Following his last visit to England a couple of years before his death he writes the 
following to Kergolay.  
I confess to you I have always (in petto) considered a book like 
The Imitation of Jesus Christ for example, when one considers it other 
than a teaching destined for cloister life, as supremely immoral.  It is not 
healthy to detach oneself from the world, from its pleasures, when they are 
honest, to the point that the author teaches and those who live by the 
reading of such a book cannot fail besides to lose all that makes the public 
virtues in acquiring certain private virtues.  A certain preoccupation with 
religious truths not going as far as the absorption of the thought in the 
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other world, has therefore always appeared to me the most conforming 
state of human morality under all its forms.82  
Tocqueville’s organization of part two of the second volume reflects his 
commitment to foster religious beliefs that equilibrate between the needs of the body 
and those of soul.  Thus, while he accepts Pascal’s view of the tension inherent in 
human nature, he nonetheless disagrees in principle with the doctrine of 
predestination that defines Pascal’s rigid Catholic orthodoxy since it is clearly 
incompatible with his humanistic and liberal approach to religion.  For him religion 
will be successful in democracy only if it fulfills the following objectives: 1) serves as 
the guarantor of the freedom, public peace and social order that material prosperity 
needs to flourish; and 2) provides not only the spiritual nourishment that satisfies a 
universal human longing but also compels the mind to contemplate the future by 
placing the rewards for the sacrifices of this life in the hereafter.  This section then, 
which is the last he devotes on the whole to religion in his commentary, must be 
considered his final word on the subject.  
The religious teaching of Tocqueville, l’homme politique, has clearly a very 
different objective than that of Pascal, the polemist, and thus it hints obliquely toward 
its end unlike that of his mentor, which unambiguously and unconditionally tends 
toward the inspiration of divine faith.  Human faith, i.e., the one generated by habits, 
is good enough for Tocqueville because it leads to morality in this world, which is an 
important initial step toward contemplating that which lies beyond the mundane and 
immediate cares that fill democratic aspirations.  This is exemplified by his tacit 
approval of the methodical approach of the American to religion.  The belief of 
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Tocqueville’s American far from being divinely inspired is dictated by the interest he 
has in the utility of religion to guide opinions toward order, which in turn enables the 
passion for material well-being to flourish.  Although it is a practice that begins as 
pure calculation to satisfy material interest, nonetheless, it initiates overtime the 
habits that can potentially inspire the heart to beliefs, therein its merit.  For this 
reason, it is good enough for Tocqueville who believes that unless religion 
accommodates democracy’s predominant passion it will not succeed in inculcating in 
man the habit of thinking about his future-- an outlook that is beneficial to him man in 
this life as well as the afterlife.  In sum, Tocqueville considers religion in a way that 
fulfills both a political and human need and he is able to realize his complex two-
pronged objective by adopting selected elements from the teachings of Pascal, 
Rousseau and Montesquieu.    
Always cognizant of the democratic mind’s indomitable distaste for abstraction, 
Tocqueville simplifies Christian dogmas in a way that brings into focus an affinity 
between him and Rousseau.  Moreover, because democracy propels man toward 
materialism by making him focus primarily on the needs of the body, Tocqueville insists 
that religion must accommodate this propensity and in this respect he shows himself the 
disciple of Montesquieu for whom the remedy must be suited to the inclination to which 
the regime gives rise.  Finally, materialism being of greater concern to him because it is 
the malady of democracy, he exhorts his compatriots to return to their Christian tradition 
by invoking Pascal’s argument that it is in man’s interest to bet on the existence of God 
and the immortality of his soul.   
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Although Tocqueville does not embrace Pascal’s austere orthodoxy, he uses his 
stirring language in a way that is consistent with Montesquieu’s view of virtue, i.e., 
interest imitates virtue when it functions as the basis of common action.  Tocqueville 
adduces the American’s use of religion as a pillar of liberty to support his innovative 
religious doctrine as a democratic necessity.  One glimpses his rationale for reconciling 
Pascal’s religious teaching with Montesquieu’s political philosophy in a rough draft for 
the first volume in which he explains the following comment about the Americans’ 
attitude toward religion.  “Most of them think that the knowledge of self-interest well-
understood is enough to lead man toward the just and the honest.”83  His interpretation of 
Montesquieu’s concept of republican virtue enables him to combine it with Pascal’s use 
of interest as a powerful incentive to lead man to beliefs in a way that harmonizes with 
democracy’s penchant for material well-being.  
That which he [Montesquieu] understands by virtue is the moral 
force that each individual exercises over himself and which prevents him 
from violating the right of others.  When this triumph of man on the 
temptations is the result of the weakness of the temptation or a calculation 
of personal interest it does not constitute virtue in the eyes of the moralist; 
but it follows the idea of Montesquieu who spoke of the effect much more 
than the cause.  In America it is not virtue that is great, it is the temptation 
that is small, which comes to the same thing.  It is not disinterest that is 
great, it is the interest that is well-understood, which also comes to the 
same thing.84     
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Tocqueville collapses his reading of Montesquieu with Pascal’s view-- both of 
which appeal to interest, albeit toward different ends-- to show that public virtue, which 
is essential to liberty, is especially dependent in democracy on the morality religion 
fosters.  He finds support for the effectiveness of his method in religion itself, which has 
always used the idea of interest well-understood to inculcate in human beings the habit of 
thinking about the afterlife. The Americans have adjusted this aged-old religious practice 
to the democratic taste for material wealth by showing that it brings tangible benefits as 
well in this world.  Tocqueville sanctions the American’s doctrine of self-interest well-
understood precisely because it encapsulates the teaching of Montesquieu on practical 
affairs and Pascal’s guide to religious beliefs in a way that serves the cause of liberty.    
Nevertheless, Tocqueville maintains that he resorts to a utilitarian argument to 
promote religion only because he accepts democratic mediocrity as an irrefutable fact.  
He argues that since men can no longer be motivated by lofty principles under a system 
of equality, the only way to bring them to moral virtue is by way of something within 
everyone’s reach.  He finds that an enlightened self-interest is a powerful incentive 
toward that objective inasmuch as it brings to light the material compensations to be 
obtained by subduing the passions.   On the political level, it transforms democratic 
individualism into communal involvement and on the religious side, it accustoms man to 
place the object of life beyond this life.  His endorsement then of self-interest well-
understood as a moral code of conduct is a product of careful deliberation based on the 
particular circumstances that prevail under a system of equality.  The following comment 
in his draft for the chapter on this subject supports this study’s view. “If morality was 
strong enough on its own, I would not find it so important to lean on utility.  If the idea of 
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the just was more powerful, I would not speak as much on the idea of utility…It is 
because I see that morality is weak that I want to put it under the safeguard of interest.”85  
Thus, using Montesquieu’s concept of virtue and Pascal’s challenge to man to 
wager on the side of immortality, Tocqueville makes a utilitarian argument to promote 
the advantage of religion over philosophy in the tradition of Rousseau’s Savoyard Vicar, 
i.e., to maintain a balance between religion and philosophy to avoid fanaticism on the one 
hand and on the other skepticism, 86 or materialism in the case of democratic people.  
However, unlike Rousseau-- whose teaching shows an equal distrust for religion and 
philosophy-- Tocqueville combines religion, which puts the goal of life in the afterlife 
and thus enjoins man to think about the future, with the rational method of philosophy to 
combat democratic materialism.  This approach creates an affinity between him and 
Pascal who found it equally advantageous to appeal to interest to cure the irreligion of his 
time. “This idea [the notion of interest tied to religion] which does not appear to me 
worthy of the great soul of Pascal summarizes perfectly the state of souls in countries 
where reason is strengthening itself while religious beliefs are faltering.”87           
Pascal’s exhortation to man to acquire the moral habits that inspire the heart to 
belief and his appeal to interest to encourage these habits are useful to Tocqueville since 
the motivation he provides for doing so is by far the one most conformable to democratic 
inclination.  It is not surprising then to see Tocqueville invert Rousseau’s dictum that “the 
body must be vigorous in order to obey the soul,”88 with his own assertion that “the soul 
must remain great and strong, if only to be able from time to time to put its force and its 
greatness in the service of the body.”89 By confining his debt to Pascal to his appeal to 
interest and habits to bring democratic man to beliefs, Tocqueville is able to formulate a 
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religious doctrine for democracy that tempers materialism and makes religion a pillar of 
liberty in the tradition of the enlightenment, with the caveat that he substitutes 
Rousseau’s omnipresent God for Pascal’s hidden God.  In short, by infusing Pascal’s 
perspective with the lessons of the enlightenment, Tocqueville arrives at showing the 
advantage to man in democracy of turning his gaze from time to time toward the future to 
disabuse him of his obsession with the present.   
Tocqueville’s ever-present fear of the political consequences of materialism, 
which in nineteenth century France proved repeatedly to be a sure and certain path to 
despotism, brings him to advocate elevating pride to a virtue in democracy-- a 
compromise that further reflects his selective approach to the teachings of Pascal, 
Rousseau and Montesquieu.  This accommodation is unmistakably contrary to Pascal’s 
belief that the concupiscence of pride turns man away from goodness and justice and 
Rousseau’s warning that pride as a product of amour-propre can be an instrument of 
compassion as well as the misanthropy and untruth he associates with philosophy and 
intolerance he connects with religion.  But, Tocqueville has the greater concern of 
instilling in his countrymen the dignity that makes liberty its predominant care and he 
recognizes that the mediocre ambitions democracy favors encourage complacency in way 
that is harmful to his cause.  In advocating pride over humility for democratic people he 
shows himself the faithful heir of Montesquieu who believes that the character of a nation 
is formed by a mixture of virtues and vices and from this combination it results 
sometimes that moral virtues have the pernicious effect of vices and political vices 
imitate virtue by the overall benefit they bring.90  Tocqueville like Montesquieu wants 
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less to obscure the infinite distance between vices and virtues than to underline that their 
mixture produces unintended effects.     
Tocqueville defends his departure from the traditional Catholic teaching of Pascal 
by arguing that the Church’s teaching on humility restrains the noble ambitions that lead 
to human greatness in democracy.  He affirms that man’s aspiration in this regime is 
irrevocably lowered by the competitiveness for limited resources compelling his soul to 
put all its efforts into mediocre undertakings.  His advocacy of pride in this context is 
based less on moral than on political considerations.  In fact, his position on pride is 
consistent with his advocacy for religion inasmuch as he argues that the great advantage 
of each in democracy is to compel man to think about the future.  For Tocqueville it is 
indisputable that great human achievements are possible only in a society in which a 
future-oriented outlook is cultivated.   “[F]ar from believing that one must recommend 
humility to our contemporaries, I should want one to strive to give them a vaster idea of 
themselves and of their species; humility is not healthy for them; what they lack most in 
my opinion, is pride.  I would willingly trade several of our small virtues for this vice.”91        
Sanford Kessler for whom Tocqueville’s religious teaching replicates Rousseau’s 
civil religion points to his promotion of pride as a virtue as an example of his lack of  
commitment to the traditional, revealed Christianity embraced by Pascal.  It is not 
difficult to see how Tocqueville’s modification of Christianity could be interpreted this 
way unless equal consideration is given to his ingrained aristocratic perspective as well as 
the complex intellectual influence that guides his analysis of democracy.  Toqueville was 
well aware of the danger that pride poses to human happiness and his own experience 
with it has a bittersweet quality that on the one hand, inspires in him the self-confidence 
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to accomplish great deeds that is the mark of his nobility, and on the other, vindicates for 
him Pascal’s warning about its peril.  In the first instance, Tocqueville demonstrates the 
general spirit of his caste for vast ambitions in a letter in which he outlines his project for 
the last great work he produced, L’Ancien régime et la révolution.  
I believe myself thus in a better state than I was when I wrote the 
Démocratie to treat well a great subject of political literature…I have the 
pride to believe that I have more than anyone the distinctive characteristic 
to bring to such a subject a great freedom of mind and to speak without 
passion and without reservations of the men and the things [of that era]…I 
don’t have any traditions, I don’t have any party, I don’t have any cause if 
it is not that of liberty and human dignity.92  
In the second instance Tocqueville reveals how pride causes him to suffer a great 
spiritual lassitude. 
I have finally returned home [to the Tocqueville chateau] since a 
few days.  I should be happy and tranquil.  I am agitated and worried.  
Why?  That is difficult enough to untangle myself.  Because after all I 
don’t have to complain of my fate.  I possess in the area of domestic 
happiness, I believe, all that is given to man to have in this world and as to 
external goods, I am scarcely more mistreated than my contemporaries. 
Nevertheless, I am habitually somber and troubled.  I attribute this tiring 
and sterile state of the soul sometime to one cause, sometime to another.  
But I think at bottom it is attached to one only that is profound and 
permanent, the discontent with myself.  You know there are two types of 
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prides, very distinct or rather the same pride has two faces, one sad and 
one cheerful.  There is a pride that pays itself with the delight of the 
advantages which it enjoys or believes to enjoy.  That is called, I think, 
presumption.  Since God wanted to send me the emptiness of a great dose 
of pride he should well have, at least, sent me the one that belongs to this 
first type.  But the one I possess is of an altogether contrary nature.  It is 
always anxious and discontented.  Not envious though, but melancholic 
and black.  It shows me at every turn all the faculties that I lack and their 
absence drives me to despair.93  
 Tocqueville is fully cognizant that he is stricken with the illness of the soul for 
which Pascal provides an excellent rationale. Throughout his correspondence he 
consistently complains to his friends about his black melancholia, which began to assail 
him soon after his encounter with the thinkers of the enlightenment who provoked his 
unshakable doubt and prevented him from enjoying the consolation of Pascal’s religion.   
Tocqueville’s awareness of the deprivation he suffers recalls Pascal’s perspective on the 
gift of grace.  In a letter in which he remembers his father who, unlike him, never strayed 
from the religious instruction he received from their Jansenist preceptor, Abbé Lesueur, 
he states:  “I saw in my father what I have until now seen only in him, the presence of 
religion entirely in the least actions of his life at every minute.  His life and death have 
been for me the great proof of the excellence of religion.  They filled me with an ardent 
desire to believe.  But, alas! Who is master to do it if God does not intervene?”94        
Tocqueville appears to mourn his lost of faith as much as he grieves the death of 
his father in this personal avowal to his friend Corcelle, a zealous Catholic convert.   
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Nevertheless, his affinity with Pascal on the subject of divine grace remains a personal 
struggle that never insinuates itself in his commentary except perhaps to intensify his 
exhortation that religion must occupy the preeminent place among the institutions of 
democracy by insisting that democracy cannot subsist without the moral precepts of 
Christianity.  France provides him empirical evidence that the philosophy of the 
enlightenment alone is not enough to combat the democratic restlessness caused by the 
yearning for a perfect and elusive equality that undermines liberty. Borrowing Pascal’s 
language allows Tocqueville to go beyond Montesquieu and Rousseau-- both of whom 
concede that religion is desirable to order political life-- to affirm that in democracy it is 
not only the sole foundation of stability amid perpetual agitation but also to show that it is 
the spring of human dignity.  Thus, Tocqueville’s democratic religion aims to promote 
liberty not only by teaching that moral conformity is necessary to political life but also by 
showing that Christianity alone provides man solace from the anxiety and sometimes the 
despair generated by the unreasonable hopes and desires equality nurtures.  
In the final analysis, Tocqueville’s religious doctrine must be assessed from the 
perspective that it is formulated to make reason and habits the means for recapturing the 
religious instinct that disappeared with aristocracy.  His teaching reflects his conviction 
that liberty would remain unattainable as long as the intractable climate of instable 
desires democracy fosters is joined to the irreligion that characterized the bourgeois 
monarchy of Louis-Philippe in France.  In such a political climate, he believes that the 
only way to bring men to religion is by an indirect route along which they are shown that 
prosperity is achieved by resisting fleeting passions for a great undertaking.  To this end, 
he urges political leaders to set a good example by putting in place a system of 
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meritocracy to replace that of favors so that progress is seen as the fulfillment of an 
ambition obtained by slow and painstaking effort.  His legacy then must be evaluated on 
the basis of his firm and enduring conviction that it is by appealing to men’s interest that 
one succeeds in bringing them through habit little by little to religion unbeknownst to 
them.  He expresses best the motive of his religious doctrine in the final chapter dedicated 
to this subject in the second part of volume two.  
I therefore do not doubt that in habituating citizens to think of the 
future in this world, one would bring them little by little and without their 
knowing it to religious beliefs.  Thus the means that permit men up to a 
certain point to do without religion is perhaps, after all, the only one 
remaining to us to lead the human race by a long detour back toward 




                                                 
NOTES 
 
1 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, trans. and ed., Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn 
Miller and Harold Samuel Stone, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pt. 5, 
bk. 25, chap. 2, 479.  
2 Whereas Rousseau points to the diversity of religions and their competing truths as 
valid reasons to doubt revelations and the Scriptures, Pascal argues that Christianity is the 
true religion because it is the only one which proclaims : “Vere tu es Deus absconditus.” 
God must be hidden for man to sense his corruption and to seek a remedy for it.  “Thus, it 
is not only just, but useful for us that God be hidden in part, and revealed in part, since it 
is equally dangerous for man to know God without knowing his misery, and to know his 
misery without knowing God.”  Pascal, Pensées, texte de l’édition Brunschvicg, édition 
précédé de la vie de Pascal par Mme Périer, sa soeur, intro. et notes Ch.-M. des Granges, 
(Paris: Editions Garnier-Frères, 1964), nos. 585 & 586, 225. 
3 Even though Tocqueville was for a brief period a minister of the Napoléon government, 
he considered Napoléon’s ambition the nearest threatening danger to France.  Louis 
Napoléon was first elected president on December 10, 1848 for one-term of four years 
according to the Constitution of June 1848.  Tocqueville was a member of the 
constitutional assembly and was therefore very familiar with the deliberations for each 
article of the Constitution.  Tocqueville learned during his tenure as minister of a plot 
formed in July 1849 by a combined enterprise of the President and the majority leaders of 
the National Assembly to alter the Constitution by force. From the beginning of his 
tenure as minister he made it his personal objective “to prevent the overthrow of the 
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Republic and especially to hinder the establishment of the bastard monarchy of Louis 
Napoléon.”  After learning about the plot he applied all his skill at preventing Napoléon 
from plunging into some dangerous enterprise by flattering his ambition to restrain him.  
Thus, he explicitly told Napoléon  “I will never serve you in overthrowing the republic; 
but I will gladly strive to assure you a great position in it, and I believe that all my friends 
will end by entering into my plan.  The Constitution can be revised; Article 45, which 
prohibits re-election, can be changed.  This is an object which we will gladly help you to 
attain.”  Tocqueville knew the chances for revision were doubtful, so he hinted that if 
Napoléon governed France peacefully, wisely and modestly, he might possibly be re-
elected at the end of his term in office, in spite of Article 45, by an almost unanimous 
vote.  Nevertheless, in March 1851 a committee was organized for the re-election of 
Louis Napoléon.  On December 2 of that year Napoléon made himself president for life 
by a coup d’état.  On December 2, 1852 he proclaimed himself emperor making himself 
the master of France.  Alexis de Tocqueville, The Recollections of Alexis de Tocqueville, 
ed., intro., J. P. Mayer, (London: The Harvill Press, 1948), 255 & 268.    
4 Letter to Francisque de Corcelle, December 28, 1854, in Oeuvres complètes, 
correspondance d’Alexis de Tocqueville et de Francisque de Corcelle, correspondance 
d’Alexis de Tocqueville et de Madame Swetchine, ed. J. P. Mayer, texte établi par Pierre 
Gibert, soumis pour contrôle et approbation à Claude Bressolette et André Jardin, (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1983), tome XV, 129.  (Hereinafter reference to this work will be shown as 
OC XV).  
5 Letter to Francisque de Corcelle, September 17, 1853, in ibid., 81-82. 
 
6 Letter to Francisque de Corcelle, May 13, 1852, in ibid., 55-56. 
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7 Letter to Francisque de Corcelle, September 17, 1853, in ibid., 81. 
 
8 The Rome affair is the culmination of a succession of events connected to the series of 
revolutions beginning in 1789 to establish democracy in France.  The revolution of 1789 
after having expulsed the pope from Rome ended by making him prisoner of the first 
Napoléon.  The revolution of 1830 provoked the uprising of the roman states allowing the 
French to take possession of Ancôme and make the reform of the temporal government of 
the pope a European affair.  The effect of the 1848 revolution was a little different at least 
for a time insofar as it was Pope Pius IX who appeared to take on his own initiative the 
direction of a liberal movement by effectuating social and political reforms in his states.  
He also pronounced himself against the domination and intervention of Austria in the 
roman peninsula to the point of appearing before his own troops as the guarantor of 
Italian independence.  Nevertheless, on April 29, 1848 following the February revolution 
that overthrew King Louis-Philippe of France, he published an encyclical declaring 
himself opposed to any intervention on his behalf against the war between the Piedmont 
and Austria.  In other words, he was retracting his previously favorable engagements to 
an independent and eventual unification of Italy. At the same time he revealed himself 
incontestably opposed to Italian independence and thus leaving Austria with a free hand 
to intervene in the peninsula.  The defeat of Austria by the king of Piedmont on Mars 23, 
1849, was followed by violent insurrections in Rome, which forced the pope to flee and 
to take refuge in the states of the king of Naples.  These series of events placed France in 
the doubtful position of finding a political solution to reconcile the temporal power of the 
pope with the demands of the republican revolutionaries for liberalization.   France faced 
 299
                                                                                                                                                 
the difficult choice of supporting the revolution against papal power or supporting this 
power against the revolution. 
Corcelle was assigned by his former classmate, General Louis Eugène Cavaignac, then 
military dictator of the second French republic, on November 24, 1848 to act as Envoy 
Extraordinary to Civita-Vecchia to assure the security and liberty of the pope and his 
momentary retreat to France.  Meanwhile, on November 26, Pius IX took refuge at Gaète 
after making a diverging maneuver to change the course of his ship to make believe he 
was leaving for France.  The pope uncertain of the outcome of the upcoming December 
elections in France and having greater confidence in Austria had decided to refuse the 
offer of exile proposed to him by the French government. 
The Roman affair took a different turn in 1849 after Louis-Napoléon was elected 
president of the republic on December 10, 1848.  Tocqueville assumed the responsibility 
of Foreign Minister on June 2, 1849.  French public opinion was not favorable to an 
intervention in Rome by the republican government of France, which aimed to overthrow 
the roman republic.  There were two determining factors for France’s intervention in the 
Rome affair in 1849:  1) the need to lend assistance to the head of the Catholic Church, to 
safeguard the rights of conscience of the overwhelming Catholic majority of the country; 
and 2) the impossibility of giving free reign to Austria to restore solely the pontifical 
government and the fear that if France did not take preemptive action in the interest of the 
church and its national greatness Austria would gain an unacceptable influence in Italy 
that could become the cause of a general European war.  The French government was 
very much divided on the subject of intervening in the Rome affair.  While some did not 
want Austria to act alone, others displayed strong sympathies for the roman republic.  
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But, upholding this republic would cause France to become isolated from the European 
nations which supported the Holy Father and would not hesitate to take arms against 
France to defend the pope.  In addition to the division in the French government and the 
clamor of French public opinion, there were also misunderstandings between the French 
army posted in Italy and its diplomatic representatives in that country that further 
complicated the situation. 
Such was the imbroglio Tocqueville inherited when he was handed his ministerial 
portfolio.  He quickly assigned his Friend Corcelle to act as Special Envoy of the republic 
to Rome.  For Tocqueville the situation was clear if complicated.  He inherited a situation 
not of his making whose utility he admitted was doubtful but he was prepared to take 
courageously all responsibilities for its outcome.   Homme politique  and ever 
conscientious of his ministerial responsibility, he had to assume a political posture whose 
implications he could not ignore in Paris or Rome.  He agreed that the pope should return 
to Rome and for this eventuality he was prepared to use all the means at his disposal, 
including the contingent of French troops already positioned in Italy.  But, he did not 
intend to do it at any price and especially not at the price of an absolutist restoration that 
would negate all previous liberal reforms, political as well as social.    
If Corcelle assumed his responsibility with as much a cool head as Tocqueville, he 
nonetheless was a product of the religious sentimentality that represents so well the 
romantic spirit of the nineteenth century.  The French church having lost its spiritual and 
cultural power and emptied of its resources, including its theological system of education, 
after the 1789 Revolution compensated for this lost in the nineteenth century by 
developing the practice of piety through various organized manifestations of faith, 
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including the construction of churches, processions, pilgrimages, etc.  Anything that 
appealed to the sentiments, all that caused emotions for the faith to be aroused was 
developed.  These conditions created throughout the nineteenth century a progressive 
attachment to the person of the pope and caused the transformation of the proud 
gallicanism that was the mark of French Catholicity into the ultramontism that so well 
expressed this need to attach oneself to the tangible manifestations of the faith of the 
church and to Rome.  Corcelle belongs to those who seduced by the personality of Pius 
IX reacted to him emotionally.  He found himself engaged in a politico-diplomatic 
imbroglio that brought him back progressively to a forgotten or insufficiently enlightened 
faith.  His reactions and expressions in his correspondence with Tocqueville are filled 
with effusive comments about his meetings with the pope.  Tocqueville on more than one 
occasion shows his impatience both on the personal as well as the political level with 
Corcelle’s sentimentality.  While Tocqueville never ceased to see the clearly dishonest 
political game of the roman side of the affair, Corcelle could only see “the pontifical 
government” and all the confusion this expression incorporates regarding the temporal 
power, the political and the spiritual power.  The tension between the two friends reached 
its nadir on October 2 when an exasperated Corcelle tended to Tocqueville his request for 
an immediate resignation.  Ibid., 11-47 passim.            
9 Alexis de Tocqueville, Letter from Arthur de Gobineau to Alexis de Tocqueville, 
October 16, 1843, in  Oeuvres complètes, correspondance d’Alexis de Tocqueville et 
d’Arthur de Gobineau, édition définitive publiée sous la direction de J. P. Mayer, texte 
établi et annoté par M. Degros, introduction par Jean-Jacques Chevalier, avertissement de 
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J. P. Mayer, (Paris: Gallimard, 1959) tome IX, 64.  (Hereafter reference to this work will 
be shown as OC IX). 
10 Tocqueville, Recollections, 106. 
 
11 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality 
Among Men” in The First and Second Discourses, ed. Roger D. Masters, trans. Roger D. 
and Judith R. Masters, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1964), 103. 
12 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, trans. & intro. Maurice Cranston, (New 
York: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1968), bk. 4, chap. 8, 182.  
13 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile or On Education, intro., trans. & notes Allan Bloom, 
(New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1979), bk. 4, 295. 
14 Letter to Arthur de Gobineau, October 2, 1843, in OC IX, 58.  See also Alexis de 
Tocqueville, “The European Revolution” & Correspondence with Gobineau, intro., ed., 
& trans. John Lukacs, (Connecticut: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1959), 206. 
15 Tocqueville has a very negative view of Islam, the only other monotheistic religion that 
offered itself for comparison with respect to its compatibility with democracy since there 
was no Jewish state in the nineteenth century.  He criticizes Mohammed in Democracy in 
America because he mixes indiscriminately human and divine laws, an approach that is 
antithetical to his advocacy of keeping these two things separate. Alexis de Tocqueville, 
Democracy in America, trans., ed., & intro., Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop, 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press), 2000, vol. 2, pt. 2, chap. 5, 419.  See also  
Oeuvres II, De la démocratie en Amérique, édition publiée sous la direction d’André 
Jardin avec, pour ce volume, la collaboration de Jean-Claude Lamberti et James T. 
Schleifer, (Paris: Gallimard, 1992), vol. 2, pt. 2, chap. 5, 533-534. (Hereinafter reference 
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to this work will be shown as DA, vol., pt., chap. with the page number of the English 
translation appearing first and that of the French text second and the two separated by a 
slash, e.g., DA, II, 2, 5, 419/533-534).  
Tocqueville read the 1783 Savary translation of the Q’uran in March 1838.  This 
translation of the Arabic text contained notes and an abbreviated introduction of the 
Prophet Mohammed’s life taken from the works of the most esteemed Arabic scholars.  
He took notes on the first eighteen chapters, which are published in the Pléiade édition of 
the Oeuvres complètes, tome III, p. 134-162.   Oeuvres II, De la démocratie en Amérique, 
II, 1, 5, 534 note 1 on p. 1094. 
Furthermore, we glimpse in his private correspondence other concerns he raises about 
Islam’s inherent flaws, which for him makes it incompatible with democracy.  Writing to 
Corcelle on March 19, 1838 he states that the “Q’uran is a clever transaction between 
spiritualism and materialism, the angel and the brute.”  OC XV, 98.  Despite his overall 
condemnation of Islam, this comment reflects Tocqueville’s own attempt to find a 
balance between these two tendencies, which equality fosters.  It is noteworthy that this 
letter is written while he is engaged in the project of formulating his religious doctrine in 
the second  volume of Democracy in America. 
Likewise, writing to Kergolay on May 23, 1941 from Algeria he provides an assessment 
of the challenge facing France’s colonial project in that country by alluding to Islam’s 
tendency to foster fanaticism.  “Colonialism will be easy but its result always precarious.  
Those who had hoped for a genuine peace with Abd el-Kader are mistaken.  He cannot 
do it, if he wanted for two reasons:  I was telling you that the only common sentiment 
that connects the tribes was fanaticism.  It is only by exploiting fanaticism that he can be 
 304
                                                                                                                                                 
strong, and he can exploit it only through war.”  Alexis de Tocqueville, Oeuvres 
complètes, correpondance d’Alexis de Tocqueville et de Louis de Kergolay, ed. J. P. 
Mayer, texte établi par André Jardin, intro. & notes Jean-Alain Lesourd, (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1977), tome XIII, 86.  (hereafter reference to this work will be shown as OC 
XIII). 
Lastly, it is worth reproducing here a passage already quoted elsewhere in this study, 
which unmistakably captures Tocqueville’s negative view of Islam.  In the course of his 
interminable arguments with Gobineau about the superiority of Christianity he states the 
following in a letter, October 22, 1843.  “I have often studied the Q’uran when concerned 
with our relations with the Moslem populations of Algiers and the Orient.  I must say that 
I emerged convinced that there are in the entire world few religions with such morbid 
consequences as that of Mohammed.  To me it is the primary cause of the now visible 
decadence of the Islamic world, and though it may be less absurd than the polytheism of 
the ancients, its political and social tendencies being in my view, more to be feared, I 
regard it relative to paganism itself more as a setback than a progress.” OC IX, 69.  See 
also  “The European Revolution” & Correspondence with Gobineau, 212    
16 Letter to Francisque de Corcelle, September 3, 1856, in OC XV, 175. 
 
17 The Social Contract, bk. 4, chap. 8, 181. 
 
18 Tocqueville, Recollections, 120. 
 
19 DA, II, 2, 15, 521/660.  
20 In 1762 Rousseau’s Emile was condemned by the parliament of Paris forcing him to 
flee from France.  Subsequently, he had to flee Geneva where he was wanted.  
Afterwards, he was expelled from the Canton of Berne.  From that time, Rousseau-- the 
 305
                                                                                                                                                 
victim of political and religious intolerance-- was harried from place to place in search of 
a refuge.  See Maurice Cranston’s Introduction to The Social Contract, 24-25.   
21 Rousseau praises Mohammed’s religion for giving unity to his political system.  Ibid., 
bk. 4, chap. 8, 179.   The reader will recall that Tocqueville castigates Mohammed’s 
religion precisely for this reason.   See note 15 above. 
22 Letter to Arthur de Gobineau, October 2, 1843, in OC IX, 57-58. See also  “The 
European Revolution” & Correspondence with Gobineau, 205-206. 
23 Letter to Francisque de Corcelle, August 28, 1856, in OC XV, 172. 
 
24 Rousseau prefaces the “Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar” by telling the reader 
that the Vicar’s interlocutor is a young expatriate in an Italian city who was born a 
Calvinist.  He concludes the Savoyard Vicar’s reflections on religious opinions with the 
advice he gives to the young man.   “Go back to your country, return to the religion of 
your fathers, follow it in the sincerity of your heart, and never leave it again.  It is very 
simple and very holy.  I believe that of all the religions on earth it is the one which has 
the purest morality and which is most satisfactory to reason.”  This apparent concession 
does not in any way suggest that Rousseau is better disposed toward Calvinism than he is 
toward other Christian sects.  The doctrine of predestination, one of the fundamental 
dogmas of Calvinism, is certainly one that he finds repugnant to reason.  Rousseau 
emphatically rejects the idea that some men are born with grace and others are not. 
Rousseau, Emile, bk. 4, 260, 301 & 311. 
Tocqueville as a general principle rejects the idea of predestination, particularly when it 
has no other purpose than to explain materialist doctrines and promote them.  For him, 
predestination belongs to the set of ideas most dangerous to democratic times because it 
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reinforces the democratic instinct to embrace materialistic theories.  Thus, whereas 
Rousseau rejects predestination as a spiritual doctrine, Tocqueville seems to reprove it 
particularly when it is aligned with materialism.  He states his position on the distinction 
he makes between predestination as a spiritual concept and as a materialist concept in his 
admonishment of Gobineau whose essay on the inequality of the races he finds truly 
offensive.  “Your doctrine in fact is rather a sort of fatalism, of predestination if you will; 
different at any rate from that of St. Augustine, the Jansenists and the Calvinists (it is the 
last ones who resemble you the most by the absolutism of the doctrine) since you tie very 
closely together predestination and matter.  You continually speak about races 
regenerating or degenerating, losing or acquiring through an infusion of new blood social 
capacities which they have not previously had- I think these are your own words.  This 
kind of predestination it seems to me, I will admit, is a close cousin of the purest 
materialism and be sure that if the crowd, which always follows in its reasoning the most 
beaten tracks would admit your doctrine this would lead it straight from races to 
individuals and from social capacities to all sorts of potentialities.  In any case, whether 
fatality is introduced directly in the material order of things, or whether God willed to 
make different human species so that He imposed special obligations on certain men, as a 
result of the race to which they belong, not to have certain sentiments, certain thoughts, 
certain habits, certain qualities that they know without being able to acquire them, this 
matters little to my concern, which is that of the practical consequences of these different 
philosophical doctrines.  The two theories have the consequence of putting a great 
limitation, if not a complete abolition, on human liberty.  Thus, I confess to you that after 
having read your book I remain as before opposed in the extreme to these doctrines.  I 
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believe them to be very probably false and very certainly very pernicious.”  Letter, 
November 17, 1853, in OC IX, 202.       
25 Ibid., bk. 4, 308. 
 
26 The Social Contract, bk. 4, chap. 8, 181. 
 
27 Ibid., bk. 4, chap. 8,  182.  
 
28 Rousseau, Emile, bk. 4, 235 note. 
 
29 The Social Contract, bk. 2, chap. 6, 83. 
 
30 Rousseau, Emile, bk. 4, 312-313 note. 
 
31 DA, II, 1, 5, 418/531. 
 
32 The Social Contract, bk. 4, chap. 8, 186. 
 
33 DA, II, 1, 5, 418/532. 
 
34 The Social Contract, bk. 3, chap. 4, 114. 
 
35 Ibid., bk. 4, chap. 8, 182. 
 
36 DA, II, 2, 15, 520/660. 
 
37 Rousseau, Emile,  bk. 4, 300. 
 
38 DA, II, 1, 5, 423/538. 
  
39 DA, II, 1, 17, 458/583-584. 
 
40 Tocqueville targets Adolphe Thiers whose Histoire de La révolution he condemns for 
its inversion of the limits of good and evil.  In a letter to Pierre-Paul Royer-Collard, 
December 6, 1836, Tocqueville describes the negative effect his reading of the book had 
on him.  “L’Histoire de la révolution caused me a singular horror and the most violent 
antipathy for its author.”  Alexis de Tocqueville, Oeuvres complètes, correspondance 
d’Alexis de Tocqueville et de Pierre-Paul Royer-Collard: correspondance d’Alexis de 
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Tocqueville et de Jean-Jacques Ampère, ed. J. P. Mayer, texte établi, annoté et préfacé 
par André Jardin, (Paris: Gallimard, 1970), tome XI, 29-30.  
Tocqueville addresses his distaste for the general theories that is the preferred system of 
those he considers mediocre historians in his Recollections.   “I have come across men of 
letters, who have written history without taking part in public affairs, and politicians, who 
have only concerned themselves with producing events without thinking of describing 
them.  I have observed that the first are always inclined to find general causes, whereas 
the others, living in the midst of disconnected daily facts, are prone to imagine that 
everything is attributable to particular incidents, and that the wires which they pull are the 
same that move the world.  It is to be presumed that both are equally deceived. 
For my part, I detest these absolute systems, which represent all the events of history as 
depending upon great first causes linked by the chain of fatality, and which, as it were, 
suppress men from the history of the human race.  They seem narrow, to my mind, under 
the pretense of broadness, and false beneath their air of mathematical exactness.  I believe 
(pace the writers who have invented these sublime theories in order to feed their vanity 
and facilitate their work) that many important historical facts can only be explained by 
accidental circumstances, and that many others remain totally inexplicable.  Moreover, 
chance, or rather that tangle of secondary causes which we call chance, for want of the 
knowledge how to unravel it, plays a great part in all that happens on the world’s stage; 
although I firmly believe that chance does nothing that has not been prepared beforehand.  
Antecedent facts, the nature of institutions, the cast of minds and the state of morals are 
the materials of which are composed those impromptus which astonish and alarm us. 
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The Revolution of February [1848], in common with all other great events of this class, 
sprang from general causes, impregnated, if I am permitted the expression, by accidents; 
and it would be as superficial a judgment to ascribe it necessarily to the former or 
exclusively to the latter.”  Alexis de Tocqueville, The Recollections of Alexis de 
Tocqueville, trans., Alexander Teixeira de Mattos, ed. & intro. J. P. Mayer, (London: The 
Harvill Press, 1948) 67-68.  
41 Tocqueville concludes Democracy in America the way he began by attributing to 
Providence the movement of the world toward democracy.  He states in his introduction 
that “[t]he gradual development of equality of conditions is therefore a providential fact, 
and it has the principal characteristics of one: it is universal, it is enduring, each day it 
escapes human power…”   DA, 6/7  
Likewise, he affirms at the end of his analysis of democracy that “[i]t is natural to believe 
that what most satisfies the regard of this creator and preserver of men is not the singular 
prosperity of some, but the greatest well-being of all… equality is perhaps less elevated; 
but it is more just, and its justice makes for its greatness and its beauty.” DA, II, 4, 8, 
674-675/852.   
42 DA, II, 1, 17, 463/589. 
 
43 Pensées, no. 72, 88-91. 
 
44 DA, II, 1, 17, 462/588-589. 
 
45 Tocqueville “admired Lamartine as the greatest French poet of their time” and 
according to his biographer, André Jardin, borrowed from his preface of Jocelyn the idea 
that the destiny of man would become the source of democratic poetry.   André Jardin, 
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Tocqueville, A Biography, trans. Lydia Davis & Robert Hemenway, (New York: Farrar, 
Strauss & Giroux, 1988), 258-259.  
Nevertheless, if Tocqueville admired the poet in Lamartine he did not appreciate his 
leftist politics in which he revealed himself as the personification of the human depravity 
Pascal condemns.  Lamartine was his colleague in the Chamber of Deputies and 
Tocqueville paints a scathing portrait of his political character in his Recollections.  
“Lamartine was the last man to sacrifice himself in this way [allowing himself to be 
gloriously defeated while saving his country].  I do not know that I have ever, in this 
world of selfishness and ambition in which I lived, met a mind so void of any thought of 
public welfare as his.  I have seen a crowd of men disturbing the country in order to raise 
themselves: that is an everyday perversity; but he is the only one who seemed to me 
always ready to turn the world upside down in order to divert himself.  Neither have I 
ever known a mind less sincere, nor one that had a more thorough contempt for the truth.  
When I say he despised it, I am wrong: he did not honour it enough to heed it in any way 
whatever.  When speaking or writing, he spoke the truth or lied, without caring which he 
did, occupied only with the effect he wished to produce at the moment.  The 
Recollections of Alexis de Tocqueville, 125-126.  
46 See letter to Corcelle, September 13, 1844, in OC XV, 192. 
 
47 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Julie ou La Nouvelle Héloise, (Paris: Editions Garnier Freres, 
1952) tome II, 6ème partie, 342. 
48 Ibid., 340. 
 
49 Ibid, 361. 
 
50 Ibid., 345. 
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51 One finds no less than sixty-three references to Rousseau in Chateaubriand’s Essai sur 
les révolutions and Génie du Christianisme, which taken on the whole clearly show his 
ambivalent feelings toward the hero of his youth as shown by the following examples.   
In the Introduction to the first part of the Essai, he admits that his first writings bear 
witness that he nourished himself on the works of Rousseau inasmuch as he reproduced 
the flaws of his model.  In chapter III he states: “[d]espite the admiration that I professed 
then for J. J. Rousseau, I fought vigorously the system of his Social Contract, and the 
reader will see shortly that this brought me to repudiate the republics in favor of the 
constitutional monarchy.”  
 In Chapter XXIV, he reproaches Rousseau the pride that causes him to treat with 
familiarity the Prussian king, Frederic, in his famous letter, October 30, 1762, to this 
king.  Further in the same chapter, he adds a long footnote in which he provides a 
scathing analysis of the works as well as the character of Rousseau.  “I re-read the works 
of Rousseau, in order to see if they would justify, in the tribunal of my mature reason and 
my developed taste, the enthusiasm with which he inspired me in my youth.  I did not 
find again the sublime in the Emile… One senses in the Emile more the ill humor of the 
misanthrope than the austerity of sage:  society is judged by a wounded amour-propre… 
Rousseau is not definitively above other writers than only in about sixty letters of La 
Nouvelle Eloise, in his Reveries and in his Confessions. … Rousseau is more poetic in 
his depictions than in his affections; his inspiration comes more from the senses than 
from the soul; he has little of the divine flame of Fénélon; he expresses deep feelings, 
rarely lofty sentiments:  his genius is of a great beauty, but it is more attached to earth 
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than heaven… I don’t reproach myself my enthusiasm for the works of Rousseau; I keep 
in part my first admiration, and I know now on what it is founded.  But if I had to admire 
the writer, how could I have excused the man?  How was I not revolted by the 
Confessions on the basis of the facts? Rousseau believed he could dispose of the 
reputation of his benefactress!  Rousseau did not fear to make immortal the dishonor of 
Madame de Warrens...”  
 In part II, chapter XXVI of the Essai,  Chateaubriand exclaims: “ [b]ut what force of 
genius in Rousseau, to have at the same time predict the revolution and its crimes [in the 
Emile]? and  what unbelievable circumstance, that these same writings  served to bring 
them to fruition.”   
He returns to the subject of Rousseau’s influence on the revolution in chapter XLIII.  “As 
for the Social Contract, since a part of it is found in the Emile, we know that it is after all 
an extract of a greater work that he throws out and concludes nothing; I believe that in its 
actual state of imperfection, it has done little good and much evil.”  
In part II, book III, chapter VIII of the Génie du Christianisme, Chateaubriand defends 
the passion to which Christianity gives rise and which has been qualified as fanaticism by 
adducing the comparative advantage Rousseau gives to fanaticism over irreligion in the 
Emile.  In part III, book IV, chapter V, he asserts: “Rousseau is one of the writers of the 
eighteen century whose style has the most charm, because this man, bizarre by intention, 
had at least created for himself a shadow of religion.  He had faith in something that was 
not Christ, but which nevertheless was the Scriptures; this phantom of Christianity, as 
such, has sometimes given much grace to his genius.  He who raised himself with such 
strength against the sophists, would he not have done better to abandon himself to the 
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tenderness of his soul, than to lose himself, like them, in systems, which he has done 
nothing but rejuvenate old errors.”  Francois Auguste-Renéde Chateaubriand, Vicomte, 
Essai sur les révolutions. Génie du Christianisme, texte établi, présenté et annoté par 
Maurice Regard, Bibliothèque de La Pléiade, (Paris : Editions Gallimard, 1978), 42, 59, 
126-127, 366, 400, 707 & 869.   
52 In section VIII of the defense of the Génie du Christianisme, which previously 
included René, Chateaubriand provides the following clarification about his intention.  
“Everything that an impartial critic, who wants to enter into the spirit of the work, had the 
right to demand from the author, is that the episodes of this work would have the visible 
effect of making religion loved and its utility shown.  Now, the necessity of the cloisters 
for certain misfortunes of life and those, even which are the greatest, that the power of a 
religion alone can close the wounds that all the balms of the earth would not know how to 
heal, are they not invincibly proven in the story of René.  The author fights besides the 
particular failings of the young people of the century, the failing that leads directly to 
suicide.  It is J.- J. Rousseau who introduced the first among us these reveries so 
disastrous and so reprehensable.  In isolating himself from men, in abandoning himself to 
his dreams, he has led a crowd of young people to believe that it is beautiful to throw 
oneself in the wave of life.  The romance of Werther has developed since the germ of this 
poison.  The author of the Génie du Christianisme, feeling obliged to enter in the context 
of his apology some pictures for the imagination, has wanted to denounce this kind of 
new vice, and paint the fatal consequences of an exaggerated love of solitude.”  Ibid, 
1102-1103. 
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53 Francois Auguste-René de Chateaubriand, Vicomte,  Atala, René, Le dernier 
abencerage, intro. Emile Faguet, (Paris: Nelson, Editeurs, 1939), 145. 
54 Alphonse Marie Louis de Lamartine, Marquis, Jocelyn in Oeuvres poètiques 
complètes, texte établi, annoté et présenté par Marius-Francois Guyard, Bibliothèque de 
La Pléiade, (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1963), 3ème époque, September 20, 1793, 623.  
55 Ibid., 9ème époque, November 9, 1800, 738. 
 
56 Ibid., 2ème époque, February 28, 1793. 
 
57 Pascal explains the origin of this conflict in a letter written October 17, 1651to his 
sister Madame Périer and her husband.  In this letter, he meditates on the consolation 
provided by Christianity to cope with the death of someone dear, in this case that of their 
father.  “God created man with two loves, one for God, the other for oneself; but with this 
law, that love for God would be infinite, that is, without no other end than God himself, 
and that the love for oneself would be finite and relating to God.  Man in this state not 
only loved himself without sin, but he could not have loved himself except without sin.  
Since then, sin having arrived, man has lost the first of these loves; and love for oneself 
having remained alone in this great soul capable of an infinite love, this amour-propre 
extended itself and spilled over in the emptiness that love of God left; and thus it has 
loved itself alone, and everything for itself, that is, infinitely.  There is the origin of 
amour-propre.  It was natural to Adam, and just in his innocence; but it became both 
criminal and immoderate, following his sin.  There is the source of this love, and the 
cause of its defectiveness and of its excess…The horror of death was natural to Adam 
innocent, because his life being very agreeable to God, it must have been agreeable to 
man: and death was horrible, when it ended a life in conformity with the will of God.  
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Since then, man having sinned, his life has become corrupted, his body and his soul 
enemies one of the other, and both of God.  This horrible change having infected a life so 
saintly, the love of life remained nonetheless: and the horror of death having remained 
the same, what was just in Adam is unjust and criminal in us.  There is the origin of the 
horror of death, and the cause of its defectiveness.  Let us enlighten then the error of 
nature by the light of faith.”  Blaise Pascal, Oeuvres complètes, texte établi et annoté par 
Jacques Chevalier, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, (Paris: Gallimard, 1954), 496-497.       
58 Pensées, nos. 458 & 461, 191-192. 
 
59 Ibid., see no. 485, 197. 
 
60 Pascal wrote these series of letters, nineteen altogether followed by four legal briefs 
addressed to the ecclesiastical judges and members of Parliament, to defend the Jansenist 
position against that of the Jesuit on the theological question of grace, a subject he 
abandoned after the third letter to focus instead directly on challenging his opponents on 
questions of morality and most importantly that of responsibility.  The seventeenth 
century Jansenist-Jesuit quarrel has its origin in Pelagius’ denial of the necessity of grace, 
which was refuted by Saint Augustin causing the Pelagians to be condemned by Rome in 
418, 529 and many times later, notably at the Council of Trent.  Pelagius’ heresy 
consisted in the following: his belief in  personal responsibility, in human ability to avoid 
sin and evil by free choice and assertion that a Christian is defined by his moral standards 
and not by baptism.  His doctrine appeared dangerous to the Church due to its claim that 
the holiness of the Church depends on the Christian virtues of its members.  The Church 
feared that such a claim would leave it incapable of fulfilling its mission to spread 
Christianity around the world.   
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The Jansenists who considered themselves the heirs of Saint Augustine found themselves 
in the heretical position of the Pelagians of the early Christian era whose doctrine was 
revived in seventeenth century France by the Jesuit followers of Luis de Molina who 
published in 1588 a semi-Pelagian doctrine on grace titled Concordia liberi arbitrii cum 
gratiae donis etc.  On May 31, 1653 Pope Innocent X issued the bull Cum Occasione 
condemning five propositions attributed to Cornelius Jansenius in his magnum opus titled 
Augustinus, a long theological treatise derived from Augustine’s theology and doctrine of 
predestination .   Jansenius’ treatise is divided into three volumes: the first deals with the 
Pelagian heresy; the second deals with the grace given to the first couple in Paradise and 
the state of fallen nature; and the third with the “grace of Christ the Savior.”  The 
seventeenth century quarrel in which Pascal took part focused on whether man can be in 
a state of grace and free at the same time.  Jansenism asserts that grace works infallibly 
within God’s purpose and therefore man cannot be both free and in a state of grace.  In 
effect, Jansenism puts in peril human liberty.  Pascal, Oeuvres complètes, 659-661 & 
905. 
According to Leszek Kolakowski, the condemnation of Jansenius’ doctrine by the Church 
in effect constituted an implicit refutation of Augustine’s teaching, “its own greatest 
theological authority.”  In fact, Kolakowski goes on to argue that the ascendance of Jesuit 
doctrine in seventeenth century France ushered the de-Augustination of the Roman 
Catholic Church in that country.  This movement was aimed at finding a middle ground 
for the Church to adjust to the new emerging civilization brought about by Cartesianism.  
The upper classes of French society were no longer disposed to submit to the discipline 
and deadly seriousness of the Augustinian doctrine of predestination, which essentially 
 317
                                                                                                                                                 
denies the power of human liberty and teaches that the only path to salvation is a life of 
penance.  It was a time in which amour-propre and curiosity flourished and the educated 
classes asserted their freedom of inquiry, all warnings and censures notwithstanding.  The 
upper classes and the royal court refused to subject themselves to the “moral stringency 
and inflexibility” of the Augustinian Jansenists who proclaimed “that curiosity is a 
dreadful sin, that theatre is a diabolic contrivance, that flirting with one’s neighbor’s wife 
is irrevocably a straight path to eternal fire, and that one ought to give one’s belongings, 
apart from the bare necessities, to the poor.”   
The Jesuits recognized that Augustinian orthodoxy was no longer suited to the times and 
that the Church risked losing its following among the upper classes if it continued to 
impose its strict standards.  Together they constituted an odd mix of “laxists” as well as 
rigid moralists and confessors-- a fact recognized by Pascal in the fifth Lettre Provincial-
-  who produced a variety of manuals to be used in different social circumstances to 
attract and retain a following.  Kolakowski maintains that their followers were not 
atheists or libertines but rather the nobility.  They were by strict Christian standards 
people of questionable morals who nonetheless wanted to believe that there must be a 
less strenuous and less exhausting method of eternal salvation than the Augustinian 
Jansenists would suggest.  Hence, the “easy devotion” the Jesuits implemented “was a 
way to keep them [the nobility] in the Church and under the Church’s partial control 
(especially in matters concerning the education of the young) and ultimately to lead them 
to God, who is really merciful-- that is to say lenient-- and understands human weakness.  
The Jesuits in a sense believed in the power of grace more than the Augustinians did: to 
be sure it is up to us and our free will to make grace efficient, but it is not a very 
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laborious task precisely because God is so lavish in distributing his gifts, and nobody is 
left helpless by him, whereas in Augustinian doctrine he distributes his grace sparingly 
and according to quite incomprehensible rules.”  
Kolakowski likens the reactionary position of the mid-seventeenth century Jansenists, 
who considered themselves the faithful carriers of the genuine Christian tradition, to that 
articulated by contemporary fundamentalist Christians.  Unlike the more Christian 
humanism of the Jesuits whose belief in free will suited the natural theoretical disposition 
of the educated classes, the Jansenist doctrine of predestination appealed more to those 
whose existence was confined within the narrow limits of a lifelong, monotonous, 
unchanging toil, like the existence of medieval peasants and artisans.”  Leszek 
Kolakowski, God Owes Us Nothing, A Brief Remark on Pascal’s Religion and on the 
Spirit of Jansenism, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 4-59 passim.     
61 Pascal exposes in the fifth Lettres Provinciales that the Jesuit-Molinist doctrine on 
grace, which Augustinian-Jansenism condemned as unorthodox, is driven by mundane 
considerations that have fatal consequences for morality.  “Know that their object is not 
to corrupt mores: it is not their intention.  But they also do not have for their unique goal 
to reform them: that would be a bad politic.  Here is what their thought reveals.  They 
have enough good opinion of themselves to believe it is useful and somewhat necessary 
to the good of religion that their credit extends itself everywhere, and that they rule all the 
consciences.  And because the biblical and stern maxims are proper for governing some 
types of persons, they use these in occasion where they are favorable to them.  But since 
these same maxims do not harmonize with the intention of most people, they omit them 
in the case of these, in order to have something to satisfy everybody.  It is for this reason 
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that having to deal with person of all sorts of conditions and of such different nations, it is 
necessary that they have the assorted casuists for all this diversity.  From this principle 
you judge easily that if they had only lax casuists, they would ruin their principal scheme, 
which is to embrace everybody, since those who are truly pious look for a stricter 
spiritual adviser.  But as there are not many of this sort, they do not need many strict 
advisers to guide them.  They have a few for a few; while the crowd of the lax casuists 
offer themselves to the crowd of those who are looking for laxity.  It is by this obliging 
and accommodating conduct, as Father Petau calls it, that they extend their arms to 
everybody: for, if someone presents himself to them who is well resolved to return ill-
gotten goods, do not fear that they will deter him from doing it; they will praise and 
confirm, on the contrary, such a holy resolution: but comes another who wants to have 
absolution without making restitution, the thing will be very difficult, if they do not 
furnish the means by which they will make themselves the guarantors.  That way they 
preserve all their friends, and defend themselves against their enemies; for, if one 
reproaches them their extreme laxity, they produce forthwith to the public their strict 
advisors, with some books they have written about the severity of the law of Christianity; 
and the simple-minded, and those who do not go to the depth of things, are happy with 
these proofs.  Thus, they have proofs for all sorts of people, and answer so well according 
to what is asked of them, that when they find themselves in the countries where a 
crucified God passes for folly, they abolish the scandal of the cross, and preach only 
Jesus Christ glorious, and not Jesus Christ suffering:  as they have done in India and in 
China, where they have permitted even idolatry to Christians, by this subtle invention, of 
making them hide under their clothes an image of Jesus Christ, to which they teach them 
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to report mentally the public adorations they make to the idol Chacim-coan and to their 
Keum-facum, as Gravina the Dominican reproaches them…Here is the manner in which 
they have scattered themselves all over the world thanks to the doctrine of the probable 
opinions, which is the source and the foundation of all this dissoluteness.  That is what 
you must learn from them.  For they do not hide it from anyone, not even all what you 
have just heard, with only this difference that they cover their human and political 
prudence with the pretext of a divine and Christian prudence; as if faith, and the tradition 
that maintains it, was not always one and invariable in all the ages and in all places; as if 
it were for the rule to bend to accommodate the subject who must conform to it; and as if 
the souls had only to corrupt the law of the Lord  to purify themselves of their stains; 
instead that the law of the Lord, which is without stain and all holy, must be the one 
which converts the souls, and conform them to its salutary instructions.  Go then, I beg 
you to see these good fathers, and I am certain that you will easily see, in the laxity of 
their morality, the cause of their doctrine on grace…”  Pascal, Oeuvres complètes, 704-
706.   
62 In this work Pascal examines the controversy over predestination that was vigorously 
debated among Calvinists, Molinists and Jansenists in mid-seventeenth century France.  
The three parties disputed among themselves whether man achieves salvation solely by 
the will of God or whether he plays an active role in this process.  The Calvinists 
maintained that since God created man with the intent to save some and damn others then 
man has nothing to do with his salvation, which depends entirely on the will of God.  The 
Molinists responded to this abominable opinion by taking the totally contrary position, 
which is that God conditionally wants to save all men and His will to do so is made 
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evident by the incarnation of  Jesus Christ to redeem them.  For the Molinists then the 
will of man and not that of God plays an active role in his salvation.  Pascal sided with 
the Jansenists who maintained that both these opinions are erroneous and contrary to 
Catholic theology, which is founded on Saint Augustine’s doctrine on grace.  His Ecrits 
Sur La Grace outline his position, which he presents as a middle point between the two 
extremes of Calvinism and Molinism.  He condemns their heresy, which he refutes with 
the following arguments.    
According to the disciples of Saint Augustine there are two states of human nature: the 
first nature is the one created in Adam, which coming from the hand of God was pure, 
without stain, just and upright; the other is the state in which it has been reduced by sin 
and the rebellion of the first man.  This second nature is soiled with sin, abominable and 
detestable in the eyes of God.  In the first case where man was in a state of innocence 
God in his justice showed a general and conditional will to save all men as long  as they 
wanted it by their free will aided by the sufficient grace He gave them for their salvation.  
But since Adam by his free will misused this grace-- his rebellion against God stemming 
from a movement of his will and without any impulsion from God-- he corrupted the 
entire human race, which shares with him God’s anger.  Nevertheless, the disciples of 
Saint Augustine believe that God separated the human race into one party He wanted to 
save by an absolute will founded on His mercy while leaving the other in the damnation 
where it was and where He could have left all men justifiably since all equally participate 
in the original sin and are entirely worthy of damnation.  Thus, God sent Jesus Christ to 
save absolutely and by very effective means those he had chosen and predestined from 
the whole mass who are the only ones he wanted absolutely to merit salvation after His 
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death.  God did not show a similar will for the salvation of the others who He did not 
deliver from the universal and just damnation in which He left them.  Nevertheless, a few 
of those who are not predestined are still called to participate in the good reserved for the 
selected few and thus to participate in the Redemption of Jesus Christ.  It is up to these 
people to persevere and they could do so if they wanted but being exempt from the 
number of those selected God does not give them the effective grace without which they 
never want to persevere.  Consequently, there are three sort of men: those who never 
come to faith; the others who come to it and who not persevering die in mortal sin; and 
the last who come to faith and persevere in it in charity until death.  Jesus never had an 
absolute will that the first receive any grace by His death since they have not in effect 
received any.  He wanted to redeem the second and gave them the grace that could have 
led them to salvation if they will to use it, but He did not want to give them that particular 
grace of perseverence without which one never uses well the grace.  But for the last ones, 
Jesus Christ wanted absolutely their salvation and led them to it by certain and infallible 
means.   Therefore, the disciples of Saint Augustine maintain that all men are obliged to 
believe with a belief mixed with fear.  This belief should keep them from holding with 
certitude that they belong to this small number of the elected that Jesus Christ wants to 
save.  It should also keep them from ever judging that any of the men who live in this 
world, no matter how wicked and impious, are not of the number of the predestined,  for 
as long as they have a moment of life it should be left to the impenetrable secret of  God 
the discernment of the elected from that of the damned.  This then obliges all men to do 
for the wicked and impious that which can contribute to their salvation.  In sum, the 
opinions of the disciples of Saint Augustine show that God has an absolute will to save 
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those who are saved and a conditional will and by prediction to condemn the damned; 
and that salvation comes from the will of God and damnation from the will of men. Ibid., 
951-954.  
63 Pascal aims to combat the free-thinking of his time with an apology for Christianity 
that frames a path to salvation for man by appealing to the interest he has in persevering 
in faith.  He argues in the Pensées that since no one knows for sure whether the soul is 
mortal or immortal it is in man’s interest to bet on the existence of the Christian God to 
overcome the misery of the human condition.  If the soul is immortal and one has lived 
the Christian way he will have the satisfaction of finding out that he was right and if not 
he will not be disappointed since in that case there is no experience beyond death.  
Therefore, Pascal proposes that it is rational for man to bet on the existence of God 
because if he is right he wins and if he is wrong he loses nothing.  Alternatively, the 
atheist who rejects the Christian God because he believes the material world is all there is 
will not only be deprived of the satisfaction of knowing that he is right but will also have 
to face the terrible consequences of the judgment anticipated by Christian theology if he 
is wrong.  Thus, it is a win and no-lose situation for the believer and a no-lose and lost 
one for the atheist.    
“I had spent a long time in the study of the abstract sciences; and the little communication 
that one can have in them disgusted me with them.  When I begun the study of man, I 
saw that these abstract sciences are not suitable to man, and that I was losing sight of my 
condition more by penetrating in them than others by ignoring them… But I believed I 
found at least many companions in the study of man and that it is the true study suitable 
to him.  I was wrong; there are even less who study it than geometry.  It is only for lack 
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of knowing how to study that one looks for the rest… Only one thought occupies us, we 
cannot think of two things at the same time; about which good takes us according to the 
world, not according to God.  Man is visibly made to think; it is all his dignity and all his 
merit, and all his duty is to think as he should.  Now the order of thought is to start with 
the self, and of one’s author and one’s end.  Now, of what does the world think?  Never 
of that; but to dance, to play the lute, to sing, to make verses, to chase the ring, etc., to 
fight, to make oneself king, without thinking of what it is to be king, and to be man.” 
Pascal, Pensées, nos. 144-146, 115-116 
“Before I enter into the proofs of the Christian religion, I find it necessary to depict the 
injustice of men who live in the indifference of looking for the truth of the one thing that 
is important to them, and that touches them so closely.  Of all their straying, it is without 
doubt the one that most proves them guilty of their folly and blindness, and in which it is 
the easiest to confuse them by the first sights of common sense and by the natural 
sentiments.  For it is indubitable that the time of this life is not but an instant, that the 
state of death is eternal, of whatever nature it might be, and that thus all our actions and 
our thoughts must take paths so different depending on the state of this eternity, that it is 
impossible to approach it with a sense and judgment other than that which settles it from 
this perspective, which must be our last object.  There is nothing more visible than that 
and thus, following the principles of reason, the conduct of men is entirely unreasonable, 
if they take another path.  Let us then judge on that point those who live without 
reflecting upon this last end of life, who let themselves follow their inclinations and their 
pleasures without reflection and anxiety, and, as if they could annihilate eternity by 
turning their thought away from it, think only of making themselves happy in this 
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moment alone.  Nevertheless, this eternity subsist, and death, which must open it and 
which threatens them at every hour, must place them inevitably in a short time in the 
horrible necessity of being eternally either annihilated or unfortunate, without knowing 
which of these eternities is forever prepared for them.  There [is] a doubt of a terrible 
consequence.  They are in peril of an eternity of miseries; and on that, as if the thing was 
not worth the trouble, they neglect to examine if it is of these opinions that the masses 
receive with a too credulous facility, or of those which, being obscure in themselves, 
have a very solid foundation, although hidden.  Thus, they do not know if there is truth or 
error in the thing, or if there is force or weakness in the proofs.  They have them before 
their eyes; they refuse to look at them, and in this ignorance they take the side of doing 
all there needs to be to fall in this misfortune in the case that it is, to wait to meet the 
challenge in death, being nonetheless very satisfied in this state, to make profession and 
finally vanity of it.  Can one think seriously of the importance of this matter without 
being horrified by such an extravagant conduct?” Ibid., no. 195, 129. 
“The immortality of the soul is a thing that matters to us so strongly, that touches us so 
profoundly, that one has to have lost all sentiment to be in the indifference to know that 
which it is… Thus our first interest and our first duty is to enlighten ourselves on this 
subject, on which depends all our conduct…Nothing betrays more an extreme weakness 
of mind than not to know what is the misfortune of man without God; nothing marks 
more a bad disposition of the heart than not to hope for the truth of the eternal promises; 
nothing is more cowardly than to put on a bold front against God…[T]here are but two 
kinds of persons that one can call reasonable: either those who serve God with all their 
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heart because they know Him, or those who look for Him with all their heart because 
they don’t know Him.” Ibid., no 194, 124 & 128.  
64 Pascal’s untimely death prevented him from completing this work, which remains a 
series of notes copied and edited for publication by a committee constituted in October 
1668 for that purpose by his friends and his sister, Gilberte Périer.  This edition known as 
the Port Royal edition appeared in 1669.  It was authoritative for over a century until 
Victor Cousin proposed in 1842 the necessity to publish a new edition founded on the 
careful study of Pascal’s handwritten manuscript, which according to his nephew Etienne 
Périer consisted of the small pieces of paper on which Pascal’s wrote his thoughts and 
classified them in folders.  Pascal, Oeuvres complètes., 1081-1083. 
65 Pensées, nos. 346 & 347, 162-163. 
 
66 Ibid., no. 430, 179-180. 
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 This dissertation began by inquiring into the disparate intellectual traditions that 
influence Tocqueville’s religious teaching to explain its apparent ambiguity.  It showed 
the mutual dependence of religion and liberty in Tocqueville’s thought before proceeding 
to outline his admiration for the Americans whose ordered lives in the chaotic world of 
democracy he attributes to their enlightenment and the prominence of religion in their 
mores.  It then unraveled the way in which Tocqueville reconciles the claim of the 
enlightenment that all opinions are suspect until subjected to the scrutiny of individual 
reason with the irrationality of belief in revealed religion.  It relied heavily on 
Tocqueville’s correspondence and a comparative reading of his works with those of his 
three mentors to disentangle the complex principles of the new political science he 
outlines for the age of equality in Democracy in America.  This methodology led to the 
identification of the constitutive elements of his religious doctrine, which carefully 
combines selected features of the enlightenment with those of Christianity in a way that is 
consistent with the democratic inclination to focus solely on the material world while at 
the same time it seeks to moderate it.    
Up until this point, this study has tried to answer the question:  what is the essence 
of Tocqueville’s religious doctrine?   To fulfill that objective it examined the influence of 
Montesquieu, Rousseau and Pascal on Tocqueville’s teaching to show that it has two 
components:  provide order in the otherwise disordered democratic state; and satisfy a 
primordial human need for the eternal.  Given Tocqueville’s affirmation that only a 
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modified Christianity can sustain human dignity and liberty under a system of equality 
insofar as it fulfills these two requirements it might be appropriate to ask at this juncture 
whether his teaching has universal applicability.  Put another way, it might be useful to 
ask whether countries that do not share the philosophic and religious traditions that 
inform Tocqueville’s teaching can successfully establish and maintain democratic 
freedom.  The connection Tocqueville makes among Christianity, the enlightenment and 
democratic freedom makes it reasonable to wonder about the viability of any endeavor to 
impose American-style democracy on non-Western and non-Christian societies.  While it 
is beyond the scope of this study to answer this question it is worthwhile to raise it since 
after all Tocqueville supports his thesis with the following claim.   
Next to each religion is a political opinion that is joined to it by 
affinity.  Allow the human mind to follow its tendency and it will regulate 
political society and the divine city in a uniform manner… The greatest 
part of English America has been peopled by men who…brought to the 
New World a Christianity that I cannot depict better than to call it 
democratic and republican...1
Tocqueville is unequivocal that only a modified Christianity can regulate the 
dangerous democratic instinct for individual independence, which left unrestrained 
causes man to become amoral and apolitical.  Christianity’s teaching on the equal 
freedom of all men before God coincides with the democratic passion for equality while 
at the same time it imposes on men moral obligations to God and to each other to produce 
order.  Moreover, Tocqueville ranks Christianity highest among all other religions 
because it alone possesses a universal quality that transcends place and time.  Unlike 
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other religions, which are applicable only to certain countries, certain mores, a social 
state or a particular nation, it embraces all humankind.  In fact, this universal quality 
constitutes for him the greatest indicator of Christanity’s divine origin.   
Nevertheless, Tocqueville’s painstaking analysis of democracy is based on two 
homogeneous nineteenth century societies: Protestant America and traditionally Catholic 
France, which embraced secularism after the Revolution.  In the first, he finds the 
harmonious coexistence of religion and democratic liberty whereas in the second where 
religion is reviled liberty is conspicuously absent.  In the first volume of Democracy in 
America, which focuses on the benefit of religion to society rather than the individual, 
Tocqueville attributes the cause for this disparity to the separation of church and state that 
reigns in America.  One has to consult L’Ancien régime et la révolution for Tocqueville’s 
in-depth analysis of the way in which the intermingling of politics and religion in France 
undermined religion. Suffice it to say here that in France religion, which was closely 
associated with the ancien régime, shared the latter’s fortune when it was toppled by the 
Revolution with dire consequences for liberty. 2  All the same, Tocqueville’s unique 
perspective in Democracy in America provides an excellent starting point from which to 
examine the long-term ramification of the movement toward greater secularism that 
afflicts contemporary American society insofar as it illuminates the danger to liberty it 
portends provided the right questions are asked.    
Has not secularism’s ostensible concern for religious freedom produced the 
fundamentalist reaction that is increasingly attempting to merge religion and politics 
thereby creating the danger to democratic liberty Tocqueville warns us about?3   Would 
not a secularist position that concedes religion benefits society serve more effectively to 
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counteract the radicalism that characterizes the fundamentalist movement and thus serve 
better the cause of freedom?  By framing the questions in this manner it becomes possible 
to envisage a new way to talk about a polarizing issue in the hope of guiding America 
toward the former prudence that in Tocqueville’s view is the hallmark of her liberty.   
One way to do so is to begin from the standpoint that Tocqueville’s new political 
science wants to-redirect the enlightenment project to its roots in Christianity, which he 
credits for the civilization of the entire Western world.  Viewed from this perspective his 
teaching provides an alternative approach from which to ponder contemporary moral 
issues such as: the contentious debate on the separation of church and state4 in which the 
support of the liberal media for the secularist position serves to radicalize the 
conservative movement;5 and the controversial issues of late-term abortion and same-sex 
marriage.6  These subjects are politically divisive partly because contemporary society is 
bereft of a moral authority from which to evaluate ever-expanding rights claims inasmuch 
as public opinion is manipulated by a media that is more committed to secularist than 
conservative values, the first of which are associated with the rationalism of the 
enlightenment and the second with religion.   
Religion, which began to lose its force with the advent of radical feminism in the 
1960’s, is now under greater attack the more it is associated with the growing political 
influence of the fundamentalist Christians.  This trend entrenches the secularists in their 
position that moral choice should be dictated by individual reason and the 
fundamentalists in the fanaticism that defines their religious zeal.  Tocqueville’s teaching, 
which affirms the utility of religion to society, especially in democratic republics, makes 
evident that the establishment of moral standards is beyond the sole competence of 
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human reason and thus cannot be left to individual choice particularly in the transient 
world of democracy where the absence of old laws and traditions make the moral 
authority of religion a necessity. 
The philosophers of the eighteenth century explained the gradual 
weakening of beliefs in an altogether simple fashion.  Religious zeal, they 
said, will be extinguished as freedom and enlightenment increase.  It is 
unfortunate that the facts do not accord with this theory. 
There is a certain European population whose disbelief is equaled 
only by their brutishness and ignorance; whereas in America one sees one 
of the freest and most enlightened peoples of the world eagerly fulfill all 
the external duties of religion. 
On my arrival in the United States it was the religious aspect of the 
country that struck my eye.  As I prolonged my stay, I perceived the great 
political consequences that flowed from these new facts.7        
If Tocqueville were to take part in the contemporary debate on the separation of 
church and state fueled by the school prayer, and Pledge of Allegiance controversies, and 
the contentious moral issues of abortion, sex education, and homosexual marriage, inter 
alia, he would agree neither with the secularist nor the fundamentalist interpretation of 
the First Amendment to the Constitution.  By making individual reason the sole arbiter of 
morality the first discounts the need for a uniform moral law attributed to divine authority 
to guide man in democracy, where all the resources of the intellect are focused on the 
pursuit of material well-being.  The second goes to the other extreme by advocating a 
conception of moral law that borders on intolerance and fanaticism.  Tocqueville who 
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painstakingly tries to show that “American liberty was born in the bosom of religion and 
is still supported in its arms”8 would no doubt challenge these ideological readings, each 
of which threatens liberty by embracing an extreme materialism and spiritualism 
respectively.   
Tocqueville for whom the American founding is situated in the Puritan 
establishment of the New England states found that religion continued to thrive at the 
time of his visit in 1831, forty-two years after the ratification of the Constitution.  In fact, 
he attributes this fortunate circumstance to the following reasons:  the Puritan founding is 
largely responsible for the pervasiveness of religion in all American habits and 
sentiments; and the great strength of religion comes from the separation of church and 
state mandated by the Constitution.  Nevertheless, it is safe to assume from his praise of 
the force of religion in American life that he would not read into the Establishment clause 
the need for a complete public disavowal of the non-sectarian piety articulated by the 
founding fathers in the Declaration of Independence.  He would probably agree with the 
view of a prominent constitutional scholar who maintains that the founders intended that 
the broad language of the Constitution would be illuminated by the moral vision outlined 
in the principles of the Declaration of Independence.9  Thus, Tocqueville would 
undoubtedly argue that an interpretation of the First amendment should take into 
consideration the moral reasoning that is the basis of the Declaration, which makes 
reference to “Nature’s God,” “the Supreme Judge of the World,” and “the Protection of 
divine Providence.”10    
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Still, rather than enter upon the controversial moral issues that confront American 
society today, let it be sufficient here to recapitulate Tocqueville’s perception of the 
limits of reason and the utility of religion in democratic republics.  As noted elsewhere in 
this study Tocqueville’s analysis of democracy is very clear that liberty in America is 
owed to the dominant status religion enjoys in this country and its absence in France is 
attributable to the preeminence of secularism.  American freedom subsists in the chaos of 
democracy because it originated in the harmonious combination of the practical 
application of the rationality of the enlightenment with the Christian mores that 
permeates all aspects of social life.  The numerous Christian sects he found in America 
did not produce the doubt and intolerance commonly associated with sectarianism 
because they shared uniform Christian moral values.  Moreover, public opinion reflected 
the pervasiveness of Christian ethical principles in American social mores and compelled 
conformity to them.   In contrast, French democracy succumbed time and again to 
despotism because the enlightenment project, which was disseminated by the French 
Revolution, came to be identified with secularism after the Revolution.   Tocqueville’s 
teaching adumbrates that once the progress of equality facilitated the vulgarization of the 
enlightenment’s proclamation that reason is the sole arbiter of truth it became obvious 
that the commonplace realities of the new social order made reason alone an unreliable 
guide for morality. 
Several considerations underpin Tocqueville’s call for a new political science to 
enable men to live if not virtuous but at least ordered lives.  Collectively, these 
consideration support the leitmotif of his commentary, viz.,  equality imposes such 
drastic changes in the ideas and sentiments of man that it makes it all the more urgent to 
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bring the humanitarian principles of the enlightenment into harmony with Christian moral 
precepts.  Put another way, the enlightenment that ushered the age of equality subjects 
everything to human reason but democracy, which subjects everything to its ever-
changing laws, needs something outside of its dominion to regulate it and that something 
is religion.  
First among the considerations that support Tocqueville’s religious teaching is the 
notion that equality has eliminated the possibility of leisure, which enabled man under 
aristocracy to abandon himself to the contemplation associated with the philosophic life.   
Thus, Tocqueville implies that aristocratic inequality made it possible for the men of his 
caste to appeal to reason to validate their beliefs, a luxury unavailable to the democratic 
crowd.  Put another way, reasoned opinion can no longer be a viable path to virtue in 
democracy inasmuch as equality imposes intellectual constraint on the individual 
compelling him to rely on a source outside himself for moral guidance, which is common 
opinion.  If democratic opinions are to have a moral content they must be founded on the 
beliefs inspired by the code of ethics and moral principles taught by Christianity from 
which the humanitarian ideas of the enlightenment are derived.  In effect, Tocqueville 
wants to refocus the discourse of modern morality generated by the humanitarian 
principles of the enlightenment from its emphasis on rights to the obligations Christianity 
insists that equality before God imposes on all men.  Evidence of his irrevocable posture 
on this matter is found in the polemic on morality that was the subject of his 1843 
correspondence with Gobineau.   
Tocqueville and Gobineau begun corresponding that year when Tocqueville 
considered enlisting the collaboration of the young Gobineau in a work which he 
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tentatively undertook for the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques.  It was to be 
the study of the new moral concepts and social habits developing in Europe during the 
dissolution of the old aristocratic order and the new progressing democracy.   Tocqueville 
sought to discover the distinctive features of the “new” moral doctrines to determine their 
consequences.  There ensued an epistolary conversation between the two men in which 
their disagreement about the influence of Christianity on the humanitarian ideas of the 
enlightenment illuminates Tocqueville’s convictions.   
Gobineau argues that the enlightenment produced, inter alia, an innovation in the 
area of human welfare that “very favorably proves the progressive nature of morality.”11    
For example, he maintains that modern morality changed the Christian maxim that man is 
condemned to work from a painful duty into an equal right to work.  Tocqueville 
reproves him for his inability to see that the innovations he considers morally superior to 
the principles of Christianity are merely new applications of its principles in a different 
social state.  In fact, Tocqueville’s posture throughout this exchange reflects his 
conviction that the enlightenment project’s emphasis on progress caused it to repudiate 
the core beliefs of Christianity with the result that there has been since its inception a 
general lowering of moral standards.  He adduces modern morality’s glorification of the 
flesh, which is directly opposed to the Christian concept of the “open struggle of the spirit 
over the ruling flesh,” as “the natural and logical consequences of a weakened religious 
faith and of widespread doubt about the existence of the other world.”12  He enjoins 
Gobineau to proceed with the assignment by starting from the premise that “Christianity 
is the great source of modern morality.”13         
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Second, Tocqueville chooses to model his religious doctrine partially on the 
teaching of Rousseau-- who rescues man from the debasement into which the egalitarian 
discourse of modernity plunged him by re-introducing him to the moral appeal of 
classical political philosophy-- and partially on Pascal’s apology for Christianity to 
moderate the spurious effect of equality on liberty.  He supports his advocacy for 
meshing the philosophy of the enlightenment with Christian morality by affirming that 
this combination conforms to “the natural state of men in the matter of religion”14 in 
democratic republics. Thus, one might say that Tocqueville’s democratic theory aims to 
bridge the gap between the rights’ discourse of the enlightenment that animates the 
democratic social order and the equal moral obligations Christianity imposes on all men.    
There lies behind Tocqueville’s enthusiasm for the enlightenment the more sober 
realization that in promising more than it could deliver it wearied the human spirit.  
Tocqueville admires the Americans for putting into practice the teachings of the 
enlightenment without any knowledge of its theories while he remains distrustful of the 
excessive taste of the French for general ideas and “blind faith in the goodness and 
absolute truth of any theory,”15 especially in matters of government. By the mid-
nineteenth century the great lassitude of revolutions that weighed on France causes 
Tocqueville to question the efficacy of the enlightenment project in one of his many 
rebukes addressed to Gobineau on the subject of his racist theory.   Even though 
Tocqueville’s comments below postdate the first Democracy by eight years, they recall 
his anxiety about France’s prospects for liberty even before he undertook his great work 
as shown by his letters home from America, some of which have been previously cited in 
this study. 
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The last century had an exaggerated and a rather puerile 
confidence in the power that man exercises over himself and in that of 
peoples over their own destiny.  That was the error of the time;  a noble 
error, after all, which, if it brought about the commission of many follies, 
led to the accomplishment of some very great things, beside which 
posterity will find us very small.  The fatigue of revolutions, the tedium of 
emotions, the failure of so many generous ideas and so many vast hopes, 
all this has now precipitated us in the opposite excess.  After having 
believed ourselves capable of reforming ourselves; after having had an 
excessive pride, we have fallen into a humility that is no less excessive; 
we believed ourselves capable of everything, today we believe ourselves 
capable of nothing, and we like to believe that from now on struggle and 
effort will be useless and that our blood, our muscles, and our nerves will 
always be stronger than our will and our virtue. 16    
The idea that modern philosophical discourse, which displaced religion, is 
partially responsible for the moral bankruptcy of France occupied Tocqueville more than 
usual in the interval between his retirement from public life following Louis Napoleon’s 
coup d’état of December 1, 1851 and his painstaking preparatory research to began 
writing in December 1853 L’Ancien régime et la révolution.    The preparation for this 
book led him to study the work of Jean Domat (1625-1696), friend of Pascal and most 
eminent jurist of France in the reign of Louis XIV, whose work provided the justification 
for the royal absolutism practiced by this king.  Domat’s work emphasizes duty rather 
than right as the moral foundation of social order.  Tocqueville’s comments to Corcelle 
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on January 1, 1853 on his reading of Domat encapsulate his belief that not only reason 
but also revelation must be man’s guide to morality.  “Domat looks at civil laws, their 
source and their goal in his Traité des Lois (Treatise on Law).  He has them all emanating 
from divine laws like reason and revelation indicate, and all working towards the ends 
that God gave to man.  Nothing is greater and simpler than this general view that 
Christianity alone could provide.”17   
Tocqueville’s teaching thus consistently directs posterity to return to the Christian 
ideas that gave impetus to the humanitarian principles of the enlightenment as a way to 
reinstate the equal obligations to God and man they impose on all men.  He reminds us 
that an ordered equality can be achieved only through the proper balance of rights with 
duties.  Therefore, in Tocqueville’s moral universe a just apportionment of rights must be 
based on the highest obligation to be fulfilled, which for him is always the preservation of 
freedom.   
 
How Tocqueville’s Teaching Belies the Claim that Secularism is Desirable to Protect 
a Constitutional Right to Religious Freedom 
 
 The previous chapter sought to refute the position of scholars-- most notably that 
of Sanford Kessler-- who argue that Tocqueville’s religious teaching is comparable to 
Rousseau’s civil religion.  It relied principally on the arguments for religion Tocqueville 
makes in the second volume of Democracy in America, which not only shows the natural 
connection between religion and the human heart but also that of Christianity and 
democracy, to support its case.  Nevertheless, if one focuses primarily on the teaching of 
the first volume of the Democracy, which emphasizes the utility of religion to society, it 
might be easy to conclude with Kessler that it bears indeed a strong likeness to 
 340
Rousseau’s civil religion.  In the chapter titled “Indirect Influence that Religious Beliefs 
Exert on Political Society in the United States” in the first volume, part two, chapter nine 
Tocqueville avers “[i]f it serves man very much as an individual that his religion be true, 
this is not so for society.  Society has nothing to fear nor to hope from the other life; and 
what is most important to it is not so much that all citizens profess the true religion but 
that they profess a religion.”18
The differentiation Tocqueville makes between the religion of the individual and 
that of society is important in the context of a discussion on religious freedom in twenty-
first century America since Tocqueville-- despite his attachment to Christianity and 
preference for Catholicism in both volumes of Democracy in America-- looks at religion 
in this chapter strictly from the political point of view.  In that particular chapter 
Tocqueville wants to persuade his compatriots that religion, especially Catholicism, is not 
antidemocratic and that religion-- whose association with the absolutism of the monarchy 
in France produced an ardent secularism-- can be reconciled to liberal principles by 
following the American example of religious disestablishment.  He is convinced that 
religion is strong in America because it reigns in its own sphere and does not mix with 
politics.  
 As shown elsewhere in this study Tocqueville believes that religion alone imposes 
important restraints on the dangerous passions democracy awakens because it is founded 
on an immortal interest that does not change and the constancy it provides makes it a 
powerful ally of liberty inasmuch as it fosters self-government.  His commentary in the 
first volume underscores that the Anglo-Americans of the nineteenth century viewed 
religious morality as their common interest and made it a patriotic duty to bring religion 
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to the ever-expanding Western frontier states to prevent their descent into anarchy and 
thus safeguard the liberty of the republic.  It also underlines that since moral conformity 
was compelled by common opinion it is likely that a certain number of Americans 
practiced their religion more out of habits than convictions but what is important for 
Tocqueville is that the result for society was the same inasmuch as their compliance 
fostered liberty.  Likewise, in the second volume Tocqueville hopes to kindle a love of 
liberty by guiding the individual to faith through an appeal to his self-interest.  Therefore, 
it is not unreasonable to wonder about the endurance of American liberty if religion is 
undermined by secularism in the final outcome of the debate on the separation of church 
and state, which paradoxically presents itself more and more as a choice in which 
secularism is synonymous with freedom and non-sectarian public piety is viewed as an 
infringement on freedom.  
 Tocqueville’s argument to support religious disestablishment in the first volume 
of the Democracy intones his familiar theme that from the human perspective religion is 
useful because it alone gives hope to the human heart amid the vicissitudes of life.   By 
giving to man a particular form of hope religion shows itself to be “natural to the human 
heart as hope itself.”  This, then, the human quality of religion convinces Tocqueville that 
“disbelief is an accident [and that] faith alone is the permanent state of humanity.” It is a 
universal quality shared by all religions, which “draw from man himself an element of 
strength that can never fail them, because it depends on one of the constituent principles 
of human nature.”19 Thus, Tocqueville implies that secularism  is incapable of fulfilling 
man’s highest aspiration inasmuch as it extinguishes for him the light of hope and for this 
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reason it is particularly dangerous in democracies where everything being in flux religion 
remains the only fixed point around which man can orient himself.  
Tocqueville is far less concerned about the destabilizing effect of schism on faith 
in democracies than he fears the great danger of indifference provoked by “negative 
doctrines” that undermine religions without providing anything to fill the void they leave.  
These doctrines, which affirm the falseness of one religion without replacing it with the 
truth of another, have the same consequence as secularism inasmuch as they leave men 
without hope “to follow the doubt that leads them to despair.”20  Doubt in turn produces 
the restlessness that endangers social life by eroding its moral foundation.  Tocqueville 
provides some guidelines to overcome this danger so that a favorable common opinion of 
religion can survive in democracy.  He exhorts those who have ceased to believe religion 
true to continue nonetheless to consider “religious beliefs under a human aspect [and] 
recognize their empire over mores and their influence on laws.”21  Likewise, he urges 
those who continue to believe to feel free to expose their faith for all to see while 
entreating them to have compassion for the lost of faith of their contemporaries.   This 
compromise in which the unbelievers hide their disbeliefs and the believers expose their 
faith extinguishes the tendency to indifference by producing a public opinion favorable to 
religion. 
 Tocqueville provides a description of the way in which secularism undermined 
liberty in France that is almost an accurate depiction of the onslaught on freedom it has 
produced in America today.  He identifies there four categories of men: those who no 
longer believed in Christianity or any other religion; those who were arrested in doubt; 
those who believed but dared not show it; and a few who had the moral strength to brave 
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public opinion.  The latter carried away by their effort harbored a deep hatred for those 
who attacked religion in the name of freedom and since they associated the innovations 
freedom engenders with hostility to religion they despised it in principle.  He describes 
them as men who are at war with their centuries.   
A similar situation is seen in America today provoked by the relentless assault of 
secularism on religion.  The secularists whose interpretation of the Establishment clause 
seems to be less freedom of religion than freedom from religion challenge the symbols 
and religious sentiments that have suffused American public life for most of the history 
of the nation.  Their quest to eliminate religion from public life has produced a 
fundamentalist backlash that will not stop short of trampling on freedom.  Meanwhile 
moderate believers have become more and more timid about exposing their beliefs for 
fear of being identified with the extremists.  The growth of the political power of the 
fundamentalists under the present administration has produced a negative reaction to 
religion not unlike the one that caused Tocqueville to exhort France to adopt the 
American doctrine of separation to protect religion from becoming enmeshed in political 
passions.  Much like in Tocqueville’s France, religion today divides men into republicans 
and democrats, conservatives and liberals, and because it is so closely united to the 
ideology of these political parties it shares the hatred with which each side views the 
other.    
 Tocqueville advocates the separation of church and state not to eliminate religion 
from public life but to restore it to its youthful energy by exhorting his contemporaries 
“to allow to faith the use of all the strength it still preserves.”22  He is unequivocal that he 
fears an alignment of religion and politics, particularly in democracies where power 
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changes hand continuously and laws reflect changing opinions.  He is certain that in these 
circumstances the fortune of religion will always remain uncertain inasmuch as it is 
dependent upon the material force of those in power.  Thus, he construes separation as 
the absence of a material partnership between religion and politics and not as a mandate 
for the abolition of religious symbols and the profession of religious sentiments in the 
public sphere.  He provides an anecdote that illuminates his understanding of the doctrine 
of the separation of church and state, which clearly shows that he does not believe that a 
public reference to God is a violation of that doctrine. 
 While I was in America, a witness presented himself to the assizes 
of the county of Chester (state of New York) and declared that he did not 
believe in the existence of God and the immortality of the soul.  The 
presiding officer refused to accept his oath, given, he said, that the witness 
had destroyed in advance all the faith that could have been put in his 
words.  The newspapers reported the fact without commentary.23
      Tocqueville cites the article that reports this incident in English as it appeared 
in the New York Spectator of August 23, 183124 not only to support his view on the 
importance of religion to society but also to endorse its public acknowledgment in a way 
that recalls Rousseau’s dictum that the social contract imposes on citizens the duties of 
religion “as sentiments of sociability.”  “Without being able to oblige anyone to believe 
these articles, the sovereign can banish from the state anyone who does not believe them; 
banish him not for impiety but as an antisocial being, as one sincerely unable to love law 
and justice, or to sacrifice, if need be, his life to his duty.”25  Moreover, Tocqueville’s 
reference to the reaction of newspapers is particularly enlightening.  It makes clear that 
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the media far from challenging the rules of the court acquiesced in a way that amounts to 
its tacit agreement with the American public, which in Tocqueville’s view is enlightened 
enough to know that religion makes possible the order commerce needs to prosper.   
 The important influence Tocqueville attributes to religion in fostering freedom in 
American society brings into question the attempt of secularists to redefine the objective 
of the First Amendment.  Tocqueville’s careful study of American democracy reminds us 
that historically the intent of the Establishment clause has not been to eliminate religion 
from public life but to promote a social environment in which religious diversity can 
thrive without impediment since, to paraphrase, it does not matter to society whether its 
religion is true.  The clause’s essential goal, which is to foster tolerance, then does not 
preempt acknowledgement of the most basic dogmas on which almost all religions agree: 
the existence of God and the immortality of the soul.  In fact, Tocqueville’s account 
shows that Americans widely have historically agreed that a person’s credibility is 
closely connected to his willingness to profess these dogmas, which for him are the 
essential pillars upon which democratic freedom is maintained.    
 
A Possible Tocquevillian Response to the Controversial Issues of Abortion and 
Same-sex Marriage   
 
As noted previously Tocqueville responded to the greater focus on rights that 
governs modern morality by insisting on merging the principles of the enlightenment 
with those of religion to establish a balance between rights and duties.  His anxiety about 
the greater emphasis modern morality places on rights stems from his keen understanding 
that the foundation of virtue in democracy is very fragile insofar as it is rooted in self-
interest.  As shown in chapter three he is presciently aware that at some point in the 
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future the harmony between private and general interest he found in America may be 
dissolved.  “But up to what extent can the two principles of individual well-being and the 
general good in fact be merged?  How far can a conscience, which one might say was 
based on reflection and calculation, master those political passions which are not yet 
born, but which certainly will be born?  That is something which only the future will 
show.”26  
A case in point is the “civil right” issue of same-sex marriage sparked by the 
November 2003 decision of the Massachussetts Supreme Judicial Court that declared the 
state’s ban on gay marriage unconstitutional.  As the controversy prompted by this 
decision becomes more acrimonious it is not unreasonable to wonder whether the 
movement for greater civil rights, which begun in the 1960’s to correct a grave racial 
injustice by appealing to the moral language of the Declaration and the Protection clause 
of the Fourteen Amendment, has unwittingly opened the floodgates precipitating 
America down a sliding slope wherein private interest supersedes all consideration to the 
common interest.  The civil rights movement was the launching pad from which radical 
feminism initiated the social revolution that challenged the institution of marriage27 to 
which ironically people of the same sex now want access to legitimate their union, and 
called for a woman’s right to abortion.  Tocqueville’s teaching reminds us that it is not 
enough to invoke the principle of civil rights to carry a wholesome debate on the 
controversial moral issues that confront us today but that our deliberation must take into 
account the obligations on which an ordered social life is founded.  
Tocqueville helps us to talk about women and gay rights in a moral context if we 
contemplate them not only from the perspective of his understanding of the idea of rights 
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but also from that of his teaching on the system of cooperation between the sexes he 
maintains makes social life possible.  He acknowledges that in democracy the idea of 
rights must be bound to self-interest to give equal citizens a stake in the political system 
and that if rights are to be recognized in principle each must have a particular good to 
defend.  Thus, for him the idea of rights is necessary to the establishment of democratic 
order inasmuch as one is bound by the right he wants to enjoy to the duty to respect that 
of another and in this way private interest harmonizes with common interest.  However, 
Tocqueville also teaches that a division of labor on the ground of sexual difference is 
needed for social harmony in democracy and it is actualized in the institution of marriage, 
which is the foundation of society.  He takes pain to show that sexual equality is not 
synonymous with sameness and that a well-ordered social life depends on defining the 
separate obligations of the sexes on the basis of their natural differences.  Thus, in the 
interest of democratic order it might be worthwhile to start a political discourse on the 
right claims of the sexes from the same premise as Tocqueville, i.e., the separate 
obligations nature has carved for each sex form the basis on which their claims to equal 
rights must be evaluated.     
Chapter four outlined the important role Tocqueville believes woman plays in 
shaping morality in society by contrasting the way in which social order is affected by the 
different views held by the French and Americans on the equality of the sexes.  
Tocqueville explains the influence of woman on society by comparing American 
conjugal happiness to the domestic disorder that reigned in Europe to show a connection 
in the way in which domestic order extends to society at large.  He eulogizes the 
American woman whose austere mores he finds have their origin in her religious beliefs 
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allowing her to set the moral tone of society. Woman, he states in Democracy in 
America, is the foundation of morality inasmuch as she rules the home and the order she 
establishes there affects the moral tone reflected in society.   
 Tocqueville insists that the harmony that reigns in domestic life affects social 
order irrevocably inasmuch as it is in the home that man forms the habits that rule the 
opinions and tastes that he takes with him to the public place. Social life is ordered in 
America where “the bond of marriage is most respected” because religion “reigns as 
sovereign over the soul of woman” enabling the American to draw “from his home the 
love of order, which he afterwards brings into the affairs of state.”  In contrast, “[i]n 
Europe, almost all the disorders of society are born around the domestic hearth, not far 
from the nuptial bed.  It is there that men conceive their scorn for natural bonds and 
permitted pleasures, their taste for disorder, their restiveness of heart, their instability of 
desires.”28  Thus, unlike his American counterpart the European brings to the public 
sphere the disorderly passions that agitate his heart and trouble his own dwelling.   
 In drawing these comparisons Tocqueville not only wants to show the close 
connection between private and public morality but he also wants to underline that 
woman plays a critical role in the establishment of morality in society.  American women 
have a positive influence on social life inasmuch as they draw from their religious beliefs 
the moral values that govern their irreproachable conduct whereas the licentiousness of 
European women has detrimental consequences for society. 
 The natural distinctions on which Tocqueville found the separate obligations of 
the sexes to foster social order point to a number of inferences from which to consider the 
moral issues that confront present-day America in the areas of abortion and same-sex 
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marriage.  In the first case, if woman holds to her moral obligations, which for 
Tocqueville are manifested in her modesty and chastity, then the unfortunate 
circumstance of unwanted pregnancy does not arise to bring her to consider abortion as a 
choice to which she is entitled.  Thus, a debate about the moral conduct of women 
appears to be the starting point from which to deliberate on this issue.  In the second 
instance, if each sex has a defined social role that has its foundation in their natural 
abilities then to overlook the different contributions each brings into their union is to 
pervert nature’s order, which intends that the two sexes compliment each other.  On this 
basis, same-sex marriage is indefensible inasmuch as it subverts the natural order on 
which social order is founded.   If Tocqueville is right that it is women who make mores 
because “religion is often powerless to restrain man in the midst of the innumerable 
temptations that fortune presents to him…but it reigns as a sovereign over the soul of 
women” it follows that when women’s morals degenerate and men and women exchange 
roles it is a matter of time before society becomes utterly depraved and with social decay 
the light of freedom is inevitably extinguished.        
 To conclude, if Tocqueville’s moral teaching is to have any bearing on 
preserving America’s love of liberty in the twenty-first century it is well worth   
remembering his dictum that “American liberty was born in the bosom of religion.”  For 
Tocqueville, even though religion and politics are kept in separate spheres in America 
religion nonetheless “should be considered the first of their [Americans] political 
institutions; for if it does not give them the taste for freedom, it singularly facilitates their 
use of it.”29  Religion facilitates freedom because it tames the dangerous inclinations of 
democracy.  A prominent French scholar summarizes Tocqueville’s thought succinctly in 
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his description of the contradiction inherent in democracy that makes it dependent on 
religion.   
Democracy wishes to fulfill nature.  To do this, it takes upon itself 
to domesticate and subject it.  Once this domestication is complete, nature 
will be itself and nothing but itself.  This domestication will never be 
achieved, because nature produces inequalities.  This impossibility, which 
reveals the contradiction in democracy, is fortunate.  The moment this 
domestication was complete, man would be dehumanized.  On the one 
hand democracy’s project is unrealizable, because it is contrary to nature.  
On the other, it is impossible to stop short of this democracy and go back 
to aristocracy.  This is because democratic equality also conforms to 
nature.  It follows that we can only moderate democracy; we cannot stop 
short of democracy, because it fulfills nature.  We cannot attain the end of 
this movement, for it would mean subjecting nature completely and 
dehumanizing man.  We cannot escape democracy.  We can never make 
democracy completely “real,” and we must not try.  We can and must 
moderate democracy, limit it, temper its hostility to nature, all the while 
benefiting from its conformity to nature.  To affirm and will democracy 
insofar as it is in conformity with nature, to limit it insofar as it is contrary 
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religion a pillar of liberty is founded on a compromise between materialism and 
spiritualism.  For those who oppose the phrase “under God” in the Pledge and Judge 
Moore’s attachment to religious symbolism it might be well worth to remember that 
although the Founding Fathers broke with the Puritans’ intention to create a Christian 
nation they nonetheless did not intend either to create a secular state.   Purdue University 
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America argues that there are two extreme views about the intention of America’s 
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these views is correct.  Professor Lambert makes the case that the founders at 
Philadelphia formulated the Establishment clause to accommodate the religious diversity 
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Note on the Texts 
Democracy in America 
This study uses the 1992 Pléiade edition of Tocqueville’s Oeuvres I and II, the 
first of which contains an account of his voyages to Sicily, America, England (1833), 
England and Ireland (1835), Switzerland, Algeria (1841 & 1847), notes of a work on 
India (never completed), his political and academic writings while the second combines 
the first and second volumes of De la démocracie en Amérique.  Ouvres II is comprised 
of the first volume of the 13th edition and the second volume of the 12th edition, which in 
effect is the 6th edition of the second volume since the two volumes published by Charles 
Gosselin were completed five years apart, the first in 1835 and the second in 1840.  The 
1840 publication of the second volume appeared originally in two volumes, which were 
reprinted again the same year.  Subsequently, all publications of the Democratie 
combined the first volume with the second volume.  The 13th edition was the last one to 
be published in Tocqueville’s lifetime.  It combines the first volume with the 7th edition 
of the second volume.  Because Tocqueville did not read the proofs of the 13th edition, 
which contains numerous publishing errors, the Pléiade edition reproduces the second 
volume of the 12th edition published by Pagnère in 1848 because it was the last edition 
reviewed by Tocqueville.   
The Pléiade edition updates the 1951 Gallimard edition of Oeuvres, papiers et 
correspondances d’Alexis de Tocqueville from which it differs in significant ways.  Its 
most noticeable difference is its inclusion of extensive notes and analyses of 
Tocqueville’s work.  The first volume contains an introduction by AndréJardin, 
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Tocqueville’s biographer, essays by prominent French students of Tocqueville including 
André Jardin, Françoise Mélonio, Lise Quéffelec, and extensive explanatory notes by 
these scholars as well as the marginal notes found in Tocqueville’s own manuscripts.  
The second volume contains an introduction and essay by another prominent French 
student of Tocqueville, Jean-Claude Lamberti, as well as notes similar to those found in 
the first volume. 
The two volumes of De la démocracie en Amérique of the Gallimard edition are 
reproductions of the 1850 Pagnère edition, which we know Tocqueville did not review.  
He became gravely ill that year with the lung sickness that would cost him his life nine 
years later and left France for the warmer climate of Italy to cure himself and ponder his 
career in politics by writing his Recollections.  However, Tocqueville made one small  
change to the 1850 Pagnère edition that was undoubtedly politically motivated by adding 
two appendices to the first volume: 1) a paper he produced on January 15, 1848 for the 
Academie des Sciences Morales et Politiques as a rebuttal to M. Cherbuliez’s 1843 work 
titled “De la démocracie en Suisse” and the famous speech he gave on January 27, 1848 
to the Chamber of Deputies to awaken his all too complacent colleagues from their 
slumber to hear the rumbling sound of the revolution that would erupt barely a month 
later to provoke the fall of the Guizot cabinet on February 23 and force King Louis-
Philippe to abdicate on February 24.  Given the importance he assigned to these two 
discourses, which are compiled in Oeuvres I of the Pléaide edition and classified as 
political and academic writings, an overview of them is provided below.   
The 1850 publication followed Tocqueville’s retirement from political life after 
the October 1849 fall of Minister Barrot’s cabinet in which he served as France’s 
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Minister of Foreign Affairs.  Subsequently, the Prince President Louis-Napoléon begun 
to put in motion the wheels of his future despotic rule that culminated in the coup d’état 
of December 2, 1851.  It is little wonder then that given these political developments, 
which confirmed Tocqueville’s greatest fear, he found the time opportune to expand his 
study of democracy in that year’s publication of the Démocratie by including in it his 
thoughts on the challenges it faced in the Europe of the 1850’s.  The first paper addresses 
the causes for the revolutionary nature of Swizerland’s fledgling democracy and the 
second the abuses of the July monarchy of Louis-Philippe and their impact on public 
morality. 
The paper on Cherbuliez’s work received extensive coverage in France’s major 
newspapers, including La Presse, Le Siècle, Le Journal des débats, La Revue des Deux-
Mondes.  In it Tocqueville castigates Cherbuliez who disparages democracy and blames 
it for Switzerland’s political deficiencies.  Tocqueville seeks to show that Cherbuliez’s  
partisanship blinds him to the fact so evident to Tocqueville himself that Switzerland 
although a republic is not a democracy but a country in the throes of a democratic 
revolution.  In fact, his examination of Switzerland’s political institutions reveals they are 
far more regressive toward the liberal movement sweeping Europe than the most 
entrenched monarchies.  Tocqueville maintains that Cherbuliez’s false assumption and 
his nostalgia for aristocracy not only prevent him from looking for the remedies to 
combat democracy’s excesses, as he himself had done in his work on American 
democracy, but also from recognizing that Switzerland’s constitution has numerous flaws 
that exacerbate the vices inherent in democracy, including an  executive branch that lacks 
its own power, a judiciary that is confounded with political power and a system of 
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confederation that increases the ineptitude generally associated with a federal 
government.   
Likewise, the speech to the Chamber was published the day following its delivery 
in the French paper Le Moniteur universel.  Tocqueville chastises the Guizot government 
and supplicates his colleagues to change the corruptive spirit that drives it lest all perish 
in the tempest he sees gathering on the horizon.  He argues that the bourgeois values that 
permeate French political life have caused the degeneration of public and private 
morality.  Moreover, he affirms that the abuse of influence and the surreptitious 
appropriation of power outside the constitution are a breeding ground for the socialist 
opinions taking root in the masses.  He warns the government that it has brought this 
calamity upon itself by governing not through the appeal of opinions and sentiments 
directed at the common good but by appealing to the particular interest of individuals.  In 
short, he paints for the government a vivid portrait of its corruption in order to emphasize 
that it risks losing its power as all men do when they are no longer worthy to hold it.   
In addition to its use of the Pléiade edition of Tocqueville’s works this study uses 
the English translation of Democracy in America by Harvey Mansfield and Delba 
Winthrop.  The translators have sought to remain faithful to Tocqueville’s intended 
meaning and have succeeded very well in their quest.  
Other Published Works 
References to Tocqueville’s L’Ancien régime et la révolution use the text edited 
by G.W. Headlam and the English translation of Alan S. Kahan, which is edited by two 
prominent Tocqueville scholars, François Furet and Françoise Mélonio.  Likewise, 
references to Tocqueville’s Souvenirs use the 1893 publication by his nephew le Comte 
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de Tocqueville and the English translation of J. P. Mayer, another prominent Tocqueville 
scholar.   
Tocqueville’s Correspondence 
The works cited in this study for Tocqueville’s correspondence refer to the two 
main editions of his complete works.  The first edition published in the 1860’s by 
Madame de Tocqueville and his friend Gustave de Beaumont was truncated in great part 
to protect his memory and the privacy of his correspondents, most of whom were still 
alive at the time of their release.  In fact, Beaumont did not publish many of 
Tocqueville’s letters until Madame de Tocqueville who survived her husband by 5 years 
died on December 22, 1864.  This edited publication, which is generally referred to as the 
Beaumont edition even though Beaumont published it under Madame de Tocqueville’s 
name, was all that was available to the public until Antoine Rédier’s research early last 
century allowed J. P. Mayer to undertake to compile beginning in the 1950’s 
Tocqueville’s complete works (Oeuvres complètes), which contains the unedited version 
of his invaluable correspondence.   Because the J. P. Mayer edition is the most complete 
edition, this study uses it mostly whenever it is possible. 
For the ease and convenience of locating the texts the study cites as an additional 
source when necessary the letters especially selected for translation by James Toupin and 
Roger Boesche for their vivid portrayal of Tocqueville’s political ideas.  Messrs. Toupin 
and Boesche follow the same method as this study insofar as they also rely more heavily 
on the J. P. Mayer edition.  It is noteworthy that after having compared some letters from 
the two editions they maintain nevertheless that the distortion attributed to the Beaumont 
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edition has occasionally been exaggerated insofar as the modifications made by him did 





Article Published by Louis de Kergolay titled “Etude Littéraire sur Alexis de 
Tocqueville,” in Le Correspondant, April 18611
 
 
“I lived, I could say, so close to the literary productions of Alexis de Tocqueville, 
I have so much assisted, in his principal works, to the intellectual progress of the creation, 
that my attention has perhaps been more captivated than that of another by the study of 
his way of doing.  Thus, in speaking freely of his talent as a man of letters, as I 
understand it, I don’t have at all the pretension of transmitting general ideas in the matter 
of critic, but simply the more modest will of forming my own opinion on a certain writer 
in particular.  I am sustained elsewhere by this conviction that in studying in depth as 
much as possible the literary form of an author, and after others have judged him from 
may be a more elevated point of view, one contributes one’s part by entering further into 
the man himself and into the most intimate secrets of his thoughts. 
“One can say of Alexis de Tocqueville, considered from the literary point of view, 
that he has loved the form with as much passion as those who prefer it to the substance, 
and that he has nonetheless always preferred the substance to the form, for he has never 
taken the pen but obsessed by the ideas that he felt the need to deliver to the public.  This 
passion of the form was already born in him before he was himself conscious of it, and it 
is what one sees well, if one wants to page through his first youthful essays or take a 
cursory view of his most intimate letters, some of which were written to his companions 
during his childhood. 
“Those who have preferred to study the real substance of his ideas and his 
doctrines have signaled, as a characteristic trait of this conscientious mind, the 
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perseverance with which he reacts on his thought rather than tolerate something 
unfinished in it.  One finds him, in the smallest details of his style, as faithful to this habit 
as in his most profound meditations…everywhere a great purity of language, an 
assiduous search for perfection… 
“Tocqueville, like a great number of distinguished writers, puts willingly on the 
first plan the principal idea that he wants to bring to light; he seems to find it more simple 
and may be more respectful to tell you first and straight out the substance of his thought; 
then he explains it, justifies it, supports it with arguments or examples, develops the 
consequences, goes deeply into the least folds, urges you, shakes you, convinces you.  
The paragraph, this small composition in miniature, which must nevertheless be complete 
and form a whole like the more extensive compositions, is often in Tocqueville’s writings 
a real masterpiece… 
“The beauty of his style has something inimitable; he has, if I can express myself 
this way, less rhetoric than any of our writers, even the most renowned…[W]e admire in 
Rousseau this great art of performance in which a simple idea, sound or false, sometimes 
very remarkable, sometimes not very new and ordinary enough, gives him sufficient 
material to unfold under our eyes the most magnificent spectacle, clustering admirable 
accessories around his principal subject and embellishing it with pompous 
decorations…Tocqueville develops nothing except to make himself more surely 
understood, or else when he feels himself invited to add some truly new notion to those 
he has already presented. 
“Some people have tried to find a certain affinity between his style and that of 
Montesquieu; this comparison appears to me to rest on superficial grounds.  In the 
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Démocratie, the subject is often carved into small chapters preceded by a very significant 
and very distinctive title to excite the curiosity of the reader; Montesquieu had given this 
example but the goal of the two authors is not the same.  Montesquieu, who does not 
seem to attach a very great importance in making you catch hold of the sequence of ideas, 
holds above all to give spice to a subject as serious as De l’esprit des Lois; Tocqueville 
does not aim at titillating, but is attached to distinguishing as neatly as possible the 
different order of ideas, and seems to think that the surest way to make known the link 
well is to present separately each of the rings which comprises it.  Montesquieu, 
vivacious, sparkling, Southern, full of projections, relates to you with an inexhaustible 
spirit his speculations on the greatest human affairs; Tocqueville, solemn, meditative, 
reserved, advances with the caution of a pioneer on a badly explored terrain before him, 
and considers only to serve as a guide to those who will not fear to tread in his following. 
“I would not go as far as to say that Tocqueville never has, at anytime in his 
literary life, searched for in Montesquieu some models to follow.  But this was only of a 
secondary enough manner, not very lasting, and, in my opinion, not effective.  Still on the 
college school bench, he was particularly under the charm of La Bruyère…Later, having 
become a man, but still young, tackling the formidable enterprise of the Démocratie, he 
envied Montesquieu his talent to revive and to shake unceasingly the interest of the 
reader by the abruptness of the blows with which he strikes his attention, and he tells 
himself then that it would be most certainly a rare fortune to know how to steal his secret.  
But neither one nor the other of these two men was his principal guide in his literary 
career.  As he approached maturity, he attached himself by preference to other masters, to 
none other than Pascal for the very depth of the language, to Voltaire for the ease and the 
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art of lightening the style.  He asked above all to the one to help him to improve himself 
in the qualities that were his own, to the other to communicate to him something of those 
which he felt himself less naturally gifted.  But we encounter unceasingly, in all the arts, 
men who have taken particularly for model this or that master, and who, after the most 
sustained efforts to take the most advantage of his lessons, arrive at a genre all different 
from his.  The talent of a writer, that of an artist, is the combined product of his natural 
genius and the studies to which he devotes himself, two sources often so distinct, that it 
does not suffice to settle one’s eyes on one of them to know how to predict in what way 
their mixture will color his works.  Nothing most certainly resembles less Voltaire’s 
genre than that of Tocqueville, and Pascal is not either the type to which one could justly 
compare him. 
“If some comparisons should absolutely be tried, I would not venture to make 
them with the author of Les Provinciales, this writer without analogue, who, by the little 
antique flavor of his style, the acidity of his expression, his manner of shooting his 
thought off like an arrow to the heart of that of his adversary, by this inimitable mixture 
of grace and force, of subtlety and large reason, has remained an isolated model.  But I 
would point out, in a more general manner, that Tocqueville belongs by certain sides to 
this small phalanx of writers who, with a style often very different from that of Pascal, 
have joined, like him, to the study of science a natural organization eminently literary, 
and whose style forms, in some way, the linkage between the purely scientific language 
and that of literary people.  I find again in him, it seems to me, certain qualities proper to 
a few among them: a meticulous application in the exposition of the facts and the 
research of the details; the habit of enclosing the fruit of his works in rigorous formulas, 
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more real conciseness than apparent swiftness, because he never agrees to jump over the 
nuances and to appear to jump over great spaces by looking as though he were in a hurry; 
more dignity in the style than lightness and casualness, which holds may be in part to his 
incredible horror of vagueness and disdains for these indecisive and elegantly neglected 
expressions which deliver to the reader only a first pencil and leave his imagination 
playing itself freely around our thought. 
“But it is usually an ungrateful and often dangerous task this search for 
dissimilarities or analogies between writers whose physiognomy is rarely comparable.  
Tocqueville has a very particular style that one cannot relate to any other.  He is evidently 
a student of our great writers of the 17th century, but a student who puts to a whole new 
use the weapon that his masters have entrusted to him: the beautiful style full of serenity 
of the 17th century serving to depict often bitter impressions, the language of a period of 
intellectual confidence diverted toward the discussion of all the social problems that 
torment us, of forms materially rested and where one feels that the thought is not: strange 
contrast, but fertile, of which he had the awareness himself and of which he has known, 
more than once, to draw from beauties of the first order, when he wanted, by cleverly 
calculated effects, to upset the soul of the reader. 
“He excels above all in these beautiful effects of sadness which have a secret 
affinity with the state of his soul.  The more we search all the details of the style of any 
writer, the more we are invincibly brought back to the word of Buffon: “the style is the 
man himself.”  But next to a merit, it is not rare to meet an imperfection, so tight is often 
the space that separate them.  Tocqueville does not know enough how to tear himself 
away from the preoccupations that besiege him and to come out from time to time from 
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his great seriousness to smile a little to the reader; he forgets too much to come to his 
rescue, by making him experience a few of these more happy and less grave impressions 
which mend the soul and do it good; and one of the reproaches that one could may be 
more fairly make of his style would be, if it is permitted to me to express myself this way, 
a lack of cheerfulness.  It is a direct effect of his own organization and the natural bent of 
a mind usually anxious; but it is also the fault of the time in which he lived.  If 
Tocqueville is, among our contemporaries, one of those whose weak side is the most 
sensitive, how many among them could we say are clearly exempt, and the absence of 
serenity, is it not a little the seal of everything in this century?... 
“It always seemed to me that Tocqueville, in the work of composition, produced 
phrase by phrase; I mean to say that after having made a very general plan of a piece 
which occupied him, he applied himself to bring forthwith each phrase to the degree of 
perfection of which he was capable, before allowing himself to pass to the next phrase.  
This method, that I believe the least common, and which can sometime make the diction 
less flowing, has great consequence on the style.  The creation of each phrase becomes a 
sort of hand-to-hand struggle between the style and the thought, which clasp each as 




                                                 
 
NOTES 
1.See Annexe in OC XIII, 352-363. 
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Appendix C 
A Synopsis of Tocqueville’s Correspondence 
 
Tocqueville’s voluminous correspondence with, inter alia, Louis de Kergolay, 
Sophie Swetchine, Abbé Lesueur, Gustave de Beaumont, Eugène and Charles Stoffels, 
Pierre-Paul Royer-Collard, Jean-Jacques Ampère, Ernest de Chabrol, Claude-François 
(Francisque) de Corcelle, Arthur de Gobineau, and his wife Mary Motley provides a 
window into both his private and political views on religion, ethics and morality.  The 
context in which he discusses these subjects varies among his correspondents.  If he 
expresses in some letters his life long battle with metaphysical doubt he nonetheless 
never vacillates on his position about one’s duty to lead a moral and ethical life as was 
exemplified by his own irreproachable conduct in public life, if not completely so in 
private life.  In short, Tocqueville’s correspondence not only reveals his noble character 
but it also exposes his sensitivity for the members of his intimate circle as well as the 
contradictions he harbored like all mortals.  Since there is no other appropriate context in 
this study to include especially some of the letters in the last category, some of these 
specifically to Kergolay and Beaumont have been incorporated herein to provide a 
comprehensive portray of the man he was.    
In a lecture J. P. Mayer delivered at the London School of Economics and 
Political Science on February 20, 1952, at the time he was directing the publication of 
Tocqueville’s work, he attributed enough importance to his correspondence to declare 
that “it is by no means unlikely that his letters may be ranked even above his published 
works.”1
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Tocqueville’s correspondence with his cousin and childhood friend Louis de 
Kergolay, his tutor Abbé Lesueur, his spiritual advisor Madame Sophie Swetchine, his 
friend and colleague Francisque de Corcelle and his protégé Arthur de Gobineau is 
particularly interesting to this study.  It enables the reader to examine his most private 
thoughts on politics and morality for the reasons outlined below.  These letters in 
particular have been reproduced throughout this study to support its position that   
Tocqueville’s religious teaching is two-dimensional.   
The correspondence with Abbé Lesueur and Madame Swetchine  expose 
Tocqueville’s struggle to regain his faith while one letter in particular to his friend 
Charles Stoffels provides a vivid description of Tocqueville’s battle with doubt.  
Tocqueville’s correspondence with Corcelle reveals his strong admonition of the vices of 
the Catholic Church and the great harm papal absolutism and the Church’s political 
ambitions cause to the advancement of morality and liberty in France.  This 
correspondence, which is examined in greater detail in chapter five, is particularly 
interesting because the two friends bitterly disagreed about the Church’s temporal power.  
Their disagreement on this issue reached its nadir during Corcelle’s assignment as special 
negotiator to Rome during the 1849 French occupation of that city.  At that time 
Corcelle’s was the subordinate of Tocqueville who was France’s Minister of Foreign 
Affairs.  His correspondence with Gobineau is also valuable because it contrasts the 
antithetical principles of Tocqueville’s scholarship with those of his protégé and their 
opposed moral and political effects on society.     
If Tocqueville’s letters to those listed above, excepting AbbéLesueur, reveal the 
thoughts and ideas that preoccupy him as homme politique, one finds in his letters 
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addressed to his wife Mary Motley and friend le bon Ampère, as he was fond of calling 
him, the mental and emotional sensitivities that were characteristic of him.  His affection 
for and attachment to family and friends provided him great solace from the 
disappointments of political life as shown in his letters to them.  He tirelessly assures 
Mary, who was often tortured and afflicted by his infidelities, that she is his best and 
most cherished friend and to the bachelor Ampère whose warm friendship was a salve to 
the isolation that followed his political retirement and confinement during his illnesses 
how much he appreciates and treasures his friendship.  His frailty and poor health 
frequently cast a dark cloud upon Tocqueville.  His profound love and high esteem for his 
wife, Mary, and deep affection for Ampère, who visited the couple for months at a time 
particularly after Tocqueville withdrew from public life, were effective antidotes to the 
black melancholia from which he suffered as a result of poor health and deep concerns 
for the political future of France.   
The correspondence between Tocqueville and Kergolay, who has already been 
introduced at the very beginning of this study, is most valuable because they were united 
since early childhood until the end of his life by a profound, trusting and affectionate 
friendship that was open to the discussion of every conceivable topic of concern to them, 
particularly his preoccupation with questions of religion and morality.  Moreover, 
Tocqueville never wrote anything or took any important decision without consulting his 
friend.  It is all the more amazing that they were thus united throughout their lives given 
that Tocqueville’s sober acceptance of democracy was antithetical to Kergolays’ strong 
legitimist sympathies.  Yet their political differences never clouded their friendship or 
affected the frank discussions on politics and morality they maintained throughout their 
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lives.   Referring to the special bond they shared, Tocqueville wrote to Kergolay from 
New York that “one of the advantages of our friendship, is that we know each other so 
perfectly and we are so sure of our veracity one toward the other, that we can express to 
each other the beginnings of our opinions without fear of interpretations; we are well 
certain that the mind of the one of us who writes is perfectly in the position in which it 
shows itself, neither more nor less.”  A few years later, in the letter in which he tells 
Kergolay that there are three men with whom he spends every day a little time--Pascal, 
Rousseau and Montesquieu—he adds “I am missing a fourth, who is you.  Although our 
opinions differ often and on very serious points, there is in our general way of 
contemplating human affairs and feeling them such great analogies that your 
conversation always manages to awaken me and animate me.  There is only you who can 
do that consistently…”  
Kergolay and Tocqueville’s ideas on the role religion play in inculcating morality 
in society overlap.  Tocqueville’s published works contain the development of ideas 
whose seeds are found in the course of the philosophical discussions the two friends 
carried in their life long correspondence.  For example, following the publication in 1833 
of Du système pénitentiare aux Etats-Unis et de son application en France, which 
Tocqueville and Beaumont produced in collaboration, Kergolay writes to him that in the 
few passages he read in the papers he recognizes certain things which they had talked 
about previously, such as the comments on religion in the American population.  Further, 
he adds “I found in the passages on religious feelings, ideas that pleased me because they 
are my own.”   
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Another letter provides further evidence of the intellectual bond the two friends 
shared.  The wide acclaim with which the public received his first volume of Democracy 
in America prompted Tocqueville to write to Kergolay to encourage him to produce a 
work of his own.  He expresses his confidence in Kergolay’s ability, particularly because 
he considers him after all to be his tutor.  Kergolay’s inability to adapt to the social and 
political upheavals of his time was a cause of great concern and sadness to Tocqueville 
who saw him wasting his immense potential to produce great works.  Responding to 
Tocqueville’s prodding, Kergolay states: “I do not know what you want to say when you 
say that you believe I am your tutor; that is a crazy idea; we have so rehearsed  ideas 
together, that there are many of which we do not know anymore the original author.  
Each of us has nevertheless made since he exists a certain number of good remarks and 
observations that the other has not made.  I am often struck by this; when I re-read your 
book, I am all surprised of the quantity of ideas which have become clear in your eyes 
and are not yet at all sorted out in my own mind.  If the practical life of politics should 
not tear you from the life of a man who searches and publishes ideas and if the material 
life did not constrain me either, we would become two old Greeks, like Socrates and his 
flock, walking in equal footsteps in order to follow each other more easily, at least in 
conversation …”2   
Lastly, Tocqueville’s correspondence with Kergolay is valuable for providing a 
rare view of Tocqueville’s innermost sentiments about his human failings.  It is to 
Kergolay, who often played the difficult role of conciliator in his marriage, that he 
confesses his inability to remain faithful to his wife despite his love for her.  His 
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infidelity was a source of great moral conflict for him, which he expresses in a letter, 
September 27, 1843, to his friend dated.   
“I found Marie in a state of exasperation genuinely despairing.  What more than 
anything tore my heart was to see that the excessive agitation of her mind was finally 
affecting her physical health.  She ate little, slept poorly and was getting thinner before 
my eyes.  This spectacle filled me with a pain that you understand better than I would be 
able to tell you… For my part, I feel still, I will confess to you, a depth of moral aching 
accompanied by sadness and anxiety.  It is very evident that there is something in me that 
cannot satisfy Marie and that she ties all her happiness to a sole condition that I cannot 
provide her except by changing myself from top to bottom, difficult undertaking.  I love 
her with an ardor that goes as far as passion.  She has my trust without reserve; I desire 
her happiness and I work at it unceasingly as much as it is in me to do so.  She is for me 
that which every woman, I think, have ever been to a man: the first condition not only of 
happiness, but of tranquility, of effort in everything, almost of life, and all that is not 
enough for her.  She would like not only to rule habitually over my senses; but to 
captivate, suppress them so to speak.  If she does not have that, she has nothing.  The 
least divergence on my part appears to her the last and most horrible of misfortunes.  
There is no hope of making her hear reason on this point.  Time in advancing seems to 
make her more and more irritable on this chapter of which previously she spoke with 
much less intensity.  This darkens terribly the only side of a future which for a long time I 
considered with happiness and gratitude.  I see myself definitively placed in this 
alternative or to drive to despair and may be to strike as far as her life the being who is 
most precious to me in this world and in whom I sum up for myself all ideas of genuine 
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happiness; or to tame for ever and to destroy an instinct that too many experiences have 
taught me naturally excite itself from time to time as far as blindness and a kind of 
madness.  How will I manage to stop this kind of boiling of the blood that the approach 
of a woman no matter who she is causes me still, as twenty years ago?... Assuredly, 
nothing shows me better than what is happening to us, if that needs to be shown, to what 
extent happiness is elusive in this world and the human condition a miserable thing.  Here 
all the conditions for being happy are found but one and that one is enough to cancel all 
the others…”3   
Tocqueville’s relationship with Beaumont began later in life but it was equally 
important to him insofar as they shared similar interests and ambitions, which they both 
realized with long political careers in the Chamber of Deputies and as members of the 
Constituent Assembly in 1848 to write a new constitution for France.  They also traveled 
together to America in 1831 where Beaumont nursed Tocqueville through a serious 
illness in Tennessee and to Algeria in 1841 where he also nursed him through another 
illness at Camp Edis.  He met Beaumont in 1827 when he was appointed juge auditeur at 
the law court of Versailles where Beaumont served as deputy public prosecutor since 
1826.  The similarity of their background and contrasting personalities drew them to each 
other and they formed a bond that lasted the rest of their lives except for the incident 
outlined below.   
The correspondence with Beaumont reveals Tocqueville’s deepest emotions about 
the unwavering loyalty he associated with friendship.  This is most evident in the 
exchange of letters that record the pain Tocqueville suffered during his quarrel and 
disagreement with Beaumont about an unfortunate misunderstanding over their 
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collaboration in launching an opposition newspaper that momentarily erupted into 
political war between them and cooled their friendship between 1844 and 1848.   
In Tocqueville’s France where newspapers were identified by their affiliation with 
political parties, Tocqueville and Beaumont were writing for different journals during the 
summer of 1844 and the Spring of 1845 when Tocqueville took over an opposition 
newspaper Le Commerce while Beaumont who intended to join him eventually was still 
honoring a commitment he had made to another journal, Le Siècle.  These two papers 
took different positions on the issue of the day-- the right of the Catholic Church to 
establish educational institutions that could compete with state-approved institutions and 
the right to do so without state interference.  This development put French liberals who 
had historically quarreled with the Church in an awkward position especially because the 
Catholic party was demanding political change based on liberal principles.  Le Siècle took 
an anticlerical position while in Le Commerce Tocqueville supported a moderate position 
not because he supported the Catholic party but because he did not advocate state 
monopoly of education.  Tocqueville’s honor and reputation as a progressive liberal was 
compromised in the course of the dispute that was aired in the newspapers and he felt 
horribly betrayed by Beaumont.  He writes the following to him on December 9, 1844. 
“I did not want to write you these last three days.  I feared that the liveliness of 
my sentiments exceeded by far the reality of the facts.  It is essential, however, that I do 
so today, because I fear you might misunderstand the cause of my silence.  You have, 
very involuntarily no doubt, distressed me and wronged me as, perhaps in all the world, 
you alone were capable of doing.  I have one vulnerable point.  My birth and the opinions 
of my family [who are all legitimists] can lead people to believe that I am attached to the 
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legitimists and to the clergy, and, as I have not married, as you have, a granddaughter of 
General Lafayette, this point of departure must naturally lead my enemies to attack 
unceasingly, not only my actions, but my intentions, not only my conduct, but my honor.  
At the first prick that their self-esteem receives, they do not fail to attack in this way, and 
the day after the one on which they waged this cowardly and disloyal war on me, you 
publicly separate yourself from me on the question that divides us. I am not reproaching 
you for that, I was expecting it.  But you are leaving me alone without shielding me.  Did 
you need the attacks of Le Siècle in order to know how my conduct would be interpreted 
by our common adversaries?  Not only that but you declare to them that they have your 
complete sympathy.  Your friendship for me prevents you, it is true, from associating 
yourself with the war that is being waged against me … God is my witness that I do not 
hold it against you, but you have caused me great sorrow.   I would have preferred that 
you had abandoned me in the virgin forest or in the camp at Eddis, [referring to 
Beaumont’s care during his illnesses] instead of acting then toward me as a brother.”   
It is a tribute to the character of both men that they not only overcame their 
disappointment with one another over this misunderstanding but resumed again their 
warm friendship.  Nothing attests more to this than the fact that it was to Beaumont that 
Tocqueville wrote his last letter pleading him to come to Cannes on March 4, 1859, 
shortly a month before he died on April 16 of the same year.  “My dear friend, I know 
nothing that has ever grieved me so much as what I am going to say to you: I ask you to 
come…What can I say to you, my friend, if not this: COME. COME, as fast as you can.  
You alone can put us back on the field.  Your cheerfulness, your courage, your liveliness, 
the complete knowledge you have of us and of our affairs, would make easy for you what 
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would be impracticable for someone else.  Come.  I know what I am asking you is an 
immense proof of friendship.  I know it; but I know to whom I am addressing myself… 
Let me treat you like a brother; have you not been a thousand times more in a thousand 
situations! …Do not answer.  Come.  Do not be vexed with the man who is imposing 
such a cruel tax on you; but think rather of the unfortunate man, of the friend of more 
than thirty years, who fears all sorts of misfortunes, if you do not come to his aid…Come.  
May Madame de Beaumont pardon us or rather I am sure she has already pardoned us.  I 
embrace you from the depth of my soul.”4   
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NOTES 
1 J. P. Mayer, “Tocqueville as a Political Sociologist,” Political Studies I, (1953): 135. 
2 See Letters to Louis de Kergolay, 29 June 1831, November 10, 1836, January 8, 1833, 
September 4, 1837 respectively and letter from Kergolay to Tocqueville, September 30, 
1837, in OC XIII, 13, 225,418, 310, 472, 477.   
3 See OC XIII, 120-122. 
 
4 See Alexis de Tocqueville, Selected Letters on Politics and Society, ed. Roger Boesche, 
trans. James Toupin and Roger Boesche, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 






Tocqueville, Alexis de.  Democracy in America.  Translated by Harvey C. Mansfield and 
  Delba Winthrop.  Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2000. 
 
________.  Egalite sociale et liberté politique.  Textes choisis et présentés par Pierre 
Gibert.  Préface de René Rémond.  Paris: Editions Aubier-Montaigne, 1977. 
 
________.  Journey to America.  Translated by George Lawrence.  Edited by J. P. Mayer. 
 London: Faber And Faber LTD, 1959. 
 
________.  L’Ancien régime.  Edited by G. W. Headlam, B.A. London: Oxford 
University Press, 1969.  
 
________.   Memoir on Pauperism.  Translated by Seymour Drescher. Introduction by 
 Gertrude Himmelfarb. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1997.  
 
________.  Oeuvres I.  Voyages. Edition publiée sous la direction d’André Jardin 
 avec, pour ce volume, la collaboration de Françoise Mélonio et Lise  
Quéffelec.  Paris: Bibliothèque de la Pléiade.  Editions Gallimard, 1992. 
 
________.  Oeuvres II.  De la démocratie en Amérique I et II. Edition publiée sous la  
 direction d’André Jardin avec, pour ce volume, la collaboration de Jean- 
 Claude Lamberti et James T. Schleifer. Paris: Bibliothèque de la Pléiade.  
 Editions Gallimard, 1992. 
 
________. Oeuvres complètes. Tome II. L’Ancien régime et la  
révolution. Edition définitive publiée sous la direction de J. P. Mayer. 
Introduction par Georges Lefèbvre. Paris: Librairie Gallimard, 1952. Vol. 1. 
 
________.  Oeuvres complètes. Tome II. L’Ancien régime et la révolution. 
 Fragments et notes inédites sur la révolution. Edition définitive publiée sous 
 la direction de J. P. Mayer. Texte établi et annoté par André Jardin.. Paris: 
 Librairie Gallimard, 1953. Vol. 2. 
 
________.  Oeuvres complètes d’Alexis de Tocqueville: correspondance et oeuvres 
  posthumes. Tome V.  Publiées par Madame de Tocqueville. Paris: Michel Levy  
 Frères,  Libraires Editeurs, 1866 
 
________.  Oeuvres complètes. Tome VI. Correspondance anglaise: correspondance  
 d’Alexis de Tocqueville avec Heny Reeve et John Stuart Mill.  Edition 
définitive publiée sous la direction de J. P. Mayer.  Texte établi et annoté par  




________.  Oeuvres complètes. Tome VII. Correspondance étrangère d’Alexis 
 de Tocqueville.  Amerique, Europe Continentale. Edition publiée sous la 
direction de J. P. Mayer. Volume établi par Françoise Mélonio, Lise Quéffelec 
 et Anthony Pleasance. Soumis pour contrôle et approbation à Jean-Claude  
 Lamberti et à David Lee.  Paris: Gallimard, 1986. 
 
________.  Oeuvres complètes. Tome VIII.  Correspondance d’Alexis de Tocqueville 
 et de Gustave de Beaumont.  Edition définitive publiée sous la direction de J. P.  
Mayer.  Texte établi, annoté et prefacé par André Jardin.  Paris: Gallimard, 1967. 
 
________.  Oeuvres complètes. Tome IX. Correspondance d’Alexis de Tocqueville et  
d’Arthur de Gobineau. Edition définitive publiée sous la direction de  
J. P. Mayer. Texte établi et annoté par M. Degros. Introduction par Jean-Jacques 
Chevalier. Paris: Librairie Gallimard, 1959. 
 
________.   Oeuvres complètes. Tome X. Correspondance et écrits locaux. Edition  
publiée sous la direction de J. P. Mayer. Volume établi par Lise Quéffelec- 
Dumasy. Prefacé par André-Jean Tudesq et soumis pour contrôle et approbation 
à Louis Girard et à Yves Nedelec. Paris: Gallimard, 1995. 
 
________.  Oeuvres complètes. Tome XI. Correspondance d’Alexis de Tocqueville et 
 de Pierre-Paul Royer-Collard: Correspondance d’Alexis de Tocqueville et de 
 Jean-Jacques Ampère.  Edition définitive publiée sous la direction de J. P. Mayer. 
 Texte établi, annoté et prefacé par André Jardin.  Paris: Gallimard, 1970. 
 
________.  Oeuvres complètes. Tome XIII. Correspondance d’Alexis de Tocqueville 
 et de Louis de Kergolay. Edition définitive publiée sous la direction 
 de J. P. Mayer. Texte établi par André Jardin. Introduction et notes par Jean-Alain 
Lesourd. Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1977. 
 
________.  Oeuvres complètes. Tome XIV. Correspondance familiale.  Texte établi par 
André Jardin et annoté par Jean-Louis Benoit et André Jardin.  Prefacé par Jean- 
 Louis Benoit et soumis pour contrôle et approbation à Jean-Claude Casanova et à  
 Michelle Perrot.  Paris: Gallimard, 1998. 
 
________.  Oeuvres complètes. Tome XV. Correspondance d’Alexis de Tocqueville et 
 de Francisque de Corcelle.  Correspondance d’Alexis de Tocqueville et de  
 Madame Swetchine.  Edition publiée sous la direction de J. P. Mayer. Texte établi 
 Par Pierre Gibert.  Soumis pour contrôle et approbation à Claude Bressolette et à 
André Jardin.  Paris: Gallimard, 1983.  
 
________.  Oeuvres complètes. Tome XVI. Mélanges.  Edition publiée sous la direction 
 de J. P. Mayer.  Volume établi par Françoise Mélonio. Soumis pour contrôle et 
 approbation à Jean-Claude Casanova et à Pierre Rosanvallon.  Paris: Gallimard,  
 1989.  
 387
 
________.  Oeuvres complètes. Tome XVIII. Correspondance d’Alexis de Tocqueville  
 avec Adolphe de Circourt et avec Madame de Circourt. Edition publiée sous la  
 direction de J. P. Mayer. Volume établi par A. P. Kerr. Soumis pour contrôle et 
 approbation à Louis Girard et à Douglas Johnson.  Paris: Gallimard, 1983. 
  
________.  Selected Letters On Politics And Society.  Edited by Roger Boesche.  
 Translated by James Toupin and Roger Boesche.  Berkeley and Los Angeles:  
   University of California Press, 1985. 
 
________.  Souvenirs de Alexis de Tocqueville.  Publiés par le Comte de Tocqueville. 
Paris: Calmann Levy (Ancienne Maison Michel Levy Frères), 1893. 
 
________.  “The European Revolution” & Correspondence with Gobineau.  Introduced,  
edited and translated by John Lukacs.  Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press 
Publishers, 1959. 
 
________.  The Old Regime and the Revolution. Edited by François Furet and Françoise  
Mélonio.  Translated by Alan S. Kahan.  Vol. 1: The complete Text.  Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1998. 
 
________.  The Recollections of Alexis de Tocqueville.  Translated by Alexander  
Teixeira de Mattos.  Edited by J.-P. Mayer.  London: The Harvill Press, 1948. 
 
________.  Writings on Empire and Slavery. Edited and Translated by Jennifer Pitts. 




Armour, Leslie.  “Infini Rien” Pascal’s Wager and the Human Paradox.  Published for  
the Journal of the History of Philosophy, Inc.  Carbondale and Edwardsville: 
 Southern Illinois University Press, 1993. 
 
Beaumont, Gustave de.  Marie ou l’esclavage aux Etats-Unis: tableaux de  moeurs 
 américaines.  Paris: Librairie de Charles Gosselin, 1835. 
 
Boesche, Roger.  The Strange Liberalism of Alexis de Tocqueville.  Ithaca: Cornell 
 University Press, 1987. 
 
Byron, George Gordon, Baron.  Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage and Other Romantic Poems.  
Edited by Samuel C. Chew.  New York: Odyssey Press, 1936. 
 
Chateaubriand, Auguste Francois-René, Vicomte de.  Atala, René, Le dernier abencerage.  
Introduction par Emile Faguet.  Paris : Nelson Editeurs, 1939. 
 
 388
________.  Essai sur les révolutions. Génie du Christianisme.  Texte établi, présenté et 
annoté par Maurice Regard.  Paris : Bibliothèque de la Pléiade.  Editions 
Gallimard, 1978. 
 
Dolan, John P.  History of the Reformation, A Conciliatory Assessment of Opposite 
Views.  Introduction by Jaroslav Pelikan.  New-York and Toronto: The New 
American Library, 1965. 
 
Drescher, Seymour, Tocqueville and England.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
 1964. 
 
Duby, Georges, ed.  Histoire de la France.  Paris: Librairie Larousse, 1970. 
 
Dworkin, Ronald W.  The Rise of the Imperial Self: America’s Culture Wars in  
Augustinian Perspective. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 
1996. 
 
Faguet, Emile.  Politiques et moralistes du dix-neuvieme siècle. Premiere série.  Paris: 
 Société Française d’Imprimerie et de Librairie. 
 
________. Politiques et moralistes du dix-neuvieme siècle. Deuxieme série.  Paris: 
 Société Française d’Imprimerie et de Librairie. 
 
________. Politiques et moralistes du dix-neuvieme siècle. Troisieme série.  Paris: 
 Société Française d’Imprimerie et de Librairie. 
 
Flaubert, Gustave.  Sentimental Education or The History Of A Young Man.  New-York 
and London: M. Walter Dunne, 1904. 
 
Frohnen, Bruce.  Virtue and the Promise of Conservatism, The Legacy of Burke and 
 Tocqueville.  Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993. 
 
Goldstein, Doris S.  Trial of Faith, Religion and Politics in Tocqueville’s Thought.  New 
 York: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, Inc., 1975. 
 
Goubert, Pierre.  The Course of French History. Translated by Maarten Ultee.  London: 
 Routledge, 1991. 
 
Jardin, André.  Tocqueville, A Biography.  Translated by Lydia Davis with Robert 
 Hemenway.  New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc., 1988. 
 
Jordan, Jeff, ed.  Gambling on God, Essays on Pascal’s Wager.  Lanham: Rowman & 
 Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1994. 
 
Kessler, Sanford.  Tocqueville’s Civil Religion, American Christianity and the Prospects 
 for Freedom.  Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994. 
 389
 
Kojève, Alexandre.  Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, Lectures on the 
 Phenomenology of Spirit.  Assembled by Raymond Queneau.  Edited by Allan 
 Bloom.  Translated by James H. Nichols, Jr. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
 1969.   
 
Kolakowski, Leszek.  God Owes Us Nothing, A Brief Remark on Pascal’s Religion and 
 on the Spirit of Jansenism.  Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995.  
 
Koritansky, John C.  Alexis de Tocqueville and the New Science of Politics: An 
 Interpretation of Democracy in America.  Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 
 1986. 
 
Lamartine, Alphonse Marie Louis, Marquis de.  Oeuvres poétiques complètes.  Texte 
établi, annoté et présenté par Marius-Francois Guyard.  Bibliothèque de la 
Pléiade.  Paris : Editions Gallimard, 1963. 
 
Lamberti, Jean-Claude.  Tocqueville and the Two Democracies.  Translated by Arthur 
Goldhammer.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989. 
 
Lawler, Peter Augustine.  The Restless Mind, Alexis de Tocqueville on the Origin and 
 Perpetuation of Human Liberty.  Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 
 1993. 
 
Lawlor, Mary, S.N.D.  Alexis de Tocqueville in the Chamber of Deputies: His  
Views On Foreign and Colonial Policy.  Ph.D. diss., The Catholic University of  
America, 1959.  
 
Lively, Jack.  The Social and Political Thought of Alexis de Tocqueville.  Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1962. 
 
Mancini, Matthew.  Alexis de Tocqueville. New York: Twaine Publishers, 1994. 
 
Manent, Pierre.  Tocqueville and the Nature of Democracy.  Foreword by Harvey C. 
 Mansfield. Translated by John Waggoner. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
 Publishers, Inc., 1996. 
 
Mather, Cotton.  Magnalia Christi Americana.  Edited by Kenneth B. Murdock with the 
 Assistance of Elizabeth W. Miller. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977. 
 
Mayer, J. P.  Alexis de Tocqueville.  Paris: Gallimard, 1948.   
________.  Alexis de Tocqueville, A Biographical Study in Political Science.  
 Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1966. 
 
Mélonio, Françoise.  Tocqueville and the French.  Translated by Beth G. Raps. 
 390
Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1998. 
 
Mesnard, Jean.  Pascal. Translated by Claude and Marcia Abraham.  University: 
 University of Alabama Press, 1965. 
 
Montesquieu, Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de.  Considerations on the Causes of the 
Greatness of the Romans and their Decline.  Translated by David Lowenthal. 
London: Collier-MacMillan Limited, 1965. 
 
________.  Oeuvres complètes.  Préface de Georges Vedel.  Présentation et notes de 
 Daniel Oster.  Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1964. 
 
________.  Persian Letters. Translated by C. J. Betts.  New York: Penguin Books, 1973. 
 
________.  The Spirit of the Laws.  Translated and Edited by Anne Cohler, Basia Miller 
and Harold Stone.  New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 
 
Pascal, Blaise.  Oeuvres complètes.  Texte établi et annoté par Jacques Chevalier. 
Bibliothèque de la Pléiade.  Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1954. 
 
________.  Pensées.  Texte de l’édition Brunschvicg.  Edition précédée de la vie de 
Pascal par Mme Périer, sa soeur.  Introduction et notes par Ch.-M. des Granges. 
Paris: Editions Garnier Frères, 1964. 
 
Pierson, George Wilson.  Tocqueville in America.  Abridged by Dudley C. Lunt from  
  Tocqueville and Beaumont in America.  Garden City, New York:  Anchor  
 Books Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1959. 
 
Rédier, Antoine.  Comme disait Monsieur de Tocqueville. Paris: Librairie académique 
 Perrin Et Cie, Libraires-Editeurs, 1925. 
 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques.  Emile or On Education.  Introduction, Translation and Notes by 
Allan Bloom.  New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1979.   
 
________.  Julie ou La Nouvelle Heloise: Lettres de deux amants habitants d’une petite 
ville au pied des Alpes.  Paris: Editions Garnier Frères, 1952. 
 
________.  The First and Second Discourses.  Edited by Roger D. Masters.  Translated 
by Roger D. and Judith R. Masters. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1964. 
 
________.  The Social Contract.  Translated and introduced by Maurice Cranston.  New 
York: Penguin Books, 1968. 
 
Shiner, L. E.  The Secret Mirror, Literary Form and History in Tocqueville’s
 Recollections.  Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988. 
 
 391
Terchek, Ronald and Conte, Thomas C.  Theories of Democracy: A Reader.  Lanham, 
Md.:  Rowman and Littlefield, 2001. 
 
Trevelyan, G. M.  A Shortened History of England.  London: Penguin Books, 1942. 
 
Waterman, Mina.  Voltaire, Pascal and Human Destiny. New York: Octagon Books, 
 1971.   
 
Zetterbaum, Marvin.  Tocqueville and the Problem of Democracy. Stanford: Stanford 
 University Press, 1967. 
 
